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Eustathius of Antioch is recognised as a pivotally important ‘Nicene’ figure 
in the early part of the ‘Arian’ controversy but, largely due to the paucity of sources, 
there is very little in-depth discussion of his theology.  The recent discovery that 
Eustathius wrote Contra Ariomanitas et de anima, an anti-subordinationist treatise 
focusing on the soul, now preserved in an epitome, both offers unprecedented 
opportunities for understanding Eustathius’ theology.  This thesis examines 
Eustathius’ theological anthropology, an important aspect of his thought.  It 
considers the question with regards both intrinsic ontology and the meta-narrative of 
human history – soteriology and eschatology – and situates it within the context of 
fourth-century metaphysics and the uncertainty surrounding questions of human 
society raised by Christianity’s new status under Constantine. 
 
Eustathius’ picture of the relationship between the body and the soul relies on 
a hylomorphic dualism indebted to Platonised Aristotelianism, emphasising the 
interdependence of body and soul whilst sharply distinguishing them as substances. 
He regards the soul as passible in itself.  Eustathius regards human beings as 
degraded both in existential state and in circumstance relative to the condition in 
which they were created and articulates the gap between human potential and human 
actuality primarily in terms of the relationship between Adam and Christ. Eustathius’ 
picture of Christ as perfect humanity is informed by a sense of radical disjunction 
between God and creation, typical of fourth-century metaphysics, and he 
consequently holds a relatively autonomous conception of human perfection.  
Eustathius regards free will as freedom to discern and choose the right thing, which 
relies on a fundamentally optimistic perception of human moral nature.  Eustathius’ 
anthropology consistently grounds human essence and identity in earthly life and 
correspondingly founds his soteriology on the fulfilment of current potential, 
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References to the Hebrew bible are according to the LXX, unless otherwise stated.  
Unless otherwise stated, translations of Greek and Latin literature are my own, under 
the supervision of Dr. Paul Parvis.  I have made use of the translations indicated in 
the bibliography for other ancient languages.  Quotations of Eustathius’ Syriac 
fragments are generally based on the French translation in José Declerck, Eustathii 
Antiocheni, patris Nicaeni, opera quae supersunt omnia, Corpus Christianorum, 
Series Graeca, 51 (Turnhout, Brepols, 2002). 
 
For Eustathius’ fragments, I adopt the referencing system of José Declerck.  For 









The objective of this thesis is to examine the theological anthropology of 
Eustathius of Antioch. 
 
Eustathius was bishop of Beroea and then Antioch in the 320s.
1
  He is known 
for a highly unified conception of the Father-Son relationship, and a highly divisive, 
proto-Nestorian Christology.  He is widely acknowledged to be a hugely important 
figure in the Constantinian Church.  As the bishop of Antioch at the Council of 
Nicaea, a better grasp of his theology must be significant to our understanding of the 
early ‘Arian’ controversy.  As a self-declared anti-Origenist, who nonetheless shared 
Origen’s unusual belief in Christ’s human soul, he is important to the history of 
Origenism in the fourth century.
2
  And, as perhaps the earliest example of adherence 
to what is in many respects proto-Nestorian Christology, he is important to 
understanding the background to the fifth-century Christological controversy. 
  
Despite this, there is remarkably little scholarship on Eustathius.  This is 
partly because the sources, until recently, have been extremely sparse.  Other than 
one anti-Origenist treatise, there are a handful of fragments preserved by later 
writers.  However, this has changed with the discovery that Eustathius is the author 
Contra Ariomanitas et de anima [Ariomanitas], previously ascribed to Gregory of 
                                                 
1
 The dates of his accession to both sees are disputed.  See discussion in chapter 1. 
2
 This in turn could further our understanding of the ‘Arian’ controversy, the starting point of which 
has sometimes been seen as a dispute within Origenism.  C.f. Manilo Simonetti, La Crisi ariana nel 





  Though this is preserved as an epitome, the epitomiser is trying to get across 
Eustathius’ own arguments, and aims at completeness.  It gives us unprecedented 
insight into Eustathius’ thought.  The time is right for fresh scholarship. 
 
In addressing itself to his theological anthropology, this thesis makes a 
necessary contribution to our understanding of Eustathius, and his place in the 
history of Christian theology.  By ‘theological anthropology’ I mean the conception 
of the human person in a theological context.  Matthew Steenberg has recently 
argued that a significant strand of patristic theology should be seen in an 
anthropological way, and this view has much to recommend it.
4
  Anthropology is 
central to most theology, because human reflection tends to find a place for 
humanity, even if it is not anthropocentric, as such.  Fourth-century anthropology is 
especially important for several interrelated reasons. 
  
Firstly, there was a very significant development in normative metaphysical 
assumptions in the fourth century, and this required a renegotiation of humanity’s 
relationship to God relative to second- and third-century anthropology.  Roughly, 
there was a new certainty about and emphasis upon the categories of ‘having always 
existed’ and ‘having come to be’ as key for articulating the distinction between God 
and everything else.
5
  This carries with it, among other things, an especially sharp 
                                                 
3
 See José Declerck, (ed.), Eustathii Antiocheni, patris Nicaeni, opera quae supersunt omnia, Corpus 
Christianorum, Series Graeca, 51 (Turnhout, Brepols, 2002) and discussion in ‘modern research’ 
section below and in ‘Contra Ariomanitas et de anima’ section of chapter 2. 
4
 Matthew Steenberg, Of God and Man: theology as anthropology from Irenaeus to Athanasius 
(Edinburgh, T and T Clark, 2009). 
5
 This is discussed in detail in chapter three. 
13 
 
sense of the disjunction between God and humankind.  The conceptualisation both of 
humanity in relation to God and of God incarnate are placed against a new backdrop. 
 
Secondly, the ‘Constantinian revolution’ again raises fundamental 
anthropological questions.  These questions are about both human society and the 
way in which the gap between current society and eschatological society relates to 
human potential. 
 
The third reason that I identify for exploring fourth-century theological 
anthropology derives largely from the other two: we cannot fully understand the 
‘Arian’ controversy without understanding the theological anthropologies of those 
involved in it.  Many ways of understanding the controversy have been proposed.  
Often, they have been framed in terms of an attempt to find the lynch pin of the 
controversy.  This is pointedly true of the work of Robert Gregg and Denis Groh, in 
which the authors argued that the ‘Arian’ view of Christ was driven by soteriological 
concerns.
6
  Rowan Williams depicts the key issues in cosmological terms, and Sara 
Parvis has followed him here, though she sees the participants in the controversy as 
divided firmly into two camps, where Williams sees more ambiguity.
7
  It is my 
opinion that a cosmological emphasis has much to recommend it as far as 
understanding the immediate question of dispute at Nicaea is concerned, but that 
                                                 
6
 Robert Gregg and Denis Groh, Early Arianism: a view of Salvation (London, SCM, 1981). 
7
 Rowan Williams, Arius, Heresy and Tradition rev. ed. (London, SCM, 2001), and Sara Parvis, 
Marcellus of Ancyra and the lost years of the Arian controversy, 325-345 (Oxford, OUP, 2006), p.54. 
14 
 
Gregg and Groh, among others, have identified important strands in the wider 
theological milieu surrounding Nicaea, and that this milieu cannot be ignored. 
 
Lewis Ayres has focused primarily on the doctrine of God itself, and has 
identified four theological trajectories within the ‘Arian’ controversy: 1) “theologians 
of the true wisdom” who emphasise the “eternal correlative status of Father and 
Son.”
8
 2) “The ‘Eusebian’ theologians of the ‘One Unbegotten’.
9
  3) “Theologians of 
the undivided Monad.”
10
 4) “Western anti-adoptionism: a Son born without 
division.”
11
  These provide a useful hermeneutical key which acknowledges the clear 
dividing line referred to above whilst allowing for the complexity and variety of 
theological positions within the ‘Arian’ controversy. 
 
What is evident in so many reconstructions of the ‘Arian’ controversy is that 
anthropology considerably elucidates the question; soteriology is intrinsically 
anthropocentric, focusing on the gap between human possibility and its current 
actualisation.  Cosmology often starts from the point of trying to understand the 
person’s place in the universe.  Christology, the question of God becoming human, 
or taking on humanity is, again, entwined with anthropology.  I am not proposing 
that anthropology is the, or a, defining theological issue in the question of the 
doctrine of God as played out at the Council of Nicaea.  At least, I do not propose 
                                                 
8
 Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: an approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford, 
OUP, 2004), p.43. 
9
 Ibid, p.52. 
10
 Ibid, p.63. 
11
 Ibid, p.70. 
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this in the sense that I do not think that anthropology is ‘what the opposing parties at 
Nicaea were arguing over.’  However, I believe that anthropology is a thread running 
through the various ways in which both pro-Arians and anti-Arians thought about 
and articulated the doctrine of God. 
 
Eustathius of Antioch’s theological anthropology is particularly interesting.  
The work newly attributed to him focuses on the soul.  This not only gives us 
enticing access to his anthropology, but shows that it was an important area of his 
thought, closely connected to his wider theology.  Eustathius’ ideas on the soul, we 
shall see, are often strikingly original and reveal a particularly interesting negotiation 
of the problems arising in the fourth century.  His negotiation of the novel 
metaphysical assumptions of the fourth century goes rather further than others in 
reducing the importance of the categories ‘perceptible’ and ‘intelligible’ and, 
correspondingly he has a highly developed concept of mental and emotional desire 
and suffering.  With respect to the ‘Constantinian revolution’, he shows profound 
ambivalence which marks his discourse on freedom and power. 
 
Eustathius’ anthropology is closely connected to his Christology: his 
argument in Ariomanitas rests on Christ’s full humanity.  The main source for 
Eustathius’ anthropology therefore appears in a Christological context.  This might 
be seen to raise the question of how one can examine Eustathius’ anthropology 
without first detailing his Christology.  It is certainly true that one cannot say much 
about either of these topics without saying something about the other.  I do not think 
16 
 
it is helpful to reduce either Christology or anthropology to a facet of the other in 
Eustathius’ case.  However, if one were to seek to pinpoint one of the two as 
logically prior to the other, it seems to me that one would have to pinpoint 
anthropology.  Eustathius’ purpose in writing the bulk of his (partially) extant works 
may have been Christological.  However, he tends to base his Christological 
arguments on anthropology.  The foundation of his Christological argument in 
Ariomanitas is that the Word bore a full human being.  He then makes a number of 
anthropological arguments to elucidate what this means for Christology.  This thesis 
will therefore focus on anthropology without extensive attention to Christology 
(though further work on Eustathius’ Christology would also be extremely valuable). 
 
A word needs to be said about the manner of categorising various theological 
and ecclesial groupings in the ‘Arian’ controversy.  The term ‘Arian’ has been 
widely criticised as a descriptor of subordinationist theology within the fourth-
century disputes about the doctrine of God, often because it seems to exaggerate the 
significance of both the person and the theology of Arius within these disputes.
12
  
These criticisms have much to recommend them and I have here opted instead for the 
term ‘pro-Arian.’  It could be argued that this fails to address the problem of the 
undue centralisation of Arius himself, and this might indeed be the case if some of 
Eustathius’ anti-subordinationist writings hailed from the later fourth century.  
However, (as I will argue) all of Eustathius’ anti-subordinationist polemic can be 
dated to the 320s and was almost certainly written between 323 and the end of 327.  
17 
 
In this context, Arius is neither the main protagonist nor, in real terms, the main 
issue.  However, the participants at Nicaea itself and in the discourse immediately 
surrounding it can meaningfully be placed in two camps: ‘for’ and ‘against’ Arius.  
One’s position on Arius is, for this brief period, a focus of group unity.  The 
subordinationist theologians justifiably identified by Ayres as “Eusebian” are, at this 
point, also specifically pro-Arian.  ‘Pro-Arian’ is as meaningful a term as we are 
likely to find for subordinationist theology immediately surrounding Nicaea.  ‘Anti-
Arian’, expresses, similarly, the position of Alexander and his allies around the time 
of Nicaea.  Neither term here designates theological homogeneity within these 
groups. 
 
Furthermore, as I am examining Eustathius’ ideas, his own perception and 
construction of the dispute is highly relevant.  As I will argue, the title Ariomanitas – 
“those stirring up war around Arius” was probably Eustathius’ own, and reflects a 
sense that one’s position on Arius was a defining feature of one’s place in the 







                                                                                                                                          
12
 For example, this is the view expressed by Richard Hanson who dubs the term ‘the Arian 
controversy’ “a serious misnomer” in The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God (Edinburgh, T and 
T Clark, 1988), pp.xvii-xviii, quote p.xvii. 
13
 See ‘Contra Ariomanitas et de anima’ section in chapter 2. 
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Eustathius in modern research 
Several trends are prominent in the treatment of Eustathius in modern 
research.  Firstly, Germanic and Francophone scholarship have generally shown 
more interest in Eustathius than its Anglophone counterpart.  Secondly, a teleological 
approach to Eustathius is especially pointed, partly due to the fact that he appears 
more often in a catalogue of significant thinkers than on his own.  His Christology is 
frequently discussed as an important precursor to Nestorianism, and his exegesis as 
an example of Antiochene ‘literalism.’  The conception of Eustathius’ theology as 
belonging to a specific tradition associated with Asia Minor and Syria, or more 
specifically Antioch, and held in contradistinction to an Alexandrian tradition, gained 
prominence in German Protestant scholarship in the early twentieth century, and 
recurs in various guises across much of the later research.  There has also been a 
clear recognition that the circumstances surrounding his deposition are key to the 
contested ecclesiastical and imperial politics of the 320s-330s.  Correspondingly, 
Eustathius’ deposition occupied Anglophone scholarship in the later twentieth 
century, even though it was otherwise not especially concerned with him.  A large 
proportion of the scholarship is devoted to the elaborate task of reconstructing 
Eustathius’ corpus.  The lack of comparable attention to Eustathian theology owes 
much to the difficulty of this reconstruction and the sheer scarcity of the sources.  It 
is, therefore, unsurprising that there has been much fresh interest in Eustathius’ 




Several editions and critical notes of Eustathius’ works were produced in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
14
  Then, 1905 saw an explosion of scholarship 
relating to Eustathius, and formative to later discussion of him.  Ferdinand Cavallera 
devoted considerable attention to Eustathius in his Le schisme d’Antioche, high-
lighting his importance as an opponent ‘Arianism.’
15
  In the same year, he published 
an edition of Homily on Lazarus, Mary and Martha, which he attributed to 
Eustathius.
16
  This attribution has proved an abiding, though far from 
uncontroversial, legacy in Eustathian scholarship.  Very shortly after Cavallera’s 
publication, Louis Saltet argued that the homily’s Trinitarian theology and 
Christology were often drastically anachronistic to the fourth century.
17
  At the time, 
this seemed almost decisive, though the debate was to be reopened again by the 
                                                 
14
 For a discussion of the various editions of Eustathius’ work, c.f. Declerck, Eustathii, pp.CIII-
CXLV.  Two editions of Eustathius’ fragments were produced in the eighteenth-century, first by 
Johann Albrecht Fabricius, and later by André Galland: Fabricius, Fragmente ex libris Eustathii 
Antiocheni deperditis in Bibliotheca Graeca, vol. VIII, (Hamburg, 1717), 166-89, Galland, Fragmenta 
ex libris S. Eustathii episcope Antiocheni deperditis in Bibliotheca veterum Patrum, vol. IV (Venice, 
1768), pp.548-83.  In 1804, Gottlieb Harles produced a revised edition of Fabricius’ text in 
Bibliotheca Graeca, vol. IX, (Hamburg, 1804), 131-49.  It was then over half a century (1857) before 
Jacques-Paul Migne published a further complete edition in PG, 18:676-697. In 1883 J.P. Paulin 
Martin published ten Syriac fragments attributed to Eustathius, with a Latin translation.  This included 
two (almost identical) fragments from a work against Photinus, the disciple of Marcellus of Ancyra, 
Analecta sacra Patrum antenicaenorum ex codicibus orientalibus collegit vol. IV (1883), pp.210-13, 
441-3.  (Contra Photinum was later to be deemed inauthentic, though the case for Eustathian 
authorship was revived by Rudolph Lorenz in 1980. See below).  The following year, Jean Baptiste 
Pitra offered a further three Greek fragments, not previously attributed to Eustathius, in Analecta 
Sacra Spicilegio Solemensi parata, vol. II, (Paris, 1884), pp.xxxviii-xl. In 1886, Albrecht Jahn 
produced an edition of Eustathius’ Engastrimytho contra Origenem, an attack on Origen’s 
interpretation of 1 Kingdoms 28.  Eustathius had attached Origen’s own, otherwise lost, treatise on the 
subject, and this also appears in Jahn’s edition.  Des h. Eustathius Erzbischofs von Antiochien 
Beurtheilung des Origenes betreffend die Auffassung der Wahrsagerin I. Kön. (Sam.) 28 und die 
bezüngliche Homilie des Origenes aus der Münchner Hds. 331 ergänzt und verbesset mit kritischen 
und exegetischen Anmerkungen (Leipzig, J.C. Hinrichs, 1886). 
15
 Ferdinand Cavallera, Le schisme d’Antioche (Paris, Picard, 1905). 
16
 Cavallera, Saint Eustathii Episcopi Antiocheni in Lazarum, Mariam et Martham homilia 
christologica. Nunc primum e codice groviano edita cum commentario de fragmentis eustathianis; 
accesserunt fragmenta Flaviani I Antiocheni.  Thessim alteram Facultati Litterarum Universitatis 
Parisienis proposuit F. Cavallera (Paris, Picard, 1905). 
17
 Louis Saltet, “Le schisme d’Antioch”, Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique (Paris, 1906), 120-125. 
20 
 
discovery of a new manuscript.
18
  To the homily, Cavallera attached most of the 
extant fragments, though he did not reproduce in full those that were available in 
print elsewhere. 
 
In Le schisme d’Antioche, Cavallera offered a vivid picture of Eustathius’ 
character and place in the church of the 320s, though he rightly acknowledged a great 
deal of uncertainty surrounding many of the details of Eustathius’ life.  He presented 
Eustathius and Marcellus of Ancyra as the champions of Nicene orthodoxy after the 
death of Alexander.  Correspondingly, Cavallera’s Eustathius is a tireless, 
recalcitrant, and uncompromising opponent of subordinationism.  His wider 
understanding of the ‘Arian’ controversy is significant to the nuances of this picture.  
In contrast to some other scholarship, he makes a clear distinction between Arianism, 
per se, and a watered down version adhered to by the supporters of both 
Eusebiuses.
19
   Eustathius, he claims, was a staunch opponent of both.  Eusebius of 
Caesarea is presented as Eustathius’ principal theological adversary, while Eusebius 





                                                 
18
 See discussion of van Esbroeck below.  In 1923, Friedrich Zoepfl, “Die trinitarischen und 
christologischen Anschuuangen des Bischofs Eustathius von Antiochien”, Theologische 
Quartalschrift, 104 (1923), 170-201, pp.170-1, writes that the lack of knowledge of Eustathius’ 
theology is largely due to there being only one full extant work, assuming rather than defending the 
truth of Saltet’s claims. 
19
 C.f. Cavallera, Schisme, p.38.  For scholarship that tends to see two ecclesial factions at Nicaea, c.f. 
discussion of Andrew Burn, below.  This picture is also key to Sara Parvis’ construction of the ‘Arian’ 
controversy in her Marcellus. 
20
 Cavallera does note that Eusebius of Caesarea was the one to accuse Eustathius at the council which 
deposed him, but sees this as part of a plan which Eusebius of Nicomedia was instrumental in 
creating. C.f. his Schisme, p.36 and p.38. 
21 
 
Also in 1905, Eduard Schwartz produced a Syriac version of a synodal letter 
purporting to be from a council in Antioch, which he dated to 325.
21
  This discovery 
was radically to alter our perception of the ‘Arian’ controversy.  Significantly for our 
purposes, it brought Eustathius, bishop of Antioch, to the centre stage (confirming 
Cavallera’s picture), though this did not in fact invigorate Eustathian scholarship in 
proportion to the fresh opportunities that the letter offered.  Schwartz produced a 
Greek retroversion, which he acknowledged to be approximate, of the Syriac text.  
The initial response to Schwartz’s publication was mixed.  Adolf von Harnack 
claimed that the letter was a forgery.
22
  Schwartz angrily defended the authenticity of 
his discovery, but Harnack stood his ground.
23
  In 1913, Erich Seeberg surveyed the 
controversy surrounding the Council of Antioch and ultimately defended the 
authenticity of the synodal letter.
24
  Some doubts about the authenticity of the letter 
still lingered, but Seeberg’s work prompted a shift in the debate in favour of the 
letter’s genuineness.
25
 Schwartz’s discovery has since been corroborated by the 




                                                 
21
 Eduard Schwartz, “Zur Geschichte des Athanasius, VI: Die Dokumente des arianischen Streites bis 
325”, Nachrichten von der Könlichen Gessellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. (Philologisch-
historische Klasse aus dem Jahre 1905), 257-299 = GS, III, pp.117-68. 
22
 Adolf von Harnack, “Die angebliche Synode von Antiochien im Jahre 324-5”, Sitzungsberichte der 
kgl. Preussichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, xxvi, (Berlin, 1908), 477-91. 
23
 Schwartz, “Geschichte des Athanasius, VII: Das antiochenische Syndodalschreiben von 325”, 
(1908), 305-374 = GS, III, 169-187.  Harnack, “Das angebliche Synode von Antiochien im Jahre 324-
5”, Sitzungsberichte der kgl. Preussichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, xiv (Berlin, 1909), 401-25. 
24
 Erich Seeberg, Die Synode von Antiochien im Jahre 324/5 (Berlin, Trowitzsch, 1913). 
25
 For a discussion of the response to Seeberg’s monograph, c.f. Frank Cross, “The Council of Antioch 
in 325 A.D.”, Church Quarterly Review, vol. 128 (1939), 49-76, pp.49-53. 
26
 By François Nau, “Litterature canonique Syriaque inedited”, Revue de l’Orient Chrétien, XIV 
(1909), 1-31 and Henry Chadwick, “Ossius of Cordova and the Presidency of the Council of Antioch 
325”, JTS 9 (NS) (1958), 292-304.  The date of this synod has been the subject of disagreement.  
Parvis dates it to December 324 in her Marcellus, p.78.  Because one of the tasks of the synod was to 
appoint a new bishop of Antioch, it must have occurred relatively soon after the death of Eustathius’ 
22 
 
Schwartz also made various attempts to reconstruct the events of Eustathius’ 
life, within his extensive studies on the chronology of the ‘Arian’ controversy.  
Significantly, he argued for the Eustathian authorship of the pseudo-Athanasian 
Sermo Major de Fide and Expositio Fidei, which had been found, by Jerome, in the 




Over a number of years, but also beginning at the turn of the last century, 
another German scholar, Friedrich Loofs, developed a picture of an ‘Antiochene’ 
theological school, in which he ultimately included Eustathius.  In doing so, he 
offered categories for understanding Eustathius that were to recur, and be contested, 
in later scholarship.
28
  Loofs’ work on Eustathius particularly bears the mark of 
German Protestant scholarship in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries in 
its search for ‘biblical’ Christianity.  His treatment can only be adequately 
understood within his wider picture of the development of Christian doctrine, and a 
connected long-term schism in the church at Antioch. 
 
He first became interested in Eustathius in developing and reworking 
Theodor Zahn’s thesis on the ‘Asia Minor’ (kleinasiatische or vorderasiatische) 
                                                                                                                                          
predecessor.  It is widely, and, correctly accepted that this was Philogonius, though the various 
primary sources are somewhat confused on this, on which see below. 
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 Schwartz, Der s.g. Sermo major de fide des Athanasius, (Sitzungsberichte, Munich, 1924). 
28
 Loofs’ picture is in turn determined by the construction of Eustathius in ancient sources, notably the 
pro-Nestorian bias of Theodoret, who preserved a large portion of Eustathius’ work.  The connection 
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Socrates, H.E., I.24 (CPG, 6028), writes that Eustathius was accused of Sabellianism at the council 





  This tradition ostensibly focused on the historical Christ and took an 
economic approach to the Trinity, in contrast to the philosophising approach of the 
‘Alexandrian’ school.
30
  Ignatius of Antioch, Irenaeus and Marcellus were key 
figures in Zahn’s reconstruction.
31
  Loofs reworked Zahn’s thesis, focusing the 
tradition more specifically on Antioch.  He ultimately concluded that the tradition 
was better labelled ‘Antiochene’, and added Eustathius.
32
  Paul of Samosata was key 
in shaping Loofs’ conception of this tradition (though Loofs claimed that he was less 
important than Eustathius to the later Antiochene School).
33
  He draws a line 
between Tertullian and Nestorius, and sees Eustathius, along with Paul of Samosata, 
as one significant mediator between the two. 
 
Loofs emphasises divine unity in Eustathius’ theology, and cautiously 
concludes that Eustathius, like Paul of Samosata, believed that the Son went out from 
the Father at the time of the incarnation.
34
  Much of the later scholarship that 
otherwise echoes Loofs has sought to qualify his reconstruction of Eustathius’ 
                                                 
29
 Loofs first addressed the idea of the ‘Asia Minor’ tradition in the article “Die Trinitätslehre 
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C.f. Joseph Lienhard, “Marcellus of Ancyra in Modern Research”, Theological Studies 43 (1982), 
486-503 
31
 Theodor Zahn, Marcellus von Ancyra: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie, (Gotha, F.A. 
Perthes, 1867). 
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 Eventually, as he drafted Eustathius into the tradition, Loofs changed his mind about Marcellus’ 
theology, deciding that Marcellus echoed Origenism as much as he did the tradition of Antioch.  In 
this way, Loofs ended up emphasising significant differences between the theology of Marcellus and 
Eustathius. 
33
 Loofs, Paulus, p.294. Following the suggestion of Leontius, Adolf von Harnack connected Paul of 
Samosata with the later Antiochene tradition.  C.f. Ibid, pp.293-4.  
34
 Ibid, pp.296-300. 
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The state of the church at Antioch became a very important factor in the 
development of this tradition, in Loofs’ revised understanding of it.  The two 
theological schools juxtaposed by Zahn became two opposing ecclesial factions at 
Antioch in Loofs’ thought.  Cavallera had dated the schism of Antioch from 
Eustathius’ deposition.
36
  Conversely, Loofs argues that the church in Antioch had 
been divided since the time of Paul of Samosata, and had had simultaneous 




In 1923, Friedrich Zoepfl also linked Eustathius to ‘Asia Minor’ theology, in 
an article examining his Trinitarian theology and Christology.
38
  In Zoepfl’s view, 
Asia Minor’s mark on Eustathius was evident in his strong soteriological emphasis 
on Christ’s humanity which echoed the concept of ἀνακεφαλαιωσις found in Ignatius 
and Irenaeus.
39
  This emphasis, Zoepfl claimed, was particularly reflected in 
Eustathius’ belief in Christ’s human soul.
40
  Zoepfl further noted what he saw as a 
corresponding sense that Christ’s humanity renders God visible.  However, he also 
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 See discussions on Zoepfl, Sellers and Lorenz, below. 
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 Cavallera, Schisme, p.43. 
37
 Loofs, Paulus, pp.180-6. 
38
 Zoepfl, “Die trinitarischen und christologischen Anschuuangen.”  My chronology here reflects the 
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 Ibid, p.201.  For the ‘Asia Minor’ tradition in Eustathius, see also p.182.  The concept of 
ἀνακεφαλαιωσις in Irenaeus is well documented. C.f. Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (Cambridge, 
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found Origenist Platonism in Eustathius’ Christology.  Ironically, this is evident, for 
Zoepfl, specifically in Eustathius’ concept of Christ’s human soul because it 
mediates between the Logos and the material world and correspondingly undermines 
the sense that Christ’s humanity is what makes the Logos visible.
41
  Zoepfl thus 
depicted Christ’s human soul as pulling in two different directions in Eustathius’ 
Christology, but had the sense that the Eustathian doctrine of Christ’s human soul 
was inextricably linked to Origenism. 
 
Zoepfl declined to label Eustathius ‘Nestorian’, but did note several parallels 
in the two men’s Christology.  In Zoepfl’s view, it is only possible to speak of 
“Menschwerdung” – of God becoming human – in a very loose sense in Eustathius’ 
Christology; Eustathius, rather, conceives of the Logos as dwelling in, or putting on, 
the human Jesus.
42
  Zoepfl was more firmly persuaded that Eustathius was not a 
Sabellian; he believed that Eustathius’ Logos theology diverged sharply from Paul of 
Samosata’s, because, for Eustathius, the Logos had a separate, personal existence.
43
  
In this respect his picture is very different from Loofs’. 
 
Zoepfl subsequently wrote on the pseudo-Eustathian Hexamaeron, arguing 
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 Zoepfl, “Die trinitarischen und christologischen Anschuuangen”, p.198. 
41
 Ibid, pp.188-9. 
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 Ibid, p.195. 
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 “Der Logos ist für Eustathius ein personlich abgeslossenes Wesen”, ibid, p.178. 
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Shortly after Zoepfl’s article and Loofs’ monograph, Andrew Burn gave a 
lecture on Eustathius, in English.
45
  His picture of Eustathius’ life largely echoed 
Cavallera: Eustathius is starkly opposed not only to Arius, but also to both 
Eusebiuses and their supporters, and he is deposed as a consequence of the Eusebian 
party’s duplicitous machinations.
46
  Burn also followed the recent German 
scholarship in defining Eustathius as an ‘Antiochene’ theologian.
47
  However, he 
explicitly defended Eustathius’ Chalcedonian orthodoxy, taking a two-pronged 
approach (and risking self-defeat in the process).  He argued both that Eustathius’ 
divisive Christology was merely speculative, whereas Nestorius attacked the 
church’s doctrine, and that Eustathius, anyway, saw Christ as “perfect God and 
perfect man.”
48
  A confessional, in this case Anglican, influence is, of course, as 
evident in Burn’s dissociation between Eustathius and Nestorius as it was in Loofs’ 
enthusiastic association of them. 
 
In 1928, Robert Sellers produced what remains the only monograph on 
Eustathius’ theology in English.
49
  He also included a substantial discussion of 
Eustathius in his later Two Ancient Christologies.
50
  In both works, he juxtaposed 
Antiochene theology with Alexandrine theology, and saw them as competitors within 
                                                                                                                                          
44
 Zoepfl, Der Kommentar des Pseudo-Eustathios zum Hexaëmeron (Munich, Aschendorf, 1927).  See 
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 Andrew Burn, Saint Eustathius of Antioch, Nicaean lectures, no. 1 (London, 1926). 
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 Ibid, pp.6-9.  Because he is aware of the Council of Antioch, Burn is more decided than Cavallera 
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parties [at Nicaea], for and against Arius.”, p.9. 
47
 Ibid, p.20. 
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 Ibid, p.15 and p.22 respectively.  He additionally allows that historiography may have been unfair in 
its analysis of Nestorius’ Christology. 
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 Robert Sellers, Eustathius of Antioch and his place in the early history of Christian doctrine 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1928). 
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the history of Christian doctrine.  According to Sellers, Antiochene theology was 
defined by dyohypostatic Christology and literalist exegesis.  He placed Eustathius 
squarely within the ‘Antiochene’ tradition, and drew a direct line between Paul of 




Sellers’ treatment of Eustathius echoed the then recent German scholarship, 
though he placed less emphasis on economic Trinitarianism than the German 
tradition had done.  He followed Zoepfl more closely than Loofs, particularly in that 
he believed that Eustathius allowed the Son a personal existence where Paul of 
Samosata had not.  He criticised Loofs for failing to appreciate this.  For Eustathius 
“the eternal Logos is ‘Son’ – ‘the Son’ is not set up with the indwelling of Wisdom 
in the Man” and “for Eustathius, the Son has His own hypostasis.”
52
  Sellers felt that 
Eustathius’ theology was superior to Paul’s in this respect.  Like Loofs, Sellers saw 
something valuable in the ‘Antiochene’ tradition, and wished to safeguard its 
distinctiveness.  This sometimes led to a problematically circular method of 




In 1933, Wilhelmine Brockmeier produced a detailed study of 
Engastrimytho’s grammatical style and diction.
54
  She noted that Eustathius’ style is 
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 Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies: a study in the Christological thought of the schools of 
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Michel Spanneut is the foremost Eustathian scholar of the twentieth century.  
He produced a major edition of Eustathius’ works, with an extensive introduction, in 
1948.
56
  He also wrote several articles on Eustathius.
57
  In his edition, he rejected the 
Eustathian authorship of Sermo Major de Fide and Expositio Fidei, proposed by 





One article focused on exegesis in Engastrimytho, and marked a turning point 
in the understanding of Eustathius as an ‘Antiochene’ exegete, which was itself part 
of a wider development in the study of patristic exegesis.
59
  Though Spanneut sees 
significant parallels between Eustathius’ exegesis and that of later theologians often 
associated with Antioch, such as Theodore and Diodore, his picture of Eustathian 
exegesis complicates the category ‘literalist’: Eustathius, he argues “condemns a 
literalist conception of inspiration [of scripture] which, wrongly or rightly, he 
                                                 
55
 Ibid, pp.3-4. 
56
 Michel Spanneut, Recherches sur les écrits d’Eustathe d’Antioche (Lille, Facultés Catholiques, 
1948). 
57
 Spanneut, “Eustathe d’Antioche exegete”, SP, 7 (1966), 549-559; “Eustathe d’Antioche”, 
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 Spanneut, Recherches, pp.87-89. 
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  He argues that Eustathius criticised Origen primarily for 
failing to regard scripture holistically.
61
  Correspondingly, both his approach to the 
question of Eustathius’ ‘Antiochene’ status and his conclusions differ from Sellers’ 
in important ways.  He starts from an exposition of Eustathius’ exegesis, and moves 
to a comparison with Theodore and Diodore, rather than rooting Eustathius, from the 
outset, in this later tradition.  Spanneut’s analysis thus avoids the sometimes 
problematic tendency, found in Sellers, to read Eustathius in light of later discourses. 
 
Spanneut remained, until very recently, the last scholar to write extensively 
on Eustathius, but the next five decades were to witness sporadic interest in the 
contents of the Eustathian corpus and rather more persistent interest in the date and 
nature of his deposition.  He otherwise appeared in works on other aspects of the 





Shortly after the appearance of Spanneut’s critical edition, Felix Scheidweiler 
wrote a series of articles on Eustathius, largely focusing on his corpus, and was, at 
least at first, more persuaded by Schwartz than by the more recent work of Spanneut.  
He initially accepted the Eustathian authorship of Sermo Major de Fide and 
Expositio Fidei and introduced the argument that Eustathius was the author of 
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61
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  He based his claim very largely on the similarity between it 
and the other two works.  Accepting Eustathian authorship of these works supposes 
that Eustathius was still alive after the Council of Serdica, which Scheidweiler argues 
on the basis that he wrote Contra Photinum, which also clearly post-dates Serdica.
64
  
Scheidweiler later attributed all three works to Marcellus of Ancyra.
65
  He 




Aloys Grillmeier rejected the picture of Eustathius as proto-Nestorian in his 
Christ in the Christian Tradition.
67
  Grillmeier notes the more unitive Christology in 
a few, probably early, fragments and describes the theology in them as “completely 
un-Antiochene, in the later sense of the word.”
68
  Eustathius’ Christology did later 
become divisive, he claims, in response to Arianism: Eustathius noticed that logos-
sarx Christology, favoured by the ‘Arians’, required the Logos to be the subject of 
Christ’s passions, and therefore undermined the Logos’ divinity.  Eustathius clearly 
articulated Christ’s human soul to guard against this ‘Arian’ position.
69
  By 
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 Felix Scheidweiler, “Ein Glaubensbekenntnis des Eustathius von Antiochen?” Zeitschrift für die 
neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, 44 (1952/3), 237-249. 
64
 Ibid, p.242. Photinus did not come to prominence until the 340s. 
65
 Scheidweiler, “Wer ist der Verfasser des sog. Sermo Maior de Fide”, Byzantinische Zeitschrift vol. 
47 (2) (1954), pp.333-357.  As Joseph Lienhard has observed, this was part of move in a radically new 
direction within Marcellan scholarship. See Lienhard’s “Marcellus” pp.495-6. 
66
 Scheidweiler, “Die Fragmente des Eustathios von Antiocheia”, BZ, 48 (1955), 73-85. 
67
 This work was originally written in German and appeared in two editions, both of which have been 
translated into English.  The treatment of Eustathius can be found in vol. 1, rev. ed. (London and 
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emphasising the defensive context of Eustathius’ divisive Christology, Grillmeier 
seeks to place it out with the realm of dogma. 
 
In 1975, Michel van Esbroeck reopened the debate about the Eustathian 
authorship of Lazarus in a monograph examining several Georgian homilies.
70
  He 
published a further article on the subject in 1982.
71
  He based his argument on a 
Georgian version of the text, which had been discovered in 1930.  Van Esbroeck 
argued that the Georgian manuscript was closer to the original Greek and showed 
that the original was, after all, Eustathian.  Declerck has, however, demonstrated 
otherwise.
72
   
 
In 1980, Rudolph Lorenz defended the Eustathian authorship of Contra 
Photinum (which had been more assumed than defended by Scheidweiler).
73
  The 
silence surrounding Eustathius after his deposition is often considered compelling 
evidence of his relatively early death, but Lorenz argues that it can be explained by 
the fact that he insulted Helena, and was therefore destined to remain a persona non 
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The extant fragments of Contra Photinum defend the author against the 
charge of believing in “three Gods” and maintain some clear distinction between 
hypostasis – of which there is only one - and prosopon – of which there are three – in 
the Godhead.
75
  Therefore, in arguing that the Trinitarian theology of Contra 
Photinum is that of Eustathius, Lorenz suggests a picture in which Eustathius’ 
emphasis on divine unity is qualified, and though echoing both Zoepfl and Sellers, he 
somewhat advances on them.  He defends his attribution to Eustathius of a 
distinction between hypostasis and prosopon, by arguing that the use of prosopon, in 
Contra Photinum to refer to God’s nature echoes Eustathius’ use of ἴδιον to refer to 




Both strands of Lorenz’s argument relatively downplay the relationship 
between theology and politics in shaping the ‘Arian’ controversy.  The theological 
disagreement between Photinus and Eustathius overrode their anti-‘Arian’ alliance, 
and Eustathius’ deposition was firmly in the realm of imperial politics, to the extent 
that alterations in the relationship between the imperial administration and his 
theological faction did not affect it. 
 
In the later twentieth century, there was some consideration of Eustathius’ 
exegesis and in particular his place in the history of exegesis, focusing on 
Engastrimytho: In 1989 Manilo Simonetti produced a new edition of Engastrimytho, 
together with the respective treatments of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa on the same 
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  Joseph Trigg shortly afterwards wrote an article examining the nature of 
Eustathius’ disagreement with Origen.  He follows Spanneut in accepting that 
Eustathius and Origen represented opposed exegetical traditions but questioning the 
use of a dichotomy between literalism and allegory in understanding these 
traditions.
78
  The work of Simonetti and Trigg was part of a wider interest in the 
categories of ‘Antiochene’ and ‘Alexandrian’ in Christian exegesis in the third and 




The last sixty years have seen significant discussion of Eustathius’ deposition 
and accession in Anglophone scholarship.  I survey this scholarship here, and will 
discuss the topic in detail in chapter 1. 
 
It is now conventional to date Eustathius’ accession to the See of Antioch to 
the Council of Antioch in 324/5.
80
  However, Paul Parvis has recently questioned this 
thesis.
81
  His argument is closely connected to a wider uncertainty surrounding the 
episcopal succession in Antioch. 
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The chronology of the bishops of Antioch in the 320s has long been 
confused, principally because, whilst most ancient sources refer to Paulinus of Tyre 
as Eustathius’ predecessor, Philostorgius and serveral others refer to him as 
Eustathius’ successor, and this latter claim has been widely accepted.
82
  Philogonius 
of Antioch is, consequently, seen as Eustathius’ predecessor.  However, Richard 
Burgess has argued that there would not have been time for Paulinus’ episcopate if 
he had succeeded Eustathius, and therefore believes that Paulinus was, after all, 
Eustathius’ predecessor.
83
  It is known that Philogonius died on 20
th
 December, 
because this is his feast day.  Much scholarship has assumed that this was December 
324.  However, Burgess places Philogonius’ death on 20 December 323, a year 




Paul Parvis has developed Burgess’ thesis in a different direction, which in 
some ways reinvigorates Friedrich Loofs’ picture of a schism at Antioch, but ties it 
more closely to the ‘Arian’ controversy.
85
  Parvis suggests that Eustathius and 
Paulinus were simultaneous, rival bishops.  He argues that Constantine’s so-called 
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“letter to Arius and Alexander suggests” that there were two rival bishops of Antioch 
at the time of writing, and that this remained the case;
86
 this is why Constantine 
never travelled east.  So, in Parvis’ view, Eustathius was a bishop of Antioch from 
the death of Philogonius in 323, and the (strongly anti-‘Arian’) Council of Antioch 
asserted his legitimacy over that of Paulinus.  Paulinus was then recognised as bishop 
of Antioch by the emperor after Eustathius’ deposition. 
 
Parvis’ argument has three main strands.  Firstly, he follows Stuart Hall in 
arguing that Constantine’s letter was written to the Antiochene Synod of 324-5, not 
to Arius and Alexander personally.
87
  To this end, he notes that Eusebius says that 
Constantine ἐπιτίθησι the letter to Alexander and Arius, and that Eusebius only uses 
this term when he is introducing excerpts in the Vita Constantini, and that here it 
means that Constantine “presented” the letter in question.
88
  Eusebius does not say, 
therefore, that the letter was “written” to Alexander and Arius. 
 
Secondly, Parvis argues that the text of Constantine’s letter refers to a 
disputed succession.  Σύνοδος, he claims, should be read as ‘corporate body’ when 
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  He further suggests that Constantine’s lament that “the honour of the 
synod be removed by impious dissension…” should be rendered as continuing 
“…from the congregations” i.e., δήμων, rather than either “through you” or “through 
us.”
90
  Thirdly, he argues that Constantine’s admonition to his readers to “open to me 
the road to the east” indicates that he was prevented from making an imperial visit 
east because “an emperor could not be received by rival bishops.  His adventus could 




The discussions about Eustathius’ accession have tended to feed into 
discussions about his deposition, largely because of the close interrelation of the 
evidence.  Eustathius was one of the bishops deposed from his see when Constantine 
came to favour the pro-Arian faction.
92
  Estimates of the date of his deposition range 




A central consideration in dating Eustathius’ deposition is the deposition of 
Asclepas of Gaza, Eustathius’ ally.  The synodal letter of the Eastern council of 
Serdica declares that Asclepas was deposed seventeen years previously.
94
  The 
Western council of Serdica says that he was deposed at Antioch “praesentibus 
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adversariis et Eusebio ex Caesarea.”
95
  Henry Chadwick assumed that this phrase 
implied Eusebius’ presidency at the synod that deposed Ascelpas, whilst Hanson 
noted that it could refer simply to Eusebius’ presence there.
96
  Hanson argued that 





Socrates’ 347 used to be the most reliable date for Serdica, so Eustathius’ 
deposition was placed in 330-1.
98
  However, since the discovery of the Festal Index 
in 1848, it has become clear that the council of Serdica took place in either 342 or 
343.
99
  Counting inclusively, this places Eustathius’ deposition at the latest between 
326 and 327.  Chadwick’s 326 date for Eustathius’ deposition is partly dependent on 
his dating Serdica to 342.  Burgess, arguing for 328, suggests that those at Serdica 
miscounted, but Parvis argues that this is unlikely, especially as they were probably 
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Chadwick and Timothy Barnes have both argued that Eustathius and 
Asclepas were deposed simultaneously.
101
  Burgess conversely suggests that there 
were two separate councils at Antioch quite close together, and that the first deposed 




Several documents potentially connected to Eusebius of Caesarea’s Chronici 
Canones make references which point to 328 as the date of Eustathius’ deposition.  
Burgess correspondingly favours 328, largely because of a particular understanding 
of the interrelation and reliability of these documents.  
 
Firstly, the accession of Eulalius is entered in the Chronicon miscellaneum ad 
annum Domini 724 pertinens (Chron. 724) in the Syriac epitome of Eusebius of 
Caesarea’s Chronici Canones.  Eusebius of Caesarea, Philostorgius and Theodoret 
all write that Paulinus of Tyre succeeded Eustathius and was himself succeeded by 
Eulalius, after six months.
103
  Here, it is the first entry after Athanasius’ 328 
ordination as bishop and the second before the Dedication Council of 
Constantinople, May 330.
104
  Burgess argues that this suggests that it occurred 
between the two, allowing for another, interceding event, and therefore probably 
during 328 or possibly 329.  Jerome’s Latin translation and continuation of Chronici 
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Canones says that Eustathius was deposed in the year 22-23 “Constantine”, which 
would, again, be 328-9. 
 
Burgess was also the first to note that the Syriac Chron. 724 states that 
Eustathius was bishop for four years. He argues that both Jerome’s Latin translation 
and the Syriac epitome in Chron. 724 are drawing on a now-lost Greek continuation 
of Eusebius’ Chronici Canones, completed in Antioch in c350.  He dubs this 
Continuatio Antiochensis and considers it reliable.
105
  Parvis seems dubious about the 
relationship of such a continuation to Jerome or the Syriac epitome and argues that, 
anyway, it would be less reliable than Serdica’s references to the deposition of 
Asclepas.
106
  Burgess, dating Eustathius’ accession to 325, places his deposition in 
late 328. 
 
Eduard Schwartz argued for a 326 deposition on the basis of Asterius’ letter 
in defence of Eusebius of Nicomedia.  He argued that Asterius must have written this 
letter during Eusebius’ exile, which he thinks took place through 325-7.  He then 
noted that this letter refers to Paulinus of Tyre as μακάριος suggesting that he is 
dead.
107
  Schwartz believed that Paulinus succeeded Eustathius and therefore argued 
that Eustathius must have been deposed in time to allow for Paulinus’ brief 
episcopate and, therefore, in 326.
108
  Hanson objected on two grounds: μακάριος is 
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not exclusively applied to the deceased, and Asterius probably wrote in defence of 
Eusebius of Nicomedia after he returned from exile.  He argues that Asterius, who 
sacrificed during the Diocletian persecution, was too cowardly to defend Eusebius 




The Empress Helena’s journey into the eastern empire has also been 
important in the discussion of Eustathius’ deposition.
110
  Helena went to Jerusalem, 
passing through Antioch, between the deaths of Crispus and Fausta (Constantine’s 
wife and one of his sons) in the first half of 326 and her own death, in Constantine’s 
presence, sometime in 327.
111
  Athanasius claims that Eustathius was putatively 
deposed for insulting Helena.
112
  Chadwick believed that Helena went on pilgrimage 
in a show of sorrow for the deaths of Crispus and Fausta and, therefore, in 326.
113
  
Hanson argued that Constantine would not have permitted his mother to make such a 
pilgrimage, as it would have looked like a pilgrimage of reparation and consequently 
caused him further embarrassment over the deaths he was trying to downplay.
114
  He 
therefore concluded that Helena’s pilgrimage must have been rather later, in 327.  
Conversely, Sara Parvis has argued that, in order for Helena to have returned to 
Constantinople to die in Constantine’s presence even at the very end of 327, she must 
have started her pilgrimage in July or August 326. 
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The relative order of Eustathius’ deposition and the return of the handful of 
pro-Arians exiled by Constantine at and shortly after Nicaea has been perhaps the 
most significant point of disagreement within the wider discussion of the deposition. 
 
Hanson argues that Eusebius’ return predated Eustathius’ deposition on the 
basis of a fragment from Eustathius’ work on Proverbs 8:22 [D79] which he reads as 
complaining about the Eusebians having recently gained powerful sees, and which 
Sara Parvis, conversely, believes to be a description of Nicaea.  He also claims that 
the tone suggests that it was not written by a bishop in exile.
115
  The text mentions a 
Eusebius, and Hanson’s thesis is dependent upon the belief it refers to Eusebius of 
Nicomedia and not Eusebius of Caesarea.
116
  This is bound up with Hanson’s belief 
that Eustathius was deposed after Constantine allowed Arius, and subsequently 
Eusebius of Nicomedia, to return from exile. 
 
Sara Parvis, conversely, sees Eustathius’ deposition as a trigger for 
Constantine’s ‘pro-Arian’ policies.  Her argument is primarily based on 
Constantine’s letter to Arius, dated 27
th
 November but of uncertain year.  The letter 
asks why Arius has not yet appeared at court as requested.  Parvis argues that 
Constantine must have written a previous letter summoning Arius sufficiently prior 
to 27
th
 November that he could have expected Arius to have received it and made his 
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way to court by then.  Considering the time it would probably have taken for Arius to 
receive the letter and travel to court, she surmises that Constantine summoned Arius 
from exile in September of the same year.  She notes that Theognis and Eusebius of 
Nicomedia petitioned to be allowed to return from exile after Arius had already been 
readmitted and, arguing that Eusebius was in exile for three years, she concludes that 
he and Theognis returned in 328.  Parvis therefore argues that Constantine 




A number of different reasons have been given for Eustathius’ deposition.  
Richard Hanson argued that he was deposed for Sabellianism, whilst Williams 
accepted Athanasius’ claim that he lost his see for “insulting Helena.”
118
  Sara Parvis 
rejected this idea, instead picking up Philostorgius’ and Theodoret’s claim that he 
was deposed on trumped up charges of sexual misconduct – more specifically, for 
impregnating a young woman, perhaps a prostitute.
119
  Chadwick and Hanson had 
previously both roundly rejected this account as too typical of a hagiographical 
fabrication.
120
   Parvis, conversely, claims that it would be congruent with 
Constantine’s dramatic but frequently ill-informed behaviour towards the church.  
She also notes that it would explain the mysterious and sudden nature of Eustathius’ 
deposition. 
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Rowan Williams and Sara Parvis both argue that Eustathius’ deposition was 
part of a chain of events that caused Constantine to change his mind in favour of the 
Eusebians, rather than a consequence of Constantine’s change of mind.
121
  This was 
to develop into a highly significant contour in the historiography: firstly, a position 
on whether Eustathius’ deposition helped to trigger, or resulted from, Constantine’s 
change of mind is mutually determining with the interpretation of several other key 
pieces of evidence about Eustathius’ deposition.  Secondly, it has sometimes 
corresponded to a wider division in scholarly views on the ‘Arian’ controversy.  
Whilst Hanson does not believe that there was a conspiracy against Eustathius and 
Alexander’s other allies, Parvis does. 
 
José Declerck’s edition of the entire Eustathian corpus came out in 2002.  It 





Following the publication of this new edition, there are many signs of 
growing interest in Eustathius.  Robert Greer and Margaret Mitchell have published a 
new edition of Engastrimytho, together with an English translation, which forms part 
of a wider study on patristic exegesis of 1 Kingdoms 28.
123
  Though the context of 
Declerck’s critical edition is doubtless significant, this work continues a trend begun 
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before Declerck’s publication in its obvious interest in Eustathius as a figure within 
the history of Christian exegesis, and in the Witch of Endor text. 
 
Sara Parvis reopened, though did not develop, the question of Eustathius’ 
relationship to the ‘Asia Minor’ tradition in her monograph on Marcellus of 
Ancyra.
124
  In particular, she noted parallels between Eustathius’ conception of the 
image of God and that in both Marcellus and Irenaeus.
125
  She also suggested that 
Marcellus and Eustathius had a very similar doctrine of God, but that, although they 
can both, in different ways, be accused of proto-Nestorianism, Marcellus also has 
some strong similarities with Athanasius, lacking in Eustathius. 
 
A series of articles on Eustathius has also followed Declerck’s publication.  
The Jesuit scholar Patricio de Navascués considered the philosophical currents in 
Eustathius’ thought.  He argued that Eustathius was significantly at odds with both 
Platonism and Stoicism but had much in common with Aristotelianism, particularly 
Aristotelianism of a Stoicised form.
126
   
 
Subsequently, Kelley Spoerl has written two articles on Eustathius.
127
  The 
first compares the doctrine of God and Christology in Eustathius and Marcellus.  
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Spoerl’s point of comparison is determined more by the two thinkers’ putatively 
extreme position with the Nicene alliance, than by any potential connection with 
Irenaeus, and an older ‘Asia Minor’ or ‘Antiochene’ tradition.  Spoerl argues that 
Eustathius and Marcellus were closer in Christology than in Trinitarian doctrine, 
nearly the reverse of the position more tentatively suggested by Sara Parvis.  Spoerl’s 
second article explicates Eustathius’ physiology in a particularly opaque fragment 
from the new epitome of Contra Ariomanitas.
128
  She argues that Eustathius has a 
broadly Aristotelian physiology and links the soul particularly with the heart.  I 
myself have recently written two articles on Eustathius, the first examining the 
disembodied soul between death and resurrection, and the second comparing his 





For a long time, Eustathius did not receive the attention that his place in the 
Constantinian church and his role in the early ‘Arian’ controversy merits.  This was 
due in large part to the scarcity and fragmented nature of the sources, as is attested to 
by the comparably greater attention paid to the components of his corpus.  The 
discovery of the epitomised Contra Ariomanitas et de anima provides a fresh 
opportunity.  The work of Spoerl and Navascués begins to avail itself of the new 
opportunity to examine Eustathius’ relationship to Hellenic thought provided by our 
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clearer understanding of his Contra Ariomanitas.  The new epitome of such a major 




The aim of this thesis is historical, and, therefore, so is the methodology.  My 
purpose is to describe Eustathius’ conception of the human person, which is a piece 
of intellectual history, so my task is partly exegetical.  The reconstruction of 
historical circumstance is also involved, in order to appreciate the historical context 
of Eustathius’ thought. 
 
The fragmented nature of Eustathius’ extant corpus renders the exegesis of 
his writings especially problematic.  This has shaped my approach to the sources in 
various ways.  Firstly, I am extremely cautious about drawing any conclusions from 
omission.  Secondly, with regards to the epitome, it is necessary to be aware that the 
wording is unreliable.  Thirdly, I cautiously use Engastrimytho to clarify Eustathius’ 
other writings. 
 
This thesis addresses a range of questions within anthropology.  Some of 
them – such as the relationship between the body and the soul – are treated 
extensively and explicitly within Eustathius’ extant corpus.  Others – such as 
soteriology and eschatology, are alluded to, but never treated fully.  In the latter case, 




When reconstructing someone’s thought, the category ‘fact’ acts in a 
particular way. The fact sought is the author’s meaning.  However, in many cases, 
even the author might not be able to expand on his or her comments without altering 
their sense slightly. The question “what did x think?” has an objective answer, but its 
objectivity is one that we can never fully grasp.  It is possible to answer this question, 
but only approximately.  One is trying to reconstruct an imaginative world.  
Historical context is partly collective; however, it is also, inevitably, partly personal. 
 
One of the key questions that arises in intellectual history is how far it is 
useful to ask different questions about an author’s work than they themselves have 
asked.  On one hand, asking questions that had not occurred to the author might 
suggest a failure to understand the author.  On the other, it is not clear that asking the 
same questions that the author is asking elucidates his or her thought at all.  I assume 
that it is meaningful, and useful, to ask questions that an author may not have asked.  
It is, nonetheless, also possible to frame questions in a way, or rely on assumptions, 
that suppose a different worldview to Eustathius’. 
 
There are two mutually supporting components of the descriptive task that is 
key to intellectual history.  The first is empathetic.  We try to get inside the head of 
the author in question and to think in his or her terms.  The second is expressive.  If 
we were only to speak in the words of the author in question, this would be merely 
transcriptive; it would not elucidate, and could not communicate, the author’s ideas.  
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We must put the author’s ideas into new language, not because we wish to “shed the 
illusions of the epoch” or, indeed, those of the individual, but because we wish to 
understand them.
130
  We do this, to some degree, necessarily, whenever we read.  
Translation is interpretative.  Correspondingly, so is listening, so is reading.  We are 
more likely to describe well if we acknowledge that description involves this 
expressive externality. 
 
It is not my intention to assess the value of Eustathius’ theological 
anthropology.  Nonetheless, it is impossible entirely to divorce a description of a 
concept from an opinion of its worth, and a description that tries to do so entirely has 
a tendency to be less descriptive.  I do not attempt to expunge my descriptions of 
assessments of their worth, and do on occasion explicitly acknowledge my value-
judgements. 
 
Partly, here, I am filling in the gaps left by the fragmentation of the corpus.  
This fragmentation poses problems in the reconstruction of Eustathius’ thought.  His 
extant writings contain many ideas which, on the face of it, logically contradict each 
other but, because the corpus is so fragmented, it is difficult to establish whether 
these are genuine contradictions, or whether Eustathius elsewhere offers syntheses.  
This problem is further compounded by Eustathius’ exegetical method (which will be 
discussed in more detail in both chapter 2 and chapter 5).  He often takes two or 
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more apparently contradictory passages, exegetes them individually, and then offers 
an overall synthesis.  Occasionally, it is unclear whether we have a contradictory 
opinion from Eustathius, or one half of this exegetical method. 
 
Engastrimytho is a good bench-mark here, though it must be allowed that 
Eustathius expressed different ideas in different works, and developed his ideas and 
changed his mind over time.  The epitome of Ariomanitas can also help us in 
elucidating the rest of Eustathius’ corpus, because its purpose is to summarise the 
work of Eustathius.  If anything, the epitomiser would gloss over uncomfortable 
contradictions, rather than accentuating them.  Furthermore, the epitomiser had 
before him the original Eustathian text, and wished to convey its meaning.  Although 
we have someone else’s interpretation of Eustathius in the epitome, we have an 
attempt to give us a sense of the whole text, from someone who was aware of it.  
Both Engastrimytho and the epitome of Ariomanitas show us an eclectic thinker who 
drew on a wide range of thought systems and ideas in forming his arguments, and 
tended to worry about the consistency of details when it related to the immediate 
arguments he was making.  He stands in the middle of many intellectual cultures and 
his life spans the period when the Christian Church went from being an illegal, and 
persecuted, sect to the religion favoured by the emperor.  Eustathius’ thought in 
many ways resembles a collage. 
 
This thesis is very concerned with Eustathius’ engagement with Hellenic 
philosophy, which, I argue, is profound but highly complex.  Patristic scholarship has 
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a somewhat dubious history when it comes to considering the influence of Hellenism 
on Christianity, often constructing a highly problematic, and reductive, Biblicist-
philosophical divide.  I avoid doing this, partly because it risks denying the Greco-
Roman context of the New Testament and partly because it fails to appreciate the 
necessary process of interpretation in reading a text.  If certain axioms of one’s 
worldview are Hellenic, this will impact one’s interpretation of the bible, even if one 
honestly intends to take one’s definitions of the world from scripture.
131
  Equally, 
expressing Christian dogma in philosophical language does not necessarily 
subordinate the dogma to the philosophy, but can reinterpret and reinvigorate it in a 
novel, Christian, direction.  Philosophy can be used to focus on scripture as the 
foundational imaginative and conceptual resource.
132
  It is, additionally, difficult to 
categorise particular schools, because of their frequent interpenetration.  This thesis 
identifies various strands and trajectories within late antique philosophy, without 
concerning itself with their ultimate origins. 
 
Eustathius himself is not a devotee of any philosophical school, but is heavily 
indebted to Aristotle.  He actively attacks Plato, but nonetheless assumes many ideas 
that were typical in many manifestations of late antique Platonism in constructing his 
own theology.  He follows in a much broader late antique tradition in synthesising 
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My treatment of Origen’s legacy requires a note.  Origen was a prolific writer 
and highly complex thinker who delighted in speculation.  His most controversial 
work, De Principiis, is not extant in anything close to its original form.
134
  It is, 
consequently, notoriously difficult to establish the original contents of Origen’s 
corpus, and even more difficult to establish which of the ideas expressed within it 
Origen held as dogma.  He is perhaps best known for doctrines that it is not clear that 
he espoused, such as the transmigration of souls.
135
   
 
Much of Origen’s legacy is shorn of the most controversial metaphysical 
claims attributed to him, and we must appreciate this if we are to appreciate the 
distorted mark of Origenism on Eustathius.  Nontheless, the controversial aspects of 
Origen’s thought are also important for understanding his legacy, and more 
particularly the reaction against it, for two reasons.  Firstly, where he refers explicitly 
to Origen, Eustathius is not engaging generously.  Secondly, the unusual areas of 
Origen’s thought elucidate the rest of it; one is more likely to venture a circumspect 
suggestion if it makes sense, and if is useful in solving otherwise intractable 
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conceptual problems.  When I refer to ‘Origenism’, I am not seeking to weigh into or 
adjudicate discussions about which aspects of Origen’s legacy do him justice, but 
simply to denote that legacy. 
 
Eustathius is repeatedly critical of Origenism, but is also influenced by it.  He 
engages a great deal with Methodius’ critique of Origenism.  This has recently been 
shown to be more complex, and less consistently negative, than was once 
supposed.
136
  The complexity of Methodius’ treatment of Origen is partly reflected in 
Origenist echoes in Eustathius’ anthropology.  However, Eustathius himself 
interprets Methodius deliberately in an anti-Origenist way.  Nor are all Origenist 
aspects of his theology shared with Methodius.  He places himself in an anti-
Origenist tradition with Methodius, but negotiates both thinkers independently. 
 
Summary 
Chapter 1 sets out the details of Eustathius’ life, focusing especially on his 
time at Antioch, and the controversial events surrounding his accession to and 
deposition from the See of Antioch.  Chapter 2 discusses the available sources for 
Eustathius.  It establishes the parameters of Eustathius’ corpus and describes the 
scope, purpose and context of his extant works.   
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Chapter 3 examines the relationship between the body and the soul in 
Eustathius’ thought.  It argues that Eustathius emphasises the interrelation of body 
and soul in human identity and experience, whilst sharply distinguishing them as 
substances.  This echoes certain key aspects of Platonised- Aristotelianism, 
specifically in suggesting a hylomorphic body-soul dualism.  Eustathius deploys 
Aristotelianism in constructing an anthropological ontology that owes much to 
Irenaeus and Methodius of Olympus, but also refers to the soul, and its relationship 
to God, in ways that echo Origen.  It is also argued that Eustathius emphasises the 
passibility of the soul, explaining human emotional experience in terms of his 
integrated anthropological ontology, and depicting sorrow as a proper aspect of 
human experience. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the image of God in Eustathius’ thought, and identifies 
three main strands.  Firstly, echoing Origen, Eustathius clearly distinguishes between 
humanity and Christ qua image and the eternal Son qua image, maintaining a sharp 
disjunction between God and humanity within the metaphysical framework of the 
‘Arian’ controversy.  Secondly, Eustathius’ image theology has an important 
soteriological dimension that invokes a parallel between Adam and Christ, and sees 
eschatological humanity as conformed to Christ.  Thirdly, in locating the image of 
God at least partly in the human body, Eustathius emphasises the physical nature of 
human beings.  There is also a suggestion that the image is visible, but incomplete, 




Chapter 5 examines Eustathius’ soteriology, partly drawing on the discourse 
about Adam and Christ parallelism in chapter 4.  It argues that Eustathius has a 
strong sense of the lapsarian nature of the current human condition, which he 
conceives of in both existential terms – mortality, corruptibility, and inherited 
predisposition to sin, and circumstantial terms – slavery to the devil.  This latter is 
tied in with a belief that the current world order in many ways limits and constrains 
our freedom.  Correspondingly, Eustathius’ discourse on slavery to the devil reflects 
his observation of power in the Roman Empire, though it does not draw a direct 
parallel between the two.  Eustathius’ also has a strong sense of the individual’s guilt 
before God and need for forgiveness, which features primarily in his discourse on 
Christ’s death.  This chapter argues that the disparate strands of Eustathius’ 
soteriology meet in the concept of Christ as typical and archetypal human being. 
 
Chapter 6 examines free will in Eustathius’ thought.  It identifies in 
Eustathius two interrelated, and mutually qualifying, concepts of human free will: the 
liberty of indifference and freedom to discern and intend to carry out the right course 
of action.  Eustathius identifies ultimate and total freedom with the latter.  He 
believes that human freedom was hugely constrained by the lapse, but not entirely 
removed; currently, we are trapped, but have sufficient free will to ask for God’s 
help.  His conception of ultimate freedom draws on common currents in both pagan 
philosophy and patristic thought, and is anthropologically optimistic, in that it 




Chapter 7 examines Eustathius’ eschatology, drawing together various 
strands from previous chapters.  It argues that Eustathius believed that Christ would 
reign over an earthly kingdom, commensurable to but vastly superior to the Roman 
Empire.  This locates ultimate human identity in current identity and emphasises the 
importance of the current life.  It also acts as a challenge and a foil to the current life, 
and reveals present manifestations of human society and government to be deficient.  
This chapter then considers Eustathius’ view of eschatological judgement.  It 
observes a tension between a picture of universal salvation and one of divisive 
judgement, and argues that Eustathius did not believe in universal salvation, but that 
his soteriological system lends itself to this idea nonetheless. 
 
This thesis fills a major gap in scholarship by offering badly needed fresh 
research into a key figure in the early fourth-century church.  In certain ways, my 
claim that anthropology is important to Eustathius, and my analysis of the 
soteriological role of Christ’s humanity in his thought revive important strands in 
older Germanic scholarship, particularly that of Friedrich Zoepfl.  It also offers an 
original picture of Eustathius’ anthropology qua anthropology, drawing heavily on 
the epitome of Ariomanitas, and therefore on a source that was unavailable to 
previous scholarship.  In doing so, it opens a new window onto the conception of the 
human person in the philosophically and politically tumultuous earlier fourth 



























Chapter 1: Eustathius’ life 
 
Most of Eustathius’ life prior to the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy is 
shrouded in mystery.  A handful of facts can be pieced together from various ancient 





Eustathius was from Side, a harbour town in Pamphylia.
138
  He was evidently 
highly educated.  Not only does he have a classicising writing style, but he was at 
least reasonably familiar with Greek philosophy and medicine.
139
  His parents’ 
religious affiliation is unknown. 
 
Eustathius was probably a confessor under either Diocletian or his successors, 
or, at any rate, was at some point arrested.
140
  Evidently, he became bishop of Beroea 
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before the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy as, according to Theodoret, Eustathius 
received Alexander’s letter about Arius, He Philarchos, whilst bishop there.
141
  The 
date of He Philarchos would therefore help to give some shape to his later career.  
There has been much disagreement about this, which is closely connected to the 
debate about exactly when the controversy broke out, and a corresponding 
disagreement about its nature.  The discussion is well-known and there is little need 
to go over old ground here.  Sara Parvis has provided the most recent summary of the 
historiography of the outbreak, and of the relevant evidence.
142
  The key points are as 
follows.   
 
Hans-Georg Opitz claimed that the argument began in 318, arguing that it 
started suddenly but developed slowly.
143
  Schwartz subsequently argued that the 
outbreak, which took some building up to, didn’t happen until 324 and that the 
disagreement then progressed very quickly.
144
  Schwartz’s argument relies on his 
belief that Constantine did not defeat Licinius until 323; he thought that the entire 
controversy must have taken place after Licinius’ ban on the meeting of synods had 
been lifted.  In placing Licinius’ defeat in 323, he allowed the maximum time for the 
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necessary events predating Nicaea to have occurred within these parameters.
145
  
Rowan Williams has posited 321.
146
  Parvis, whilst acknowledging that Williams’ 
suggestion is reasonable, argues for 322, following Schwartz’s assumption that one 
must allot the shortest time possible to the events between the outbreak of the 
controversy and the Council of Nicaea.
147
  She then argues that He Philarchos and 
Alexander’s other letter to all bishops, Henos Somatos, were written and dispatched 
simultaneously, and were versions of the same letter (one need not, in that case, 
allow time for both of them).  It is clear that He Philarchos was written in either 321 
or 322, and that we can therefore safely assume that Eustathius was bishop of Beroea 
by then. 
 
Very little is known about Eustathius’ time as bishop of Beroea.  Trigg has 
described him as a “rising star” in the decade after the end of the ‘Great Persecution’, 
and the little available evidence seems to commend this picture.
148
  Despite 
Alexander’s very different theological leanings, Eustathius received He Philarchos 




Eustathius’ theological context prior to the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ 
controversy bears the mark of Asia Minor and Antioch, and, explicitly, anti-
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Origenism.  Eustathius was evidently a great admirer of Methodius of Olympus, to 
whom he refers in glowing terms in Engastrimytho Contra Origenem.
150
  This 
indicates a pre-existing disagreement with Eusebius of Caesarea, who wrote warmly 





A prior connection with key members of what was to become the anti-Arian 
alliance at Nicaea is also evident.  Eustathius was clearly on good terms, and in anti-
Origenist cahoots, with Eutropius of Adrianople, as he wrote Engastrimytho Contra 
Origenem at the request of Eutropius, who had complained that he found Origen’s 
interpretation inadequate.
152
  Eutropius is named by Athanasius as having been 
deposed because he disagreed with Eusebius of Nicomedia.
153
  Furthermore, in his 
attachment to theologians from Asia Minor, Eustathius apparently follows earlier 
bishops of Antioch.  For example, Vitalis, Philogonius’ predecessor at Antioch, 
attended the Council of Ancyra in 314, and was the only bishop outside of Asia 
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Accession to Antioch 
The See of Antioch was clearly already pitted against the pro-Arian cause 
prior to Eustathius’ accession, as Arius names Philogonius of Antioch as one of his 
opponents, despite claiming widespread support from Eastern bishops.
155
  However, 
the city of Antioch evidently hosted theological diversity on this point; Paul Parvis’ 
argument about episcopal succession at Antioch is very persuasive, as it accounts for 
the chronological confusion of the bishops, explaining why Paulinus is sometimes 
listed as Eustathius’ successor, sometimes as his predecessor.  According to the pro-
Arian faction at Antioch, Paulinus had been bishop there since Philogonius’ death 
but, according to the anti-Arian faction and the imperial administration, he was not 
bishop of Antioch until Eustathius’ deposition.  Eustathius acceded to Antioch as the 
intended champion of anti-Arian theology. 
 
The Council of Antioch 324 
The creed produced at Antioch was strongly anti-subordinationist.  Sara 
Parvis notes both its similarity with He Philarchos and its dissimilarity with the 
Creed of Nicaea 325.
156
  Eustathius’ involvement in this council shows him to have 
been highly important on the anti-Arian side of the controversy from a relatively 
early stage, vindicating Cavallera’s picture of him as a major player in the 
Constantinian Church. 
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The Council of Nicaea 
Relatively little is known about Eustathius’ role at Nicaea.  Hanson argues 
that Eustathius was responsible for the inclusion of the term ὁμοόυσιος in the creed, 
and that he pressured the reluctant Alexander on this point.
157
  Parvis notes the 
absence of the term ὁμοόυσιος in the creed produced at the Council of Antioch, and 
argues that this undermines Hanson’s suggestion.
158
  It remains possible that 
Eustathius conceived of the usefulness of the term ὁμοόυσιος between Antioch and 
Nicaea.  However, there is no mention of it in his anti-Arian writings, which would 
be surprising if he were its champion, particularly because he does refer to his 
opponents’ failure to adhere to Nicaea.
159
  It is therefore unlikely that ὁμοόυσιος was 
Eustathius’ idea. 
 
As observed in the introduction, Parvis identifies a Eustathian fragment as 
containing a description of Nicaea.  The fragment in question is from Eustathius’ In 
Proverbia 8.22 and is preserved in Theodoret’s Historia Ecclesiastica [D79].  It is, 
unfortunately, extremely ambiguous, and Hanson has read it as referring to anti-
‘Nicene’ intrigue several years after Nicaea.  Here is the Greek text: 
[Ὡ]ς δὲ ἐζητεῖτο τῆς πίστεως ὁ τρόπος, ἐναργὴς μὲν ἔλεγχος τὸ γράμμα τῆς 
Εὐσεβίου προὐβάλλετο βλασφημίας. Ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ ἀναγνωσθὲν, αὐτίκα συμφορὰν 
μὲν ἀστάθμητον τῆς ἐκτροπῆς ἕνεκα τοῖς αὐτηκόοις προὐξένει, αἰσχύνην δὲ 
ἀνήκεστον τῷ γράψαντι παρεῖχεν. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ ἐργαστήριον τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Εὐσέβιον 
σαφῶς ἑάλω, τοῦ παρανόμου γράμματος διαρραγέντος ὑπ’ ὄψει πάντων ὁμοῦ τινες 
ἐκ συσκευῆς, τοὔνομα προβαλλόμενοι τῆς εἰρήνης, κατεσίγησαν μὲν ἅπαντας τοὺς 
ἄριστα λέγειν εἰωθότας. Οἱ δ’ Ἀρειομανῖται δείσαντες μή πη ἄρα τοσαύτης ἐν ταὐτῷ 
συνόδου συγκεκροτημένης ἐξοστρακισθεῖεν, ἀναθεματίζουσι μὲν προπηδήσαντες τὸ 
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ἀπηγορευμένον δόγμα, συμφώνοις γράμμασιν ὑπογράψαντες αὐτοχειρί. Τῶν δὲ 
προεδριῶν διὰ πλείστης ὅσης περιδρομῆς κρατήσαντες, δέον αὐτοὺς ὑπόπτωσιν 
λαμβάνειν, τότε μὲν λεληθότως, τότε δὲ προφανῶς τὰς ἀποψηφισθείσας 
πρεσβεύουσι δόξας, διαφόροις ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς ἐλέγχοις. Βουλόμενοι δὲ δὴ 
παγιῶσαι τὰ ζιζανιώδη φυτουργήματα, δεδοίκασι τοὺς ἐπιγνώμονας, ἐκκλίνουσι τοὺς 




Hanson argues that Eustathius wrote this after the start of the ‘Arian purge’ but 
whilst he was still in his see.  This reading relies on rendering the phrase 
προεδριῶν…κρατήσαντες as “now that they have gained control of the leading 
position.”
161
  Sara Parvis, however, reads it as referring back to Nicaea: “having held 





Parvis’ reading of this fragment is more probable than Hanson’s, though its 
translation is highly problematic.  Although Hanson’s translation of κρατέω as “to 
gain control” is perfectly plausible, κρατέω can also mean “hold onto” in the sense of 
“retain.”  Whilst προεδρια can refer to a privileged position, it can also refer to a 
leading ecclesiastical office.  Given that the context in this fragment is an 
ecclesiastical council, the latter does seem somewhat more likely.  It is therefore 
equally possible to translate the phrase, as Parvis does, “after they had held onto their 
seats.”
163
  That Eustathius was less than happy about Constantine’s new role in the 




 Hanson, “Fate”, 171-4. 
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church at the time of writing D79 is further implied by the claim that his opponents 
ἐκκλίνουσι τοὺς ἐφόρους.  Timothy Barnes renders this phrase “they corrupt the 
secular rulers”, arguing that ἐκκλίνουσι cannot plausibly mean “to avoid.”
164
  This 
seems to me most probably correct; otherwise the text suggests that the secular rulers 
are trying to get the bishops, and failing, and it is not clear how this could be the 
case.  I also follow this reading in part because I believe that Eustathius’ deposition 
must be seen as a trigger for Constantine’s change of mind, rather than a 
consequence of it, as I argue below.  
 
Furthermore, Eustathius elsewhere expresses frustration at what he perceives 
as his opponents’ duplicity in signing up to Nicaea and then teaching against its 
theology: in Ariomanitas, he writes that “if [they say that the Word]…is susceptible 
to passions, they anathematise themselves, because they have denied his 
immutability in writing, in public and also in private, after having agreed to it in the 
assembly.”
165
  In this passage, Eustathius seems to have the impression that Nicaea 
failed to bring the pro-Arians in line, very much cohering with a sense that they kept 
hold of their seats when they should have lost them.  The evidence suggests that 
Eustathius was frustrated with the pro-Arians’ continued place in the church, and that 
he blamed the attempt to compromise at Nicaea for this.
166
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I argue that Eustathius was deposed in 327 and follow Paul Parvis in arguing 
that Eustathius’ deposition was closely connected to a fracas during Helena’s visit to 
Antioch.
167
  I suggest the Helena’s pro-Arian theological leanings may have had a 
part to play in the events at Antioch during her visit. 
 
Let us examine Hanson’s claim that Asclepas was deposed under Eustathius. 
This is very unlikely.  In his Historia Arianorum, Athanasius lists Asclepas among 
those deposed by pro-Arian intrigue.
168
  It would be unproblematic, in itself, to 
dismiss Athanasius’ claim, since he was keen to construct a narrative of persecuted 
orthodoxy.
169
  Nonetheless, as a Eustathian ally during the ‘Arian’ crisis, it is very 
unlikely that Asclepas would have been deposed at Antioch whilst Eustathius was 
bishop.  Considering Western Serdica’s claim that Asclepas was deposed 
praesentibus adversaries et Eusebio ex Caesarea, it is clear that Eusebius of 
Caesarea would not have presided over a synod there whilst Eustathius was bishop.  
The two men were fierce rivals, engaged in a pamphlet war and, anyway, why 
wouldn’t the resident bishop of Antioch preside over a synod at Antioch?
170
  
Whether Eusebius presided at Asclepas’ deposition or not, we can assume that 
Eustathius was deposed either at the same time as or before Asclepas and, therefore, 
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that seventeen years prior to Serdica is the latest possible date for his deposition.  
Sara Parvis has persuasively demonstrated that 343 is the correct date of Serdica.
171
  
Counting inclusively, seventeen years before Serdica is therefore 327. 
 
Eustathius was almost certainly deposed before Asclepas.  Burgess’ argument 
that Eustathius and Asclepas were deposed in two successive synods is convincing: 
Athanasius mentions both Eustathius and Asclepas as victims of the ‘Arian purge’, 
but he names Eustathius as one of the first to fall whilst referring to Asclepas 
separately later in the narrative.
172
  Athanasius was in a good position to know about 
the relative order of these depositions, and had little motive to misrepresent it.  
According to Philostorgius, Eustathius was deposed by a synod at Nicomedia.
173
  
This is unlikely, as all the other church historians more plausibly report that he was 
deposed at Antioch.
174
  However, it does further undermine the connection between 
Eustathius’ deposition and Asclepas’.  As Williams notes, twice-yearly provincial 
synods were by now prescribed, so it is not necessary to seek out large-scale councils 
as possible occasions for each deposition.
175
  Plausibly, Eustathius, a ring-leader and 
therefore de facto protector of the politically weaker Asclepas, was removed, leaving 
Asclepas vulnerable.  If the two were deposed at separate synods, Eustathius was 
deposed more than seventeen years before Serdica, which suggests he was deposed 
in either 326 or 327 but, as I argue shortly, 326 is too early for a number of other 
reasons. 
                                                 
171
 Parvis, Marcellus, pp.210-17. 
172
 Athanasius, Hist. Ar. (CPG, 2127), 4.4 and 5. 
173




Chron. 724, though cited by Burgess as evidence that Eustathius was deposed 
in 328, in fact rather more suggests that he was deposed in 327 if one works on the 
basis that Eustathius became bishop in early 324 and that Paulinus was recognised as 
bishop of Antioch for the period between Eustathius’ deposition and Eulalius’ 
succession.  Even in this case, though, early 328 remains a possibility. 
 
As we have seen, the author of Chron. 724 enters Eulalius’ accession directly 
after Athanasius’ 328 ordination to the episcopate.  Burgess thinks that this suggests 
328 because he believes that Paulinus preceded Eustathius, and therefore does not 
allow time for Paulinus’ episcopate before Eulalius’ succession.  (Burgess takes 
Paulinus to have been bishop for six or seven months, following Chron. 724).  
However, if Paulinus was, in fact, a rival bishop alongside Eustathius, and then 
officially and widely recognised on Eustathius’ deposition, we must allow time for 
his ‘official’ episcopate in between Eustathius and Eulalius, which takes us more 
plausibly to 327 than 328. 
 
Chron. 724’s claim that Eustathius was bishop for four years is, as Burgess 
asserts, a valuable piece of evidence, but its signification is determined by the date of 
Eustathius’ accession.  It is certain that Eustathius was appointed to Antioch shortly 
before Nicaea, and therefore, a four-year occupancy places his deposition at 327-9.  
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It immediately rules out Henry Chadwick’s very early date of 326 and the once-
conventional 330/1 supported (for reasons other than the conventional ones) by 
Richard Hanson.  More, specifically, if we place Eustathius’ accession at 324, it 




So, the evidence of Serdica points to 327 whilst most of the manuscripts 
surrounding Chronici Canones suggest 327 but also permit early 328. 
 
Burgess offers another reference in support of 328-9: pseudo-Dionysius of 
Tel-Mahre, which may or may not have been dependent on Continuatio 
Antiochensis, dates Eustathius’ deposition to 640 of the Seleucid era.  This would be 
24 “Constantine”, or 1 October 328 to 30 September 329.  Rubric 7 of Chron. 724 
gives the same date.  However, the list containing this date confuses Eustathius of 
Sebaste with Eustathius of Antioch.  Burgess, bizarrely, sees this as improving the 
reliability of its evidence because it shows that the given date does not derive from a 
chronicle.
177
  Unfortunately, it also shows that whatever source the date did derive 
from is unreliable.  Serdica is a more reliable witness. 
 
It is necessary to examine the two pieces of evidence favouring 326 and 330 
respectively.  As observed in the introduction, Schwartz argues for the former, 
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Hanson the latter, both on the basis of Asterius’ letter in defence of Eusebius of 
Nicomedia.  Hanson’s claim that Asterius did not write in defence of the exiled 
Eusebius is weak; he constructs an entire moral character for Asterius from an 
instance of weakness under immense pressure.  Nonetheless, he is right to note that 
the reference to Paulinus as μακάριος does not necessarily mean that he was dead at 
the time of writing.  There is little concrete evidence, then, for 326. 
 
The evidence in favour of 330/1 is found in Theodoret, who claims that 
Meletius’ exile occurred thirty years after Eustathius’ deposition.
178
  Meletius’ exile 
was conventionally dated to 361 but 360 is now the accepted date.  Either way it jars 
with the other evidence.  Burgess plausibly supposes that thirty was simply a “round 
figure.”
179
  Theodoret’s claim is, anyway, insufficient to outweigh the evidence of 
Serdica. 
 
Athanasius’ claim that Eustathius was deposed for insulting Helena suggests 
at least a temporal connection between her journey East and his deposition.  It is a 
rather specific claim, and therefore Athanasius’ reference implies that it was at least 
plausible; Helena almost certainly met Eustathius, and he was most probably 
deposed shortly afterwards.  Sara Parvis is right to note that Helena must have started 
her journey in July or August 326, in order to be back with Constantine, to die in his 




Seeing Eustathius’ deposition as a trigger for Constantine’s change of mind, 
as Parvis does, becomes problematic if we accept that Eustathius was still bishop 
when Eusebius of Nicomedia returned.  Sozomen, Socrates and Theodoret all place 
Eusebius’ return before Eustathius’ deposition.
180
  However, Parvis offers persuasive 
arguments against their reliability.  She notes that Socrates confesses that his claim is 
based on inference from Eusebius’ Vita Constantini on which, she argues, Sozomen 
also relies.
181
  She further argues that Theodoret’s chronology of these events is 
evidently confused as he refers to Eusebius as bishop of Constantinople at the time of 
Eustathius’ deposition, despite the fact that Eusebius did not become bishop of 




Hanson’s argument that Eusebius’ return predated Eustathius’ deposition is 
bound up with his interpretation of the Eustathian fragment D79, partly because he 
reads it as complaining about the Eusebians having recently gained powerful sees, 
and claims that the tone suggests that it was not written by a bishop in exile.
183
  
Eustathius must, then, have written it before being deposed, but after the pro-Arians 
had begun to take the upper hand. 
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Some of Hanson’s arguments for his claim that D79 refers to Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, not Caesarea, are weak.  In particular, he gives a lot of weight to 
Eusebius of Caesarea’s claim that his own statement of faith was well-received at 
Nicaea.
184
  As Hanson argues, we know that Eusebius of Nicomedia did produce a 
controversial statement of faith at Nicaea;
185
 the passage could refer to either 
Eusebius.  The next stage in Hanson’s argument is, however, deeply problematic.  He 
argues that we cannot simultaneously hold that Eusebius of Nicomedia is the 
‘Eusebius’ of D79 and that he was in exile while it was written; why, Hanson asks, 
would an exiled bishop be a target? This argument extrapolates too much about the 
content of Proverbia 8:22 from the fragments available, and consequently concludes 
that it was directed primarily against the Eusebius referred to in this passage.  
Perhaps it would be odd for Eustathius to have written a work primarily aimed at 
Eusebius of Nicomedia were he still in exile, and looking likely to remain there.  
However, we do not have a work directed against either Eusebius, but only a 
fragment preserved by Theodoret of Cyrus, who was not especially interested in 
Eustathius’ circumstantially-determined political agenda.  It is perfectly plausible 
that Eustathius attacked the exiled Eusebius of Nicomedia as part of a wider anti-
Arian polemic. 
 
Williams’ and Parvis’ causal chain most convincingly explains the return of 
Arius before Eusebius.  It is not, otherwise, clear why the man who (for whatever 
reasons) ended up at the centre of the storm is allowed to return from exile, while 
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those who took up his cause are not.  It also coheres with Athanasius’ claim that 
Eustathius was an early ‘victim’ of the ‘Arian purge’, about which Athanasius would 
be certain to know, and have no reason to lie.  The length of Eusebius of 
Nicomedia’s exile is therefore germane to the date of Eustathius’ deposition.  We 
know he was exiled in 325, shortly after Nicaea.  According to Philostorgius, he was 
in exile μετὰ τρεῖς ολους ἐνιατούς.
186
  Bruno Bleckmann reads this as “three whole 
years” whilst Barnes reads this as “two and a bit years”, their disagreement deriving 
from divergent views of idiomatic usage.
187
  According to Philostorgius, Eusebius 
was exiled three months after Nicaea.
188
  Parvis plausibly suggests that “three whole 
years”, which she considers the most appropriate rendering, could date either from 
Nicaea – July/August 325 or from the exile – September/ October 325.  Barnes’ 
reading correspondingly suggests 328.  Significantly, Arius was readmitted before 
Eusebius of Nicomedia.  If we accept Barnes’ reading, we may either place 
Eusebius’ return in 327, the latest point it allows, – as Barnes himself does – or we 
must conclude that Arius corresponded with Constantine, and was readmitted, in 
326.
189
  The latter possibility seems problematically early – it would hardly allow 
time for Eustathius to have engaged in a polemical writing match with Eusebius of 
Caesarea, and particularly to have produced so substantial a work as Ariomanitas, 
which certainly postdates Nicaea.  Eusebius, then, must have been readmitted in 328, 
suggesting that Arius corresponded with Constantine in September 327. 
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It was very probably an event related to Helena’s visit to Antioch that 
changed Constantine’s mind in Arius’ favour in September 327. George of Laodicea 
claims that Eustathius was formally charged with Sabellianism.
190
  Sabellianism is a 
plausible pro-Arian attack on Eustathius but, for that reason, is an insufficient 
explanation for his deposition.  It relates closely to the theological dispute in which 
Constantine had, albeit lukewarmly, sided with the anti-Arians.  The pro-Arians 
would need something else to depose the bishop of one of the most important cities 
in the eastern half of the Empire and, if one should wish to downplay the degree of 
pro-Arian intrigue against Eustathius, it is hard to imagine how Sabellianism came 
into the question.  The claim that Eustathius was deposed for impregnating a 
prostitute does, as Hanson and Chadwick argue, bear an uncomfortable resemblance 
to a hagiographical fabrication.  Sara Parvis’ suggestion that reports of such 
behaviour would have enraged Constantine admittedly puts it in a more plausible 
light, because such a cataclysmic reaction is necessary to explain Eustathius’ 
deposition.  However, Paul Parvis’ reconstruction of the disputed succession at 
Antioch offers a more convincing explanation. 
 
Although the idea that Eustathius ‘insulted’ Helena initially seems a little 
implausible, it is rendered intelligible when placed in the framework of events 
suggested by Paul Parvis.  As already noted, he believes that Constantine was 
prevented from travelling to the east because there were two rival bishops at Antioch.  
Helena, he suggests, was sent in lieu of her son, and then conferred some degree of 
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recognition upon Eustathius’ rival.  Eustathius’ responded inappropriately during 
some part of the ceremonial associated with the imperial visit and its attentions to the 




This picture is highly plausible in light of the unprecedented nature of 
Helena’s visit.  Imperial visits to bishops had never taken place before.  In a societal 
setting obsessed by etiquette, no one could be quite clear what the etiquette was.  
Throw into the mix rival bishops and attendant congregations, both of whom wish to 
be recognised by the imperial administration, and neither of whom wish to worship 
with each other, and you have a recipe for disaster.  Eustathius may have tried to 
push his luck, but he may, just as plausibly, simply have been unsure what was 
expected of him.  He may, for example, have been expected to receive Paulinus at a 
mass, and refused to do so.  He might even have considered this a polite suggestion 
from Helena, rather expecting that she would accept his position and disinvite 
Paulinus, because Eustathius was, after all, the officially recognised bishop.  It is also 
possible that he was somewhat more deliberately belligerent, particularly given his 
irritation at Constantine’s pacifying tactics at Nicaea.  If, however, this looks 
foolhardy to the point of improbable, there is no need to invoke it to explain Helena’s 
part in Eustathius’ deposition. 
 
The claim that Helena’s own theological leanings were pro-Arian may help to 
elucidate her relationship with the two bishops.
192
  Helena may well have made some 
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attempt to include, or make dialogue with, Paulinus and his pro-Arian congregation 
in line with her own beliefs.  It is just possible that she even favoured Paulinus in 
deliberate disregard for Constantine’s recognition of Eustathius, though this is very 
unlikely.  If so, her actions certainly had the effect of turning Constantine in favour 
of the pro-Arian faction, and perhaps this was her intention.  However, if it was, this 
was a remarkably high risk strategy: ecclesiastical politics were uncertain, as was the 
outcome of any deliberate attempt to disrupt the situation in Antioch further. 
 
We should also not assume, with the false clarity of hindsight, that the church’s 
position as favoured by the Roman State was absolutely secure.  Constantine’s 
motives in favouring Christianity are a subject of considerable contention and far 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  Suffice to note that, immediately after Nicaea, 
Constantine’s approval of Christianity probably still seemed somewhat conditional 
on its success, or at least on it not proving to be an outright liability.  If we suppose 
that Helena had, by this point, become sufficiently committed to and involved in 
Christianity to promote actively her own theological viewpoint within the church, we 
must also assume that she would not have wanted to render it such a liability.
193
  A 
little belligerence on the part of Helena, adding to the belligerence of Eustathius, is, 
however, plausible.  If Helena issued invitations to both bishops to come to meet 
with her, when Eustathius declined to attend, on the basis that Paulinus would also be 
present, she would, plausibly, have called Eustathius’ bluff and refused to disinvite 
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the bishop whom she, anyway, preferred.  Paulinus and the pro-Arians would then be 
afforded a golden opportunity to take the upper hand.  Paulinus would probably have 
been very willing to attend with Eustathius as he was on a weaker footing anyway.  
This would have been the best offer he was likely to get.  Constantine badly wanted 
an end to strife in Antioch, and it looked as though Paulinus was willing to 
compromise for the sake of peace, but Eustathius was not.  It would then be a small 
jump to the suggestion that Eustathius had insulted Helena by refusing to cooperate. 
 
In conclusion, it seems to me by far most likely that Eustathius was deposed 
in late 327, though it should be admitted that the evidence of Chronici Canones 
would also permit early 328.  I believe that Paul Parvis’ reading of Constantine’s so-
called ‘Letter to Arius and Alexander’ is correct, and that therefore we must suppose 
that Paulinus was a rival, pro-Arian bishop at Antioch during Eustathius’ episcopacy 
there, and that Helena’s journey was at least partly intended to take the place of 
Constantine’s thwarted imperial visit to the east, in which the major city of Antioch 
would have been extremely important.  This also explains how it is that Helena 
became connected with Eustathius’ deposition: she had to negotiate the rift in 
Antioch in the unprecedented situation of an imperial visit involving the Christian 
church.  Her theological leanings, Eustathius’ belligerence and the opportunism of 
the pro-Arian faction combined to result in Eustathius’ deposition, and the 
subsequent deposition of other anti-Arian bishops. 
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The other reasons floated for Eustathius’ deposition – impregnating a 
prostitute, and Sabellianism – are both accusations that could either have been made 
at the time, as codicils to the main event, or arisen later. 
  
Eustathius’ Death 
Eustathius must have died in exile, probably before 337 and certainly before 
the Synods of Serdica.  This is evident primarily because he did not try to return to 
his see with the other exiles from Constantine’s late 320s purge, who returned in 
337.
194
  The Eastern Synod of Serdica also refers to him as exitus, which may denote 
his death, though Scheidweiler believes it does not, and he is justified in noting that 
the term itself is somewhat ambiguous.
195
  Eustathius’ death in exile would explain 
the silence following his deposition.
196
  Socrates produces an unsubstantiated report 
that Eustathius ordained Evagrius as bishop of Constantinople, which would mean he 
was alive in the 370s.
197
  Sozomen also says that Eustathius ordained Evagrius and 
adds that “having been recalled from banishment by Jovian, he lived privately at 
Constantinople, and devoted himself instructing those who held his sentiments, 
exhorting them to persevere in their view of the divine being.”
198
  However, most 
modern scholarship has concluded that these much later reports are a less reliable 
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indicator of the date of Eustathius’ death than his total silence following his 
deposition.  This seems to me persuasive.
199
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Chapter 2: Eustathius’ writings 
Although Eustathius wrote extensively, only his De Engastrimytho contra 
Origenem [Engastrimytho] survives in full.  Fragments of other writings are cited in 
a wide variety of genres across several centuries.  Declerck’s new edition of 





It is impossible to construct a complete and altogether reliable picture of any 
author’s theology when relying heavily on fragments.  An epitome offers its own 
complications: it is, even more than a body of fragments, another author’s 
interpretation of the original work.  However, an epitome is compiled with the 
express intention of capturing the thrust of the work it treats, which is not the case 
with the extant selection of Eustathian fragments.  Declerck’s recent discovery of the 
Eustathian authorship of the epitome of Ariomanitas has therefore opened up new 
vistas of opportunity for understanding Eustathius’ theology, particularly in the 
important area of the ‘Arian’ controversy. 
 
Most of the extant Eustathian fragments have been selected from Eustathius’ 
work by thinkers engaged in discourses different to his own.  Because his belief in 
Christ’s human soul provided a valuable precedent to ‘Nestorian’ Christology, his 
work was a fruitful resource for those engaged in the Christological controversies of 
the fifth and sixth centuries.  Aside from the aforementioned epitome, Eustathius’ 
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fragments are overwhelmingly preserved by thinkers on different sides of these later 
controversies, most notably Theodoret of Cyrus.
201
  I address specific authors later.  
Here, I make the general observation that the circumstances in which the Eustathian 
fragments were selected have two interrelated consequences: later thinkers have 
placed his writings within disparate systems of meaning, vesting words and phrases 
with anachronistic significance.
202
  The themes and arguments that later authors 
considered significant in Eustathius are not necessarily what he had considered to be 
the central portions of his discourse.  Furthermore, those citing Eustathius have often 
deliberately aligned his thought to theirs.  Consequently, where we see an apparently 
coherent system emerging, it is not necessarily Eustathius’ system.  Fortunately, 
Eustathius’ fragments are preserved in works on opposite sides of later disputes, so 
no one school has hegemony over our conception of him.
203
  It is, therefore, 
reasonable to suppose that ‘pro-Nestorians’ quoted him more frequently than 
‘monophysites’ at least partly because he was more useful to them.  Nonetheless, the 
sources remain problematic.  In this chapter, through careful examination of the 
Eustathian corpus, I shall identify an appropriate methodology by which to construct 
Eustathius’ theological anthropology from the available material. 
 
There are many potentially Eustathian fragments the authorship of which 
remains uncertain.  Understandably, many scholars have tried to judge the 
authenticity of attributions to Eustathius by comparing the theology of the fragments 
                                                                                                                                          
200
 The nature of this work is the subject of much discussion.  I expand below. 
201
 On Christ’s human soul, c.f. Hanson, The Search, p.202. 
202
 C.f. discussion on Theotokos below. 
81 
 
in question with what they believe to be Eustathian theology.  I have already noted 
that Eustathius’ Christology and his exegesis have both been considered defining 
aspects of his theology.
204
  It is therefore necessary to discuss both Eustathian 
Christology and Eustathian exegesis here.  The discussions in this chapter are not 
intended to be comprehensive, but to delimit the range of theologies that we may 
consider possible in Eustathius, in order to avoid the circularity of rejecting uncertain 
writings purely on the basis of ideas found in securely Eustathian writings. 
 
I will now survey Engastrimytho and the fragments.  I consider the 
authenticity of each group of fragments and their place in the Eustathian corpus, 
examining Eustathius’ writings chronologically as far as possible.  Much previous 
scholarship, including José Declerck’s comprehensive edition, has addressed the 
works from which the most fragments survive first and has consequently privileged 
the later, anti-‘Arian’ works which have so strongly shaped the view of Eustathius as 
proto-Nestorian, thus unwittingly reinforcing the consequences of biased selection.  
Examining the fragments chronologically better reflects the development of their 
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There are several works that have been previously attributed to Eustathius the 
misattribution of which is now fairly clear, and I will not discuss these texts in detail.  




Homilia: Cavallera attributed this work to Eustathius, acknowledging that 
there were some later interpolations.  However, Louis Saltet subsequently noted that 
its Trinitarian theology and Christology were anachronistic to the fourth century.
206
  
A Georgian version of Homilia came to light in 1930 and in 1975, Michel van 
Esbroeck reopened the debate about the Eustathian authorship of Homilia in a 
monograph, in which he examined six patristic homilies in Georgian.
207
  He 
published a further article on the subject in 1982.
208
  He believed that the Georgian 
version of the text was closer to an original Greek version than was the extant Greek.  
He argued that the Georgian version of the homily showed that the original was, after 
all, Eustathian.  However, Declerck has convincingly established that many 
anachronisms remain.
209
  The arguments against the Eustathian authorship of 
Homilia are persuasive: it is written in extremely simple prose, in contrast to every 
known extant work of Eustathius.  Esbroeck suggested that this was because it was 
aimed at a less elitist audience.  Though this is not impossible, the huge difference in 
style must be considered a point against Eustathius’ authorship.  The Georgian 
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homily is at best a text that could be contemporaneous with Eustathius and which he 
would not have found positively objectionable.  There is very little in it that actually 
echoes Eustathius, and much more that seems surprising.
210
  I will not reopen the 
discussion here. 
 
Attributions of Commentariae in Hexameron and Contra Photinum both 
presume an improbably late date of death for Eustathius.  Friedrich Zoepfl has 
demonstrated the extensive influence of late fourth-century sources on Hexameron, 
notably Basil of Caesarea’s Homiliae in Heaxameron.  It therefore must be dated to 
the third quarter of the fourth century, as Zoepfl argues.
211
  Photinus did not come to 
prominence until 343, so if one accepts that Eustathius wrote against him, it must be 
despite the improbability that Eustathius was still alive when Serdica took place.  It is 
immensely implausible, both theologically and politically, that Eustathius would 
have written a work against Photinus, the avid disciple of his ally Marcellus of 
Ancyra and can therefore hardly be used as proof, in the face of opposing evidence, 
that Eustathius lived into the 340s. 
 
Three pseudo-Athanasian works have been attributed to Eustathius by 
German scholars, and the cases for and against them are connected: Sermo Major de 
Fide, Exposito Fidei and Contra Theopaschita.  Both Sermo Major de Fide and 
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Expositio Fidei were attributed to Eustathius by Eduard Schwartz, who supposed that 
they were both contained within a collection of writing that Jerome picked up at the 
Eustathian library.
212
  Spanneut argued persuasively that both works were attributed 
to Eustathius because of Jerome’s misattribution to Athanasius.
213
  Felix 
Scheidweiler initially accepted the Eustathian authorship of Expositio Fidei and 
Sermo Major and introduced the argument that Eustathius was the author of Contra 
Theopaschita, found in the same dossier as the other pseudo-Athanasian works.
214
  
He based his claim very largely on the similarity between it and the other two works.  
Accepting Eustathian authorship of these works supposes that Eustathius was still 
alive after the Council of Serdica, which Scheidweiler argues on the basis that he 
wrote Contra Photinum, which also clearly post-dates Serdica.
215
  However, given 
that the Eustathian authorship of Contra Photinum is so dubious, quite irrespective of 
its lateness, this argument holds no water.  Scheidweiler anyway later attributed all 




Allocutio ad imperatorem Constantinium was attributed to Eustathius in the 
eighth century but in the early eighteenth century Johannes Albert Fabricius 
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Liturgia: though putatively Eustathian, there is little mark of Eustathian 






Spanneut places three other Eustathian fragments, which are preserved in 
Polychronius on Proverbs, in a single, otherwise unattested work “On Proverbs” 
[D127, D137, D138].
219
  Spanneut’s designation here is speculative.  These 
fragments have generally been considered authentic, but Declerck accepts only 
D127.  Declerck has noted a jarring lack of Eustathian vocabulary in D137 which, 
given that it is otherwise unattested and of uncertain derivation, is sufficient to 
designate it as apocryphal.
220
  Declerck’s main issue with D138 is that its exegesis, 
which is especially allegorising, is unique in the Eustathian corpus.
221
  Given the 
diversity of Eustathian exegesis and the fragmentary nature of the sources, it is 
insufficient to establish that D138 is apocryphal.  It remains uncertain. 
 
The Syriac work containing fragment D113 contains three further Eustathian 
fragments [D117, D118, D119b] from three separate works, of which they are the 
only extracts to survive. 
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D117 is introduced as “from the discourse on temptation.”  It contains the 
word Theotokos and Sellers consequently rejects it.
222
  I have noted the 
methodological problem with this approach.  Furthermore, to read into Theotokos the 
‘monophysite’ intention that the Syriac author presents it as carrying risks 
anachronism.  Admittedly, even in his own, fourth-century, context, Theotokos 
would have jarred with Eustathius’ sometime insistence that Mary was the mother of 
Christ’s humanity.
223
  Nonetheless, there are several reasons to think that Eustathius’ 
pre-controversy Christology had room for the term.  It coheres with his Christology 
in Engastrimytho, where he often refers to the actions and experiences of Christ as 
those of God.  It should be noted that Eustathius may not have actually rejected the 
term later in his career; it is in many ways consistent with his insistence on the 
divinity of the Word and Theotokos was very widely used, including at Antioch 
324.
224
  At any rate, whilst Theotokos may be a reason for dating “the discourse on 
temptation” relatively early, and certainly before Nicaea, it is not a reason for 
rejecting the Eustathian authorship of the fragment.    
 
Oratio coram tota ecclesia and Secunda oratio coram tota ecclesia 
D119 is also attested in Greek in the thirteenth-century codex Florilegum 
Achridesse.  Both versions are said to come from a Eustathian work “on the church.”  
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The introduction to the Syriac D119 additionally references John 1.14 as a subject.  
As the fragment itself does not quote this verse, any mistake here is presumably 
accidental, and it is likely that John 1.14 was addressed.  Sellers objects to D119 on 
the basis that, in it, God suffers.  God the Word, in fact, is killed, so he also 
presumably dies.  This picture could hardly form a sharper contrast to Eustathius’ 
anti-Arian polemic, which attributes suffering to the human in contradistinction to 
the Word.
225
  However, as I will argue, it is evident from Engastrimytho that 
Eustathius’ Christology was not always sharply divisive.  In light of this, D119 looks 
less surprising; we may well imagine that Eustathius started out with a Christology in 
which Christ’s divinity suffered;
226
  Engastrimytho looks like a kind of bridge 
between Eustathius’ doctrine of God in Tota ecclesia and his doctrine of God in his 
anti-Arian works.  In Engastrimytho, the Word is often designated as the agent of 
Christ’s actions, but Eustathius nonetheless emphasises the omnipresence and 
transcendence of the Word of God at other moments.  The ground was prepared for 
an overt rejection of divine passibility in the ‘Arian’ controversy.  D118 is described 
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as “from the second discourse on the church.”  This second work may well build on 
themes from the first.  
 
These works all very probably predate the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ 
controversy.  Grillmeier and Declerck have both supposed this on the basis that their 
Christology is not strongly divisive as it is in Eustathius’ anti-‘Arian’ tracts.
227
  This 
is largely persuasive.  Admittedly, the problems of circular methodology apply in a 
particular way to writings that are not overtly polemical; as most Eustathian tracts 
which can be externally assessed as dating post-Nicaea are overtly anti-Arian, it is 
not clear how far Eustathius’ Christology changed as a result of the controversy and 
how much, alternatively, he had a different emphasis when engaging directly with 
pro-Arian opponents.  D117 and D119 focus on the crucifixion and their tone 
suggests a devotional emphasis on it rather than a strictly theological emphasis on 
unitive Christology.  Nonetheless, the contrast between the attitude to divine 
suffering in D119 and in Eustathius’ later work does suggest that this devotional tone 
had not yet been forced to be reflective about its implications for the unity of God of 
divinity of the Word.  If the title of the second discourse on the church may be taken 
at its word, it must postdate the first, but the two works might well be part of the 
same wider project.  Eustathius’ first work on the church can thus be dated prior to 
c318 with some confidence, and this is probably also true of his second. 
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De Hebraismo and In Joseph 
Only one fragment [D120] from the exegetical work designated De 
Hebraismo survives, and only two from In Joseph [D121, D122].  It is unclear 
whether the titles of these works are original: the In Joseph fragments are found in a 
fifth-century chain on Genesis.  Declerck speculates that it is possible either that the 
compiler had access to Eustathius’ works or that he was working from an existing 
dossier, which leaves the origin of the titles uncertain.
228
  The derivation of the 
phrase De Hebraisimo is similarly unclear.  In both cases, the titles refer to the 
subject of the very short passage that is preserved so, if the author quoting them was 
unsure of their derivation, these would be natural titles to add.  In particular, within a 




Two identical Greek fragments preserved in iconodule works are introduced 
as “Of Eustathius, the holy bishop of Antioch, from the writing on the Samaritan 
woman.”  This work is otherwise unattested.
229
  It is possible that the compilers were 
drawing on a single source, so the identical title does not confirm its authenticity.  
However, the passage quoted actually addresses 2 Corinthians 3.18, not the Gospel 
narrative about the Samaritan woman, again lending some weight to the title and at 
least suggesting that any mistake was accidental.  It is anyway unclear whether “On 




Sellers argues that the phrase τοῦ κυρίου παναγίαν σαρκα, which is found in 
this fragment [D123], is not Eustathian.
230
   Spanneut allows that the phrase is found 
nowhere else but does not find it surprising in Eustathius as he does use the term 
παναγίος, in a different context, and refers to Christ’s body as αγίος.  Furthermore, 
Spanneut argues, the “appropriation du corps par le Verbe” is common in Eustathius’ 
writings.  Spanneut does, however, suggest that the Christology is insufficiently 
divisive for the period after the outbreak of the controversy.
231
  Declerck counters 
that the image theology of D123 is similar to that in the Council of Antioch 324.
232
   
 
In his analysis, Spanneut, not unreasonably, considers this phrase with 
regards to its Christology.   If one is considering Christology from a purely 
mechanical standpoint, his claim that the theology implied in the phrase παναγίαν 
σαρκα echoes Eustathius is reasonable.  Eustathius very often refers to the Word 
taking up the human body. Spanneut’s suggestion that the fragment’s Christology is 
too monistic to post-date the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy also makes a lot of 
sense.  However, everything about Eustathius’ theology that confirms Spanneut’s 
suspicions also suggests that the phrase itself is not Eustathian: Eustathius often 
refers to Christ assuming not sarx but soma and, in the later writings especially, 
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tends to couple this with psuche: “Christ did not take up a body alone, but also a 
soul.”
233
  Despite a frequent emphasis on Christ’s assumption of the human body, it 
is only once signified by the term sarx in the extant writings, in the form of a quote 
of John 6.63: “the flesh profits nothing.”
234
  Declerck, in turn, fails to appreciate fully 
the strangeness of the phrase in Eustathius when he does not adequately address 
Spanneut’s discomfiture with fragment D123’s unitive phraseology as distinct from 
theology. 
 
Despite this, it is unclear that this phrase is not Eustathian because the 
emphasis in referring to Christ’s flesh is here ecclesiological, and specifically 
Eucharistic, more than Christological: most of the instances in which Eustathius 
refers to Christ’s body are explicitly Christological, and often aiming at clarity with 
regards to the mechanism of the incarnation.  Eustathius only uses the word παναγία 
in one other place; it is in Engastrimytho, and he writes about the “παναγία 
utterances” of the law, the prophets, and all the rest of scripture.  It has a sense of the 
sanctity and unity of scripture, which plausibly coheres with its use in Samaritan, if 
the Eucharistic context is taken to have an ecclesiological dimension. 
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Furthermore, the Eucharistic context of Eustathius’ writing in Samaritan is 
also a liturgical context.  This is a liturgical context in which sarx is used to refer to 
Christ’s body.  Eustathius’ use of the word here would be almost expected, even 
though he does not use it in other contexts. 
 
De Engastrimytho Contra Origenem 
Engastrimytho is an exegetical treatise on 1 Samuel 28:3-25 (LXX 1 
Kingdoms), attacking Origen’s exegesis of the passage.  Eustathius wrote it at the 
request of Eutropius of Adrianopolis.
235
  It evidently postdates the death of 
Methodius of Olympus in 311, as it refers to him as “one worthy of blessed 
memory.”
236
  In its current form, it is comprised of a reproduction of Origen’s 
otherwise lost exegetical treatise on 1 Samuel 28:3-25, probably altered, and 
Eustathius’ exegesis of the same passage.
237
  Declerck speculates that these two 
works were probably joined quite early.
238
  Whilst this text, which is the fullest 
example of Eustathian work, is outwith his dispute with the pro-Arians, it is not 
outwith a polemical context.  The main aim of Engastrimytho is to undermine 
Origen’s reading of the passage.  Margaret Mitchell has detailed the deliberately 
adversarial nature of Engastrimytho and the basis of its polemical manoeuvres in 
Hellenistic rhetoric.
239
  Frances Young sees it as emblematic of the fourth-century 
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“Antiochene reaction against Alexandrian allegory.”
240
  As I will demonstrate, this is 
a problematic understanding of the relationship between the two texts, if not their 
two authors. 
 
Young’s claim is part of the very wide tradition categorising Eustathius as an 
‘Antiochene’ exegete in varying degrees of contradistinction to ‘Alexandrian’ 
exegesis.
241
  Young’s own analysis contributes to a badly needed, and ongoing, 
reconsideration of these categories.  Earlier scholarship, and particularly the 
Germanic scholarship that has been concerned with Eustathius, had tended to equate 
‘Antiochene’ exegesis with ‘literal’ exegesis and ‘Alexandrian’ exegesis with a type 





Eustathius does explicitly attack Origen for ἀλληγορῆσαι in Engastrimytho, 
and similarly writes critically of allegory in Ariomanitas.
243
   He also expresses an 
intention of following τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας γράμμα – “the letter of the narrative.”
244
  
However, the category ‘literalist’, as it appears in authors such as Sellers, is 
unhelpful because it fails to appreciate the breadth and complexity of hermeneutic 
that could, in Eustathius’ view, be involved in an interpretation of scripture that 
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priveliged τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας γράμμα.  In line with Young’s analysis of ‘Antiochene 
exegesis’, he does often consider that scripture has a ‘typological’ meaning, taking 
figures in one part of scripture to be a kind of image of figures in another part, or to 
represent figures other than those named in the text (though Young has rightly 
questioned the wisdom of the term ‘typology’ as a descriptor).
245
  For example, he 
says that, in Isaiah 14, the prophet has “substituted the character of the Assyrian 
king” for the devil.
246
  Young’s reworked picture of ‘Antiochene exegesis’ is in large 
part descriptive of Eustathius’ method in Engastrimytho.   
 
However, as many scholars have observed, Origen seems readier to take the 
text at its word than Eustathius is: Origen believes that the witch really did see 
Samuel whilst Eustathius claims she is lying.
247
  With regard to exegetical method, 
this is primarily a very interesting observation about Origen.  Origen asserts the 
validity of allegorical exegesis to the exclusion of an historical reading for certain 
passages but declares that I Kingdoms 28 is not such a passage.
248
  Young’s analysis 
that Eustathius is reacting to “Alexandrian allegory” is therefore problematic, 
because the text to which Eustathius is reacting represents a point at which 
‘Alexandrian’ and ‘Antiochene’ exegesis meet.
249
  Because of this, Eustathius has a 
problem attacking Origen.  His strategy is to argue that Origen is wrong from every 
possible angle and, consequently, scholars have interpreted Engastrimytho diversely, 
largely through focusing on one of Eustathius’ arguments above others.  Eustathius’ 
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exegesis in this work is very often responding to Origen’s, and consequently 
threatens to undermine itself because, in its attempt to present Origen’s error as over-
determined, it fails to offer a single hermeneutic or coherent hermeneutical system. 
 
David Wallace-Hadrill argues that “the primacy of historical event as against 
that of the text narrating the event…is the burden of Eustathius’ attack upon Origen’s 
position.”
250
  He here draws on Spanneut’s argument that Eustathius prioritises the 
‘sense’ of scripture whilst attacking Origen for prioritising the word.
251
  Certainly, 
the necessity of interpreting specific historical events in a particular way in order to 
maintain the coherence of Scripture recurs throughout Engastrimytho.  For example, 
Eustathius emphasises the need for 1 Kingdoms 28 to cohere with the Levitical 
indictment of divination.
252
  However, this is additional, and supposedly 
complementary, to a word-by-word reading of the text before him, not alternative to 
it.  Although Eustathius claims that the witch did not really raise Samuel, he claims 
that she was lying; he bases his argument on the literal meaning of the narrator in 
contradistinction to the witch.
253
  As Young points out, he respects the “narrative 
coherence” of the text.
254
  Joseph Trigg claims that Eustathius either fails to 
appreciate or ignores Origen’s argument that the narrator asserts Samuel’s 
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  Trigg is right to criticise Eustathius on this point, but more because he 
does not do justice to Origen’s argument than because he does not address it. 
 
Important to Origen’s argument is the LXX’s claim that “Saul ἔγνω that it 
was Samuel”.  He reads ἔγνω as “knew” and asks: how can Samuel know what is not 
true?
256
  Eustathius gives a veritable arsenal of counter-arguments, many deliberately 
misrepresentative of Origen, but among these he defends the wording of the text.  
Eustathius interprets ἔγνω as referring to Saul’s perception: “and Saul, being out of 
his mind, believed, from what he had heard that this was Samuel himself.”
257
  He 
thus brings the dispute away from the mechanism of textual authority towards the 
epistemological connotations of the term ἔγνω.  This is coupled with another claim 
relying on the same hermeneutic: that everything suggesting that Samuel was raised 
is said in the voice of the necromancer, not the voice of the Holy Spirit.  In both 
cases, Eustathius attempts to give an argument that maintains the priority of the voice 
of the narrator in scriptural interpretation.
258
  Eustathius’ argument may not 
convince.  Nonetheless, in making it, Eustathius assumes that it is necessary to 
respect τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας γράμμα – “the letter of the narrative” – which he asserts to be 
his intention near the start of his treatise.
259
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Eustathius’ rejection of a certain kind of allegorical exegesis in 
Engastrimytho is an unreliable indication of his wider exegesis.  In Engastrimytho, 
he is refuting Origen, the great champion of allegorical exegesis and it would be 
natural for Eustathius to wish not to appear more allegorical than him.  We should 
not allow this to obscure an observation made in part by Young herself, and since 
advanced upon: it is often difficult to distinguish between typology, acceptable in the 
Antiochene school and allegory, associated with Alexandria.
260
  This is particularly 
so because, in order to claim that one set of events is an imprint of another, one must 
establish the order of the events that act as an imprint.  Attempts to distinguish 
between metaphorical exegesis that respects the internal structure of a given text – 
typology – and metaphorical exegesis that does not – allegory – remain in danger of 
assuming that there is an ‘obvious’ structure, which can be accessed without 
reference to a particular community in which a text is read.  This can still be a 
fruitful exercise, but is a dangerous exercise, which is significant for the purposes of 
establishing the authenticity or otherwise of putatively Eustathian works, especially 
in such a fragmented corpus. 
 
In Engastrimytho, Eustathius is primarily concerned not with exegesis – 
Origen’s method is not that different from his own here – but with the theological 
consequences of Origen’s reading of 1 Kingdoms 28: he is concerned at the idea that 
anyone other than God has the power to bring souls up from Hades.
261
  Trigg argues 
that Eustathius’ principal issue with Origen is Origen’s willingness to see Scripture 
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  This is not a principal concern of Engastrimytho, but in arguing 
that it is, Trigg makes a valuable observation.  He notes Eustathius’ particular 
concern that 1 Kingdoms cohere with the Mosaic indictment of divination.
263
  It is 
necessary to subjugate some texts to others in Biblical interpretation, and here 
Eustathius subjugates 1 Kingdoms 28 to Leviticus.  His motivation is theological.  
Young claims that Antiochene exegesis was concerned with the “overarching 
narrative of universal history.”
264
  This is true, but does not allow us to arrive at an 
understanding of Antiochene exegesis in which a given reading of a text is produced 
solely with reference to exegetical principles applied to the text in question.  This is 
because the criteria by which an event is integral to a narrative are subjective.  
Consequently, “the over-arching narrative of universal history” cannot be a starting 
point for exegesis, but only another fruitful concern raising further questions; it is 
difficult to see how one could determine which events were integral to a given 
narrative without appealing to theological principles determined by factors other than 
exegesis. 
 
Charles Kannengiesser argues that the ‘Arian crisis’ was “essentially one of 
hermeneutics.”
265
  In the ‘Arian’ controversy, theological presuppositions were at 
stake for Eustathius as they are in Engastrimytho.  Whilst scripture was central to 
these disputes, hermeneutics were not an independent factor in them, because the 
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sense of scripture is dependent on hermeneutics that are developed by particular 
communities in particular contexts, and influenced by these contexts; the role of 
scripture in theological discourse is therefore interdependent with the contexts in 
which it is read.  This is of primary importance in understanding Eustathius.  He will 
probably try to reconcile wider theological concerns, bound up with the thrust of 
Scripture, with the words of a particular passage.  This is the case, for example, in his 
interpretation of the term ἔγνω as referring to perception rather than knowledge.  He 
wants to argue that Saul did not see Samuel, but is determined to reconcile this with 
the claim that “Saul ἔγνω that it was Samuel”.  Origen, by contrast, declares that it is 
acceptable to overlook the “narrative sense” of a particular passage where this sense 
is unhelpful.  This is not a sentiment to which Eustathius is amenable;
266
  
nonetheless, the ‘words’ are not Eustathius’ primary concern; the necromancer’s 
inability to call up souls from Hades is. 
 
Young is right to offer the ‘sense’ as a hermeneutical priority, alternative to 
the “words”, to which Eustathius does hold.  In Ariomanitas, Eustathius shows 
himself to be keenly aware of apparent contradictions in scripture, and committed to 
finding the message of scripture in a wider consistency. Correspondingly, he often 
juxtaposes two opposing perspectives before bringing them to a wider synthesis.  For 
instance, he notes that Luke gives a different account of the thieves crucified next to 
Christ than Matthew and Mark; it is only in Luke that one of the thieves repents.  
Eustathius claims that Matthew and Mark describe both thieves initially 
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blaspheming, whilst Luke recounts the eventual repentance of one of them.
267
  
However, Eustathius’ commitment to the ‘sense’ of scripture should not obscure the 
fact that this ‘sense’ is necessarily partially dependent on a wider theological 
framework.  This is especially problematic when considering fragments as we cannot 
see how his exegesis develops. 
 
In addition to exegeting scripture along typological-allegorical lines, in 
Ariomanitas, Eustathius explicitly states that the most obvious meaning of a text will 
not always be sufficient to understand how the text fits together with the rest of 
scripture: “Everything that is demonstrated from the body of the text, one must take 
as a concrete reality.  However, whatever things receive referents to a more 
mysterious design, to these rightly allot their own manner.”  (Eustathius makes this 
claim in reconciling the divergent accounts of the thieves crucified with Christ in the 
synoptic gospels).
268
  We should not, therefore, read into his attack on Origen’s 
exegesis a purely ‘historical’ approach to scripture. 
 
In Melchisedek 
Whilst Bishop of Beroea, Eustathius wrote to Alexander of Alexandria, at his 
behest, about Melchizedek.  A fragment of his letter [D113] is preserved in a Syriac 
‘monophysite’ work written before c562.  Another three fragments [D114-116] are 
preserved in a fifth-century chain on Genesis.
269
  Fragment D115 is attested in four 
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additional places, two carrying attributions to Eustathius.
270
  A portion of it is found 
in a homily on Melchizedek attributed to John Chrysostom, in exactly the same form 
as in Florilegium Coislinianum secundum alphabeti litteras dispositum 
[Coislinianum] [D115b] and its Eustathian authorship has consequently often been 
rejected, including by Sellers.
271
  Berthold Altaner subsequently discovered that, 
elsewhere in Coislinianum, the entire fragment attributed to Chrysostom appears 
again.  However, here only the portion additional to the version of D115 found in the 
chain on Genesis [D115a] is attributed to Chrysostom.
272
  Therefore, as Declerck 
argues, the connection with the homily by pseudo-Chrysostom is no reason for 
rejecting the Eustathian authorship of D115. 
 
Fragment D113 is described as deriving from Eustathius’ letter to Alexander, 
Archbishop of Alexandria, on Melchizedek, and Jerome testifies to the existence of 
such a work.
273
  In the chain on Genesis, D114-D116 are all described as deriving 
from a work “on Melchizedek.”  All four fragments form part of the same discussion, 
in which Melchizedek is described as prefiguring Christ.  Sellers has also objected to 
the authenticity of most of these fragments on several dogmatic grounds.  D113, he 
says, confuses the natures of Christ, in contrast to Eustathius’ divisive Christology.  
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Sellers then objects that fragments D114 and D116b present Melchizedek as a 
“supernatural being” which was “surely not the opinion of Eustathius.”
275
  Sellers 
supports his incredulity with Jerome’s testimony.
276
  It is in itself possible that 
Jerome was being duplicitous in order to represent Eustathius favourably.  However, 
an examination of the extant fragments, including D115, vindicates Jerome.  In D115 
Eustathius claims that Melchizedek was, in fact, of Canaanite descent but that 
scripture does not so refer to him so as not to associate him with the immorality of 
the Canaanites: “it was most unsuitable to force together the man who had achieved 
the peak of righteousness for himself with the race who had achieved the peak of 
unrighteousness.”
277
  In D114, Eustathius notes what Hebrews says about 
Melchizedek; this he could hardly contradict.  He then explains precisely how it does 
not mean that Melchizedek had no parents.  A key argument in the extant fragments 
is that Melchizedek was not a supernatural entity, but a flesh and blood human. 
Sellers, it turns out, is right to trust Jerome, but wrong to allow this to lead him to 
reject the authenticity of D114; had he been aware of the authenticity of the other 
Melchizedek fragments, he would have been able to reconcile his view of Eustathius’ 
theology with the contents of D114.  
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Sellers’ first argument raises an important question which will bring us back 
to a consideration of Engastrimytho: is dyohypostatic Christology a basis for 
verifying Eustathian authorship? This would involve rejecting otherwise secure 
fragments and is dangerously circular given our incomplete picture of Eustathian 
theology.  As observed in the introduction, it has often been suggested that 
Eustathius’ Christology became more divisive with the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ 
controversy. 
 
A significant shift in Eustathius’ Christology is very clear.  As observed in 
the introduction, Grillmeier argued for a clear change in Eustathius’ Christology as a 
result of the ‘Arian’ controversy.  Engastrimytho gives a somewhat more nuanced 
picture of Eustathian Christology.  Eustathius often refers to Christ as “God” in this 
work.  For example, when referring to Christ’s temptation in the wilderness, 
Eustathius writes that Satan tempted Christ but that ὁ κύριος responded 
θεοπρεπῶς.
278
  Elsewhere in Engastrimytho, Eustathius does refer to Christ’s human 
soul in contradistinction to the Word and it here forms part of an argument for 
Christ’s divinity, broadly speaking.  This occurs in the context of Eustathius’ 
objection to Origen’s comparison between Samuel’s putative descent into hell and 
Christ’s.  Here, Eustathius claims, Origen speaks of Christ “as though speaking of a 
mere human being, and no longer having any regard for his divine nature.”
279
  
Eustathius goes on to give Christ’s human soul a central role in the salvation of the 
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  Christ’s human soul is able to save because it is “strengthened by 
divine power because of the constant association (συνουσίαν) of God the Word…”
281
  
In Engastrimytho, Eustathius implies a dyohypostatic Christology most strongly 
when talking about Christ’s soteriological role.  His simultaneous emphasis on 
Christ’s divinity in these soteriological passages might suggest that we should not 
read a unitive Christology into other references to Christ’s divinity.  It is clear, 
however, that before the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy, Eustathius wrote of 
Christ in ways that, out of context, appeared antecedent to Cyril of Alexandria rather 
than Nestorius.  We therefore cannot reject the Eustathian authorship of a fragment 
on the basis of apparently miahypostatic Christology. 
 
There is a difference in emphasis between Eustathian works before and after 
the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy.  However, especially where a fragment is 
difficult to date, using Christology to do so is circular; it assumes total discontinuity 
in Eustathius’ theology before and after Nicaea.  It also assumes that the passage of 
time and the events therein were the overriding factors in determining the nature of 
Eustathian work.  Christology is useful in dating fragments but can only be used in 
this capacity extremely cautiously. 
 
We may, then, safely assume that all three fragments putatively deriving from 
In Melchisedek are Eustathian.  I have already noted that Eustathius’ letter to 
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Alexander shows good relations between the two men before the ‘Arian’ controversy 
was in full swing.  It is worth considering that, aside from the controversy, these rosy 
relations between the Origenist Alexander, and the fiercely anti-Origenist Eustathius 
are a little surprising.  Might this suggest that, at the time that Eustathius wrote this 
letter, alliances were already forming? I have noted the probability of a longstanding 
alliance between Eustathius and his predecessors at Antioch, Vitalis and Philogonius 
respectively.  Perhaps Alexander, becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the 
possibility of a fight in which the Eusebian party would be his opponents, decided to 
make overtures to the Antiochenes.  Writing to Eustathius, who apparently already 
had a reputation as a formidable exegete, to ask his opinion on a difficult collection 
of scriptural passages would be a good way to do this.  This might place the date of 
this letter in the early 320s, or possibly just before.  D113 does, it is true, contain 
Christology that would be surprising in Eustathius, were he keenly aware of the pro-
Arian challenge: it is the Word who descended into the water (presumably at 
baptism).  Here, the Word is the active agent, whereas, in Eustathius’ anti-
subordinationist work, the Word almost exclusively bolsters and enables the human 
being’s agency.  It is tempting to suppose that this marks Melchisedek as a relatively 
early writing and set it against Alexander’s apparent offer of friendship to Eustathius, 
which suggests a slightly later date.  However, the Christology in Melchisedek 
closely echoes Engastrimytho, which was also probably written shortly before the 
outbreak of the controversy.  Furthermore, the brevity of the fragment makes it 
impossible to discern whether Eustathius qualified his remarks.  Therefore, I think 
we should take this work’s willingness to refer to the Word as the subject of Christ’s 
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action as a reflection on the lateness of his proto-Nestorianism, rather than the 
earliness of the work itself. 
  
Eustathius’ argument against the interpretation that Melchizedek actually had 
no parents is relatively unremarkable.
282
  Jerome claims that Origen, and Didymus, 
Origen’s assistant, believed that Melchizedek was a heavenly creature.
283
  Though 
we may suspect Jerome of being unfair on Origen, he could well have been drawing 
on a reading of Origen with which Eustathius was also familiar.  It is therefore 
possible that Eustathius’ letter to Alexander contains a veiled attack on Origen.  
More clearly, in arguing against a docetic understanding of Melchizedek, Eustathius 
argues against a docetic understanding of Christ.  Such a docetic understanding is 
something that he is later to attribute to his pro-Arian opponents, precisely because 
they fail to appreciate Christ’s full humanity: “Desiring to allegorise, they agree with 
Marcion’s followers, taking away everything around Christ’s business, so that all 
things were done in seeming and by a charade.”
284
  This may well be an indication of 
the fact that, in the correspondence between Eustathius and Alexander, the battle-
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Theodoret of Cyrus 
We come now to a large body of works preserved and attested at least 
partially in Theodoret of Cyrus.  Because of his importance to the Eustathian corpus, 
a brief comment is necessary.  There is very wide consensus on the authenticity of 
Theodoret’s citations.
285
  This is corroborated by the fact that much of what he 
quotes appears elsewhere.  The oft-noted exception is D133, which is identical to a 
writing by Didymus of Alexandria.
286
  Declerck argues that this false attribution was 
certainly accidental on Theodoret’s part: Didymus’ name would, after all, have been 
more impressive to Theodoret’s opponents than Eustathius’ was.
287
  Marcel Richard 
suggests that this mistake could have occurred because ‘Eustathians’ were interested 
in Didymus’ piece on the soul and so attached it to Eustathius’ work.
288
  It remains 
possible that Theodoret knew that the work was not Eustathian but did not know that 
it was by Didymus, in which case he would have had motive to lie in order to present 
Eustathius as author and, therefore, as favourable to his own Christology; this might 
be tempting if Theodoret were unaware that the true author of the work would, in 
fact, be more impressive.  However, this is highly speculative.  The picture painted 
by Richard and Declerck is more probable and a single false attribution is anyway 
insufficient to undermine Theodoret’s reliability substantially.  Unfortunately, 
Theodoret’s selection and framing of Eustathius’ work is less trustworthy for a 
scholar of Eustathian theology.  Theodoret was one of the main protagonists of the 
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‘Nestorian’ controversy and cites Eustathius as a precedent for pro-Nestorian views.  
This suggests that we should be a little cautious of the picture he gives us, though, as 
the epitome of Ariomanitas testifies, there is much truth in the depiction of 
Eustathius as proto-Nestorian.
289
   
 
It should also be noted that Theodoret here approaches his topic via 
anthropology, and therefore asks many of the same questions as I ask.  His selection 
is biased, but it does provide a wealth of material from which it is legitimate to draw 
cautious conclusions about Eustathius’ anthropology.  
 
Inscriptio titulorum 
There are several fragments apparently deriving from a Eustathian work on 
the Psalms which is difficult to date.  One fragment [D62] is preserved in 
Theodoret’s Eranistes.  Declerck suggests that a further two fragments [D63ab, 
D64c] are preserved in Collectio Coisliniana in Genesim.
290
  Fragment 64 is also 
reproduced in two separate ninth-century iconodule works by Nicephorus of 
Constantinople.  The introductions to these fragments vary but all carry attributions 
to Eustathius and include the claim that the fragment in question is taken from a 
writing τῆς στηλογραφίας.  Significantly, this phrase is found in Theodoret, who 
almost certainly had direct access to the work in question, and it seems to be 
presented as a title.  It seems likely that a Eustathian work of this title did exist. 
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Sellers has rejected the authenticity of the Collectio fragments because their 
exegesis is allegorical.
291
  As argued above, this argument is problematic, and 
allegorical/ typological exegesis is attested in Ariomanitas.  Spanneut has noted 
many Eustathian characteristics in these fragments.
292
  Declerck observes many 
further examples of distinctively Eustathian language.  For example, the incarnation 
is described as ναουργία.
293
  The Eustathian authorship of these fragments is 
therefore fairly certain. The titles introducing all three fragments appear to be 
variations of each other, and Inscriptio titulorum is not one of Eustathius’ better 
known works.  It is therefore likely that the two fragments in Collectio are, indeed, 
from the work cited by Theodoret, fragment D62. 
 
Declerck has noted a previously unattested fragment on Psalm 55 [D129] 
attributed to Eustathius in an eighth-century work.  He has convincingly established 
that the language and style of the fragment are Eustathian, and notes that, as 
Eustathian work was still circulating in the eighth century, the author plausibly had 
access to it.
294
  Declerck notes that fragment D129 could come from Inscriptio 
titulorum, but seems dubious.
295
  We must be aware of this possibility.  
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In Psalmum 92 
There are four extant fragments of this work, three preserved in Eranistes 
[D85-87], and one in Severus of Antioch [D88].  Severus selects a passage on the 
unity of God in order to persuade Sergius the grammarian that there must be some 
plurality of properties in Christ.
296
  This could imply that In Ps. 92 was relatively 
inoffensive to Severus, who would not wish to present Eustathius as Nestorian.  
However, Severus’ quotation is intended to emphasise division in Christ at least 
relative to his reader, and is also partly defiant in insisting that a passage, and even 
an interpretation of it, that lends itself to divisive Christology actually fits within a 
‘monophysite’ framework.  Severus’ use of these fragments does not undermine the 
impression that Theodoret would give us, that the work they derive from was 
basically dyohypostatic Christologically. 
 
It is difficult to date this work exactly; Sellers has argued that it must have 
been written before the controversy because it does not mention ‘Arian’ opponents, 
but this is a weak argument because, as Declerck notes, each fragment is quite 
short.
297
  It probably dates before Nicaea: in D88, Eustathius insists upon “one 
hypostasis” in God, which suggests that he is probably writing after the outbreak of 
the ‘Arian’ controversy.  Although, as we can establish from Engastrimytho, this 
phrase would have been perfectly consistent with his early doctrine of God, the 
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reference to “one hypostasis” is a specific and relatively technical articulation of 
divine unity that suggests this unity had been directly challenged.  However, the 
nature of Eustathius’ opponents is undefined.  Eustathius thus seems to have written 
In Ps. 92 when he was aware of a subordinationist theological challenge but did not 
yet regard it as a significant politico-ecclesial threat.  Sara Parvis argues that 
Alexander and his allies originally planned to hold the council that became Nicaea 
325 in Ancyra and to use it to exclude the ‘Eusebian’ party; this changed when 
Constantine hijacked the council.
298
  In this case, Eustathius may not have been as 
worried by the Eusebian party before 325.  It is plausible that Eustathius is writing in 
response Alexander’s letter, He Philarchos.  Eustathius’ θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ is a logical 
response to Alexander’s claim that Arius taught that the Son was not the Son of God 
“by nature”, although, as X from X language was used in diverse ways by theological 
opponents in the ‘Arian controversy’, it was not necessarily a successful response.
299
  
Given the fragmentary nature of the sources, this dating must remain speculative. 
 
In inscriptiones Psalmorum graduum 
Three fragments from a work on psalms 119-133 are preserved in Eranistes, 
and Abramowski posited an additional Syriac fragment [D84] ostensibly from a work 
on the psalms.  It is found with four other ostensibly Eustathian fragments in a pro-
Nestorian florilege containing some works of Gregory of Nazianzus and is quoted to 
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demonstrate Eustathius’ support for dyohypostatic Christology.
300
  Declerck finds its 
putative origin plausible.
301
  Two of the fragments preserved in Gregor-Scholien are 
attested, as Eustathian fragments, in another Syriac translation, which renders the 
claim of their Eustathian authorship reasonably reliable.
302
 Declerck notes that, 
although subordinationism is not overtly mentioned, Eustathius refers to Christ’s 
glory in a manner very similar to that in Contra Arianos, and consequently dates this 
work after 320.
303
  The tone is very similar to In Ps. 92, so it seems likely that this 
works dates 320-325.  We should note that all of the fragments from this work are 
preserved by those who wish to present Eustathius as Nestorian. 
 
Contra Ariomanitas et de anima 
The nature of this work was contested in earlier scholarship.  Cavallera, 
among others, argued that it was a single work divided into two parts, the first 
addressing the relationship between the body and the soul and the second refuting 
‘Arian’ logos-sarx Christology.
304
  Sellers and Spanneut have both posited two 
separate works, de anima contra philosophos and de anima contra arianos.  In this 
case, the former would have been written before the ‘Arian’ controversy began.
305
  
These arguments are interesting in themselves but have been superseded by 
Declerck.  He has established that pseudo-Nyssene ἐπιτομὴ τοῦ κατὰ Ἀρειομανιτῶν 
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βιβλίου καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς is in fact a compilation of extracts from the Eustathian 
Contra Ariomanitas, thereby demonstrating that it is a single work.
306
  This 
discovery adds many new fragments to Ariomanitas but is incontrovertible; pseudo-
Gregory contains many fragments attested elsewhere and generally accepted as part 
of Ariomanitas, including many preserved by Theodoret. 
 
Cavallera suggested that fragment D151 may come from de anima which, 
within Declerck’s newly established framework, would make it part of 
Ariomanitas.
307
  Declerck rejects the Eustathian authorship of D151, acknowledging 
that its contents would fit but arguing that the language and style are untypical of 
Eustathius.  He allows an exception to this in the phrase κατὰ τῆν τοῦ Δαυῒδ 
ὑμνολογίαν.
308
  Declerck is right that the syntax of this fragment is unusually simple 
for Eustathius, but, in a relatively short extract, a few surprisingly banal phrases are 
insufficient to establish that the text is apocryphal.  D151 could be Eustathian, but, 
even if it is, any connection with Ariomanitas must remain speculative. 
 
Declerck argues that a Eustathian follower, wishing to spread Eustathius’ 
ideas, added Gregory’s name to the text because he was a less controversial figure 
but had good relations with the Eustathian community in Antioch and was a 
sufficiently noteworthy name to draw attention to the text.
309
  This is plausible.  In 
this case, the work’s title, as attached to the epitome - κατὰ Ἀρειομανιτῶν βιβλίου 
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καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς - may have been added with the false attribution to Gregory of Nyssa.  
However, it is more likely to be Eustathius’ own, because the term ‘Ariomanitas’ 
probably is.  It is probably an earlier designation than ‘Arianism’, which it in some 
ways resembles.  The word ‘Ariomanitas’ is, as Parvis notes, a pun on Aries, the god 
of war: in using it, Eustathius dubs his opponents as ‘those stirring up war around 
Arius’ rather than ‘followers of Arius.’
310
  The conception of the Eusebian alliance as 
‘followers of Arius’ is made typical by Athanasius’ deliberate construction of the 
heresy of ‘Arianism’ in his Orations against the Arians.
311
  ‘Ariomanitas’ is a 
criticism that does not give Arius himself the same status. 
 
It is possible that Eustathius was a principal source of the Orations’ 
conception of Arianism; Lewis Ayres plausibly suggests that the ‘construction of 
Arianism’ began with Eustathius and Marcellus, and that they influenced 
Athanasius.
312
  There was opportunity for this to occur, as all three were present at 
Nicaea.  It would fit with Parvis’ thesis that Marcellus and Athanasius constructed 
‘Arianism’ together whilst in Rome.
313
  Fought over as it was in heresiological 
disputes, one would expect references to ‘Arianism’’ as a clearly-defined 
heresiological school to be well-represented by all those selecting the fragments, so 
we can, for once, trust the sources available to us in their relative scarcity of 
references to ‘Arianism’. This conception of Ariomanitas is partially borne out by the 
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text; within it, Eustathius, clearly constructs a narrative in which a particular, 
coherent group of people promote subordinationism, trying to advance it within the 
church.  According to Ariomanitas, these people have not only a unified aim, but a 
unified strategy.  This is evident in fragment D19.  A relatively short version of this 
fragment [D19b] is preserved by Theodoret, and hints at a sense of deliberate 
intrigue: 
Why do they consider it so important to show that Christ took up a 
soulless body, forming old wives deceptions? In order that, if they 
may be able to gradually corrupt some people, decreeing that 
these things are so, in this case having attached the alterations 
involved in passions to the divine Spirit, they might easily 
persuade them, as the mutable is not begotten from the nature of 
the immutable. 
 
This passage from Theodoret is elucidated by the longer (though probably less 
accurate) fragment from the epitome (D19a), of which I take a section: 
…they not only declare that the child of God was half god, but 
also [that he was] half human.  And they do this in order that, 
having attached the alterations involved in passions to the divine 
spirit, they might seduce the simpler people recklessly, as the 
mutable is not begotten from the nature of the immutable.  For if 
someone should grant to them that Christ did not take up a soul, 
they reply: ‘What then is the thing dwelling inside the tabernacle 
that is passionately grieved?
314
 Isn’t it the very Spirit of wisdom? 
And if it is grieved and cries and becomes tired, it is capable of 
passions.  And if it undergoes passion and changes, how then may 





There is no reason to doubt that this is roughly how Eustathius’ original text 
continued; Theodoret quotes the fragment in order to establish the immutability of 
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the Word, so he had already said what was most useful to him.  We have, then, the 
seeds of Athanasius’ narrative of Arianism: a unified, self-aware, calculating and 
duplicitous ecclesial-political faction promoting subordinationism and trying to lure 
the wider church away from ‘orthodoxy.’  However, certain aspects of Athanasius’ 
mature narrative are missing: Arius is not mentioned in Ariomanitas, and the word 
‘Ariomanitas’ only appears there four times.
316
  Eustathius probably did influence the 
Athanasian conception of ‘Arianism’, but Athanasius and Marcellus probably 
developed it further. 
 
This text clearly post-dates Nicaea: it is here that Eustathius accuses his 
opponents of anathematising themselves because they are denying doctrines which 
they had “agreed to in the assembly.”
317
  Eustathius refers on two other occasions to 
the doctrines enshrined in the Creed of Nicaea.  It therefore seems likely that Nicaea 
was important to the ‘Arian’ controversy in its immediate aftermath, or that 
Eustathius was trying to make it important.
318
  The implication that the pro-Arians 
are causing war in the church immediately after the Council of Nicaea supports 
Parvis’ thesis that Eustathius felt that Alexander’s cohort had failed to control the 
Eusebian party at the council.
319
  Apparently, Eustathius began to see the Eusebian 
alliance as a serious politico-ecclesial threat.  This attitude could plausibly 
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accompany either Eustathius’ attack on ‘pro-Arians’ in his see directly after Nicaea 
or the machinations of the pro-Arian party that led to Eustathius’ deposition.  It is 
therefore difficult to place within this period. 
 
Eusebius of Caesarea and Theodotus of Laodicaea are probably Eustathius’ 
particular targets in Ariomanitas.  We know that Eustathius engaged in a pamphlet 
war with Eusebius around the time of writing.
320
 
    
Certain passages within Ariomanitas seem to be particularly directed against 
Eusebius of Caesarea.  Specifically, there are passages that attack putative Platonism 
explicitly.  Admittedly, this may be a wider attack on what Eustathius perceived as 
Platonising tendencies within his opponents’ thought systems.  This would be 
congruent, after all, with his sustained attack on Origen in Engastrimytho.
321
  
Nonetheless, some passages seem to address specifically Eusebius’ Preparatio 
Evangelica.  These concern Plato’s doctrine of the soul.  Eustathius attacks Plato 
both for his belief in the transmigration of souls and for his belief in the unoriginated 
nature of souls.  Both of these criticisms were made by Eusebius of Caesarea, 
Eustathius’ fierce rival, in Praeparatio Evangelica, as a codicil to his generally 
positive attitude to Plato. 
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Furthermore, Eustathius follows Eusebius in saying that the idea of 
transmigration comes from Egyptian thought.
322
  There are several reasons to think 
that Eustathius got this directly from Eusebius: firstly, Eustathius incorporates the 
claim about Egyptian derivation into a passage that paraphrases Irenaeus, who 
himself does not mention it.
323
  Secondly, in Eusebius, the Egyptian origin of belief 
in transmigration acts as an excuse for Plato because it suggests that it is alien to his 
mode of thought.  This function is redundant in Eustathius, who never claims to like 
Plato.  He doesn’t want to excuse Plato.  Eustathius brings up the Egyptian myths 
because he is quoting Eusebius’ own words back at him and arguing that Eusebius’ 
theology in fact does imply Platonism.  Additionally, several passages in 
Ariomanitas draw heavily, and in detail, on ancient physiology and medicine.  Kelley 
Spoerl has recently argued that this is because Eustathius is aiming partly at 
Theodotus, who was a doctor, and a close associate of Eusebius.
324
  This is a 
plausible explanation of Eustathius’ focus on physiology, and complements the 
evidence pointing towards Eusebius of Caesarea as Eustathius’ main target in this 
work. 
 
This work aims not just at pro-Arianism, but at logos-sarx Christology, which 
is hardly unique to it.  (Here, the term ‘logos-sarx Christology’ refers to the idea that 
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the Word took up a body/ flesh without a soul).
325
  One of the primary reasons for 
this is probably revealed in the above-quoted D19ab, as Hanson has argued.
326
  If the 
Word is the subject of passion in Christ, the Word is not really God.  However, 
Eustathius’ disagreement with his opponents on this point must be rather more 
complex than Hanson allows, partly because Hanson’s reconstruction of pro-Arian 
theology as one based on the suffering of the Word is unpersuasive.  This is a 
reconstruction that he shares with Maurice Wiles. 
 
Certainly, a clearly articulated logos-sarx Christology is normative among all 
those whom Ayres identifies as “Eusebian theologians of the One Unbegotten”, 
including in Eusebius of Caesarea himself.
327
  The accusation that pro-Arian or 
Eusebian theology teaches that the Word is passible, and, specifically, suffers, can be 
found in several places.
328
  However, a concern with the Word’s suffering, is barely 
evidenced in what remains of pro-Arian writings.  For example, it is nowhere 
mentioned Arius’ Thalia, which is primarily concerned with the relationship between 
the Son and the Father, and the metaphysical questions pertaining to it (rather than 
soteriological ones).
329
  One of the key pieces of evidence cited by Hanson is the 
Homilies on the Psalms, which first Marcel Richard, and subsequently Wiles and 
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Gregg had attributed to Asterius the Sophist.
330
  These homilies are, admittedly, 
concerned with the suffering of God.  However, Wolfram Kinzig argued persuasively 
against the thesis that their author was coming from a subordinationist position.
331
  
The Homilies, if anything, rather undermine the Hanson-Wiles thesis, in that they 
probably date from the fourth century, but don’t seem amenable to a ‘Eusebian’ 
theological position. 
 
The most famous example of an explicit connection between logos-sarx 
Christology and the Word’s suffering is the creed generally attributed to Eudoxius 
(c300-370), bishop of Antioch and then Constantinople (This creed must 
substantially postdate Ariomanitas):
332
 “the whole person was one, composite nature.  
He was passible through the economy, for, if only soul and body had suffered, he 
could not have saved the world.  Let them answer, then, how this passible and mortal 
person could be of one substance with God who is beyond these things: suffering and 
death.”
333
  Hanson and Wiles have magnified the importance of an idea, but they 
have not altogether invented it.  Eustathius was almost certainly writing before the 
production of this creed, but it illustrates a lot of what he is worrying about.  Hanson, 
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as noted, also cites Eustathius’ fragment D19 in evidence, and he is justified in doing 
so.  Eustathius is not in general a reliable source for pro-Arian theology, but in this 
case we may trust that he is recording a real phenomenon; otherwise he has written 
an entire anti-Arian work that has no bearing on pro-Arian theology.
334
  The 
existence of the Eudoxian Creed renders it perfectly plausible that a similar take on 
strongly subordinationist theology existed in the earlier portion of the ‘Arian’ 
controversy.  It must, furthermore, be admitted that an interest in the Word’s creation 
in time is perfectly consistent with a concern for his passibility in time and, in 
arguing against Hanson’s thesis, we are making arguments from the omission of an 
idea from a very fragmented corpus. 
 
Nonetheless, Eustathius’ focus on this relatively insignificant element of pro-
Arian theology does not seem to be merited by pro-Arian theology itself, and must be 
sought elsewhere. 
  
Eusebius of Caesarea, whom I have identified as a primary target of 
Ariomanitas, is himself rather circumspect about the Word becoming passible in the 
incarnation; though he subordinates the Word to the Father in a way that allies him 
with Arius, he tends nonetheless to see the Word as impassible, arguing that the 
Word was unconstrained in the incarnation.  For example, he writes that the Word 
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“shared what belonged to him, but did not receive what belonged to others.”
335
  This 
might well suggest that Ariomanitas is also aimed at other pro-Arian theologians of a 
rather different stripe to Eusebius – the elusive figures who adhered to the passibility 
of the Word in the incarnation.  However, I do not think it right to conclude that 
others are the main targets of this work, whilst the sections aimed specifically at 
Eusebius are asides jibing the man with whom Eustathius was engaging in a 
polemical writing match elsewhere.  Rather, Eusebius is a target in Eustathius’ attack 
on theopaschite logos-sarx theology partly because Eustathius’ own anthropology 
leads him sincerely to see divine passibility implied in logos-sarx Christology.  His 
attack on Eusebius in Ariomanitas suggests that he has misunderstood Eusebius, but 
not necessarily to the extent of believing that Eusebius trumpeted a suffering God – 
rather, in assuming that he must believe in one despite himself.  Eustathius accuses 
Eusebius of allying himself with those who do think that the Word suffered in the 
incarnation, and therefore hopes to elucidate the danger involved in pro-Arian 
theology. 
 
We can better appreciate how it is that Eustathius saw such a theology, so 
clearly, in the theology of Eusebius if we appreciate his conception of the soul.  This 
topic is discussed extensively in chapter 3, and a brief sketch suffices for the 
moment.  Eustathius regards the soul as passible.  Where the Word is said to suffer 
“through the economy”, as in the Eudoxian Creed, this is a heightened version of the 
idea that the soul suffers through the body.  For Eustathius, the vivifying principle in 
a human being must be passible in itself, because this is how human passions work.  
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Logos-sarx Christology therefore immediately leads to either the native passibility of 
the Word, or docetism.  So, Eustathius lays out the conceptual options for Christ’s 
suffering as follows: 
 
What…is a better explanation?  To say that the body suffers apart 
from the soul, whilst it is not able to obtain for itself, according to 
itself, one sensible perception? Or that a mutable thing and the 
divine Spirit are constrained to be in harmony? Or that a soul is 
joined together with the body? Or he suffered in seeming and not 
in truth all the things at to the time of suffering, and before the 





Eustathius, it should be noted, must have been aware that many of his allies also 
espoused logos-sarx Christologies and, evidently, ignores this fact in Ariomanitas.  
This confirms what the title, together with the context of the text would suggest – 
that his immediate concern for the doctrine of God is primary in Ariomanitas, 






The authorship of these fragments is virtually uncontested.  The nature and 
length of the work is, however, uncertain. Theodoret cites nine fragments from 
Contra Arianos in Pentalogos, the Greek original of which is now lost; the work is, 
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however, preserved in Latin, having been appended to Pope Gelasius’ De duabus in 
Christo naturis.  Other fragments appear in Latin in Facundus Hermian, an anti-
monophysite work from c547, and in Doctrina Patrum, a late seventh-century 
heresiological catalogue with a strong anti-monophysite thrust for which Gelasius 
was probably the source.  Three short fragments were quoted by Eulogius of 
Alexandria and preserved, in turn, by Photius.  Photius reports that he found them in 
a work divided into two parts; the first half was a defence of the Tome of Leo, the 
second half a critique of what Severus of Antioch and Timothy Aelurus had said 
about the Tome.
338
  These fragments were, therefore, also selected to support an anti-
monophysite agenda.  One fragment is preserved in John of Damascus’s Sacra 
Parallela.  Most of these fragments have thus been chosen by people wishing to 
emphasise divisive Christology.   
 
In Proverbia 8:22 
What remains of this work is preserved almost entirely in Theodoret, across 
all three sections of Eranistes and, in the case of one fragment [D79], in Historia 
Ecclesiastica.  Theodoret’s interest in this text is unsurprising.  From De Fide, it is 
clear that Eustathius argued against the ‘pro-Arian’ application of the phrase “the 
lord created me…” to the Word by applying it to Christ’s humanity.
339
  This results 
in extremely divisive Christology evidenced in the fragments of In Proverbia 8:22 
[Proverbia 8:22].
340
  Theodoret, however, has removed it from its defensive 
exegetical context.  Two further fragments from this work [D80, D81] are preserved 
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in a Syriac work.  Two of the fragments in Theodoret are attested elsewhere; D65 
and D70, which Spanneut noticed in a twelfth-century chain on Luke’s Gospel.
341
  
Additionally, Gregory-Scholien cites two of its five fragments as from this work 
[D80, D81b].  The further two follow directly, noting only “from the same.”
342
  
Declerck wonders whether the latter two are also from Proverbia 8:22 but notes that 
there is no real evidence that they are.
343
  Whilst it is possible that these fragments 
are from Proverbia 8.22, the weight of the evidence is against this possibility; whilst 
the introduction to D81b asserts that it is “from the same, from the same book” D124 
is introduced only as “from the same” and D126 says “from the same Mar 
Eustathius.”  “From the same” refers specifically to Eustathius and not the work of 
origin in the case of D81b, suggesting it may well in the latter two instances.  
Further, the two later fragments, though brief, do seem less emphatic about 
dyohypostatic Christology than Proverbia 8:22.  As they are very short, this 
observation cannot be grounds for concluding that they are not from Proverbia 8.22, 
but it is, on balance, improbable.  This work was certainly written after Nicaea, 
because, as I argued in chapter 1, fragment D79 complains about the pro-Arians 
duplicity there. 
 
Loofs speculated that Proverbia 8:22 may form part of Contra Arianos and 
Cavallera suggested that it and De Fide were a single work.
344
  Neither suggestion is 




 C.f. D65. 
341
 Spanneut, “Hippolyte ou Eustathe? Autour de la Chaîne de Nicétas sur l’Évangile selon saint Luc”, 
Mélanges de science religieuse, 9 (1952), 215-216. 
342
 C.f. Abramawoksi’s text, pp.145-6 [Syriac], p.166 [Latin translation]. 
343
 Declerck, Eustathii, p.CCXII. 
344
 Loofs, “Eustathius”, p.627, Cavallera, Homilia, p.77. See below. 
126 
 
entirely impossible but both are unlikely: Proverbs 8:22 is evidently a focus of much 
of Eustathius’ anti-‘Arian’ writing as it was a central passage in the Trinitarian 
controversies.  Consequently, scholars have sometimes been tempted to amalgamate 
different anti-‘Arian’ tracts; whilst all three works cohere theologically, Proverbia 
8:22 is markedly different in tone, focusing more on God’s nature and attributes, 
particularly with reference to metaphysical questions, than Christ’s place in 
soteriology.
345
  It is also likely that several works that could be circulated fairly 
rapidly would be more useful to Alexander’s alliance in the period c325-327 than a 
few monolithic works. 
 
De Fide Contra Arianos 
Severus of Antioch preserved four fragments from a single anti-‘Arian’ 
writing in a work against John the Grammarian.  He introduces D109 as an extract 
from the work Eustathius wrote “against the Arians on the faith” and each successive 
fragment he introduces with the phrase “from the same” making a further reference 
to writing “against the Arians” before D110. Here Severus argues that Eustathius’ 
apparent Nestorianism is the consequence of his anti-Arian context.
346
  He therefore 
quotes Eustathius referring to ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Χριστοῦ in order to establish that 
there was not a time when the Word was not.  These fragments are uncontested.  
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Cavallera and Spanneut argue that the otherwise unplaceable D128, preserved in The 
Chain of Polychronius on Proverbs is part of the same work because D110 appears 
to be a slightly different version of the opening lines of the longer D128.
347
  Declerck 
is unconvinced, arguing that only the first phrase resembles an exact translation.  
However, Declerck’s normally excellent linguistic analysis is less reliable here 
because he is looking at a translation from Syriac.  Spanneut’s theory is fairly 
persuasive: D110 seems to be at least a very close paraphrase of D128.  The 
argument produced by amalgamating D128 and D110 is also typical of Eustathius’ 
anti-‘Arian’ theology.  Having quoted Proverbs 8:22 and applied it to Christ’s 
humanity, D128 focuses on the soteriological value of Christ’s humanity.  As 
Scheidweiler notes, this is a typical implication of ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, which is 
used in the Syriac fragment.
348
  The thrust of De Fide, if D128 is included, is similar 
to the Eustathius we see elsewhere, such as in Contra Arianos, D93.  D128 is 
therefore probably part of the same work as D109-D112.  It is therefore necessary to 
amend Declerck’s order of the fragments to insert D128 between D110 and D111. 
 
Cavallera argued that these fragments were part of Proverbia 8:22 on the 
basis of their concern with this passage.
349
  Spanneut notes this view but reserves 
judgement.
350
  He considers that De Fide and Contra Arianos may be the same 
work.
351
  Severus does not reference such a work in introducing them.  Cavallera is 
unaware of D109, and its introductory note “on the faith”, which has provided an 
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alternative title.  Declerck seems to regard the introduction as proof that that they 
come from a work titled De Fide Contra Arianos.
352
 The reference to “the faith” is 
not as conclusive as Declerck seems to think as it could plausibly be a description of 
either Proverbia 8:22 or Contra Arianos.  As noted above, the fragments designated 
De Fide carry a different emphasis to Proverbia 8:22; if this is not a separate work, it 
is more likely to be part of Contra Arianos.  The title of this work is uncertain. 
 
Miscellany 
Two other fragments attributed to Eustathius [D139, D140] appear in Chain 
of Polychronius on Ecclesiastes.  Whilst the compiler of Polychronius on Proverbs 
clearly did have some access to Eustathian writings, his attributions to Eustathius 
have proved unreliable.
353
  These fragments are controverted in modern scholarship. 
Sellers is dubious about them because they appear in the frequently unreliable 
catenae.
354
  Spanneut saw insufficient reason to reject them whilst Declerck, though 
eschewing Sellers’ method, agrees with him on this point.
355
  Declerck’s argument is 
convincing: in the considerable manuscript evidence for these fragments, D139 is 
rarely attributed to Eustathius, and D140 is in fact an amalgamation of two phrases 
from Gregory of Nyssa.
356
  As many Eustathian works have been confused with 
Gregory’s works, further misattributions become more probable.  Declerck’s 
observation about D140 thus gives a plausible explanation for how the fragment 
                                                                                                                                          
351
 Spanneut, “Eustathe d’Antioche”, col. 20. 
352
 Declerck, Eustathii, p.CCCCXI . 
353
 See above on In Proverbia, p.10. 
354
 Sellers, Eustathius, pp.70-71. 
355
 Spanneut Recherches p.51, p.81; Declerck, Eustathii, p.CCLIV. 
356
 Declerck, Eustathii, p.CCLIV. 
129 
 




We have evidence of eight Eustathian works probably dating from before the 
‘Arian’ controversy, one – Melchisedek – as it was about to break out, and two from 
c320-325 and either three or four works probably written between c325-327, as the 
separate identity of De Fide and Contra Arianos is unclear.  Inscriptio titulorum is 
undatable, and there are additionally several miscellaneous fragments.  It is very 
unlikely that any of the surviving writings were written after Eustathius left Antioch.  
The exegetical emphasis of Eustathius’ earlier career is central to his anti-Arian 
polemic. 
 
I can now construct a methodology on the basis of which to proceed.  
Evidently, the emphasis that a particular extract appears to carry is an unreliable 
indication of Eustathius’ focus.  Where it was most useful to those preserving the 
fragments, the arguments presented may be subsidiary to the thread of Eustathius’ 
original narrative.  Where many fragments from a writing remain, we can cautiously 
piece together the thrust of an argument.  This method is most reliable and useful 
where a particular treatise is preserved in multiple works, so that no one individual 
has presented it.  Nonetheless, it should be noted that Theodoret of Cyrus does not 
intend an exposition of Eustathius’ work; whilst he must have been concerned to 
present Eustathius as consistent, he is not primarily attempting to present the full 
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arguments of the works that he quotes.  Therefore, although Theodoret’s selection of 
subject-matter will considerably skew the thrust of the narrative, we should not 
assume that any apparent structure is deliberately constructed, irrespective of the 
faithfulness of any construction to Eustathius. 
 
There was a marked shift in Eustathius’ Christology as a result of the ‘Arian’ 
controversy but how much this signals a change of mind rather than emphasis is 
unclear because of the circumstances in which the sources were selected.  Both 
Theodoret and his ‘monophysite’ opponents focused on very specific arguments in 
Eustathius, but the fragments point towards more theological richness in the 
complete writings.  This is significant for the way we use Eustathian Christology to 
construct his conception of the relationship between the human body and soul.  As 
anthropology was not a key factor in determining that he develop a divisive 
Christology, we can best understand his anthropology by looking for continuity in 
the anthropological implications of his Christology.  As his tone is overwhelmingly 
polemical, and divisive Christology is at least partly a defensive manoeuvre, I shall 
be cautious in constructing theological systems around bold Christological 
statements, especially in short extracts where we cannot tell how his argument 
develops. 
 
Regarding theological anthropology, elements of Eustathius’ theology that do 
not appear to be directly combative of pro-Arian doctrine are more significant; whilst 
Eustathius did, apparently, incorporate the conclusions of his defensive arguments 
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into his wider theology to some extent, Engastrimytho shows us that, in polemic, 
Eustathius tended to make bold statements without fully integrating their 
implications into his wider theology.  Arguments that are directly defensive, such as 
Eustathian exegesis of Proverbs 8:22, are less significant than they otherwise might 
have been.  I have observed substantial continuity in Eustathius’ theology before and 
after the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy; my examination of Engastrimytho 
suggests that Eustathius narrowed the range of ways in which he described 
Christology after c322, more than developing a fresh understanding.  Therefore, I 
will look for common threads across different periods of Eustathius’ life in order to 





































Chapter 3: Body and soul in Eustathius’ anthropology 
This chapter examines the human body and soul, and the relationship 
between them, in Eustathius’ thought. 
 
Eustathius showed a keen interest in the nature of the human soul, and its 
relationship to the human body, in Ariomanitas, where his argument against logos-
sarx Christology is overridingly anthropological.
357
  Eustathius’ conception of the 
soul and body is, correspondingly, well thought-out and broadly coherent. This 
chapter argues that this conception remained remarkably consistent in the face of 
significant changes to his Christology and for this reason I have approached it 
thematically rather than chronologically. 
 
First, I consider Eustathius’ conception of the body and soul and their 
interaction with regard to human action.  Eustathius’ anthropology is, consistently, 
literally dualistic in the sense that the body and soul are composed of different, and 
even radically opposed, substances.  This dualism draws specifically on categories 
typical of Platonic metaphysics – intelligible and perceptible.  However, the agency 
of body and soul is extremely integrated in his account of human action and 
Eustathius often describes the interrelation of body and soul in terms that echo an 





His view of body-soul interaction owes more to Aristotle than to Plato, 
though we can only appreciate how this is so if we also appreciate the complex 
relationship between Platonism and Aristotelianism in late antique readings of them.  
When referring to Platonism and Aristotelianism here, I refer to strands of thought 
that can be identified either in Plato and Aristotle respectively, or in those who 
avowedly draw on them.  In reference to Platonism, I am here chiefly concerned with 
the use of ‘perceptible’ and ‘intelligible’ as central metaphysical categories.  With 
regards to body-soul relations, I take it that, in Platonism, the body is perceptible, the 
soul is intelligible.
358
 With reference to Aristotelianism, I am chiefly concerned with 
its fairly integrated account of the relationship between body and soul and its 
tendency to see this relationship as that of matter to form.
359
  Unless otherwise stated, 
it is to these features of Platonism and Aristotelianism that I am referring.
360
  
Eustathius has both a strong sense of the distinction of body and soul and a strong 
sense of the unity of the person.  He often suggests that the body and soul together 
comprise the agent in the person, which problematises a purely dualistic account.  
Eustathius’ attempts to reconcile substance dualism with hylomorphism may echo 
Aristotle himself and certainly reflect various contemporary efforts to synthesise 
Aristotle’s thought with Plato’s. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
357
 See my discussion on the nature of Ariomanitas, and the scholarship surrounding it, in chapter 2. 
358
 C.f. Richard Norris, Manhood and Christ: a study in the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963), p.11. 
359
 Herbert Granger has a detailed discussion on this aspect of Aristotle’s account of body-soul 
relations in his Aristotle’s idea of the soul, Philosophical Studies Series 68 (Dordrecht, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1996).  See also below. 
360
 I identify other, highly related, areas in which Eustathius draws on Aristotelianism – for example, 
in physiology; again, the term ‘Aristotelian’ in these cases refers to ideas identified in Aristotle or 
those avowedly drawing on him.  Parallel passages in Aristotle are noted. 
135 
 
I then consider body and soul in relation to the passions (πάθος).  By 
passions, I mean emotions, including both psychological experiences of, for 
example, suffering and feelings of physical need and desire.  This requires separate 
treatment largely because of its singular importance to Eustathian anthropology.  For 
Eustathius, both body and soul undergo passions in their own right and also 
appropriately – in contrast to Platonism.
361
  Further, Eustathius considers the whole 
range of human emotions, including grief, as ethically appropriate. 
 
I then examine Eustathius’ picture of the disembodied soul.  His account of 
the disembodied soul, inevitably, offers a much more divisive picture of human 
agency than is found in other aspects of his anthropology, but largely maintains an 
integrated approach to human identity.  His conception of the resurrection shows 
both a physically-affirming attitude, and, more specifically, a conception of the body 
and soul as integrated in the human person. 
 
Eustathius’ ideas on the body and the soul often echo both Irenaeus and 
Methodius and several times he seems to be positioned with Methodius, directly 
against Origen. Pointedly, Eustathius agrees with Methodius that embodiment is not 
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 The term ‘passion’, Greek pathos, roughly signifies emotions but can denote a range of things 
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the cause of sin, and also more generally in seeing the body as intrinsically good.  
However, his descriptions of the soul owe a lot to Origen.  In some ways, this reflects 
Origen’s not insignificant influence on Methodius himself, but at other times 
Eustathius seems to give the soul a role in cosmological mediation that is more likely 
to come directly from Origen.  Nonetheless, there are other ways in which Methodius 
is closer to Origen than Eustathius is.  Eustathius’ enagagement with Origenism was 
clearly heavily influenced by Methodius, but was not fully mediated by him. 
 
Metaphysical and cosmological presuppositions and beliefs are germane to 
the conception of human body and soul.  They provide both certain categories within 
which body and soul are understood, and the wider landscape in which they exist.
362
  
Platonism, unremarkably, was profoundly influential in shaping Eustathius’ 
metaphysics, but he follows a trajectory that is highly dominant in the fourth century 
in a particular negotiation of key aspects of Platonism: he interprets God’s 
uniqueness emphatically in terms of eternity.  Only God has always existed.  This is 
not a new idea in Jewish and Christian thought, but it is an idea about which 
Christians of earlier generations had been rather more ambiguous, and which they 
had not tended to emphasise to a comparable degree.
363
  This novel emphasis 
significantly alters the way in which the intelligible world is conceived, which affects 
the way that the categories of intelligibility and eternity are negotiated in relation to 
each other.  Eustathius himself rejects the impassibility of the intelligible world out 
of hand; he divorces the capacity of intelligible things to undergo passion from any 
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connection they have with the physical world.  This negotiation with Platonic 
metaphysics is along the same lines as the wider fourth-century belief that intelligible 
things can be temporal in their own right; both of these subordinate the distinction 
between perceptible and intelligible things to the distinction between God and 
everything else.  With regards to anthropology, Eustathius’ insistence that the soul is 
a subject of passion in its own right is highly significant for his conception of the 
soul and its role in the human person’s experiences. 
 
Body, soul and the person 
Eustathius’ anthropology combines substance dualism with a highly monistic 
approach to the mechanisms involved in human action and experience.  A human 
being is made up of body and soul, which are made of sharply distinct substances.  
However, when body and soul are united, it is the human being who acts, rather than 
the body or the soul.  This section seeks to demonstrate that Eustathius’ conception 
of the body-soul relationship echoes Platonised Aristotelianism. 
 
As noted in the introduction, Patricio de Navascués has recently examined the 
philosophical basis of Eustathius’ thought, devoting considerable attention to the 
soul.
364
  He argues that Eustathius rejected Platonism but drew heavily on 
Aristotelianism, though diverging from it in certain respects.  Navascués notes three 
respects in which Eustathius’ diverges from classic Aristotelianism: the definition of 
the soul as πνεῦμα; the use of κρᾶσις / μίξις in the case of the soul, including the 
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νοῦς, and the immanence of divine presence.  I do not address the third point in detail 
as it is not directly anthropologically significant.  Navascués suggests that these three 
ideas show a Stoic influence and echo a particular Stoicising tendency within 
imperial Aristotelianism.  He has made a hugely important contribution to our 
understanding of Eustathius.  In particular, he has observed a tendency in Eustathius 
to conceive of the body-soul relationship in terms similar to that of Aristotle’s 
understanding of the relationship between matter and form.  However, Eustathius’ 
explicit attack on Platonism leads Navascués to reject too hastily any possibility of 
more subtle Platonic influence on Eustathius and, consequently, his account fails to 
appreciate that Eustathius’ Aristotelianism is shaped more by its grounding in 
Platonic metaphysics - specifically in its use of the categories ‘perceptible’ and 
‘intelligible’ – than by the influence of Stoicism. 
 
A human being: a human body and soul 
Human identity is located in the union of body and soul.  In Engastrimytho, 
Eustathius writes that a human being is “one who has a proportionate mixture 
(κρᾶσιν ἀνάλογον) of both [body and soul].”
365
  This formula is foundational to 
Eustathius’ anthropology.  It occurs twice more in his writings, both times in 
Ariomanitas: “[T]he soul does not gush forth tears apart from a body, and nor will a 
body cry joylessly asunder from a soul, but [the one who cries is] the one who has a 
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 Navascués, “El sustrato filosófico.” 
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proportionate mixture from both.”; “the one who has been proportionately mixed 




Eustathius’ appeals to the mutual importance of the body and the soul to 
human ontology and identity are informed by a conception of the human person 
which remained constant throughout the period in which he wrote.  This is evident in 
the comparison of two arguments from different times in his life.  The earlier one, 
which occurs in Engastrimytho, defends the necessity of the body to human nature.  
The later one, which occurs in Ariomanitas, defends the necessity of the soul.  In the 
first instance, Eustathius is concerned to show that the ‘necromancer’ could not have 
called up Samuel or any part of him; the ‘necromancer’ could not have summoned 
Samuel, per se, because Saul did not see whatever she claimed to see, and he would 
have seen it if whatever it was had a body.  If it was without a body “it was not 
Samuel that she raised up, but the form of a spirit.  For Samuel is a being composed 
of soul and body, since a human being is one who has a proportionate mixture of 
both.”
367
  Here, Eustathius rejects the possibility of referring to a disembodied human 
soul as ἄνθρωπος.  It is significant that here, in Engastrimytho, Eustathius is 
specifically attacking Origen, who often treated the soul as the seat of human 
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identity, and that Methodius, whom Eustathius revered, attacks the location of human 
identity exclusively in the soul in his De Resurrectione.
368
   
 
In Ariomanitas, he applies an identical exegetical move in reverse.  
Throughout this work, a body-soul anthropology is an assumption central to 
Eustathius’ argument that the Word assumed a human soul: “The lord did not take up 
a half perfect human being.”
369
  Citing John 8.40, he argues that Christ must have 
had a soul since he referred to himself as ἄνθρωπος. Eustathius demands: “if he did 
not take up a soul, how is he an ἄνθρωπος?”
370
    In the second case, he was opposing 
logos-sarx Christology by insisting that, if the Word assumed a human being, this 
must have included a soul.  Eustathius’ latter argument is an inversion of his former 
argument: in Engastrimytho he argues that a human being must have not only a soul, 
but also a body; in Ariomanitas he argues that a human being must have not only a 
body, but also a soul. 
 
Key to Eustathius’ attack on logos-sarx Christology is the belief that the souls 
of human beings are of a specifically human kind.  Therefore, Eustathius argues, if 
the Word acted in place of the soul in Christ, Christ simply was not human.  
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you seek to kill me, a human being who has spoken the truth to you.” 
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Eustathius explicitly attacks Platonism for failing to appreciate this point.  The 
humanity, specifically, of human souls, and human bodies, comes out strongly in an 
attack on transmigration: “There are different and manifold kinds of souls, just as of 
bodies. Because of this, whilst the small ones die easily, the large ones are resistant, 
as they have stubbornly undergone trials.”
371
  A human body has to have a 
specifically human soul to go with it, Eustathius argues, because kinds of soul, just 
like bodies, are specific to kinds of being.  The adjective “human”, ἄνθρωπειος, is an 
ontological, rather than situational, descriptor. 
 
It is noteworthy that, even whilst defending the distinctiveness of the human 
soul, Eustathius assumes some similarity between human souls and animal souls – 
otherwise, his comparison between the souls of small and large animals would be 
meaningless in the context of his argument.  Human souls, then, are not 
incommensurable to other kinds of souls.  
 
Eustathius’ attack on transmigration is indebted (whether directly or 
otherwise) to Aristotle, who criticises those who “only undertake to explain what sort 
of thing the soul is, without postulating anything about the nature of the body 
receiving it, as if it were true, as the Pythagorean myths suggest, that any soul can 
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find its way into any body…Each craft must employ its own tools, and each soul its 
own body.”
372
   
 
In this attack on transmigration, Eustathius asserts that a human soul must 
have a human body and not a body of any other kind. In making this assertion, 
Eustathius grounds the whole person in its current context insofar as he sees the 
human body as the natural environment for the soul of a human being.  This assertion 
also involves the proposition that the human soul, qua soul, is a peculiarly human 
thing.  In believing this, Eustathius is at odds with Plato and employs a strand of 
Aristotle’s thought that was explicitly critical of Plato’s view of the soul.  Aristotle’s 
claim that human souls require specifically human bodies (quoted above) also seems 
to imply that a particular human soul requires a particular human body – and 
therefore, that the identity of a particular human being requires a particular body.
373
  
What remains of Eustathius’ own attack on transmigration implies this much less 
strongly, if at all, as it focuses to a greater degree on categories of body and soul – 
referring to large and small animals, for example.  However, it is worth noting at this 
juncture that Eustathius’ theology of bodily resurrection does, absolutely explicitly, 
make the claim that a particular soul requires a particular body, as I will argue below.  
This increases the probability that he might also have this idea in mind in his attack 
on transmigration. 
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The ontological difference between body and soul 
Eustathius’ picture of a mixture of body and soul assumes a sharp difference 
between the two.  His mode of distinguishing between the body and the soul relies on 
broadly Platonic metaphysical categories in the sense that the soul is incorporeal and, 
in some sense, intelligible, the body is corporeal and, in some sense, perceptible: 
“human nature is cut into two parts, the perceptible [αἰσθητὸν] and the intelligible 
[νοητόν].”
374
  This distinction manifests itself in various ways. 
 
Souls are naturally invisible since Samuel’s soul, if it had indeed been 
summoned, would not have been visible – Saul would have seen whatever was 
summoned if it had had a body.
375
  Eustathius’ conception of the difference between 
body and soul is consistently framed within a wider metaphysical contrast between 
corporeal, visible things and incorporeal, invisible things. 
 
Eustathius sometimes groups spirits and souls together: “demons do not have 
authority over spirits and souls [πνευμάτων τε καὶ ψυχῶν].”
376
  Similarly, he writes 
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a particular soul needed a particular body. 
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 D20:21 [Ariomanitas]. 
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that a soul is an “invisible spirit.”
377
  Navascués seems to me to be mistaken in 
thinking that Eustathius uses πνεῦμα in a Stoic, materialistic sense.  In Jewish and 
Christian usage, πνεῦμα very often has an incorporeal sense.
378
  This usage also 
coheres with Eustathius’ wider tendency to understand the soul within a Platonic 
metaphysical framework.  Most pointedly, it coheres with his claim that “human 
nature is cut into two parts, the αἰσθητὸν and the νοητόν.”
379
  This claim is 
unambiguous, unlike the reference to soul as πνεῦμα.  Furthermore the αἰσθητὸν 
portion of the pairing is reiterated as the nature of the body within the definition of 
the soul as πνεῦμα: the invisible πνεῦμα, the soul, is juxtaposed with the organs 
belonging to the perceptible world, which it vivifies.
380
  This suggests that the 
definition should be read in light of the αἰσθητὸν / νοητόν distinction. 
 
Corresponding to the distinction between perceptible and intelligible things, 
there is a sense that the soul, like these other spirits, has more in common with God, 
ontologically, than the body does.  Eustathius does sometimes refer to God’s 
incoporeality as if it were a unique attribute of God: “God dwelling in… [Christ], 
who is invisible [ἀόρατος] in nature, was not led like a lamb to death and slaughtered 
                                                 
377
 D51:2 [Ariomanitas]. 
378
 Notably the use of the term πνεῦμα to refer to the divine Spirit in the LXX and New Testament, 
which was important in defining later Christian usage. C.f. Gen. 1.2; Mk. 3.29; Athanasius, C.G. 
(CPG, 2090), 7.29.  This is connected, in turn, to its ambiguous place in some pagan philosophy and 
physiology.  Peter Singer correspondingly argues that, for Galen, the πνεῦμα is the πρῶτον ὄργανον of 
the soul in Galen on the soul: philosophy and medicine in the second century A.D., unpublished PhD 
thesis (University of Cambridge, 1993), pp.195-6.  This rather gives the impression that it mediates 
between soul and body, albeit from the body’s side of the divide. 
379
 D20:21.  See above. 
380
 D51:2-4: “On one hand, that it is invisible spirit is evident to everyone.  On the other, the motion 
makes an image of itself from the organs of perception and, moulding the activities, it furnishes 





  He uses the categories ‘perceptible’ and ‘intelligible’ to describe a 
general metaphysical distinction and regards intelligible things as more similar to 
God than perceptible things, but also occasionally has a sense that God is more 
intelligible than other intelligible things.  This ambiguous attitude to the God-
intelligibility nexus is common in patristic thought.  So, Origen, despite centralising 
a distinction between intelligibility and perceptibility, can assert that existing without 




A sketch of Eustathius’ cosmology reveals the prevalence of a distinction 
between the intelligible and the perceptible in his worldview, but also a certain 
flexibility in the application of this distinction.  (Here, the term ‘cosmology’ refers to 
the conception of the structures of the created universe).  Early Christian cosmology 
is diverse, drawing on a range of ideas and models from Greco-Roman and older, 
ancient near-eastern thought.
383
  Eustathius’ cosmology echoes this eclecticism, but 
the centrality of these categories is repeatedly evidenced. 
 
In Eustathius’ cosmos, Hades is at the bottom, the earth is in the middle and 
the heavens, which are multiple, are on top.  He frequently describes Hades as 
‘beneath’, and the heavens as ‘above.’  For instance, he extrapolates cosmography 
from Isaiah’s “Hades beneath was made angry…”
384
  Similarly, passages referring to 
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Christ’s descent and ascent are taken to refer, literally, to Christ’s journeys variously 
down from heaven, qua God, and to heaven and Hades, qua human.
385
  Eustathius 
evidently thinks that the heavens are multiple and God lives in the highest heaven.
386
  
Paradise is also somewhere above earth, presumably in one of the heavens. 
 
Eustathius’ cosmos is divided, broadly, into corporeal and incorporeal realms.  
The heavens, Hades and paradise are incorporeal realms, populated by souls, spirits 
and demons, which are incorporeal entities.  Earth is a corporeal realm, populated by 
corporeal beings.  Hades, for example, is inhabited by souls, as Samuel’s soul is 
called up from there.  There is a certain distinction here between the earth, which is 
corporeal, and everything else, which is incorporeal.  This presumably stems from 
Eustathius’ attempt to make sense of the world he knows in relation to things he 
cannot see, within the dominant conceptual frameworks available to him.  
Correspondingly, the boundary between corporeal and incorporeal realms is fluid. 
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Eustathius occasionally suggests that corporeal bodies can exist within the 
heavenly realms.
387
  He quotes 2 Corinthians 12.1-4, in which a man is taken up into 
heaven.  The man says that he is not sure whether he was embodied during this 
experience or not.  (Eustathius believes that this was Paul himself).
388
  Nowhere in 
the extant text does Eustathius state an opinion as to whether Paul was bodily taken 
up to the heavens on this occasion, and Eustathius may well have been happy to 
remain as uncertain on this subject as Paul himself claims to be.  In light of the well-
established idea of the ascension, and the biblical idea of assumption into heaven, it 
would be remarkable if he did argue that this was physically impossible.
389
  
Eustathius refers to Christ’s ascent to heaven, but does not develop this with regards 
to Christ’s body, and does not otherwise comment on the bodily assumption of, for 
instance, Elijah.  It is therefore difficult to tell how Eustathius’ concept of 
embodiment relates to Eustathius’ concept of incorporeality. 
 
The highest heaven is God’s abode, and is qualitatively superior to the other 
realms of heaven.  When humans, other than Christ, ascend to heaven, they ascend to 
other heavenly realms.  So, Eustathius reads 2 Corinthians 12.1-4 as indicating that 
Paul was taken up into the third heaven, often associated with paradise.  When 
claiming that Paul did enter the third heaven, Eustathius emphatically distinguishes it 
from the highest heaven:  
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When Paul says ‘into a third heaven’, he reveals that there is also 
another one.  For he says this not with an article, but without an 
article.  But the Lord, proclaiming it with the addition of the 
article says: “no one has ascended into ‘the’ heaven.”  The heaven 
that is higher than all, which is attached to the greater glory, into 
which the divine nature, shining forth most, is seen more distinctly 
by those who have been deemed worthy to proceed there.  So, 
then ‘no one has ascended’ into this heaven, in which the Child 




In this passage, Eustathius is synthesising various scriptural passages, some of which 
refer to heaven in the singular, others of which refer the heavens in the plural.  His 
qualitative distinction between kinds of heaven is apparently prompted by a need to 
explain this.  In order to explain it, he employs themes typical of Platonic cosmology, 
in which the soul ascends, through various heavens, to God.  He sees an apparent 
inconsistency in scripture, with regards to whether there is one heaven or many, and, 
in explaining how it is that the relevant passages actually cohere, favours multiple 
heavens. 
 
Eustathius, unremarkably, conceptualises paradise both as a garden in Eden, 
on earth, and as a place where, now that Christ has opened it, souls go after the 
bodily death.  So, he refers to “the paradise that God planted in Eden” where Adam 
and Eve lived but also emphatically believes that Christ’s soul led the soul of the 
penitent thief there on the day that they died.
391
  Although these may simply reflect 
conflicting narratives in Eustathius’ writing, they echo a well-established tradition of 
associating the earthly paradise from which Adam and Eve were banished with a 
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paradise that is, at least at the moment, not earthly, and could point either to the 
belief that paradise had been transposed from earth to the heavenly realms, or to the 
belief that the earthly paradise foreshadowed the heavenly paradise.
392
  (It should be 
noted that the idea that the paradise to which Christ travels with the thief is not 
earthly does not in itself necessarily indicate that it was in the heavens; for example, 
in the desert fathers, we find the idea that paradise is “above the earth and outside the 
firmament”, rather than in a part of the heavens.
393
  However, Eustathius himself 
does locate paradise in the heavens, as we shall see).  At any rate, Eustathius clearly 
believes that paradise was on earth when Adam and Eve dwelt in it, but identifies 
this paradise with a place that is now above the earth. 
 
Significantly, Eustathius depicts Christ’s journey to paradise as a return.   
This is what most clearly indicates that he identifies the paradise to which Christ 
leads the penitent thief with the paradise from which Adam and Eve were expelled.  
For example, he says that, in entering paradise, Christ “tamed (the) fiery sword and 
pacified the fear of the cherubim”, which is evidently a reference to the cherubim and 
fiery sword which God positioned to stand guard over “the way of the tree of life” 
once Adam was banished from it.
394
  In entering paradise, Christ is restoring Adam, 
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In both Engastrimytho and Ariomanitas, the souls of the dead are all in Hades 
prior to Christ’s descent there; between his death and resurrection, Christ goes to 
Hades and leads the souls imprisoned there to somewhere better.  In Engastrimytho, 
Eustathius writes that “Christ…dragged off the captives as his plunder and went up 
bodily on high into [the] heavens.”
396
  Similarly, in Ariomanitas, Christ “leads the 
captives captive” from Hades.
397
  Here, Eustathius specifies that Christ “leads the 
human race into paradise.”
398
  The fact that he can speak of Christ both leading the 
captives to paradise, and to the heavens, indicates that Eustathius did indeed locate 
paradise in the heavens, specifically, as opposed to somewhere else above the earth. 
  
In the face of his own insistence upon the physical, and eschatological, 
resurrection of the body, Eustathius applies the term “first fruits of the resurrection 
from the dead” to the entrance of Christ’s human soul into paradise.
399
  Eustathius 
was exegetically constrained to assert that Christ and the thief went to paradise while 
their bodies lay dead.  In emphasising that they went to paradise in their souls, 
Eustathius is actually very consistent with his discourse on the resurrection; had he 
simply asserted that Christ and the thief went to paradise while their bodies lay dead, 
                                                 
395
 In the LXX (as in the Masoretic text) it is “Adam” who is said to be “driven out” of paradise. 
396
 Engastrimytho 20.5. 
397




 D21:10-11 [Ariomanitas].  Eustathius is alluding to 1 Corinthians 15:20: “first fruits of those who 
have fallen asleep.” 
151 
 
he might have risked implying that they received other bodies after death and that 
they went to paradise in their souls and the new bodies to which their souls were now 
united.  It is specifically Eustathius’ application of the Pauline concept of “first 
fruits” from the dead to the disembodied soul that is striking and rather jarring.  This 
concept is important to his soteriology in many ways, discussed in the next chapter.  
His willingness to use it in this context, anyway, shows a certain ambiguity about the 
nature of paradise. 
 
Eustathius’ cosmology is largely unremarkable: Hades is beneath the earth, 
multiple heavens are above it.  Paradise was once upon earth, but now, when 
Eustathius refers to paradise, he thinks of it as heavenly.
400
  It is unclear whether he 
thinks that paradise has been transposed from earth to heaven, or whether he thinks 
that the earthly paradise foreshadowed the heavenly one.  A broadly Platonic 
distinction between corporeal and incorporeal realms recurs throughout Eustathius’ 
cosmology.  It is blurred, readily enough, in reference to the potentially bodily 




                                                 
400
 Eustathius additionally once refers to “Gehenna”, but it is unclear where he places this within the 
cosmos, or whether he developed his concept of it within his cosmology at all.  He writes of Gehenna 
only as part of a quote of Jesus from Matthew’s Gospel: “stop fearing things that kill the body, but 
that are not able to kill the soul.  But rather fear the one who is able to throw both body and soul into 
Gehenna.” [Matthew 10.28, D51:34-37].  The reference is incidental to his main argument, which is 
that scripture uses the term psuche variously.  Nonetheless, he apparently thought that this was a good 
opportunity to mention the reality of eternal punishment, which directly follows this quote, so he 
seems to associate Gehenna with a place of such punishment.  It is possible that Gehenna forms part 
of a “new heaven and new earth”, but this is highly speculative. 
401
 C.f. Eusebius, H.E. (CPG, 3495); Methodius, De. Res. (CPG, 1812), I.55 
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The most striking examples of this distinction with reference to the soul occur 
in the context of discussion about Christ’s human soul, and careful examination of its 
relation to other human souls is required. 
 
During Christ’s time on earth, his human soul was at times with the Spirit in 
heaven whilst his body was on earth: “The Word of God…allotted such great 
increase of authority to the human being who held him that, through the soul [the 
human being] at once both traverses the entire earth and dwells in the heavenly 
bodies.”
402
  In one sense, it is only Christ’s soul that is able to be in heaven whilst his 
body and soul are simultaneously functional elsewhere.  However, Christ’s soul does 
this as a way of fulfilling human potential.  Its ability to traverse the heavens in life, 
whilst its body is on earth, is, admittedly, consequent on its union with the Divine 
Spirit.  This Spirit-soul relationship is evident in the way that Eustathius argues for 
the necessity of Christ’s human soul.  In reference to earthly activities, he argues that 
the Word, being impassible, could not accomplish them.
403
  In reference to activities 
in Hades, heaven and paradise, he demands what use it would be if it were God, and 
not a human being, who did that.  So, he claims that, if the Word alone led the thief 
to paradise “the thief entered paradise before Christ, and he himself became the ‘first 
fruits’ of the resurrection of the dead.  Christ no longer unlocks the gates of 
paradise.”
404
  It would not have been soteriologically efficacious for the Word to 
travel to paradise without the human soul of Christ.  The feats that Christ 
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 D20:6-9 [Ariomanitas]. 
403
 C.f. D6:8-13[Ariomanitas]: “But pain and tears and laughter and sleep and hunger and thirst and 
desire and longing and anger and wrath and things such as these, which are established to be passions, 
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accomplishes in his soul in Hades and paradise are the feats of a human being.  This 
comes across strongly in Eustathius’ idea that Christ’s soul is “the first fruits of the 
resurrection from the dead.”  This idea is discussed in detail in chapter 5.  Here, 
suffice to note the strong sense that Christ is archetypically human.   
 
Both in relation to Christ’s ascent to the heavens with the Spirit, and his 
journeys to Hades and paradise, Eustathius argues that the soul is the only part of a 
human being which could have done these things.  The implication is that human 
souls have the ontological potential to be in the heavenly bodies, but only Christ in 
fact realises this potential.  It is the human soul, not the human body, which is 
granted this privilege, because spiritual realms are proper to the human soul. 
 
Eustathius’ picture of the relationship between Christ’s human soul and the 
Word shares a lot with Origen.  For Eustathius, the soul is ontologically closer to the 
Spirit than the body is, and there is correspondingly the sense that the soul is a kind 
of via media between the Word and the body. 
 
Navascués rightly notes Eustathius’ antipathy towards Platonism: he attacks 
the transmigration of souls and the unoriginated nature of souls in Plato’s thought.
405
  
                                                                                                                                          
bring to light the mutability spoken of.  If therefore, the divine Word is immutable, what is the thing 
that changes and that was subjected to sufferings of great pain? Isn’t it a soul?” 
404
 D21:9-13 [Ariomanitas]. 
405
 Navascués, “El sustrato filosófico”, esp. pp.152-5.  For Eustathius’ attack on the idea of 
transmigration see D30:30-34 and D55 [Ariomanitas].  The attack on transmigration in D30 follows a 
diatribe aimed at the notion of the ‘water of forgetting’, and Eustathius refers to his opponents as 
“Pythagorases and Platos”, so he evidently associates belief in transmigration with Plato.  For his 
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However, these aspects of Platonism are widely attacked by the vast majority of 
Christians, even those who are self-declared Plato sympathisers.
406
  In respect to 
underlying metaphysical and ontological structures, Eustathius owes much to 
Platonism. 
 
The soul as the vivifying principle of the human being 
For Eustathius, as for most ancient thinkers, the soul was the vivifying 
principle in the human being.
407
  Souls “breathe life-giving power” into bodies.
408
  
Eustathius follows in a broad Jewish and Christian interpretation of Genesis 2.7 in 
thinking that when God breathed πνοή into Adam, he breathed a soul into Adam.  
 
This framework strongly suggests that the body is passive whilst the soul is 
active, and Eustathius himself intends this suggestion.  Eustathius refers to Genesis 
2.7 in two separate passages from Ariomanitas.
409
  The first is putatively an account 
of his opponents’ position; the second is intended as a description of what really 
happened.  The point at issue is whether the Spirit could have stood in place of the 
                                                                                                                                          
attack on the idea that souls are unoriginated, see D52 [Ariomanitas]: “In the Phaedo, Plato says that 
Socrates said ‘Every soul is unbegotten.  For what is unbegotten is also immortal.’  This is the foolish 
doctrine of the Greeks.”  In fact, the passage quoted from Plato is from Phaedrus, 245 c,5 – 246 a,2. 
406
 See discussion above in this chapter and in chapter two on Platonism in Eusebius of Caesarea.  For 
Eusebius’ criticism of the unoriginated nature of souls in Plato, see his P.E. (CPG, 3486), 13.15. 
Eusebius provides numerous quotes from Plato’s works that support the theory of transmigration, 
within a section that lists various of Plato’s errors about the soul in P.E., 13.16.3-18.  For an earlier 
patristic attack on transmigration in Platonism, c.f. Irenaeus A.H., (CPG, 1306) 2.33.1. 
407
 Woolf Hirsch, for instance, claims that the animation of the body by the soul is an idea “practically 
universal, and coeval with humanity itself.” Whilst this is in danger of oversimplifying the issue, he is 
right to note the widespread nature of the notion.  C.f. his Rabbinic Psychology (New York, Edward 
Goldston, 1947), p.20. 
408
 D1:8-9 [Ariomanitas]. 
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soul in Christ.  In the earlier fragment, Eustathius quotes his opponents as describing 
the ensoulment of all bodies and then, specifically, Adam’s ensoulment.  They 
ostensibly list the functions that he received with the soul, and then demand why the 
divine Spirit could not have done all these things in Christ.  
 
Eustathius attributes to his opponents broad agreement with him on many 
points regarding what the soul does to the body, which is evident because the two 
accounts are very similar.
410
  In both instances, the body is inert before it receives the 
soul and active afterwards.  The functions that Adam subsequently possesses are 
again virtually identical; movement, breath, thought and moral agency.
411
  In both 
passages, Eustathius emphasises the inertia of the pre-ensouled body: “the body of 
the first-formed which had been adorned, was sleeping, dead, unbreathing, 
unmoved” once ensouled “he received movement.  And from that he walks and 
breathes, he governs, he reasons, he acts, he has control.”
412
  The soul animates the 
body and is therefore, in a sense, is more capable than the body.  The soul’s higher 
functionality corresponds to a higher status; it is described as “the better part” of the 
person.
413
  There is a very significant sense in which the soul is the superior partner.  
The soul and body are equally necessary to being human, but the soul, qua 
independent entity, is superior. 
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 D1, D61.  D1 is in the epitome, D61 is preserved by Theodoret.  Though these fragments contain 
very similar ideas, they are too different to be separate versions of the same portion of text.  It is, 
however, likely that they formed part of the same wider discussion. 
410
 He may attribute this agreement quite fairly, as his exegesis is unremarkable. 
411
 There are a few significant differences between the accounts, to which I return later. 
412
 D61:1-2 and D61:8-9 respectively.  I examine this passage with reference to moral agency in 
chapter 6. 
413




Nonetheless, Eustathius does not strictly regard the soul as the active agent in 
the human person.
414
  His sense of how the parts of the person operate in a given 
action varies.  His overriding impression is that the κρᾶσις of body and soul is the 
agent.  Body and soul rely on each other in any given operation.  Eustathius refers to 
τὸ σωματικὸν…ὄργανον.  This might echo Athanasius, who tends to use the phrase 
to mean that the body is an “instrument”, typically of the Word.  Eustathius also 
refers to τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανον; in Ariomanitas, he refers to it as something that the 
Word took up.
415
  If the phrase does not simply denote the soul, it must mean that the 
soul is the Word’s instrument.  The same may be true of the body.  In Engastrimytho, 
Eustathius refers to the τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανον of Samuel, which is active whilst 
Samuel’s body is dead.
416
  Here, τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανον probably refers to the soul’s 
power of manifesting itself visibly, as this is the context in which it is discussed: “the 
very apparatus of the soul used to take shape in human form…”
417
  The soul’s 
ὄργανον in this case is a capacity of the soul, rather than a separate object employed 
by it.  We therefore ought not to conclude that the phrase τὸ σωματικὸν…ὄργανον 
suggests that the body is the soul’s instrument. 
Although it is typically the person who acts, the mechanism of this action can 
seem to require body and soul to be instruments of each other, in different situations.  
The idea that the body receives movement from the soul implies that it acts through 
                                                 
414
 Jonathan Barnes discusses this question with reference to Aristotle and Tertullian in “Anima 




 On Athanasius c.f. De Inc. (CPG, 2091), 9:2:2; 43:4:5-6.  On Eustathius c.f. D20:33 [Ariomanitas]; 
Engastrimytho 6.1.  In Engastrimytho Eustathius writes: “perhaps you will say that the αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς 
ψυχῆς ὄργανον took shape in human form?” 
417
 See below in this section. 
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the agency of the soul.  It is evidently dependent on the soul in order to perform 
actions and so to fulfil its potential.  Mechanistically, the soul is also dependent on 
the body because, when it operates in the corporeal world, it must operate via the 
body.  However, Eustathius’ narrative is not typically constructed so as to draw out 
the soul’s dependence on the body, as it does the body’s dependence on the soul.
418
  
In imparting movement to the body, the soul does not so much use the body to move 
as enable the body to move.  This comes across in his description of Adam’s body 
receiving a soul.  The body enters the narrative prior to the soul, and, when the soul 
is imparted, a living, thinking being is the result.  It could even be that the body is the 
active agent here; Eustathius describes the inert, pre-ensouled body, then proceeds:  
 
ὡς δὲ εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ δημιουργικῶς ἐνεφύσησεν ὁ Θεὸς, αὐτίκα τὴν 
κίνησιν εἴληφεν· ἐξ ἐκείνου δὲ βαδίζει καὶ ἀναπνεῖ καὶ φθέγγεται, ἄρχει 
λογίζεται  πράττει διοικεῖ.  
 
What is clear in this passage is that the soul alone is not the active agent.  The soul 
has enabled the body’s agency.  In some respects, this increases the body’s agency 
relative to a conception of the body as an instrument, but in others it reduces it: 
because the soul is enabling the body rather than using the body, the body is the 
agent, or at least one of the agents, of a given action, rather than an instrument.  
However, in reducing the soul’s agency in relation to the body, Eustathius 
necessarily reduces the soul’s dependence on the body.  The soul is certainly 
dependent on the body to be part of a human being, and so achieve its telos, but it is 
not as dependent on the body as the body is on it.  Eustathius generally does not 
conceive of separate pursuits proper to the body and the soul.  The body is involved 
                                                 
418
 An important exception is to be found in his claim that, “the soul does not gush forth tears apart 
from a body, and nor will a body cry joylessly asunder from a soul, but the one who cries is the one 
who has a proportionate mixture from both…” [D7:6-8, Ariomanitas]; here, the point is the reciprocal 
dependence of body and soul on each other, rather than the greater dependence of the soul on the 
body.  This passage is discussed further in the section entitled ‘Passions.’ 
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in mental processes, for example; once Adam’s body has received a soul, Adam 
“reasons.”
419
  The fact that the soul vivifies the body requires that the soul must be 
involved, to some degree, in all of the activities that ensouled body is involved in.  
The fact that it is Adam, the being that results from a body receiving a soul, who 
thinks, suggests that the body is also involved in all the activities that the embodied 
soul is involved in. 
 
A distinction must be made between action internal to the person and action 
external to the person.  The body and soul are both required to perform a given action 
because they contribute different things to that action.  Eustathius’ description of the 
how a person cries offers a good example: “applying fire, [the soul] heats the water, 
and when this is burning, it comes up through the eyes.”
420
  The soul provides the 
heat that gets the process going, and the eyes – bodily organs – provide a conduit 
through which the heated water can travel.  In that sense, different functions internal 
to the person are proper to each.  However, as the above-quoted description of 
Adam’s ensoulment and subsequent activity shows, it is the person who is the agent 
of any given act externally, that is, as it can be observed in the world.
421
  Anything 
that a person can be said to do, such as eat, move or think, is equally the province of 
the body and the soul. 
 
 
                                                 
419
 D61:9 [Ariomanitas]. 
420
 D7:9-11 [Ariomanitas]. 
421
 This echoes some readings of Aristotle. See Michael Wedin, “Keeping the matter is mind”, Frank 
A. Lewis and Robert Bolton (eds.), Form, matter and mixture in Aristotle (Oxford, Blackwells, 1996), 
p.1: “Aristotle’s psychology reserves for the person alone such things as thinking, desiring and feeling 
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Physiology and the soul as vivifying principle 
One of the frameworks in which Eustathius explains the soul’s vivification of 
the body is physiological, and this mode of describing the relationship particularly 
emphasises the soul’s necessary, and proper, involvement in bodily functions. 
 
…God declared: ‘anyone among the sons of Israel or the 
proselytes who would eat blood, I will stand my covenant upon 
that soul and expel it from the people.’  So, it is gently suggested 
that the soul is blood.  For scripture forbids blood as nourishment.  
Because of this, when the blood flows forth, the body stands 
soulless and unmoving.  And the soul is not simply blood, but 




In this passage, Eustathius closely links soul and blood, whilst maintaining a 
distinction between them – the soul “flies in the blood” and so, presumably, is 
distinct from it.  He alludes to the soul’s vivification of the body – “when the blood 
flows forth, the body stands soulless and unmoving” – and infers from this that it 
must have some connection to the physiological processes that enable the body to 
function.  Importantly, he interprets a collection of scriptural passages that might 
seem to equate the soul with blood in such a way as to deny this equation. 
 
Eustathius draws heavily on physiological examples to demonstrate the soul’s 
involvement in bodily processes.  Though the implied mechanistic relationship 
between body and soul is unremarkable, Eustathius’ examples are calculated to 
evoke a sense of the soul’s involvement in the grittier parts of corporeal existence.  
                                                                                                                                          
pain.  The soul itself is the subject of none of these.  Nevertheless, only in virtue of the soul…does the 
person manage to be in a given such state or to perform a given such act.” 
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In particular, he gives a detailed description of the workings of the digestive system 
as part of an argument for the necessity of the soul:  
…these things being issued forth into humours and bile, some things 
being sifted beside everything, are delivered to the bulks of the 
body, whilst others are turned into blood.  Flowingly, it withdraws 
into the blood vessels, others change into bile and phlegm, the 
roughness and excrement is passed in clots through the thicker of 





This is why Christ needed a soul. 
 
It is, nonetheless, especially difficult to reconstruct Eustathius’ physiology.  
The most extended discussions of it appear in particularly confusing passages in the 
epitome.  Because we cannot be sure that the words and phrases used are Eustathius’ 
own, we cannot reliably trace medical terminology.  Furthermore, the grammatical 
construction of one particular fragment which contains Eustathius’ most extensive 
discussion of physiology is so strange as to call into question whether the epitomiser 
had a full appreciation of Eustathius’ meaning.  Some of the words are so obscure 
that they may safely be considered Eustathian.  For example the word ἔνδομα only 
appears eight times in the whole corpus of Greek literature catalogued by the 
Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.  It appears in (pseudo) Galen Definitiones Medicae and 
in a few medieval medical texts in the sense of “diminution of fever” which would fit 
the medical context.  However, it is not clear exactly how this meaning would work 
in the context of the epitome.  Here is the Greek text immediately surrounding it: 
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 D51:5-12 [Ariomanitas]. 
423




…ἀμφότερα μὲν ἠρεμεῖν ὁμοσε δικαιοῖ, διάστασιν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις 
ἐνδίδωσιν, ἵνα αἱ δυνάμεις ἔνδομα λαμβάνουσαι μεταξὺ τὰς μὲν 
τῶν τόνων ἀκμὰς ἀνανεοῦσιν αὖθις, ἐπαναλαμβάνουσαι δὲ τὰς 




As ἔνδομα follows closely on ἐνδίδωμι it could here be a derivative of this meaning 
something like ‘a giving up’ so, in this case, ‘a relaxation;’
425
 it appears to be used in 
a similar sense in Cyril of Jerusalem.
426
  The phrase could then be rendered,  
 
both [soul and body] together desire to keep still, and they give up 
the labours at an interval, in order that the powers might 
recuperate again, receiving relaxation between the strength of the 
tendons.  In turn, resuming, they reignite the straining of bodily 
strength.   
 
(Given that the relxation is, specifically, “between the tendons”, a relaxation of the 
pulse may well be meant).  However, in light of the passage’s medical context it is 
equally possible that Eustathius originally used the word ἔνδομα in the former, 
technical sense but that a less educated epitomiser placed it in a different phrase so as 
to give its less technical meaning, which may have been the only one with which he 
was familiar and which was, anyway, intuitive.  At any rate, it is difficult to construct 








 D8:8 I am grateful to Paul Parvis for this suggestion. 
426
 Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis ad illuminatos (CPG, 3585.2), 2.8.9. 
427
 The reconstruction of Eustathius’ physiology is further exacerbated by the fact that the period in 
which he wrote yields remarkably few sources on the subject, and has been categorised by Vivian 




Eustathius refers to anatomy on many occasions but never gives anything 
approaching an analysis of it.  He makes an especially close connection between the 
soul and blood, and the heart and the liver both seem to have a prominent place in his 
anatomical system, as was typical in ancient medicine, but the brain, though 
mentioned, does not seem as important in the passages we have.
428
  This suggests 
that Eustathius did not follow Plato and Galen in thinking that the “liver, the heart 





Kelley Spoerl provides a more persuasive alternative in claiming that 
Eustathius’ physiology is Aristotelian.
430
  Her arguments are based on fragment D4 
of Ariomanitas, which I quote in full: 
Since God declared in many places of scripture that a heart 
together with the soul existed with him [καρδίαν ὁμου τῇ ψυχῇ 
συνυπάρχειν αὐτῷ πολλαχοῦ τῆς γραφῆς προύλεγεν ὁ θεοϛ], it is 
necessary to confess that it is a kind of intelligible heart – for the 
bodiless is not able to have a bodily part.  Going along these 
lines, he will not need to say that Christ took up and bore a 
heartless body, will he? For if he did not need a soul, as those 
opposing say, neither did he need a heart, nor any of the 
internal organs, since each of these provisions has been created 
                                                 
428
 He is clearly a vitalist in that he regards the body as teleologically created: each of the “internal 
organs” “has been created for the sake of the reception [of food].” [D4:7-8].  Therefore, with reference 
to the medical disputes current in the late Roman Empire, he follows Galen against Erasistratus’ and 
Asclepiades’ “mechanistic” approach, but vitalism seems an almost inescapable position for anyone 
who regards the body as deliberately crafted by God. Nutton Ancient Medicine, p.233. Although the 
later triumph of Galenism may suggest it was already ascending, Nutton also notes the existence of 
Asclepedeans in fourth-century Asia Minor in Ancient Medicine, p.296.  The dispute between 
mechanism and vitalism was therefore probably a live one. 
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 Ibid, p.233.  In this system, the liver controlled nutrition, growth, and reproduction, the heart 
“conveyed heat and life” and the brain controlled nerves and feelings. See Frank Magill and Christina 
Moose, “Galen”, Dictionary of World Biography: the Ancient World (London, Taylor and Francis, 
2003), 447-51, p.449. 
430
 Spoerl, “Jesus’ digestion”, forthcoming.  See introduction and chapter 2.  I am very grateful to Dr. 
Spoerl for extensive and extremely helpful discussion of this passage. 
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for the sake of the stewardship of eating, in order that the body 
should ripen and feed and send the materials being brought in in 
the right direction.  Then, these things being issued forth into 
humours and bile, some things being sifted beside everything, 
are delivered to the bulks of the body, whilst others are turned 
into blood.  Flowingly, it withdraws into the blood vessels; 
others change into bile and phlegm; the roughness and 
excrement is passed in clots through the thicker of the intestines 
and into the outermost places and it is secreted through these.  
And if the entrails and throat and belly and the other holders of 
these things are prepared for the sake of food, and through these, 
for living – for this is germane to the question – then neither for 
these, did he need a soul that could move and revolve the bodily 
instrument, as I already said according to the true word.  For in 
this case he entirely bore imperishable life itself, and he by no 
means needed the ripe things being delivered from the earth, 
because he was nourished from heaven and so lacked nothing.  
So therefore, according to these men, if indeed Christ, received 
the soulless bulk of a body, it was free from natural desire, 
without bowls, heartless and liverless,
431
 and, the overall, a 
statue and not a human being, the shape having been cast on 
from the beginning, and the innermost stamp having fled. 
 
 Spoerl claims that, in this passage, Eustathius links the heart with digestion 
and that this echoes Aristotle.
432
  She then notes the connection between the soul and 
blood made in this passage, and elsewhere (as discussed above) and, again, posits a 
debt to Aristotle: “Aristotle not only proposed a link between the soul, the heart, the 
digestion, and the blood; as a result of this link, he saw the heart as the center of 
consciousness, of sensation, motion, and emotion.”
433
  So, she suggests that 
Eustathius’ physiology is also cardio-centric in the sense that he adheres to cardio-
centric consciousness.  
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 ἀνήπατον with the double-meaning ‘passionless.’ 
432
 See especially the portion of the passage that is italicised.  On Aristotle, Spoerl cites Peck’s 
introduction to his translation of Aristotle, Generation of Animals (London, Heinemann, 1943), 
pp.lxiii-lxiv. 
433
 She cites Aristotle, De partibus animalium ii.ι.647a 25-32; On sleep and waking (Parva naturalia) 
ii.456a1-6, in which Aristotle claims that in human beings, “sense –perception originates in the same 




It seems to me that Eustathius does indeed, like Aristotle, link the heart with 
digestion and that some degree of cardio-centricity indebted to Aristotle would 
explain the important place that Eustathius gives to the heart in his physiology, and 
the apparent lack of importance placed upon the brain, in contrast to other ancient 
(also vitalist) physiological hypotheses.   It is possible that Eustathius’ view of 
consciousness is also cardio-centric; this need not entail a materialist view of the 
soul, so his clear assertion that the soul is intelligible does not pose a problem here, 
and such a view would explain the close connection between soul and blood.  It 
should be noted, however, that such a view is not required by the progression of his 
argument in fragment D4 (as Spoerl acknowledges).  Here, Eustathius claims (as 
quoted above): 
 
Since God declared in many places of scripture that a heart 
together with the soul existed with him, it is necessary to confess 
that it is a form of intelligible heart – for the bodiless is not able to 
have a bodily part.  Going along these lines, he will not need to 
say that Christ took up and bore a heartless body, will he? For if 
he did not need a soul, as those opposing say, neither did he need 




The idea he is refuting is that, when the voice of God in scripture refers to God’s 
soul, it is referring to the entity that acted qua soul in Christ.
435
    Eustathius responds 
that God also refers to his heart – is that the heart that acted as a heart in Christ?
436
 




 For instance, Lev. 6.11: “my soul shall not abhor you.”  This argument would only suit a pro-Arian 
position if coupled with an insistence on divine impassibility and consequent assertion that this divine 
soul was not the agen(n)etos God.  Eustathius explicitly accuses his opponents of attributing passions 
to the Word in order to undermine his full divinity.  C.f. D19a and D19b. 
436
 For instance, c.f. III Kingdoms, 9:3: “And the Lord said to him [Solomon], ‘…my heart shall be 
there for ever.’ ”  
165 
 
Eustathius argues that when the voice of God refers to God’s ‘heart’ in scripture, this 
must be “a form of intelligible heart”, i.e., whatever God referred to when he referred 
to his “heart” could in no way resemble a human heart.  Neither Eustathius nor his 
pro-Arian opponents want to say that this is the heart in Christ.  It leads to the 
suggestion that Christ’s body, like Christ’s soul, was not really human.  The 
immediate structural point of Eustathius’ reference to the heart here is that scripture 
sometimes refers to God’s heart, not that the soul is particularly more connected to 
the heart than to any other part of the body.  Cardio-centric consciousness is a 
possible inference from this passage, but it is less strongly suggested than may 
initially seem to be the case.  As far as the sources will permit judgement, it seems to 
me that Spoerl is right to posit a broadly Aristotelian physiology in Eustathius in that, 
for Eustathius, the heart seems to be the lynch-pin of the physiological system, as it 
was for Aristotle.  However, it is less likely that Eustathius also followed Aristotle by 
extending this cardio-centrism to his view of human consciousness. 
 
Eustathius’ ideas about physiological mechanisms reinforce his integrated 
anthropology. More significantly, Eustathius clearly articulates the view that the 
functions of the soul and all the bodily organs are interlocked: he has a clear sense of 
the interrelation of all the organs in a system when he claims that if one has no need 
of a heart, one clearly has no need of any of the other organs, either.  Eustathius’ 
physiological discourse, on one hand, comes from a rather different place to his 
discussions of Christ’s soul accompanying the Word to heaven.  However, the close 
involvement of the soul in physiological processes gives an especially strong sense 
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of his holistic conception of the person, which is echoed, in a different way, in the 
idea that the soul, throughout its journeys to heaven, is a human soul. 
 
A hylomorphic conception of the body-soul relationship 
Eustathius not only suggests that body and soul are closely united in the 
human person but, further, tends to suggest that they are mutually defining. 
 
Eustathius often uses the picture of a statue to describe a body that has no 
soul (though not a body whose soul is not currently attached to it) and this evokes his 
conception of the relationship between soul and body well.  Whilst the body and soul 
equate to the human person roughly in the sense of two elements added together, 
something happens in the union of body and soul that a concept of animation in 
which the soul uses the body are insufficient to explain.  For example, Eustathius 
says that, in the pro-Arian picture of a soulless Christ, the internal organs are also 
absent and the “innermost stamp” has fled.
437
  The pro-Arians’ Christ, therefore, is “a 
statue of a human being and not a human being.”
438
  It is unclear whether the 
“innermost stamp” is the soul or the soul and all the organs; it is clear that the statue 
results from removing the soul.  The soul, then, makes the body human.  A statue is 
not half a person, but no person at all.  The body is not really human without a soul 
(although an important distinction must be made between a body that is not currently 
ensouled – i.e. a dead body – and a body for which there is no soul). 








It is striking how much this picture of the body-soul relationship echoes 
Aristotle, which might give a rather different picture than is suggested by my 
argument that Eustathius’ distinction between the body and the soul relies on 
Platonic categories. 
 
Aristotle’s conception of the soul is itself a topic of much contention, which 
complicates any attempt to consider ‘Aristotelian’ influence on later thinkers.  It is 
widely agreed that Aristotle regarded the soul-body relationship as a relationship of 
form to matter.  Much discussion therefore centres on the question of his 
hylomorphism.  The soul is the form of the body. So, what is form? One important 
aspect of this discussion, and the one that chiefly concerns me here, is whether 
Aristotle’s view of the soul was “attributivist” or “substantialist.”  That is, did 
Aristotle regard the soul as a property, or a thing?
439
  Aristotle’s own view of the soul 
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 I make use of Herbert Granger’s terminology from his Aristotle’s idea of the soul, Philosophical 
Studies Series 68 (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), pp.1-14.  Kirby also discusses the 
ways in which Aristotle’s “form and matter” model can be understood with reference to living things 
in his Aristotle’s Metaphysics, pp.70-99.  For a ‘substantialist’ view, c.f. William Charlton, Aristotle:  
physics I and II, rev. ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992), pp.70-79 and Howard Robinson 
“Aristotelian dualism”, Oxford Studies in ancient philosophy 1 (1983), 123-144.  For an ‘attributivist’ 
position, c.f. Julian Barnes “Aristotle’s concept of mind”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian society, 72 
(1971/2), 101-114.  Abraham P. Bos has recently argued for a much more robust kind of 
‘substantialism’, which would move the discussion of the soul in Aristotle away from hylomorphism 
to a large degree in “ ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Platonic’ dualism.”  Aristotle, he says, attacks Plato’s view of 
the soul purely on the basis that it rejects the idea that there are certain kinds of souls that correspond 
to certain kinds of bodies.  (With reference to this idea, see the discussion on ‘human being as human 
body and soul’ above).  Most later ancient thinkers followed Aristotle, not Plato, in this.  Bos’ 
argument about Aristotle’s own position is highly speculative, as it relies on a reconstruction of lost 
and incomplete works.  Even taking Bos’ argument to be correct, he has only identified one strand in 
Aristotle’s thought, and, in his desire to distance it from Platonism, he downplays the fundamental 
influence that such a position would evidently owe to Plato’s own dualism.  In arguing that many 
ancient “Platonists” were in fact Aristotelians, Bos is not as far from others who regard Aristotle as a 
dualist as he seems to be.  Aristotle’s anthropology is, again, seen as a development on Plato’s more 
than a divergence.  Late antique philosophy, either way, is influenced by a combination of Aristotle 
and Plato.  If we accept Bos’ particular argument, that Aristotle is closer to Plato than even most 
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is beyond the scope of this thesis.  I am concerned with the various strands of 
Aristotelian thinking that may have influenced Eustathius, without an immediate 
concern for their faithfulness to Aristotle.
440
  The relationship between Platonism and 
Aristotelianism is germane to the question of Aristotle’s attititude to body-soul 
substance dualism, because body-soul monism would diverge significantly from 
Platonism. 
 
It is significant in this regard that there was a widespread tendency in late 
antiquity to read Aristotle in light of Plato.  Richard Norris notes this tendency 
specifically of neo-Platonism but it can be found more widely, for instance, in 
Galen.
441
  In contrast to this growing tendency, George Karamanolis argues that 
Platonists were very ready to criticise Aristotle.
442
  It is not my intention to argue for 
a total synthesis of Platonism and Aristotelianism in late antiquity, but to observe a 
limited osmosis of ideas between the two.  The category of Platonised-
Aristotelianism is problematised by the fact that Aristotle was Plato’s pupil and self-
consciously drew on him, as well as criticising him.  On certain issues, Aristotelians 
and Platonists are grouped together in ancient philosophy, particularly in their 
                                                                                                                                          
revisionists think, then Aristotle’s influence can plausibly be seen as more pervasive than was once 
thought.  Eustathius, however, is influenced by another ‘Aristotelian’ dualism – that which does see 
the body as intrinsically connected to the soul. Platonised Aristotelianism was a perspective readily 
available to Eustathius. 
440
 Although it seems to me that the source of this disagreement can be found in Aristotle himself. I 
am sympathetic to Granger’s thesis that Aristotle credits the soul with characteristics exclusive to 
‘things’ and to ‘properties’ respectively. C.f. Granger Aristotle’s idea, p.8. 
441
 C.f. Richard Norris, Manhood and Christ: a study in the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963), p.6 and Peter Singer Galen on the soul: philosophy and medicine in 
the second century A.D., unpublished PhD thesis (University of Cambridge, 1993), p.128, 
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 George Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to 





  Where Aristotle and later trends that draw on him seem to 
agree with Plato, it is false to categorise this as external to the Platonic tradition, to 
be brought into conversation with it.  Nonetheless, I believe that the category 
‘Aristotelian’ is a useful one to bring into conversation with Platonism with regards 
to body-soul relations because this is a point on which, at their most distant from 
each other, Platonism and Aristotelianism are strongly opposed. 
 
The Hellenic context of Eustathius’ picture of the relationship between the 
body and the soul can most meaningfully be described as a Platonised 
Aristotelianism: it combines a body-soul substance dualism, in which body and soul 
are defined as perceptible and intelligible respectively, with a hylomorphic 
understanding of the way that body and soul interact to form the human person: that 
is, with an understanding of the body as the ‘matter’ of the person – the thing of 
which it is formed – which is only given its ‘form’ – and therefore, made human – by 
the soul.  Eustathius’ picture of a soulless body as a statue makes most sense in this 
light.  Though it is highly suggestive of Aristotle’s metaphor of a bronze statue, in 
which the body is the bronze from which a statue is made, and the soul is the statue 
shape, it is placed in a slightly different framework.
444
  Aristotle’s metaphor lends 
itself to substance monism, at least in the sense that it doesn’t allow for a separate 
existence of form and matter.  It is an instance in which he talks about the soul as a 
property, not a thing.  Eustathius’ metaphor not only talks about the soul as a thing, 
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 C.f. Frede A free will: origins of the notion in ancient thought (London, University of California 
Press, 2007), p.49. 
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 C.f. Aristotle, Physics 195a6-8. 
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but also allows for its separate existence, and this coheres with his more 
straightforward substance dualism. 
 
According to Eustathius, the soul is an invisible, intelligible thing, but endues 
the body with an “innermost stamp.”
445
  This looks a lot like a substantialist 
interpretation of hylomorphism.  Here, I am concerned with hylomorphism in body 
soul relations, and by hylomorphism, I mean an understanding of the body-soul 
relation as one in which the body is the matter from which the person is made, and 
the soul is what makes the body into a person.  So, Eustathius’ picture is 
substantialist in that the body and soul are separate substances – so the soul is a 
thing, rather than a property of the body; it is hylomorphic in that the body is the 
‘matter’ of the person – the thing of which the person is made – which is only given 
its ‘form’, and therefore made human – by the soul.  The entities involved in this 
substantialist interpretation of hylomorphism correspond, roughly, to a Platonic 
description of the body and soul respectively.  Although Eustathius sees the soul as a 
superior partner to the body, he has an integrated view of human action.  Eustathius’ 
description of God breathing a soul into Adam elucidates here:
446
 The body is inert 
without the soul – it “lies dead, unbreathing, unmoving”, but when the body receives 
the soul, the person becomes active.  As noted above, the extant text is unclear as to 
whether it is the body or the person who becomes active; no noun is given as a 
subject in the sentence that describes the person’s/body’s acts, and they are referred 
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 For Eustathius’ belief that the soul is intelligible, see D20:21 [Ariomanitas] and discussion above 
in the section ‘The ontological difference between body and soul.’ Eustathius claims that a soulless 
body is without its “innermost stamp” at D4:27 [Ariomanitas]. See discussion of the Eustathius’ 
description of a soulless body as a statue, above in this section. 
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to with third person singular indicative verbs.  We may wonder whether this 
ambiguity derives partly from the fact that the distinction is not very important to 
Eustathius in this particular context; when the body receives the soul, the body 
becomes the person.  At any rate, the person is certainly a third entity, neither simply 
body, nor simply soul.  The person is the intermediary entity produced when form is 
imposed onto matter.  This corresponds to the way in which the person, and not the 
body or the soul, is the agent of a given human action, in a thoroughly Aristotelian 
manner. 
 
One key passage suggesting a hylomorphic conception of the soul-body 
relationship is found in Ariomanitas.  It is, usefully, claiming to summarise the soul.  
However, as Declerck observes in his footnote to the text, it does not fit with what 
follows, and has evidently been lifted from some other part of the text: “On one 
hand, that it is invisible spirit is evident to everyone.  On the other, the motion [ἡ 
κίνησις] makes an image of itself from the organs of perception and, moulding the 
activities [εἰδοποιοῦσα…τας ἐνεργείας], it furnishes everything with visible 
marks.”
447
   
 
Navascués argues that these sentences refer to the way in which the soul 
relates to the body and that there is a tension between an invisible soul and a visible 
body, which is resolved by the perceptible organs of the body being moved and 
shaped by the soul.  He further argues that Eustathius wants to unite the soul with the 
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body without rendering the soul movable.
448
  This thesis is largely persuasive, but 
requires some expansion. 
 
We have already seen that, according to Eustathius, the soul imparts 
movement to the body.  He also, more specifically, associates the soul’s activity, or 
connection with the body, with movement.  So, he refers to “the movements of two 
spirits” as something that his opponents claim cannot dwell in one body.
449
  He goes 
on to argue that it is possible for Christ to have a soul whilst united with the Spirit, 
but the κίνησις as a referent to the action or presence of an intelligible partner to the 
body is not part of what he objects to.  It is either his concept or a concept he shares 
with his opponents.  We therefore have a reference to the soul enduing τας ἐνεργείας 
with a form. 
 
Ἐνεργείας could carry several different senses here.
450
  It seems to me that it 
does not in this case exactly carry the technical Aristotelian sense of ‘actuality’, 
because τας ἐνεργείας seem to be a product of κίνησις’ machinations, rather than a 
change of state.  Aristotle himself does not refer to movement, or the soul, as 
εἰδοποιοῦσα ἐνεργείας but Alexander of Aphrodisias writes that, before the matter is 
εἰδοποιηθῆναι it exists “potentially”, not ἐνεργείᾳ, “in actuality.”
451
  Here, 
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 D51:2-4 [Ariomanitas]. 
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 Navascués, “El sustrato filosófico”, p.62, in which the author cites Alexander of Aphrodisias, De 
anima, 22-24. 
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 Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentaria in Aristotelis metaphysica, 69:20-21. 
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εἰδοποιηθῆναι clearly refers to the giving of form and the consequent actualisation of 
the matter’s potential.  In Eustathius’ text as it now appears, εἰδοποιοῦσα may be 
similarly rendered as ‘moulding’ or ‘shaping’, but ἐνεργείας is not used in quite 
Alexander’s and Aristotle’s sense, because τας ἐνεργείας either undergo a change of 
state or are a product of a change of state. Neither quite has the sense that τας 
ἐνεργείας are the new state into which the object of κίνησις’ machinations are 
brought.  
 
It is tempting to wonder whether the epitomiser has preserved the word 
ἐνεργείας whilst misunderstanding its exact meaning, and whether Eustathius did 
intend to say that the soul, via κίνησις, causes ἐνεργείας.  As this passage bears little 
relation to what follows, it seems to have been cut out of a much longer passage.  
The epitomiser, in trying to summarise the salient points of this passage, might have 
skewed its meaning. This possibility is attractive partly because it allows for the 
widest range of meanings of ἐνεργείας.  Even if we eschew the Aristotelian 
‘actuality’, the word still tends to connote actions of some kind: activity or operation, 




This could plausibly have occurred in several ways: for example, if the 
original text, or an earlier rendering of it, had contained an accusative and infinitive 
clause in a sentence with several accusatives, the epitomiser may have mistaken 
ἐνεργείας for an object where it had originally been a subject, associated with 
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κίνησις, the form-endowing agent.  Alternatively, ἐνεργείας could have been the 
subject of another verb: so, for example, εἴδος and ἐνεργείας could both have been 
subjects of ποιέω. Most plausibly, and along the same lines, the participle 
εἰδοποιοῦσα stood as it is, but there was another participle, perhaps ποιοῦσα.  This 
may have been the verb corresponding to ἐνεργείας, εἰδοποιοῦσα being intransitive.  
The epitomiser could have omitted the other verb deliberately, or either he or a later 
scribe could have failed to copy it down.  Accepting either of the latter 
reconstructions, we would have a fairly straightforward substantialist hylomorphism: 
the soul gives the body form in rendering it active. 
 
At any rate, the phrase εἰδοποιοῦσα…τας ἐνεργείας does evidently convey 
the idea that the soul realises the potential of the body.  It closely echoes Eustathius’ 
statue metaphor, in connecting activity with form.  Navascués notes as Aristotelian 
primarily the fact that the soul is the cause of the body’s movement, but is not mobile 
itself.
453
  Eustathius, he argues, wishes to link the soul with the body’s movement, 
without equating it.  This is true, but this passage is also, more specifically, part of a 
substantialist hylomorphic understanding of the soul-body relationship. 
 
A further caveat is necessary in light of the complexity of this passage.  These 
lines initially seem to resemble some ancient discussions about the mechanism of 
sight.  Could they in fact refer to seeing a moving object? The object impresses itself 
upon the “organs of perception” – the eyes – and therefore realises their potential, 
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making them actually organs of perception.  This would, again, echo Aristotle, who 
writes that “the perceptible object realises the potential of the faculty of perception to 
exist.”
454
  This would be in keeping with Eustathius’ physiological interest in this 
text.  However, it is an improbable reading because it requires the epitomiser to have 
truncated a longer passage about the soul so that it looks like a summary of the soul.  
His reason for taking these short lines out of a longer discussion, and placing them 
here, is most likely to be either because they were, after all, a summary of the soul, or 
because his rendering of them summarised a much larger piece.  Although the echo 
of ancient theories of sense-perception is worth noting, I do not think that it is, in 
fact, what these lines are about. 
 
In articulating his view of the relationship between the body and the soul, 
Eustathius probably started from a belief in the simultaneous importance of 
physicality and of psychological experience, rather than from Aristotle, or any of his 
followers.  However, he makes extensive use of various strands of Aristotelian 
thought which enabled him to hold together the importance of the body and soul with 
a clear substance dualism.  It is very probable that he had a monistic conception of 
the soul, and, in this he was closer to Stoicism than either Platonism or 
Aristotelianism, but a Stoic influence is not really reflected elsewhere in his 
anthropological ontology.  
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In Eustathius’ thought, both body and soul are properly susceptible to 
passions.  The concept of passion (πάθος) is complex in patristic texts, and, whilst 
Eustathius’ concept is evidently firmly grounded in wider Greek patristic discourse 
and its engagement with pagan philosophers, it is necessary to look for the sense of 
the term in his own writings for our definition.  Eustathius uses the term to refer to 
emotions, desires and feelings.  It applies equally to psychological experiences, such 
as sorrow, and physical experiences such as hunger. 
 
Suffering is a specific kind of πάθος and is often a subject of particular 
concern in both philosophy and theology.  This is particularly true of mental and 
emotional suffering which, in Stoicism, was thought to be based on a false 
understanding of reality.
455
  Eustathius distinguishes between feelings of desire such 
as hunger and feelings of sorrow, but he rejects the Stoic understanding of the latter 
as inappropriate. 
 
Eustathius focuses particularly on suffering.  This is partly because he wishes 
to explain how Christ could have done everything he is supposed to have done 
without God experiencing πάθος, if the incarnate Word was fully God.  In particular, 
Eustathius wishes to safeguard the reality of every action that was soteriologically 
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necessary.  This agenda centralises Christ’s crucifixion and death.
456
  Furthermore, 
the Stoic idea that grief, in particular, is an improper emotion placed passages that 
referred to Christ’s mental anguish in a key position in disputes about the mutability 
or passibility of the Word.  The result is that the human soul is depicted as the natural 
recipient of suffering in contradistinction to the divine Word.  
 
For Eustathius, as Navascués has observed, the soul undergoes passion 
appropriately and in its own right.
457
  The soul is sometimes depicted as the primary 
subject of suffering.  A particularly striking passage from Ariomanitas, which we 
have come across before, merits an extended quotation: “He did not say ‘my body is 
in greatest pain’ so that someone who had received this from above should not think 
that, while the Spirit itself was remaining for the soul, the very bodily temple 
suffered according to itself, but he said ‘my soul is in greatest pain.’  For the 




Here, Eustathius quotes Jesus’ words in Gethsemane according to Matthew 
26:38 and Mark 14.34.  Although Eustathius believes that the soul is involved in 
Christ’s bodily suffering on the cross, he marks out Gethsemane as the particular site 
of mental anguish in Christ’s passion.  Marcellus and Athanasius do likewise.
459
  He 
is very close to Marcellus, in particular, in this respect, in that he refers to Christ’s 
                                                                                                                                          
response of such a person; one may initially begin to feel it, but a virtuous person will soon ward it 
off. 
456
 The next chapter considers the soteriological significance of Christ’s death for Eustathius. 
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experience in Gethsemane partly defensively, as something that the Word could not 
have done.  Marcellus refers to it to refute the claim that the unity of Father and Son 
resides in the unity of their wills.
460
  Eustathius is an early example of a growing 
tendency to find a place for Christ’s psychological experiences. 
 
Eustathius is so insistent partly because the claim that the soul is a subject of 
suffering in its own right, as opposed to partaking in the body’s suffering, was 
radical enough in the middle-and-neo Platonic milieu in which he was writing.
461
  
Eustathius has not simply replaced the subject of passion with the human soul, 
relative to pro-Arian logos-sarx Christology.  The mechanism of suffering is 
different.  I have already noted that, typically, in pro-Arian logos-sarx Christology, 
the Word becomes passible through the flesh, or body.  Unlike the Father, the Word 
may become passible, but he is not passible in himself.   
 
This is very similar to the place given to the soul in many forms of Platonism, 
and, consequently, in much patristic anthropology, where the soul stands as a bridge 
between the perceptible and intelligible worlds.  It is susceptible to passions, but 
largely by the mediation of the body.  This is reflected in a lot of Greek patristic 
Christology prior to and contemporaneous with Eustathius.  The Word undergoes 
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passion through the flesh as the soul does.  For example, in Athanasius’ Contra 
Gentes when the soul turns, erroneously, towards the body, it partakes of passions, 
and Athanasius correspondingly also writes of Christ’s flesh as the subject of 
Christ’s suffering.
462
  This is, pointedly, true of Christ’s mental anguish in 
Gethsemane:  
 
For the properties of the body would not have been in the 
incorporeal [Word], unless he had taken a corruptible and mortal 
body…when he was in a body suffering and weeping and toiling, 
these things, which are proper to the flesh, are ascribed to [the 
Word] along with the body…if he asked that the cup might pass 





Eustathius, like Athanasius, thinks that Christ’s mental anguish is important, but 
attributes it to the soul, not the flesh.  Gregory of Nyssa, similarly to Athanasius, 
claims that the soul is susceptible to passions through the body.
464
  Interestingly, the 
Word is more involved in suffering in Athanasius than in Eustathius, because he is as 
involved as Athanasius allows any intelligible entity to be. 
 
The soul has a kind of double agency with respect to passions.  Its part in 
enabling the body to feel a given passion is the same as in Eustathius’ wider account 
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of human action, but it also undergoes the same passion itself.  The soul both 
operates mechanically on behalf of the body, and feels the passions.   The body is 
therefore dependent on the soul’s πάθος for its own.  Thus, when he insists that the 
claim “my soul is in great pain” does indeed apply to the soul, he also argues that the 
body could not undergo passion alone because it has no sensation “according to 
itself.”
465
  Rather than the soul undergoing passions via the body, Eustathius 
occasionally suggests that the body undergoes passions via the soul.  However, he 
makes this argument in order to assert that the body and the soul undergo passions 
together, and are mutually dependent in this process, in contrast to the more 
dominant association between passions and the body.  His very assertion that the 
pain of the soul was exactly that in fact leads to the claim that “the soul does not 
gush forth tears apart from a body, and nor will a body cry joylessly asunder from a 
soul, but the one who cries is the one who has a proportionate mixture from both… 
these are passions of soul and body...”
466
  For the purpose of assessing the 
implications of this view for Eustathius’ picture of the experience of passions, it is 
significant that Eustathius is explicitly rejecting the idea that they act separately.  He 
has in mind the picture of body and soul experiencing passion individually, and finds 
it wanting. 
 
Eustathius does write that the soul receives desires from body: “he is said to 
be hungry and thirsty, [and] a yearning [ὄρεξιν] for food and drink is put in the soul 
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by the body, [lacuna] supplying the desire [τῆς ἐπιθυμιας].”
467
  This doesn’t 
problematise his sense that passions are proper to the soul – the point is that hunger 
and thirst require a body – but it does associate certain appetitive desires particularly 
with the body.  It is nonetheless significant that Eustathius is connecting the soul to 
hunger, rather than distancing it.  So, he says that Christ “defined the food as the 
soul’s business.”
468
  Eustathius’ picture seems to be that various passions may 
originate exclusively in soul or body, but that they are manifested and experienced 
through both soul and body. 
 
Although Eustathius acquired a particular defensive motive for emphasising 
the soul’s passibility in the ‘Arian’ controversy, there is no indication that he would 
not have asserted it before.  As noted in chapter two, in his relatively early Oratio 
coram tota ecclesia, the Word is said to be killed.
469
  However, this is not, 
presumably, to the deliberate exclusion of Christ’s human soul.  We might wish to 
speculate that this fragment predates Eustathius’ clear belief in Christ’s human soul, 
which we see already in Engastrimytho.  However, it is implausible that what 
underlies Eustathius’ comment is a Christology involving both a human soul and the 
Word, and in which only the Word suffers.  The most unusual element of the view 
that the soul is passible in itself is in the innate passibility of an intelligible entity.  
This operates in the same way if applied to the Word as if applied to the soul.  We 
cannot tell whether this is what Eustathius envisaged when writing of the Word being 
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killed, but, at any rate, the implied possibility of the Word in this passage says little 
about the passibility of the soul in Eustathius’ early thought. 
 
Eustathius’ account of the soul’s relationship to πάθος implies a monistic 
conception of the soul.  Eustathius does attribute to the soul qualities attributed to 
different parts of the soul in an Aristotelian or Platonic system.  The soul that Adam 
receives is “rational” [λογική], and is involved in ὄρεξις and ἐπιθυμια, often 
associated with a kind of gut desire.
470
  In the instances available to us, ὄρεξις and 
ἐπιθυμια come via the body, but because they are ὄρεξις and ἐπιθυμια specifically for 
food and drink, we cannot conclude that Eustathius would never conceive of the 
soul’s passions in these ways.  At any rate, where the soul receives passion from 
elsewhere, this is very clearly from the body, the physical apparatus, and not from an 
‘irrational’ part of the soul.  This is underlined by the fact that Eustathius does not 
refer to σάρξ, which would have been more ambiguous, but to σῶμα.  Despite the 
fact that this is within the epitome, we can trust that the word choice in this context is 
his own because it is part of the wider argument that a human being is a body and a 
soul, as he also writes in Engastrimytho.  I have noted that Eustathius, in fact, hardly 
ever uses the term σάρξ, and only uses it to refer to Christ’s body when quoting 
scriptural passages that do so.
471
  This coheres with a sense that the soul, qua soul, 
should be undergoing passions.  It also coheres with a corresponding rejection of 
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both the compartmentalisation of the soul into rational and irrational parts, and the 




Eustathius also seems to equate ψυχή with νοῦς: “[The Spirit] is happy to 
dwell with living souls, although they are not at all unpolluted – for the mind would 
partake of all filth by a short mingling…”
473
  It is unclear exactly what the mind is 
mingling with here, but it is fairly certain that it is used as a synonym for soul.  The 
souls are polluted, and this is why – because they partake of filth.  This is significant 
because it suggests that, when the soul grieves, the νοῦς grieves: it suggests that there 
is no separation between the part of the soul that grieves and the part of the soul that 
thinks.  Admittedly, it is not certain that these terms are Eustathius’ own, so we 
cannot draw firm conclusions from them.  However, the use of these terms coheres 
with and reinforces his wider sense that the soul is totally, and unambiguously, 
embroiled in the person’s emotional experience. 
 
Eustathius’ focus upon the soul as a subject of passion in its own right does 
not necessarily blur the distinction between rational thought and appetitive desire.  It 
does, however, give emotions a legitimate and important role in human experience.  
Eustathius regards the capacity for emotional experience as a good, and 
correspondingly regards many emotional experiences as morally good, in such a way 
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as to place him sharply at odds with Stoicism.
474
  Pointedly, his emphasis on Christ’s 
grieving soul makes it evident that he sees Christ’s grief as a morally appropriate 




Eustathius does juxtapose the experience of appetites such as hunger and 
thirst with Christ’s suffering in Gethsemane and on the cross.  Expanding on his 
accusation that logos-sarx Christology risks docetism, he notes, as one of its docetic 
implications that “before the cross the lord did not receive the passions that are 
natural and unexceptionable [τά…ἀδιάβλητα καὶ φυσικὰ…πάθη…].”
476
  This rather 
implies that Christ’s suffering on the cross is not natural.  The key to synthesising 
this with Eustathius’ reverence for Christ’s grief is the adjective ἀδιάβλητα.  The 
word’s immediate context – a contrast between natural passions and their presumed 
alternative – might tempt us to hear an echo of the Stoic εὐπάθεια (which, it might be 
supposed, was the term originally used).  However, this is implausible because it 
renders the rest of Eustathius’ argument incoherent by casting the other πάθη in this 
comparison – Christ’s on the cross – in a negative light.  Clearly, there is no Stoicism 
here.  The original sense is simply that other πάθη have no negative connotation, 
whilst grief is a response to something imperfect.
477
  Eustathius’ attitude to grief is at 
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odds with aspects of Stoic ethical theory that had so far been dominant in patristic 
thought. 
 
The nature of the body-soul κρᾶσις in philosophical context 
It is difficult to establish whether Eustathius’ use of the term κρᾶσις is 
especially indebted to any given philosophical school.  There was a complex 
discourse on the nature of mixture in antiquity, in which Stoicism, Platonism and 
Aristotelianism are all heavily interrelated, and this discourse is connected to 
questions of the union of body and soul.  Eustathius never describes κρᾶσις
 
in 
sufficient detail to trace his usage conclusively to a given school.
478
  Both 
Aristotelian and Stoic discourse have a tendency to emphasise the mutuality of any 
change taking place in a mixture, and this tendency is cohesive with Eustathius’ 
sense of the interdependence of body and soul.  Plotinus critiques a Stoic 
understanding of mixture with reference to body-soul relations, wishing to safeguard 
the soul from containment.
479
  Aristotle’s analysis itself allows for some ambiguity 
with regards the equality of the parts of a mixture. Κρᾶσις is a mixture whereby “any 
part of the mixture is the same as the whole.”
480
  However, if there is more of one 
substance than the other “the increase of the dominant is the result.”
481
  Richard 
Norris argues that, “Where one element in krasis is dominant, the relationship 
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between the elements is analogous to that between form and matter, and one element 
is in effect transmuted into the other.”
482
  This sounds a lot like Eustathius, but only 
insofar as Eustathius’ descriptions of body-soul relations already sound like 
Aristotle’s.  Further, it should be noted that Aristotle’s primary term for mixture here 
is μίξις, so Eustathius has probably not lifted this directly from Aristotle.  Any 
attachment to either a Stoic or an Aristotelian understanding that we might glean 
from Eustathius’ extant corpus rests on his understanding of the soul and body as 
found in his wider discourse; his use of the term κρᾶσις cannot, in itself, tell us very 
much about Eustathius’ philosophical sources, or lack thereof. 
 
Navascués is justified in observing that Eustathius’ inclusion of the whole 
soul in this mixture jars with a dominant Aristotelian understanding.  He is 
presumably thinking of Aristotle’s discussion in De Anima, where he says, of the 
νοῦς, that οὐδε μεμῖχθαι εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι  - “it doesn’t make sense for it to 
be mixed with the body.”
483
  Eustathius, in contrast to Aristotle, clearly does think 
that the entire soul is in the κρᾶσις with the body.  His sense that the κρᾶσις is the 
human being rather relies on it. 
 
Aristotle excludes νοῦς from the κρᾶσις / μίξις of body and soul on the basis 
of his theory of κρᾶσις / μίξις in a wider context – Eustathius could simply reject, or 
be unconcerned with, Aristotle’s theory of mixture.  However, this difference with 
Aristotle can also be readily explained if we accept that Eustathius has a monistic 
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conception of the soul, as I have argued is probable.  There is then no question of 
excluding a part of the soul from the κρᾶσις with the body.  In this instance, 
Navascués’ picture of a Stoicised-Aristotelianism is helpful, and can be fleshed out 
as follows: Eustathius’ particular negotiation of Platonism and Aristotelianism with 
regards to body-soul relations owes a good deal to his unified conception of the soul, 
the principal resource for which is Stoicism.  This means that emotions, or at least 
some of them, originate from the part of the person that is responsible for rationality.  
This is in contrast to both Aristotle and Plato, who posit a separate, appetitive part of 
the soul.
484
  Eustathius has taken a structure of the soul that echoes Stoic simplicity 
and used it to centralise and valorise emotions, including grief, in human experience.  
He is being deeply Hellenic, but eclectically so. 
 
The disembodied soul485 
Whilst the soul and body are intertwined when united, their union is not 
metaphysically necessary.  There is clearly an intrinsic connection between them, but 
this does not entail an intrinsic union.  That is, they are necessarily defined in relation 
to each other, but this does not entail their inability to exist separately. 
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The most attested instance of separation of soul and body in Eustathius’ 
thought is death.  Eustathius naturally regards death as the separation of body and 




Eustathius’ picture of the human person when body and soul are separate 
both elucidates and complicates his wider anthropology; looking at the human person 
when body and soul are apart crystallises the individual ontological potential of both 
of them, not least by offering concrete examples of how this potential plays out in 
terms of experience.  Eustathius does not articulate a theory of how the body and the 
soul exist when separate, but offers a number of rich anecdotes.
487
  The picture that 
emerges from these anecdotes gives a slightly different sense of the tension between 
monism and dualism to that found elsewhere in Eustathius’ anthropology.  Eustathius 
simultaneously places particular emphasis on resurrection and the importance of the 
activity of the disembodied soul.  This emphasises the radical difference between 
body and soul whilst maintaining that they are united in the eschatological, perfected 
human being, and are therefore ideally united.  
 
The soul is separated from the body and retains active agency in the finite 
period between bodily death and resurrection, whilst the corpse is inert.  
Consequently, a discussion of the human person between bodily death and 
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resurrection is almost entirely a discussion of the human soul in this period.  
However, the very inertia of the body is anthropologically significant.  The soul does 
not constitute a human being but it does in some sense act on behalf of the whole 
person when disembodied.  The dead body also operates on behalf of the human 
person, in a sense, but the soul clearly has a superior kind of agency.  By highlighting 
the soul’s unique capacity for independent active agency, Eustathius’ conception of 
the soul between death and resurrection emphasises his wider sense that the soul is 
the active agent within the human person.  However, because the soul will achieve its 
telos when reunited with the resurrected body, disembodiment is a temporary and 
inferior state for it.   The soul’s identity and experience between death and 
resurrection are connected to the person’s corporeal life, and correspondingly, to the 
particular body in which it lived.    
 
Unremarkably, the soul is alive and active between death and resurrection.  
There are numerous examples of this: Christ’s human soul leads the soul of the 
penitent thief into paradise, “while his body was encompassed by the tomb” and “on 
the same day as the death of his body”;
488
 souls are imprisoned in Hades when Christ 
arrives there;
489
 When discussing the putative summoning of Samuel in 1 Kingdoms 
28, Eustathius clearly assumes that Samuel’s soul, although not called up by the 
necromancer of Endor, is active somewhere.  His objection to Origen’s claim that 
Samuel really appeared in Endor rests on the improper power Origen attributes to the 
necromancer.  Only God has power over souls: “demons do not have authority over 
                                                 
488
 D22:21-22 and D28:2-3 respectively. 
489
 The soteriological implications of this are discussed in the next chapter. 
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spirits and souls, but God does, who rules over everything at once.”
490
  It is not the 





Having a soul that is conscious between death and resurrection is an intrinsic 
part of human experience.  This is clearest in Eustathius’ conception of Christ’s 
human soul.  I have argued that Eustathius’ principal argument in Ariomanitas is that 
Christ must have a human soul in order to be human.  The same argument lies 
behind Eustathius’ discussions of Christ’s soul between death and resurrection.  If 
Christ did not have a human soul to go to paradise, then the human Christ did not go 
to paradise, and the penitent thief was the first human being to go to paradise.
492
  In 
the case of Christ, the disembodied soul has a vital soteriological role to play, freeing 
souls from Hades and opening the gates of paradise.  (This role will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter).  This reinforces, rather than undermining, the wider 
anthropological implications of his discourse; for the moment, suffice to note two 
interrelated points: 1) It is necessary for Christ’s soul, as opposed to the Word, to 
open the gates of paradise because it is necessary for a human being to open the gates 
of paradise. 2) Salvation of humanity is effected in Hades and paradise because these 
are, properly, human realms as much as anything else.
493
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Humans continue to be defined partly by their bodies between death and 
resurrection.  Let us return to Eustathius’ claim that a human being is a 
“proportionate mixture” of body and soul.  Significantly, this claim is made to 
contrast a human being – body and soul – with a disembodied soul on its own.  
Eustathius is therefore acutely conscious of the dipartite nature of the human person 
when body and soul are separated.  Correspondingly, Christ’s soteriological activity 
in the intelligible realm of souls is paralleled by his soteriological (in)activity in the 
corporeal realm.  He has also “partaken in the grave through the body.”
494
  
Eustathius’ focus on the importance of the disembodied soul does not, therefore, 
preclude the importance of the body to human ontology or identity. 
 
Correspondingly, his discourses about the disembodied soul occur against the 
backdrop of the resurrection to come, when the two distinct parts of the human being 
will be reunited.
495
  Whilst the soul can function without the body, this is not ideal 
for the soul.  It is when the body is resurrected, and the soul is reunited with it, that 
both soul and body achieve their telos.   
 
Nonetheless, the separation of body and soul at death inevitably emphasises 
the distinction between the two.  At this moment, the fact that soul is incorporeal, the 
body corporeal, is manifested in strikingly disparate experiences for each.    The 
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union of the soul and body in the human person is ideal but, evidently, contingent.  
However the soul also has an intrinsic connection with the body.  According to 
Eustathius, the soul retains a connection to its embodied life between bodily death 
and resurrection.  However, Eustathius’ treatment involves a particular tension in the 
soul’s relationship to corporeality. 
 
Although he clearly believes that disembodied souls are not intrinsically visible 
in the corporeal world, Eustathius shows some hesitation about whether or not the 
soul can be visibly manifested, looking like the body it was united to in life.  The 
passage in question refers to souls appearing in dreams, and must be closely 
examined:   
 
[P]erhaps you will say that the very apparatus of the soul used to 
take shape in human form according to age, in order that by its 
appearance the soul might foretell the future by prophesy.  As 
everyone knows, sometimes in dreams spirits and souls appear to 
human beings, displaying the characteristics of humans with all 
their members…[but if that were the case here] why on earth didn’t 





Either, Eustathius takes it as common knowledge that souls appear to human beings 
in human form in dreams or, he does not accept this himself, but is mocking Origen, 
who does.  I argue that the latter is more probable, but also suggest that Eustathius 
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Eustathius does not comment further on the difference between souls appearing 
in dreams and in other instances.  Therefore, if we accept that he allows that souls 
appear in dreams, we must also accept that he allows that the kind of appearance that 
happens in dreams might be applicable to other circumstances, as he suggests that 
Origen would like to argue. 
 
He proposes an argument that Origen might make to explain how it could be 
that Saul did not see Samuel, while the necromancer did. The suggested argument is 
that the necromancer saw Samuel’s soul, which had taken the shape of his body.  
Eustathius then explains why this could not have been the case.  In order to establish 
whether Eustathius thinks that souls can appear, looking like the people they had 
been part of when alive, we need to establish the function of the phrase: “As 
everyone knows, sometimes in dreams spirits and souls appear to human beings, 
displaying the characteristics of humans with all their members…” οἷα δὴ κατὰ τοὺς 
ὕπνους ἐνίοτε πνεύματα καί τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐφιστανται, παμμελεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπείους 
ἐπιδεικνυμεναι χαρακτῆρας. 
 
There are two strands to the proposition that souls can appear in the form of 
their bodies.  One is partly about the intrinsic connection between the body and the 
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soul, and partly about the soul’s relationship to visibility more generally.  Can the 
soul look like its body when not attached to it? The other is about whether the souls 
of the dead manifest themselves, in any sense (visual or otherwise) in the corporeal 
world.  With regards to the latter question, Eustathius believes, as Greer has noted, 
that only God can call souls from Hades and doesn’t spend much time worrying 
about whether God ever actually does so or not. 
 
He does initially seem to accept the ontological possibility of the soul 
appearing in the shape of its body.  He proceeds to list the many reasons why this 
could not have been what happened in the case presented in 1 Kingdoms 28.  He has 
an idea of the manner in which souls return, temporarily, from the dead and what is 
described in 1 Kingdoms 28 does not fit it.  The concept that dead people’s souls 
can, on occasion, and only at God’s behest, appear in the corporeal realm is rather 
implied within his argument.  However, this implication is not necessarily indicative 
of Eustathius’ opinion.  He is trying to present his argument as over-determined. 
 
Origen himself evidently did believe that souls retain the form of the body after 
death.
498
  Methodius of Olympus referred to this belief as part of an argument, 
against Origen, against the incorporeality of the soul.  He ultimately connects this to 
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Origen’s putative doctrine of a ‘spiritual’ resurrection.
499
  This can offer a key to 
Eustathius’ own view. 
 
Eustathius writes that “Methodius…has written sufficiently about Origen’s 
doctrine [of the resurrection] and has clearly demonstrated to everyone that Origen 
unwisely gave an opening to the heretics, defining the resurrection as one of form, 
but not of the body itself.”
500
  The “opening to the heretics” is Origen’s doctrine of 
the resurrection itself, not his apparently related doctrine of the soul between death 
and resurrection.  However, this phrase does suggest that Eustathius shares 
Methodius’ sense that Origen’s conception of soul’s relationship to the body is a 
slippery slope.  Particularly in light of the immediate relevance of the “form of the 
body” idea to Engastrimytho, it seems very likely that he means to include 
Methodius’ attack on it among the things that Methodius has demonstrated.  
Furthermore, this passage contains an apology for not addressing these issues 
himself, and, therefore, makes the fact that he does not explicitly and unambiguously 
attack the doctrine of the “form of the body” less surprising. 
 
It is noteworthy that the belief that the soul retains the body’s form after death 
can be found in a wider range of authors and notably, in Irenaeus, who is often, 
somewhat justifiably, placed in contradistinction to Origen with regards to soul-body 
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  It is specifically Eustathius’ self-identification with Methodius’ thought, 
and not his wider belief in a bodily resurrection, which suggests that he rejects the 
idea of souls coming back, visibly, as ghosts. 
 
Methodius’ attack on Origen, in this instance, relies on a gradiated conception 
of corporeality.  Eustathius shares aspects of this conception, but other aspects of it 
jar with his metaphysics, and, specifically, the arguments he makes in 
Engastrimytho.  
 
Like Eustathius, Methodius initially presents his argument as overdetermined 
by claiming that even accepting Origen’s picture of the disembodied soul, Origen’s 
view of embodiment is incoherent, as it does not follow from this picture.
502
  He also, 
however, rejects the view that a soul retains the form of a body between death and 
resurrection, arguing that, insofar as it is physical, it is physical in itself.  He 
contends that souls are spoken of as if physical “not because they had another 
invisible body but because, having been stripped of their entire covering, the souls 
themselves are naturally like that.”
503
  Methodius wants to demonstrate the souls are 
naturally visible, in the sense of being “visible to reason”, whereas God is completely 
invisible.  This is part of his argument for the physical resurrection of the body. 
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Eustathius’ view of the visibility of the disembodied soul echoes this picture in 
important respects: he conceptualises Samuel in a visible way when he writes of 
clothing ready for Samuel in heaven. Samuel’s clothing, and, one may speculate, his 
appearance, would have been an idealised form of how he used to look.  Eustathius 
asserts that “imperishable garments from heaven, shining with flashing rays of light, 
are ready for the saints.”
504
  Eustathius then claims that Samuel’s soul, as ought to be 
obvious to anyone, would have been in “his priestly cloak…seen in a spiritual 
way.”
505
  This resembles Methodius’ claim that souls are “visible to reason.”  
However, whereas Methodius had set out to prove that the soul is visible in a 
spiritual sense, Eustathius allows it as a defensive manoeuvre.  He does not describe 
the soul as corporeal.  I have argued that Eustathius employs the category of 
incorporeality variously, sometimes to apply to a range of entities, including souls, 
and sometimes to demarcate God from everything else.  This he shares with both 
Origen and Methodius.  He draws on Methodius heavily in his picture of the 
disembodied soul, but does not adopt his framework for negotiating the nexus 
between God, corporeality and incorporeality.  This problematises for him 
Methodius’ argument against Origen. 
 
The ambiguous relationship between the soul and its earthly body in the period 
between death and resurrection is significant for the relationship between the 
perceptible and intelligible realms and human operation within them.  Pointedly, 
Eustathius’ ideas about the realm in which the disembodied soul operates assume the 
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same distinction between the perceptible and intelligible worlds which is found in his 
wider anthropology.  It is primarily here that we see that the categories ‘perceptible’ 
and ‘intelligible’ correspond to places. 
 
There is a dialectic between hierarchy and mutual dependence in the 
disembodied soul’s activity.  The soul remains dependent on the person’s bodily 
identity for its own.  The body, however, has an absolute mechanical dependence on 
the soul; the partnership between soul and body entails mutual dependence, but the 
body is more dependent than the soul.  Eustathius’ picture of the person between 
death and resurrection therefore reveals what is sometimes implied elsewhere; that 
the soul has more intrinsic agency than the body. 
 
The imperishable clothing ready for the saints leads us to another kind of 
connection between the soul and the earthly body.  The soul’s experiences result 
from the person’s actions in earthly life; broadly, the soul receives punishments and 
rewards for the person.  An example is Eustathius’ take on the parable of the rich 
man and Lazarus; among other things, “each man had received his fitting reward in 
each place.”
506
  There is a causal connection between the person’s earthly actions and 
the soul’s experience between death and resurrection.  Eustathius clearly thinks that 
the disembodied soul undergoes some form of punishment or reward prior to 
resurrection.  When analysing how the soul is treated between death and resurrection, 
Eustathius seems to identify the soul with the whole person. 
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There is a tension between Eustathius’ ontology of the person per se and his 
narration of human experience.  Specifically, this relates to the relative importance of 
body and soul in the location of human agency and identity.  As we have seen, 
Eustathius’ insistence that neither body nor soul is the person on its own appears 
partly in the context of the disembodied soul.  However, his narration of human 
experience repeatedly suggests that when things happen to the disembodied soul, 
they happen to the person.  When the disembodied soul acts, it acts on behalf of the 
whole person.  For example, when Christ’s soul entered paradise, Christ entered 
“through Christ’s soul” (δία τῆς ψυχής).
507
  Specifically the soul, and not the whole 
person, is the agent, but the soul provides a way for the person to act; it is therefore 
an instrument of the person.  We must remember that the dead body is also acting for 
the human being.  Christ “has partaken in the grave through the body.”
508
  There is 
occasionally a sense that both body and soul are instruments of the person who, 
paradoxically, is the sum of his or her instruments.  Here, in contrast to Eustathius’ 
conception of human action when body and soul are united, there are separate tasks 
proper to body and soul.  Eustathius’ picture of the soul between death and 
resurrection inevitably suggests a more disjointed account of the roles of body and 
soul in human agency than his picture of the person during the current life.  
Eustathius’ argument that Christ must have had a human soul because the human 
Christ must have gone to Hades and paradise between his death and resurrection only 




Here, there is a significant distinction between agency and identity.  Between 
death and resurrection, both the body and the soul perform on behalf of the person to 
some degree, and therefore both have some kind of agency; however, the soul’s role 
is active, the body’s role is passive.  The soul moves around, converses and is 
rewarded or punished.  All the body does, and all it is capable of doing, is to be dead.   
Eustathius often emphasises this by contrasting the disembodied soul’s activity with 
the dead body’s inertia.  His claim that Christ’s soul travelled to paradise “while his 
body was still encompassed by the tomb”
509
, for example, seems calculated to evoke 
such a contrast.  The disembodied soul, unremarkably, has a qualitatively superior 
kind of agency to the soulless body.  However, this hierarchical relationship is absent 
with reference to human identity.  The body and the soul are equally the seat of 
human identity.  When the soul goes to paradise, this is equivalent to the person 
going to paradise.  When the body is dead, this is equivalent to the person being 
dead.  The body, arguably, has more agency without the soul as this is the only time 
when operation, though passive, is independent. 
 
In this complicated picture, Eustathius’ anthropological framework again draws 
on a broadly Platonic distinction between body and soul.  However, the anthropology 
he builds on this framework diverges from typical Platonic conclusions: although the 
soul is the primary agent in the person and directs the body, human identity resides in 
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both body and soul, and this gives the body a kind of lesser independent agency 
when separate from the soul.
510
  Eustathius thinks, along with most other people in 
the ancient world, that the soul directs and vitalises the body during embodied 
existence.  The way that he often ends up describing the disembodied soul as if it 
were the human person is a natural, if not necessary, consequence of this.
511
  
However, it also reveals a strongly dualistic sense that bodies and souls naturally 
operate in different created spheres, with different metaphysical possibilities and 
limitations and that both of these spheres are proper to humanity per se.   
 
 Within Eustathius’ conception of the disembodied soul, a relationship with 
the body is intrinsic to the soul, which corresponds to his take on the wider 
metaphysical distinction between the perceptible and intelligible realms; they are, for 
him, distinct but intrinsically connected.  During embodied existence, the body and 
soul are partners; the soul’s continued active agency shows that it is the superior 
partner.  However, it is bereft without, and defined by, the body.  Eustathius thinks 
within the parameters of a Christianity influenced by Platonism.  The questions he is 
grappling with are common, and are logically suggested by combining a Hellenistic 
metaphysics with a belief in physical resurrection.  However, particular emphases 
give his structures particular values.  In negotiating this common problem in his 
discussions of the soul between death and resurrection, Eustathius paints a picture of 
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a soul at once superior to and dependent on the body, and its embodied existence.  
He gives a narrative of the relationship of body and soul to human experience that 
differs sharply from his wider anthropological discourse because it must describe the 
soul’s existence apart from the body, but he tries to maintain, nonetheless, a holistic 
and integrated conception of the human person. 
 
 In another context, Eustathius describes the disembodied soul in a way that is 
less qualifying and apologetic in its Platonism.  This is the context of Christ’s human 
soul, while Christ is on earth, and Eustathius’ take on it owes a lot to Origen.  As 
mentioned above, Eustathius writes that Christ’s soul went to incorporeal realms 
with the Word whilst Christ’s body was alive and on earth.  It is not altogether clear 
whether only Christ’s soul can do this, or whether all human souls can.  There are 
contexts in which patristic authors speak of the soul of a living person being 
disembodied.  For example, Athanasius writes of the soul “travelling to foreign 
places” while the body sleeps.
512
  However, the omnipresence of the soul is a highly 
unusual idea, and must be explained with reference to the extra “strength” that the 
Spirit provides to Christ.
513
  Whether the Spirit will ultimately provide this strength 
to other human souls is a complex question, discussed in chapter 5.  For now, suffice 
to observe several points about what this says about the soul in relation to the body.  
Firstly, any idea that the soul has out of body experiences whilst the person is alive 
undermines the sense that a soul is properly embodied.  Embodiment is still a proper 
state for the soul, but only one such state.  Secondly, the omnipresence of the soul 
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The resurrection of the body 
The resurrection of the body is central to any discussion of anthropology 
because it is key to the nature of human τέλος.  It is possible, to some extent, to read 
the rest of Eustathius’ anthropological ontology in light of his view of eschatological 
human ontology because in eschatological ontology we see what is intrinsic in 
Eustathius’ wider anthropological model.  In this respect, the eschaton has a similar 
relation to the current life as the period between death and resurrection.  This is, of 
course, only true insofar as Eustathius was consistent and he was not always so, as 
his ideas about the soul between death and resurrection indicate.  Nonetheless, the 
resurrection is an especially important theological principle for Eustathius, so we 
may draw some inferences about Eustathius’ wider anthropology. 
 
Eustathius regards the πνευματικόν body as corporeal, and emphatically the 
same in substance as the current body.  He conceives of some change in appearance 
between the ψυχικόν body and the πνευματικόν body, but does not develop this 
further.  The change that takes place is connected with the acquisition of moral 
perfection, which is the culmination of a process that begins in this life and which is 
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effected by the Holy Spirit.  Eustathius diverges from much patristic anthropology in 
that he does not see human telos as involving an alteration of the way that the body 
and soul relate to each other in determining and carrying out the person’s actions so 
that, for example, the soul becomes directive of the body rather than vice versa.  
Eustathius also does not conceive of the Spirit, even in the context of a progression 
from ψυχικός to πνευματικός, as a ‘part’ of the person, but as an actor upon the 
person. 
 
Eustathius makes numerous references to Methodius’ De Resurrectione, and, 
again, seems to be closely influenced by him.
515
  Eustathius’ discourse on the 
resurrection is therefore, also, self-consciously anti-Origenist.  His arguments also 
echo thinkers predating Origen, often explicitly anti-Platonist.  This contributes to 
our understanding of the ideological context of Eustathius’ attack on Origen: a large 
part of his antipathy towards Origen is based on a belief that Origen rejects or 
undermines the location of human identity partly in the body. 
 
Eustathius insists that it is the body we have now that will be raised: “the 
bodies themselves, not different ones, are to be raised.”
516
   Christ’s resurrection 
body is an archetype for ours.  Among the arguments he gives for this is that Christ’s 
resurrected body was clearly the same as the one that was crucified as it carried the 
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nail and spear marks.
517
  This obviously relies on the similarity between Christ’s 




Eustathius’ most forceful extant arguments asserting that the resurrection 
body is the same as the current one  rely on the location of human identity in a 
particular body and soul, and are therefore cohesive with the bulk of his 
anthropological ontology, (though not his belief that, before the resurrection, the 
disembodied soul is punished or rewarded for the person’s actions).  Eustathius is 
adamant that the body that is raised is the same as the one that was previously alive.  
He argues that justice demands that the person who performed an action must be the 
one who is punished or rewarded for it.  This is part of his wider sense that a person 
is a mixture of body and soul which, as already observed, is indebted to Methodius.  
The fact that a human being is necessarily defined partly by his or her body is the 
axiom underlying this argument. 
 
Those who deny that the body and soul of the resurrection are the same as the 
ones we have now are “attributing unjust judgements to God.”
519
  This argument is 
almost identical to Athenagoras’ argument in Resurrection of the Dead.  He 
addresses Plato’s view of judgement explicitly, and claims that the Platonic court is 
unjust because the person committed acts for which only the soul is judged.
520
  
Athenagoras here explicitly refers to a scenario in which there is no resurrection.  It 
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is conceivable that Eustathius thinks that this scenario – where just a soul is judged – 
would be fairer than the scenario to which he explicitly refers – the original soul or 
body attached to a new counterpart.  If so, his position here is closer to his position in 
relation to the soul between death and resurrection than it initially appears.  
However, it is more likely that Eustathius held the same view as Athenagoras for two 
reasons.   
 
Firstly, Eustathius may even make the same connection to Plato that 
Athenagoras does; his discourse on the resurrection is connected to, and probably 
follows shortly after a derisive description of souls being judged in Hades according 
to Greek mythology, and connects this to Plato’s doctrine of the pre-existence of 
souls.
521
  Secondly, in another facet of the same argument, Eustathius defends the 
need for a body more directly.  He follows Irenaeus in insisting that the bodies of the 
martyrs, since they have been tortured to death, must be raised.
522
  Eustathius’ 
arguments for the physical resurrection both especially emphasise the centrality of 
the body to human ontology.  The latter, even more than the former, assumes the 
importance of the current life to human identity.  Not only is the soul not the human 
being, but a disembodied soul would clearly be incapable of acting for the person 
before the judgement seat of God.  This is in stark contrast to his discourse on the 
disembodied soul. 
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Eustathius’ view of the bodily resurrection is part of a wider belief in the 
intrinsic value of the body.  For instance, he insists that “the flesh profits nothing” 
does not mean that the flesh was “useless;” rather, it means that only the spirit is 
‘life-giving.’
523
  The body, obviously, requires salvation, but it is as proper an object 
of salvation as is the soul.  Eustathius’ picture of the resurrection falls within a 
broadly flesh-affirming anthropology. 
 
In much patristic thought, the very resurrection of the body implies its 
weakness as well as its potential.  There is at least an element of this in Eustathius’ 
conception of the resurrection.  In so strongly connecting the final triumph of the 
resurrection body to martyrs’ bodies, Eustathius alludes to the idea that the 
resurrection body is strength made perfect in weakness.  Gillian Clark gives a 
pertinent insight into the significance of martyrs’ suffering in ancient Christianity: 
“the suffering of the body is of central importance: it is not a temporary and finally 
irrelevant anguish, left behind as the triumphant soul ascends to God, but a glorious 
demonstration of God’s power manifested in what seems most vulnerable, human 
flesh and blood.”
524
  Clark correctly identifies two aspects of the tendency to see 
martyrdom in light of a triumphal resurrection, the latter of which requires some 
expansion: one is the centrality of human physicality; the other is the weakness of the 
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body that is implied in the way God’s power is shown especially in manifesting itself 
in the body. 
 
The way in which Eustathius relates to the latter aspect of thought is 
elucidated by comparing him with Irenaeus.  Both make roughly the same factual 
claims about the connection between resurrection, soteriology and anthropology: the 
same body is truly resurrected, and both body and soul need salvation.  However, 
they have divergent emphases.  Irenaeus emphasises the resurrection of the body 
more than Eustathius.  He therefore lays more stress on the body’s importance but 
also implies that it is particularly in need of salvation.  He sometimes contrasts it 
with the soul, which does not need to be given access to immortality through the 
resurrection.
525
  Eustathius, by contrast, emphasises the soul’s need for salvation.   
 
Nonetheless, within this narrative, the soul is held as superior to the body. 
The soul was assumed, because the Word would hardly neglect the “better part” of 
the human being.
526
  For Eustathius, the body is not further degenerated than the soul 
but it is, nonetheless, inferior to the soul.  Consequently, whereas Irenaeus’ picture of 
the body’s degeneracy may point to an inferiority contingent on the lapse, the 
inferiority of the body is definitely intrinsic in Eustathius’ thought.
527
  With regards 
to the resurrection, this suggests that he sees the resurrection of martyrs’ bodies as 
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strength made perfect in the weakest part of humanity.  However, this must be 
distinguished from salvation effected in the most degenerate aspect of humanity. 
 
Eustathius does not regard the resurrection body and the current body as 
altogether identical.  The substance is the same, but it undergoes a change.  
Normally, where he suggests that the body will change when it is resurrected, he is 
directly quoting Pauline passages that focus on eschatological transformation.  In 
many of his arguments for the identity of the resurrection body with the current one, 
there is some sense of change in addition to an overriding sense of continuity.  Our 
identity with Christ, sometimes invoked to prove that the two bodies are the same, 
here entails a change.  For instance, Eustathius writes, the lord “changing the lowly 
body of human beings, conforms it to his own.”
528
  Eustathius’ discourse on the 
πνευματικόν body is part of an argument about the soul.  Crudely, he is refuting the 
(putative) claim that Christ, being πνευματικός, had the Spirit in place of a soul.   
 
He quotes the Pauline text: “the first Adam became a living soul, the last 
Adam became a life-giving spirit.”
529
  His opponents presumably defended logos-
sarx Christology on the basis that Christ was the πνευματικός Last Adam and 
therefore had a spirit rather than a soul.  It is uncertain whether Eustathius is being 
fair on his opponents, but his own point is quite clear.  He moves, in the course of 
this argument, from a defence of the presence of the soul in the πνευματικός person 
to a defence of the presence of the corporeal body in the resurrection.  The first 
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Adam, he argues, had a soul and a body; this is what ψυχικός means.  If you want to 
argue that the last Adam had no soul, you must also accept that he had no body.  The 




Eustathius is arguing against a framework that he believes his opponents to 
be using, one that sees the contrast between ψυχικός and πνευματικός as 
characterised by a contrast between soul and spirit.  Eustathius argues that, since the 
Last Adam evidently has a body, and therefore a soul, this framework for 
understanding the eschatological transformation of the human person is wrong.  
Specifically, he wishes to argue that neither component of the human person is 
replaced by something else.  The biblical text referring to a πνευματικός person does 
not refer to a person one of whose parts has been replaced by the spirit.  Thus he 
claims that “the one who is ‘soul-like’ is from body and soul, whilst the one who is 
spiritual has been brought together from divine Spirit.”
531
  He is then obliged to show 
that πνευματικός nature includes the body and soul which constitute ψυχικός nature 
and goes on to insist that the body that is resurrected must be the same as the one that 
previously lived:  
For doubtless [the body ‘sown a ‘soul-like’ body, raised a spiritual 
body’
532
] is not soulless.  For [Paul] does not show one human being 
raised up in place of another, as if, as Valentinus and his associates 
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These claims about the resurrection, which had themselves stemmed from a 
discussion of the soul, are part of a discussion of the totality of the eschatological 
human condition.  A characteristically holistic anthropology under-girds the whole 
discussion.  Whatever happens in the transformation from ψυχικός to πνευματικός 
happens to both the body and the soul. 
 
The distinction between the ψυχικός and the πνευματικός has nothing to do 
with the distinction between perceptible and intelligible things.  The passages 
referring to a ‘spiritual body’, Eustathius argues, denote a body and not a soul.  He 
then asserts that an intelligible thing is not raised in place of a perceptible thing.
534
  
Correspondingly, in contrast to much patristic soteriology Eustathius does not see 
salvation or the fulfilment of human potential as requiring the reorientation of the 
relationship between the body and the soul.   
 
J. Patout Burns identifies two principal categories in third and fourth-century 
Christian anthropology, an asceticism which emphasised moral responsibility and 
Christian Platonism.
535
  Burns’ models obviously fall short of an exhaustive 
description of third-and-fourth-century Christianity.  Nonetheless, in them he 
successfully identifies two dominant trends.  The first involves the sense that the soul 
is in danger of being caused to sin by the body, and must resist.  Elements of this 
idea can be found in the ascetic tradition, though perhaps under the influence of 
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  However, the ascetic emphasis on training the body more often seeks 
to see the body on its own terms.  Methodius, whilst focusing on the training and 
purification of the body, writes of the need for the parallel training of the soul: one 
must reflect upon the values of virginity because “it is not enough just to keep the 
body undefiled.”
537
  Here, the same thing – virginity – purifies both soul and body, in 
different ways.  Importantly for our purposes, the soul’s sin originates in itself.  You 
could have a non-virgin soul whilst having a virgin body.  Methodius’ rejection of 
the idea that sin derives from embodiment is similar to Eustathius’ sense that the 
transformation of the person occurs as a parallel transformation of body and soul, 
and does not involve a reorientation of the relationship between them. 
 
Eustathius invokes the necessary continuous identity between the person who 
lived and the person who is raised while also, in the immediately surrounding 
discussion, making a distinction between perceptible and intelligible categories.  In 
doing so, he suggests that the corporeality of the resurrection body means something 
very similar to the corporeality of the current body.  In the resurrection, though the 
body will look in some way different from the way it looks now, will not be ethereal, 
and will still be flesh and blood.  Eustathius’ view of the resurrection relies on the 
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intrinsic physicality of the human person and on the importance of our ontological 
make-up in defining who we are.  In this, he follows Methodius’ antipathy towards 
Origenism.  His theology of bodily resurrection forms part of his wider picture of the 
human person as grounded in the current life. 
 
In his use of the term πνευματικός, and the related picture of  πνευματικός 
humanity that underlies Eustathius’ discussion of the resurrection, the body and soul 
are both equally degenerate and in need of transformation.  In this respect, Eustathius 
echoes Methodius, and specifically Methodius’ form of asceticism.  Eustathius’ view 
of bodily resurrection is perhaps where he is most clearly a follower of Methodius 
and most unambiguously at odds with Origenism. 
 
The origin of the soul 
Eustathius does not discuss the origin of the soul in much detail, except to 
reject several possibilities, and it is not possible to construct a detailed picture of his 
views with any confidence.  However, as there is, to my knowledge, no extant 
discussion on Eustathius’ view of this subject, it is valuable to make a few 
observations about it in order to establish some useful contours. 
 
Eustathius clearly believes that Adam’s soul came into being at the moment 
at which God breathed it into the body.  This is germane to his relationship with 
Platonism, and will be discussed shortly.  It is more difficult to establish exactly how 
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Eustathius thought that souls originated in that it is not altogether clear whether 
Eustathius is a creationist or traducianist of some kind. 
 
Eustathius’ view of God’s action in the world would allow for either 
generationism or creationism as it incorporates both the idea that God acts through 
the perpetuation of a system built into the fabric of creation, and the idea that God 
directly and immediately intervenes in the world: in an extended passage from 
Ariomanitas, he describes the creation of the world and alludes to the Flood.
538
  
According to this passage, God designed the world in such a way that it can then 
carry out specific functions.  The rivers and lakes, for example, are designed to 
“become nourishing and fruitful.”
539
  God does, however, act directly upon the 
natural order to cause the Flood. These two positions are complementary rather than 
juxtaposed.  Eustathius’ conception of divine action in the world cannot elucidate his 
view of the soul’s origins. 
 
Eustathius’ exegesis of the passage in Hebrews which describes Melchizedek 
as “motherless and fatherless” might seem to suggest traducianism because it initially 
looks as though Eustathius may regard Christ and Melchizedek as having souls that 
were individually crafted by God, rather than received from human parents, but also 
as being exceptional in this.  However, this is not the case.  Melchizedek is described 
as “motherless and fatherless”, Eustathius argues, because he was a Canaanite; as the 
Canaanites were typically evil and Melchizedek was extremely virtuous, it was not 





right to trace his line from them.
540
  Eustathius then says that Melchizedek was 
“genealogised concerning the things of the flesh according to the nature of the flesh, 
whilst…in another way he… [is] of unrecorded descent.”
541
  This, according to 
Eustathius, is just like Christ because Christ also “on one hand, is genealogised 
according to the body, but on the other, according to the highest order, has an 
indescribable birth.”
542
   
 
Is it possible that “according to the highest order” is a reference to the soul?  
In this case, the implication would be that Christ’s soul, like Adam’s, was specially 
created but other human souls are received from a person’s parents.
543
  As we have 
seen, Eustathius does elsewhere describe the soul as the “better part” of the human 
being.
544
  This could cohere with it being “according to the highest order.”  However, 
particularly as this letter predates the ‘Arian’ controversy and Eustathius’ strongly 
divisive Christology, the phrase could refer to the generation of the Word.  It need 
not, necessarily, imply a subordinationist understanding of the relationship between 
the Father and the Son.  Furthermore, this interpretation does not really fit with what 
can be deduced about Eustathius’ argument, which is that there is nothing actually 
supernatural about Melchizedek, but that he was extraordinarily virtuous.  Therefore, 
“according to the highest order” is more likely to be simply a general reference to 




 Cf. D115.  See Hebrews 7.3, which is itself referring to Genesis 14:18-20. This raises certain 






 Whether Melchizedek would, in this case, also have a specially created soul, or whether the 
analogy with Christ is less literal, is interesting but not of immediate relevance.  It is difficult to be 
certain on this point given the fragmented sources. 
544





  The overall sense of the passage is as follows: Eustathius presents 
the literal facts of Melchizedek’s parentage and then explains why these facts are not 
described clearly in scripture; the distinction between his begetting “according to the 
flesh” and “according to the highest order” is not a distinction between the respective 
‘coming to be’ events of body and the soul therefore does not imply generationism. 
 
A single passage in Ariomanitas comes closer to suggesting traducianism.  
Eustathius argues that, as the Spirit is happy to dwell with other people’s souls, 
despite their sinfulness, there is clearly no problem with the Spirit dwelling with 
Christ’s human soul: 
For indeed the other holy men, who have been brought forth from 
bodily intercourse, and have been revealed as shabby temples, 
reaped the sweet smell of the Spirit by participation.  And Christ 
is the only one who became embodied by the Holy Spirit, he did 
not produce the better nature from participation but ‘in him the 




Here, the sin of human souls is somehow connected to human beings having come to 
be through their parents.  Conversely, the sinlessness of Christ’s soul is connected to 
the fact that Christ “became embodied by the Holy Spirit.”  This suggests, though it 
does not require, that the souls of most human beings are inherited from their 
parents.  This interpretation is rendered more likely by Eustathius’ rejection of the 
idea that the body is the cause of sin.  In the above passage, the soul is sinful because 
people come to be through their parents.  Either a person’s soul and body both come 
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present Melchizedek as supernatural. 
546
 D50:23-29 [Ariomanitas]. 
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to be through the person’s parents or only the body comes to be through the person’s 
parents, and the soul receives sinfulness from the body.  The latter possibility would 
be inconsistent with Eustathius’ belief that the body is not the cause of sin.  
Therefore, his reference to inherited pollution suggests traducianism.  We have 
insufficient evidence determine whether this is a doctrine that Eustathius elaborated, 
but he seems to make use of the idea here. 
  
It must be appreciated that Eustathius clearly does not think that Christ’s soul 
pre-existed his body: his attack on a Platonic conception of the soul, we have seen, is 
embedded within his attack on logos-sarx Christology.  The possible contrast is 
between Christ’s uniquely created soul and one inherited from his parents. 
 
Where he describes the pro-Arian position on how souls interact with bodies, 
Eustathius attributes to it the claim that souls “have come to be in order that, having 
been left behind [ἐγκαταλειφθεῖσαι] in the bodies, they might breathe life-giving 
power into them.”
547
  This admittedly opaque phrase has the sense of souls being put 
in bodies from outside, and it would be difficult to reconcile generationism with this 
picture.  It is anyway difficult to glean Eustathius’ own view on the origin of the soul 
from this passage, because it is neither the point on which he is attacking his 
opponents, nor the point on which he must agree with them for his argument to work.  
The term ἐγκαταλειφθεῖσαι may have sense that the soul is somehow out of its 
natural habitat in the body, which seems at odds with Eustathius’ normative view of 
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body-soul interaction, and might therefore suggest that he is jibing his opponents.
548
  
We cannot, anyway, be sure that this term is Eustathius’ own, because this passage is 
found only in the epitome.  Eustathius’ position on the question of traducianism 
remains unclear. 
  
Eustathius’ ideas on the origin of the soul are very often at odds with Origen, 
but also sometimes indebted to him.  Firstly, Eustathius rejects the pre-existence of 
souls.  There is a live debate as to whether and in what sense Origen held this view 
himself, and adjudicating it is far beyond the scope of this thesis and it should be 
noted that many self-declared Origenists, such as Eusebius of Caesarea also rejected 
the pre-existence of souls.  It does, however, seem likely that Eustathius attributed 
this idea to Origen, as Methodius seems to attribute it to him;
549
 as I have argued 
elsewhere, Eustathius’ attack on this idea, within Ariomanitas, suggests that he is 
concerned about Platonism within Christianity, and that he sees this as the legacy of 
Origenism.
550
  Nonetheless, Eustathius’ doctrine of Christ’s uniquely sinless soul 
closely resembles Origen’s doctrine that Christ’s human soul is the only soul not to 
have fallen.  This is discussed further in chapter 5, where the extent of his debt to 
Origen becomes apparent. 
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 The verb ἐγκαταλιμπάνω is not often used of the soul, but it is used, in a similar sense, to refer to 
the mind being left behind in the body when it turns towards lower things, in Corpus Hermeticum, 
X.24.7.  In Corpus Hermeticum, the word clearly has a negative connotation. 
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Eustathius’ picture of the relationship between the body and the soul needs to 
be viewed within the context of wider fourth-century metaphysics and, in particular, 
its engagement with Platonism.  A discussion of how Eustathius’ metaphysics 
engages with Platonism must allow for the complexity and ambiguity of Plato’s 
intellectual legacy.  Richard Norris suggests that a key metaphysical distinction in 
Platonism can be seen in terms of “mutability and changelessness…time and 
eternity” or “sensible and the intelligible, the visible and the invisible, the corporeal 
and the incorporeal.”
551
  However, Plato himself is unclear on the relationship 
between the perceptible and intelligible worlds; as Robert Berchman argues, he 
reached no conclusion, but bequeathed the question to his successors.
552
  His 
successors give different answers.   
 
For this reason, I believe that Rowan Williams’ approach to the metaphysical 
questions underlying the ‘Arian’ controversy is insightful: there was in the fourth 
century a particular negotiation of the question of the origins of the cosmos, and the 
way it was posed in the Timaeus continued to be important in framing the questions 
that were asked.
553
  The question of the eternity of the cosmos had exercised Hellenic 
intellectuals since the time of Plato.  A belief in the eternity of the intelligible world 
dominates ancient Platonism, and the eternity of the universe, in some sense or other, 
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 I made this argument in a paper given at the 16
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 International Patristics Conference, “So-called 
Platonism and the humanity of Christ in Eustathius of Antioch’s Contra Ariomanitas.”   On Eusebius’ 
rejection of the pre-existence of souls, c.f. his P.E. (CPG, 3486), 13.15. (See above). 
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 Norris, Manhood, p.11. 
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 Robert Berchman, From Philo to Origen: middle Platonism in transition (Chico, Calif., Scholars 
Press, 1984), p.24. 
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is extremely dominant across most Greco-Roman thought.
554
  Christian intellectual 
culture of the fourth century decisively rejected this picture and, with it, important 
aspects in Origen’s cosmology in which the Son and the created order can both be 
seen to be eternal:
555
 only God has no beginning, everything else has a beginning in 




Eustathius employs as a foundational metaphysical framework the distinction 
between the ἀγένητος God and γενητός everything else.  This distinction is temporal; 
ἀγένητα have always existed, γένητα have come into being.
557
  Things that come into 
being are impermanent: “Everything that has as beginning also has an end.  
Everything that ends is capable of corruption.”
558
   
 
In this respect, he follows normative fourth-century Christian thought in 
applying the categories ‘not having not existed’ and ‘having coming to exist’ to God 
and everything else respectively, and therefore not to the intelligible and perceptible 
worlds.
559
  He also does not regard intelligibility as entailing impassibility in any 
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sense.  This is much more unusual, but it is a logical development of the wider 
fourth-century engagement with Platonism.  In the insistence that everything but God 
has a beginning, the categories of intelligibility and eternity have ceased to be 
mutually determining.  In Eustathius’ thought, a similar thing has happened to the 
relationship between intelligibility and impassibility.  Eustathius keeps the categories 
of ‘intelligible’ and ‘perceptible’, and they are important to his worldview, but they 
entail less than they do in most forms of Platonism and are therefore no longer a 
pivotal metaphysical reference point.  
 
The soul is both the most fruitful and the most problematic arena for 
negotiating the relationship between the Platonic perceptible and intelligible worlds 
because, whilst it is supposed to be intelligible, it is hard to deny that it is involved in 
the sensible world.  Norris puts the problem well: “The dualistic logic requires that 
the soul be regarded as a stranger in the world of sense; but the fact of the soul’s 
present situation demands that this judgement be somewhat modified.  The soul, 
despite its intelligible and divine nature, cannot be wholly strange to the material 
world of becoming in which it is set.”
560
  Eustathius, by contrast, believes that the 
two realms are supposed to be interconnected; because the distinction between them 
is properly blurred, an intelligible thing that is “set in” the sensible world is not 
problematic in his anthropology. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
anthropology than is found in Plato, but he does not really place this in the context of wider fourth-
century Christianity. 
560
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A key part of the Platonic distinction between perceptible and intelligible, - 
‘always having been’, and ‘having come to be’ – cannot fit a distinction between two 
realms in any simple sense in fourth-century Christianity.  Eustathius explicitly 
attacks Platonism on precisely this point.  He objects to the claim that souls are 
“unbegotten and immortal”;
561
 this is language Eustathius only wants to apply to 
God.  In this passage, his objection to Platonism is that it fails to acknowledge the 
chasm between God and everything else. 
  
It is clear that fourth-century Christianity rejected the idea of an eternal 
intelligible world.  This clarified the nature of the disjunction between God and the 
world that had always been a tenet of Christian thought, in order to defend it.  
Eustathius is typical in this regard.  It is worth considering a view which suggests, 
ironically, that Origen provides a precursor to the rejection of the eternity of the 
intelligible world.  Berchman has argued that Origen innovatively blurs the 
distinction between the sensible and intelligible worlds.
562
  Berchman claims that 
Origen’s fundamental metaphysical distinction is between being per se and being per 
accidens.  Because the Word exists, like everyone else, by participating in the Father, 
the Word exists per accidens.  Importantly, in Berchman’s Origen, the distinction is 
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not temporal.  However, the concept of intrinsic being is easily connected to the 
concept of “never having not been” when one believes in creation by God ex nihilo.  
Russell, at any rate, provides a more satisfactory analysis of Origen.  He suggests 
that the Word’s participation in the Father, unlike everyone else’s, is intrinsic and 
that therefore the Word does exist per se even though it participates.
563
  This better 
captures the sense in which the Word is a genuine mediator in Origen: Origen’s point 
is that he has an intermediary ontological status.  There is nothing in his thought 
comparable to the fourth-century ontological categorisation between γενητός and 
ἀγένητος. 
 
Eustathius is more unusual in rejecting the impassibility of the intelligible 
world out of hand.
564
  The ambiguous, intermediate status of the soul comes into play 
in Platonism with regard to the passions.  The soul’s choice between the perceptible 
and intelligible worlds is presented as a choice to enter into the passions or not.  If 
the soul underwent passions, it experienced them through the body, as opposed to of 
itself.  Whether, and how far, an embodied soul can remain removed from passion 
was a subject of contention within pagan Platonism.
565
  A form of Platonism that saw 
the soul as becoming susceptible to passions through embodiment was clearly current 
in fourth-century Christianity in the eastern Empire, being found in  Gregory of 
Nyssa and Athanasius.  Among Eustathius’ contemporaries, the connection between 
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intelligibility and impassibility, complicated though it had always been, was still 
going strong. 
 
By contrast, Eustathius himself clearly does not conceive of the human soul 
as impassible.  It is true that the soul is the primary instance of an intelligible entity 
(other than God) that we have from Eustathius’ thought and, given its inevitably 
intermediate position, it does not seem best-suited to be treated as an archetype of an 
intelligible thing.  However, this argument requires that the soul enters into passions 
only via the body, or that the highest part of the soul is protected from passion.  As 
we have seen, this concept is entirely, and quite deliberately, absent in Eustathius.  
 
Eustathius’ treatment of the human soul is part of a wider Hellenic and 
patristic tendency to relativise the category of ‘intelligibility’.  I have noted that 
Eustathius shares with Origen a tendency to conceive of God as most incorporeal or 
intelligible, whilst applying the categories ‘incorporeal’ and ‘intelligible’ to a wider 
range of things, and places these things on one side of line, with God, in contrast to 
‘perceptible’ things.  However, in describing the soul as intelligible, Origen means to 
suggest that it is, of itself, impassible.  An important passage in Methodius forms a 
sharp and revealing contrast.  In it he very strongly insists upon the passibility of the 
soul, but then argues that it must, therefore, be corporeal.
566
  Eustathius gives an 
account of the soul’s role in human experience that is indebted to Methodius, but an 
account of its ontology that is indebted to Origen.  Like both Origen and Methodius, 
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Eustathius draws a line between intelligible and perceptible things.  Like Origen, he 
places the soul on the ‘intelligible’ side of the line.  However, like Methodius, he 
maintains that it is passible in its own right. 
 
Eustathius combines a belief in the ontological dissimilarity of body and soul 
with an integrated account of their involvement in human action and experience.  
The nuances vary according to the context of a given narrative, which can vary 
within a single work.  So, when he writes of the soul between bodily death and 
resurrection, he often writes as if it is a proxy for the person.  However, even in this 
context, he has a strong sense of an intrinsic connection between the body and the 
soul. 
 
Eustathius’ discourse on bodily resurrection, and the disembodied soul, 
shows an antipathy towards Origenism.  Eustathius repeatedly emphasises the 
properly physical nature of the human being.  However, he combines this with a full 
and detailed discourse on the psychological and emotional experience of the soul, in 
which he involves the body.  Eustathius’ holds together a belief in the intelligibility 
of the soul and a belief in the passibility of the soul, and thereby carries the wider 



























Chapter 4: The image of God567 
The image of God is a central theme in a wide-range of patristic anthropology and 
important anthropological battlegrounds can be seen in disparate interpretations of it. 
The key scriptural texts for an anthropological understanding of God’s image are: 
 Genesis 1:26-27: “And God said, ‘Let us make humankind [ἄνθρωπον] 
according to our image [εἰκονα] and likeness [ὁμοίωσιν], and let them rule over 
the fish of the sea, and over the flying creatures of heaven, and over the cattle 
and all the earth, and over all the reptiles that creep on the earth.’  And God 
made humankind [ἄνθρωπον], according to the image [εἰκονα] of God he made 
him.  Male and female he made them.” 
 Genesis 8:6: “[And God said] ‘whoever sheds the blood of a human being, his 
blood shall be shed in its place.  For I made humankind in the image of God.” 
 Romans 8:29: “Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed 
to the image of his Son, that he might be the first among many brothers.” 
 1 Corinthians 4:4: “…Christ…is the image of God.” 
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 This chapter contains substantial material from my article, “The image of God.” 
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 Frances Young notes the sometime significance of Exodus 20:4: “You shall not make for yourself 
a carved image or likeness…”, to patristic reflection on the image of God in humanity, but she argues 
that, with the partial (though admittedly notable) exceptions of Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem and the 
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is some connection to discourse on idolatry in Eustathius’ reference to Adam as a “statue of God.”  
(See chapter 3 and below).  However, this connection must remain highly speculative, and Eustathius, 
insofar as the evidence allows judgement, seems to me to bear out Young’s thesis. 
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The image of God is an interpretative key for the relationship between God, 
humanity, and Christ.  In Christian theology, there is a strong tendency to equate the 
image of God with human essence.  Because the term ‘image of God’ is used both in 
relation to Adam and Eve, and in relation to Christ, it denotes humankind both before 
the lapse, or the fall, and in its eschatological destiny.
569
  The anthropological 
understanding of God’s image is therefore particularly connected to a concept of 
actualised human potential.  It is anthropological in part because it is soteriological. 
 
It hardly needs adding that, relatedly, referring to human beings as ‘in the 
image of God’ has profound implications for the relationship between humanity and 
God.  It implies a similarity of some kind between humanity and God.  More 
specifically, is suggests that God is revealed in humankind.  This is closely 
connected to the concept of Christ as image, which is itself connected back to Adam 
and the rest of humankind.  ‘Image’, whilst implying identity, assumes distinction.  
Applied to Christ, this raises certain questions about Christ’s identity with, and 
distinction from, God.  Consequently, 2 Corinthians 4.4 and Colossians 1.15 became 
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Eustathius’ extant writings contain no systematic discussion of God’s image: 
he refers to it three times explicitly.  We are therefore left with the task of piecing 
together his thought from a few suggestive passages.  The ‘image of God’ is a 
notoriously complex area of patristic theology.  Furthermore, the various passages on 
which this theology is based point in rather different directions.  They reveal the 
unsurprising conviction that human beings are in the image of God, but careful 
extrapolation is required in order to reach further conclusions. 
 
Several significant anthropological points emerge from Eustathius’ concept 
of the image of God: 1) There is a strong ontological disjunction between God and 
ἄνθρωπος 2) God is revealed in humanity. 3) The human body is an integral and 
positive part of the human being. 4) Christ fulfils Adam’s potential and, 
correspondingly, is the archetype for perfect humanity.  These are ideas that are 
fundamental in Eustathius’ wider anthropology.  The image of God is not as 
prominent in Eustathius’ extant corpus as in several other patristic writings, and it is 
not possible to tell whether it led or followed other ways in which he thinks about 
anthropology.  It is clear that it coheres closely with his wider anthropological ideas 
and convictions, and can therefore, in turn, elucidate them. 
 
Two kinds of image: the Son versus Christ-Adam 
This section examines Eustathius’ understanding of the structural aspect of 
the relationship between the Father, the Son, Christ, Adam and the whole human race 
230 
 
implied in the term ‘image of God.’  Eustathius refers to God’s image explicitly three 
times, and I treat these in turn before drawing them together. 
 
One very significant passage must be quoted in full: 
 
For Paul did not say, “like in form to the Son of God” but “like in 
form to the image of his Son”, showing that the Son is one thing 
and his image another.  For, indeed, the Son, bearing the divine 
marks of the paternal excellence, is the image of the Father since, 
because like is begotten from like, the ones begotten appear as 
true images of the ones who begot them.  But the human being 
whom he bore is the image of the Son, as images are made from 
dissimilar colours by being painted on wax, some being wrought 
by hand deliberately and others coming to be in nature and 
likeness.  Moreover the very law of truth announces this.  For the 
bodiless spirit of wisdom is not like in form to corporeal people, 
but the human express image having been made bodily by the 
Spirit, bearing the same number of limbs as all the rest, and clad in 





This passage offers a hierarchical conception of the image relationship between the 
Father, the Son, the human Christ and Adam/ the rest of humanity: roughly, the Son 
is image of the Father, Christ is image of the Son and humanity is conformed to 
Christ; this might suggest that human beings other than Christ are images of Christ, 
the human being, but this is not explicit.  However, the sense in which the Son is 
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strange last sentence is that Christ’s humanity is typically human (and this point is made with much 
sarcasm).  This argument is very frequent in Ariomanitas, and the reference to the number of Christ’s 
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body is not the point of this passage. 
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image of the Father is qualitatively superior to the sense in which Christ is the image 
of the Son.  This is not simply a descending scale of images, from the Father, via the 
Son and Christ, to Adam, because a radical disjunction between the divinity of the 
Father and the Son, and the humanity of Christ and Adam, intervenes. 
 
Eustathius explicitly contrasts the sense in which the Son is the Father’s 
image with the sense in which Christ, the human being, is the Son’s image.
572
  The 
Son is the Father’s image in the sense that “[when] like is begotten from like, the 
ones begotten appear as true images of their begetters.”
573
  Conversely “the human 
being of Christ” is not “true image”: “the human being whom [the Son] bore is the 
image of the Son, as images are made from dissimilar colours by being painted on 
wax, some being wrought by hand deliberately and others coming to be in nature and 
likeness.”
574
   
 
Eustathius’ hierarchical conception of the image of God echoes Origen, as 
does his distinction between the two kinds of image.
575
  He shares his understanding 
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 In Eustathius’ anti-Arian writings, the title “Christ” is reserved for the human being; Eustathius 
never uses it for the Word/Son, as opposed to the human being.  By contrast, he does use it in a 
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 D68:7-10 [Proverbia 8.22]. 
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 De Princ. (CPG, 1482), 1.2.6., in which Origen identifies two distinct meanings of the term image, 
applying one to the relationship between God and humanity, and the other to the relationship between 
God and Christ. 1) “an object painted or carved on some material” corresponds to the sense in which 
anthropos is God’s image.  2) “a child is said to be the image of its parent when the similitudinum of 
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of the eternal Word as image not only with the range of pro-Arian theology, but also 
with other anti-Arians, such as Athanasius.
576
  However, he differs sharply from 
Marcellus, to whom he is very often closest theologically.
577
  This reflects the 
eclecticism of his intellectual resources.  It also, as Spoerl argues, indicates that he 
distinguishes Father and Son more than Marcellus.
578
  However, Eustathius 
emphatically deploys his Origenist view of image in favour of divine unity and, even 
more, the Son’s eternity. 
 
Eustathius is acutely conscious of the fact that the term ‘image’ denotes 
identity between the image and the thing it images, whilst assuming a distinction 
between them.
579
  His double interpretation of the term ‘image of God’ reflects a 
desire on his part to emphasise the identity between the Father and the Son and the 
distinction between the Son and Christ.  This is, in fact, the reason that he raises the 
question of the image of God: “Paul did not say, ‘like in form to the Son of God’ but 
‘like in form to the image of his Son’, showing that the Son is one thing and his 
image another.”
580
  When applied to the Father-Son relationship, the term ‘image’ 
connotes sameness, whilst when applied to the God-human relationship, it connotes 
distinction, though it still necessarily denotes a degree of similarity.  Eustathius’ 
                                                                                                                                          
the parent’s features is in every respect faithfully reproduced in the child.”  This sense, Origen argues, 
corresponds to the sense in which Christ is God’s image. 
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 C.f. Eusebius, D.E. (CPG, 3487), 4.2; Athanasius, C.G. (CPG, 2090), 41.3.  Origen’s and 
Eustathius’ idea of humanity qua image is also similar to Athanasius’ anthropological understanding 
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 C.f. Ayres, Nicaea, pp.62-9. 
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 Spoerl, “Two early Nicenes”, p.129. 
579
 As Jon Robertson observes in his Christ as Mediator: a study of the theologies of Eusebius of 
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p.53. 
580
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distinction between the Son’s imagehood and Christ’s imagehood corresponds to his 
wider distinction between the Son and humanity.  The Son is begotten, humanity 
(and everything else) is created:  “if… [the Son] is a creature, then he is not begotten.  
And if he is begotten, then he is not a creature, since it is not possible for the 
classification of each of these to be wound round.”
581
  It is hard to believe that he 
does not intend explicitly to refer to the wider created/ begotten distinction.  (We 





A Latin fragment from Contra Arianos initially appears to fly in the face of 
Eustathius’ insistence on the Son’s full divinity and in particular to use image 
language to distinguish sharply between Father and Son.  However, it seems likely 
that the Greek has been misleadingly rendered into Latin.  The Latin reads: “Deus 
Verbum eandem quam genitor portat imaginem, imago quippe existens divinae 
substantiae.”
583
  If one retroverts imago to εἰκονα and therefore translates it as 
‘image’ the passage reads: “God the Word bears the same image as the begetter, 
being an image of the divine substance.”  In this case, the Son is not ‘of the same 
substance’ as the Father.  However, Parvis argues that this reading jars, not only 
because it does not cohere with Eustathius’ concept of the Son elsewhere, but also 
because the Father also “bears” an image, which makes very little sense. She 
suggests that what has been translated as imago was actually χαρακτήρ rather than 
εἰκών.  The passage, she argues, should therefore be rendered “God the Word bears 
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 D107, entire fragment [Arianos]. 
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 See discussion in chapter 2 on Eusebius being the likely target of his many of his anti-Arian works. 
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Parvis’ argument is very persuasive, particularly because it does not lead us 
to the bizarre conclusion, otherwise suggested by this fragment, that Eustathius 
thought that the Father was himself an image.  What could he conceivably be an 
image of? Furthermore, there is another respect in which the translation from Greek 
into Latin may be imprecise.  Specifically, what is rendered as “eandem 
…imaginem” – “the same imprint” may have read in the Greek “τὸν χαρακτῆρα 
αὐτόν”   – “the very imprint of the begetter”; this could have been misread as “τὸν 
αὐτόν χαρακτῆρα” though, admittedly, one must posit a change in the gender of the 
pronoun from Greek to Latin.
585
  This, like Parvis’ proposed amendment, moves 
away from the suggestion that the Son has something that the Father also has, 
towards the more typically Eustathian suggestion that the Son is something that the 
Father also is.  This fragment probably does not contain the word εἰκών and therefore 
may not be directly referring to the discourse surrounding the nexus of biblical εἰκών 
θεοῡ texts.  At any rate, it carries, if anything a closer sense of the Father-Son 
relationship than the passage from Proverbia 8:22.  It is clear that this fragment does 
not represent a divergent aspect of Eustathius’ image theology. 
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235 
 
Eustathius’ concept of image evidently cannot be understood aside from his 
divisive Christology: “the human being of Christ” qua image, is distinguished from 
the Son, qua image.  Also, the connection between Adam and Christ that is found 
within Eustathius’ image-theology relies on Eustathius’ emphasis on Christ’s 
humanity: though the later, divisive nature of his Christology is not logically 
necessary to this emphasis, it becomes very important to the way that Eustathius 
articulates it.  We have almost entirely post-‘Arian’ sources for Eustathius’ image 
theology, which leaves us with the frustrating question of whether and how his 
image-theology shifted with his Christology.  As Eustathius believed in Christ’s 
human soul prior to the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy, his distinction between 
Christ as image and the Son as image would still have worked structurally.  It is 
significant that his understanding so closely echoes that of Origen, who also had a 
clearly developed concept of Christ’s human soul.  Nonetheless, he employs 
Origen’s distinction so as to maintain a disjunction between the God and humanity, 
which seems to fit, specifically, into his later, more divisive Christological 
framework. 
 
God’s image reveals God 
In Eustathius’ writings, the term ‘image of God’ denotes, among other things, 
something that reveals God.  The Son, Adam and Christ are images of God in that 
they reveal God.  The starting point for this is the revelation of God in the 
incarnation.  The revelatory nature, and therefore the image-status, of both the Son 
and Adam are bound up in Christ’s revelatory nature: Christ reveals God because of 
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the Son dwelling in him, and humanity reveals God by becoming conformed to 
Christ. 
 
The fact that Christ’s revelatory capacity relies on the in-dwelling Word is 
evident because he points, in the first instance, specifically to the Word, and only 
because he points to the Word does he point to the whole Godhead: 
  
[T]he human being of Christ is a saviour…a bringer of light to the 
human race…[in order that]…we may behold the Word and God 
through him, through the Word we may behold the universally 
sovereign authority…through the one image looking at the dyad of 




This understanding of God revealed in the incarnation is rich with paradoxes (some 
of which might threaten the coherence of the picture that they paint): the first 
paradox relates to unity and distinction within the Godhead: the Word both is God 
and reveals God.  Eustathius’ hierarchical image theology jars with his emphasis on 
divine unity in that it appears to subordinate the Son to the Father.  Also, despite 
attempts to the contrary, Eustathius cannot avoid implying more distinction between 
them than is found elsewhere in his writings.  However, even within this hierarchical 
context, he wants to maintain the unity of God.  This elucidates his distinction 
between the way in which the Son is image and the way in which Christ is image: 
Christ reveals God by pointing to something that he himself is not; the Word 






The second paradox concerns the revelatory nature of Christ’s humanity: the 
mechanism of revelation described in this passage is that Christ reveals God because 
God is incarnate in him.  Despite this, there is a strong emphasis on the revelatory 
capacity of Christ’s humanity.  The rhetorical point of this passage is that ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Χριστοῦ - “the human being of Christ” as opposed to the Son is the 
one “bringing light to the human race” and the one through whom we behold God.
588
  
It is Christ’s humanity that reveals God.  As Spoerl argues, “the ‘man of Christ’ is a 
visible image through which we perceive divinity.”
589
  There is something 
soteriologically important about the revelation of God in a human being. 
 
Elsewhere in Ariomanitas, Eustathius clearly has the idea that Adam revealed 
God.  Let us return to his description of Adam’s pre-ensouled body as a statue.  
Before God breathed a soul into Adam’s body, it was a “τοῦ θεοῦ πρωτότυπον 
ἄγαλμα”, “prototypical statue of God... most perfect copy of the most divine 
image.”
590
   The statue reference is evidently a reference, in some sense, to the 
‘image and likeness’ of God attributed to ἄνθρωπος in Genesis 1.26-27.  Describing 
the ‘image’ in terms of a statue emphasises its revelatory capacity, on two 
interrelated levels: firstly, statues are supposed to represent, and therefore to reveal, 
the things of which they are statues.  In particular, Eustathius perhaps had in mind 
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statues of the emperor, which represent him in his absence.
591
  In connecting God’s 
image with a statue of God, Eustathius chooses to emphasise this revelatory sense of 
‘image’.  Moreover, he emphasises the physicality of the image, linking it with its 
visibility.   
 
This is important within the context of Eustathius’ metaphysics, in which 
corporeality corresponds to visibility.  There is, perhaps, a bastardised Platonism 
here: the perceptible is an image of the intelligible. 
 
In the passage describing Adam as a statue of God, the “most divine image” 
that Adam is a copy of is presumably the God the Word, not the human being of 
Christ.  Adam does not image God the Word independently of God, because this is a 
description of God’s creation of Adam.  However, the Word is not “dwelling” with 
Adam, as the Word is with Christ.  This is somewhat in tension with the suggestion 
that Christ reveals God by virtue of God dwelling in him.  It suggests that we should 
resolve the ambiguities of that passage in favour of the idea that ἄνθρωπος qua 
ἄνθρωπος reveals God.  Alongside Eustathius’ conviction of the radical ontological 
disjunction between God and humanity is a conviction that humanity reveals God. 
 
                                                 
591
 On the connection between statues of gods and the image of God in Greco-Roman thought, c.f. 
George H. van Kooten, Paul’s anthropology in context: the image of God, assimilation to God, and 
Tripartite man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity (Tübingen, Mohr 
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Eustathius connects Christ’s role as “saviour” with his role as “a bringer of 
light to the human race.”
592
  There is a soteriological dimension to the revelation of 
God to humankind.  This implies that part of the problem that Christ sets right is 
human ignorance of God.  Revelation is part of the way in which the term “image of 
God” is soteriologically significant. 
 
Adam and Christ 
For Eustathius, Adam and Christ are both, in some sense, images of God.  
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether, and in what way, Eustathius synthesises these 
two ideas.  However, there is a clue in Eustathius’ emphasis on Christ’s humanity, in 
contradistinction to his divinity, in this context.  The image of God is found in the 
humanity that they share. 
 
The term ‘image of God’ refers, among other things, to human telos.  This is 
an extremely common patristic understanding of the term.  Christ qua image is, 
therefore, the archetype for perfect, eschatological humanity.  Correspondingly, he 
quotes Romans 8.29, and applies it, emphatically, to “the human being of Christ”: 
“For Paul did not say ‘conformed to the Son of God’, but ‘conformed to the image of 
his son’, showing the Son to be one thing, and his image another.”
593
  He then moves 
on to the central rhetorical point of this quote – the distinction between Christ and the 
Son, which we have seen above.  He argues “the bodiless Spirit of wisdom is not 
conformed to corporeal people, but the human impressed likeness [χαρακτήρ], 
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having been made bodily by the Spirit, bearing the same number of members as all 




Eustathius describes Melchizedek as an image of Christ, and here has the idea 
that Christ is a model for Melchizedek, giving a similar sense to that in his exegesis 
of Romans 8:29: 
 
Melchizedek, putting on the image of the type of Christ, and 
wearing visibly the imprint of his royalty, resembled Christ…he 
transmitted an image that resembled and was analogous to the 
person of Christ.  According to John, it is the Word himself… 





Sellers objected to the authenticity of this fragment on the basis that its Christology 
is insufficiently divisive.  However, the image theology implied in this passage is 
very similar to that in Proverbia 8:22, in that Melchizedek reveals God by revealing 
– in this instance, clearly by imaging – the Word Incarnate, or Christ.  Furthermore, 
Christ’s role as God’s image is dependent on the Word.  The sense that the embodied 
Word is the archetype of which Melchizedek is the image closely corresponds to the 
idea that human beings are conformed to Christ. 
 
Eustathius’ exegesis of Romans 8.29 is part of a wider Adam-Christ 
parallelism drawing on Pauline motifs.  So, in his exegesis of 1 Corinthians 15:44-
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 D113 [Melchisedek], from the French translation in Declerck, Eustathii. 
241 
 
46, he clearly has the sense that Christ perfects Adam, advancing on the original 
condition: He quotes the Pauline text: “Adam, the first human being, became a living 
soul, the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. But the first Adam was not spiritual 
but soul-like, the second was spiritual.”
596
  A little later, he writes that, “Paul wrote 
that a ‘soul-like’ body was sown, which has performed manifold sins through the 
soul, but he says that this body is raised spiritual, since he [God] changes the bodies 
of all those having been raised.”
597
  Eustathius’ exegesis of Romans 8.29 strongly 
suggests that his image theology fits into this framework: Christ qua image fulfils the 
potential of Adam qua image.  The claim that people are conformed to God’s image, 
i.e. Christ, has a strong soteriological dimension.  Christ is the first new human 
being, the perfection of Adam. 
 
The reference to the first Adam indicates that Eustathius thinks that, 
eschatologically, people will progress beyond the pre-lapsarian condition. However, 
he also thinks that ψυχικός people have “performed manifold sins.”  Prelapsarian 
people, by definition, have not performed manifold sins, so this raises a question: 
how do the prelapsarian condition and sin relate to each other in Eustathius’ concept 
of ψυχικός?  When he writes of the ψυχικόν body having sinned, he is clearly not 
thinking of Christ’s body before his death and resurrection.  He is thinking of our 
bodies, before our death and resurrection.  The body was not sown sinful, as Adam 
was not created sinful, but it has since sinned.  All who are ψυχικός
 
are now sinful, 
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so Eustathius writes of the ψυχικός
 
state as sinful state.
598
  The negation of this sin, 
and the progression beyond the prelapsarian condition, are held together in 
Eustathius’ picture of Christ as the perfect human being. 
 
Eustathius believes that humankind must be renewed; its essential condition 
must be altered in a way that is partly a restoration to its original state, but is also 
more than that.  Christ is not only the architect but also the archetype of this renewal: 
ultimately, humanity will be conformed to Christ, who is perfected ἄνθρωπος.  
Human perfection is therefore achieved in the incarnation.  Christ is an archetype for 
what we will become.  In this, Eustathius draws heavily on Irenaeus’ concept of 





Christ both restores to humankind something that Adam and Eve had, but 
lost, and advances it beyond this condition.
600
  Eustathius explains the progression 
from original ἄνθρωπος to perfected ἄνθρωπος with the Pauline distinction between 
ψυχικός and πνευματικός humanity: pre-lapsarian Adam was ψυχικός, Christ is 
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  Humanity will progress to the πνευματικός state, thereby becoming 
“conformed to the image of the Son.”
602
  The Spirit is key to the transformation of 
human nature in Eustathius’ theology.
603
   
 
Within his discourse on the πνευματικός person, Eustathius clearly draws 
conclusions about human perfection from Christology.  As Friedrich Zoepfl has 
argued, Eustathius tends to talk of the incarnation in terms of God clothing himself in 
humanity, rather than becoming humanity.
604
  Any ontological transformation is the 
consequence of God’s action as an external agent, upon Christ’s humanity.  This is 
reflected in Eustathius’ understanding of what it means for a person to become 
πνευματικός.   
 
The difference between the two states is characterised by a union between the 
person and the Spirit: “he who has been united (παγεὶς) with the Holy Spirit is 
πνευματικός, while he was has been mixed (κραθεὶς) proportionately with soul and 
body is, ψυχικός.”
605
  In this instance, Eustathius is contrasting Christ with Adam, 
and therefore his description of the union between the person and the Spirit is a 
description of the incarnation.  This leads to a discussion of πνευματικοί in general, 
in which Eustathius writes of “fellowship of the divine Spirit” [τοῦ θείου 
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  The person’s union with the Spirit is pointedly weaker 
than the body-soul union.  The Spirit does not function as a third portion of the 
person in Eustathius’ anthropology.  Eustathius has no sense of a tripartite 
anthropology in which the Spirit ultimately becomes a part of the human person.  
The Spirit is seen as an agent acting upon the person.  This is most evident in the fact 
that Eustathius thinks that the scriptural term πνευματικός means the same thing 
when applied to the saints on earth as when applied to the resurrected just.  For 
example, he quotes Galatians’ reference to “spiritual ones” restoring those who have 
sinned.  He then notes that “such a one is the one ‘sown a soul-like body, raised a 
spiritual body.’”
607
  The raising of the ‘spiritual body’ evidently comes later but, in 
connecting it to the ‘spiritual’ status of some Christians in the current life, he sees the 
resurrection as part of a process that is couched in terms of a change internal to the 
person more than the acquisition of an external substance. 
 
However, Eustathius does very clearly believe that perfected ἄνθρωπος 
involves the Spirit in a way that original ἄνθρωπος does not.  It is central to the 
transformation of the person.  The presence of the fortifying spirit makes the person 
πνευματικός.  This is clearest in Eustathius’ Christology, where the human being of 
Christ is “strengthened by the divine spirit.”
608
  Drawing an anthropological 
inference from Christology, we might suggest that, for all human beings, the change 
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between ψυχικός and πνευματικός is less dramatic and the continuity between the 
original person and the saved person is strong.   The person is transformed by God 
but this transformation relates very closely to what he or she is now. 
 
Eustathius’ anthropological understanding of the image of God highlights 
some of the possibilities and limitations for relationship of humanity to God offered 
by his divisive Christology.  As Christ’s humanity remains distinct from the divinity 
that it bears, eschatological humanity remains distinct from God.  This stands in 
contrast to the incarnational theology of Irenaeus or Athanasius, in which the human 
person undergoes theopoiesis.
609
  Eustathius’ theology provides less opportunity for 





The πνευματικός person is distinguished from the current ψυχικός person 
partly in that the moral progress is completed: “the bodies change their ways [and] 
no one sins at all anymore.”
611
  The completion of the moral process is part of the 
same process as the transformation of the body and soul from ψυχικός to 
πνευματικός.  The transformation of the body is part of an holistic transformation of 
the whole person, other aspects of which, apparently, may begin in this life.   
                                                 
609
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The person is both physically and morally transformed.  Eustathius sees the 
problem that requires resolution in the individual as twofold: both sin and mortality 
are constituents of the lapsarian human condition that will ultimately cease to 
exist.
612
  Progress towards sinlessness is evidently manifested first, as many of the 
saints are described as πνευματικός on account of holiness; although Eustathius is 
describing a different use of the word here, he sees a relationship between this use 
and its use to denote human telos.  Importantly, the salvific process is gradual.  
Furthermore, the essential change that culminates eschatologically begins in this life 
though, invariably, is never completed within it.
613
  The current world order 
apparently allows considerable possibilities for the development of human nature, 
but they are intrinsically limited possibilities.  This aspect of Eustathius’ soteriology 
focuses on the improvement of human nature from the state in which it was created, 
which is not primarily seen in terms of the correction of fault.  This lends itself to a 
relatively positive attitude to the current situation: human imperfection is not a 
catastrophic error, but a stage en route to perfection.
614
  We shall see, in the 
following chapter, that such optimism regarding our current situation is far from 
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There is some asymmetry in that the soul does not die – Christ partakes of death “through the body” – 
but the soul is nonetheless affected by death in that it is obliged to descend to Hades. 
613
 Compare Clement of Alexandria, “Through love, the future is present for him already”, Stromata 
(CPG, 1377), 6.3. 
614
 John Hick famously makes this point in his iconic Evil and the God of Love as part of a contrast 
between ‘Irenaean’ and ‘Augustinian’ theodicy.  2
nd
 ed. (London, Macmillan, 1977), p.137. Denis 
Minns, though very largely agreeing with Hick in his assessment of Irenaeus and Augustine as 
anthropological optimist and pessimist respectively, notes that Augustine’s view of the facts of human 
history is very similar to Irenaeus’. (He couples Athanasius with Augustine in this comparison). 
Irenaeus, rev. ed. (Edinburgh, T and T Clark, 2010), pp.183-6.  If we take Minns’ perspective 
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being Eustathius’ dominant soteriological motif, but we can only understand the 
entire tapestry of his soteriology, if we appreciate this aspect of it.  
 
Eustathius’ indebtedness to Irenaeus’ idea of ἀνακεφαλαιωσις suggests, in 
turn, an interesting comparison with both Origen and Methodius.  Methodius, like 
Origen refers to ἀποκατάστασις, “final restoration.”
615
  In Origen, this refers 
specifically to the restoration of souls, which is at odds with Methodius’ and 
Eustathius’ emphasis on the resurrection of the body.  However, ἀποκατάστασις and 
ἀνακεφαλαιωσις are distinguished principally (and importantly) by the metaphysical 
frameworks in which they are placed.  The idea of ἀνακεφαλαιωσις – the summing 
of all creation in Christ, and more specific sense that Christ restores and fulfils 
humankind – has many similarities, as a meta-narrative of human history, with 
ἀποκατάστασις.
616
  Methodius took various of Origen’s ideas and removed them 
from Origen’s cosmology and metaphysics.  If Methodius had an idea of 
ἀποκατάστασις from which he has removed Origen’s ambivalence about ultimate 
embodiment, it begins to look as though he had something similar to a concept of 
ἀνακεφαλαιωσις.  In this instance, in echoing what German scholarship dubbed the 
‘Asia Minor’ tradition, Eustathius shares something with Origen. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
seriously, this should caution us against reading too much about the nature of human imperfection into 
Eustathius’ belief in progress beyond the original condition. 
615
 Methodius, Convivium (CPG, 1810), 4.2.2 and 8.11.22.  Lloyd Patterson observes this and sees it 
as evidence of Origen’s profound influence on Methodius in his Methodius, pp.136-7 and pp.144-55. 
616
 I am here drawing on Mark Edwards, who has drawn parallels between Ireanaeus’ idea of 
progression from image to likeness and Origen’s in his, Origen against Plato, p.102. 
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Body, soul and the image of God 
Eustathius clearly regards the human body as integral to the image of God in 
humankind.  The place of the human soul in this picture is less clear.  It can look as if 
he has two different pictures, one in which the whole person is the image, the other 
in which the image is simply the body.  However, placed in the context of other 
discussion on the body-soul relationship, it becomes clear that it is almost certainly 
the whole person that is image in Eustathius.   
 
That the body is integral to the image of God in humankind is evident both 
from his description of Adam as a “statue of God” and his insistence that Christ qua 
image is physical.  The description of Adam’s pre-ensouled body as a statue of God 
suggests that Eustathius located God’s image exclusively in the human body.
617
  This 
coheres with the idea that the image of God reveals God, because it is in the body 
that God is made visible.  However, this jars with Eustathius’ sense that Christ qua 
image is the archetype for human completeness, because he is always adamant that 
human completeness involves both body and soul.  It is, presumably, the entire 
human being that is conformed to the image of the Son. 
 
Eustathius may simply use the term ‘image’ inconsistently.
618
  However, 
closer inspection of the statue metaphor suggests that, whilst “statue of God” does 
                                                 
617
 As discussed in chapter 3.  The description of Adam’s body as a statue is found in D61:4-5 
[Ariomanitas]. C.f. Parvis, Marcellus, p.58. 
618
 There are many precedents for varied usage. Irenaeus, for example, sometimes writes that the 
‘image of God’ is the body (C.f. A.H. 5.6.1), and sometimes writes as if it is the whole person (C.f. 
A.H., 5.3.1), but his image theology nonetheless retains a wider consistency. 
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allude to the “image of God” reference in Genesis 1.26-27, it is not intended to be 
synonymous with “image of God.”  It is, rather, an aspect of that image.  Eustathius’ 
description of Adam’s pre-ensouled body as a statue of God is reminiscent of his 
description of a hypothetical, soulless Christ, who, he argues, is the Christ of pro-
Arian theology.  (We have come across this passage before, so I quote only the most 
relevant section): “[I]f indeed Christ received the soulless bulk of a body,…he 
received a statue and not a human being, the shape having been cast on from the 
beginning, and the innermost stamp having fled.”
619
  Though the description of 
Adam’s soulless body is decidedly more positive than the description of Christ’s 
hypothetical soulless body, the structural relationship between body and soul in both 
cases is the same.  The latter description elucidates the former. 
 
I argued in the previous chapter that Eustathius emphasises the inertia of 
Adam’s pre-ensouled body.  There is simultaneously a sense of the perfection of the 
body that God has crafted, and an eerie sense of its lifelessness.  The statue of God 
has a potential that can only be realised when it receives its “innermost stamp”, 
χαρακτήρ, and is no longer a statue.  It is interesting that Eustathius uses the term 
χαρακτήρ, another word often connected to εἰκών.  There is a sense that ‘statue’ and 
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 D4:23-27 [Ariomanitas]. 
620
 There is a parallel in Ps. Menander Sententiae e codicibus Byzantinis in which both the king and 
the queen are described as εἰκών ἔμψυχος θεοῦ. See 264 and 1.79 respectively. 
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The unapologetic physicality of the image of God is, nonetheless, striking.  
The contrast with Origen, and the later Origenism that Eustathius opposed, is 
pointed.  It is particularly interesting because Eustathius shares with Origen the idea 
that Christ’s humanity is “image of the image.”  Origen can distinguish between 
Christ qua image and the Son qua image without locating the image of God in the 
body because of the belief in Christ’s human soul, which he shares with Eustathius.  





The relationship between the soulless body – a statue – and the human being, 
body and soul – an image – both fleshes out and offers a solution to a problem that 
Zoepfl identified in Eustathius’ thought.  Let us return to Zoepfl’s argument that 
Eustathius’ idea that Christ’s humanity revealed God was undermined by Eustathius’ 
Origenist sense that Christ’s soul mediates between God and the body.
622
  As argued 
in chapter 3, I believe that Zoepfl is justified in observing an Origenist schema of 
Word-soul-body in portions of Eustathius’ writing, and that this diverges from his 
other more dominant picture of body and soul as relating to God in basically the 
same way, as parts of the human being.  In his statue-image schema, Eustathius 
clearly has the idea that it is the body that reveals God, and yet the body is not yet 
entirely itself, because it does not have the soul.  Taking, admittedly, a slight 
conceptual jump, we might suppose that it is the ensouled body, the living human 
physicality, in which God is most fully revealed.  In Eustathius’ theology of the 
                                                 
621




image of God, we see how he employs Origenist Christology and metaphysics to talk 
about anthropology and Christology in an Aristotelian way. 
 
Eustathius is also drawing on Methodius in his understanding of how body and 
soul relate to the image of God but, again, he diverges from him in important 
respects.  Methodius, like Eustathius, refers to human beings as statues of God.
623
  
However, like Origen, he locates the image of God in the soul.
624
  There are also 
times at which he describes the body and soul as mutually defining with reference to 
the image, and this echoes Eustathius’ hylomorphism.  So, he says that the body 
cannot be destroyed, because it was united to the image of God.
625
  Elsewhere, he 
describes human souls as the “divinities” of human bodies.
626
  Note that he does not 
write that the soul is the “divinity” of the human being, but of the body.  This gives 
the impression that the soul, the image of God, infuses the body with that image, 
which echoes Eustathius’ idea that the soul makes the body more truly the body, 
more truly the image of God.  It is tempting to conclude that this is also Eustathius’ 
position.  However, Eustathius’ sense that Christ qua image is physical – and that 
therefore our bodies will be conformed to Christ qua image – cautions us against this 
position.  It should be acknowledged that Eustathius’ theology of the body and soul 
probably does not, in general, give more importance to the body than Methodius’ 
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 See introduction. 
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 Methodius, De Res. (CPG, 1812), I.34.2-3. 
624
 Methodius writes that “it isn’t enough just to keep the body undefiled, just as we shouldn’t give the 
impression that we think more about the temple of God than the image of God.” [Convivium (CPG, 
1810), 1.1]  This clearly distinguishes between the body, which is the temple, and the soul, which is 
the image. 
625
 Methodius, De Res. (CPG, 1812), II.24:2-4 
626
 Methodius Convivium, 1.1.  
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theology does, but his location of the image in the body, which Methodius seems to 
reject, is nonetheless important. 
 
Eustathius’ use of the image of God motif to understand the human body and 
soul in relation to God echoes and diverges from both Origen and Methodius in 
important ways.  However, he is not, in this case, torn between them. In some ways, 
Methodius is closer to Origen than Eustathius is.  In locating the image partly in the 
body, Eustathius echoes Irenaeus where Methodius decisively departs from him.
627
  
In his theology of God’s image, Eustathius stands very much in the so-called ‘Asia 
Minor’ tradition, but he nonetheless draws on both this tradition and Origenism 
creatively, to come up with a picture that his very much his own. 
 
Conclusion 
Eustathius’ theology of the image of God suggests an affinity between God 
and humanity, but it also pointedly maintains the ontological separation between God 
and humankind that is so evident in his negotiation with Platonism.  It 
simultaneously finds a positive place for humankind, as separate from God, because 
it is as separate from God that humanity is God’s image, and this description must 
carry positive connotations.  Humanity is conformed to the image of God, Christ, and 
is perfect in its humanity. 
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 For Irenaeus’ location of the image in the body, c.f. A.H. (CPG, 1306), 5.6.1. 
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The disjunction between God and humanity in Eustathius’ image theology 
echoes a wider tendency in fourth-century metaphysics to emphasise the ontological 
otherness of God.  However, other image theologies of the fourth century tried harder 
to overcome this distinction.  Eustathius’ take on God’s image is a natural, but not 
necessary, result of it. 
 
Where Eustathius’ image theology touches upon the body-soul relationship, it 
tends to cohere with his wider picture of this relationship; it is not altogether clear 
whether the image is just the body, or the body and soul.  However, if the former, 
then, even in describing the body’s image-status, Eustathius implies its 
incompleteness when bereft of the soul.  In either case, Eustathius maintains a clear 
sense of the importance and essential goodness of the body.  His location of the 
image of God in the body is all the more remarkable because it is in contrast to his 
contemporaries.  It is pointedly in contrast to Origen, whom his image theology 
otherwise, surprisingly, echoes. 
 
Eustathius’ theology of God’s image has an important soteriological 
dimension, in that we are conformed to Christ’s image, and this is tied in with a 
wider sense of progression from the ψυχικός to πνευματικός.  This in some ways 
echoes Irenaeus idea of recapitulation, which Zoepfl has attributed to Irenaeus.
628
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Chapter 5: Anthropology in Eustathius’ soteriology 
This chapter examines the anthropological implications of Eustathius’ 
soteriology. 
 
Soteriology is, to a very large degree, anthropocentric.
629
  It is about the gap 
between the current state of human beings and the highest and best state that it is 
possible for human beings to attain; that is, it is about the gap between human 
actuality and human possibility.  It therefore speaks of what a human being is, and 
what a human being can be.  The concept of the salvation of humankind assumes that 
there is something imperfect about it, or about its situation, and that humankind can 
be perfected.  Any given soteriological narrative therefore offers a description of 
what is wrong, or incomplete, in humankind and a vision of perfect humanity.  For 
Eustathius, typically of patristic thought, it is also eschatological, because human 
potential is realised eschatologically. 
 
The term ‘salvation’, and the related term ‘soteriology’, both have a broad 
semantic range and tend to refer specifically to being ‘saved’ from a bad situation; 
progress beyond the original condition cannot, strictly, be described in these terms.  
Nonetheless, in Eustathius’ thought, the concept of progress beyond the original 
condition is so interlinked with the concept of correcting the situation that follows 
from humankind’s moral lapse and ontological and circumstantial degeneration that I 
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 A soteriology focusing on the salvation of the whole of creation is, in some ways, an exception to 
this, though it still has an important anthropological dimension. I am here considering soteriology with 
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use the terms ‘salvation’ and ‘soteriology’ to refer to the process and consequence of 
achieving human telos, whether or not this process carries a negative connotation for 
the circumstance or condition left behind. 
 
Eustathius conceives of soteriology both in terms of a transformation of 
human capacity and in terms of a defeat of the devil.  These ideas are 
complementary, rather than competing.  Eustathius very clearly believes that humans 
were created in a better condition than the present one, and that we have degenerated 
to this condition. 
 
According to Eustathius, this has impacted both human circumstance and 
human nature, in interrelated ways.  Ultimately, Eustathius holds together the idea 
that humankind is in bondage to the devil and the idea of a degenerate human 
condition.  Human sin is both a cause and a consequence of both of these things.  He 
also conceives of soteriology as a negation of everything that went wrong when 
Adam and Eve sinned, and as a progression beyond the condition in which humanity 
was originally created.  The idea of Christ as the archetypal human being acts as 




                                                                                                                                          
reference to humankind in the first instance, and soteriology with reference to the rest of the created 




The idea that humanity has degenerated, both ontologically and 
circumstantially, from its original condition is fundamental to Eustathius’ 
soteriological narrative.  Something has gone wrong with humanity, and it needs to 
be put right.  Eustathius believes that Adam and Eve’s sin resulted in their essential 
degeneration, and that this degeneration was inherited by the rest of the human race.  
Eustathius’ chronology of these events is as follows: the devil falls through sin;
630
 the 
devil tempts Eve; Eve and Adam sin; humankind becomes degenerate.   
 
If Eustathius ever formulated a precise definition of ‘sin’ [ἁμαρτία], the 
extant text will not yield it to us.  Sin appears in much patristic (and later) theology 
as a self-evident concept, the boundaries of which differ, importantly, in different 
authors, but these boundaries are often undeclared.  This may well be the case in 
Eustathius’ thought.  His reference to the temptation of Eve links her sin, (or 
Adam’s) to the disobedience to God’s command not to eat from the tree of 
knowledge, and strongly suggests that sin is to some degree connected with 
disobedience to God’s command.
631
  There are ways that people ought to behave, and 
sin involves behaving in contrary ways. 
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 Eustathius writes that, “The devil, after he had fallen from his own virtue, was sentenced to live in 
Hades…”, D29:1 [Ariomanitas]. This shows both an interest in the devil’s sin, and a belief that this 
sin constituted a fall from grace.  The devil’s fall is discussed below.   
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 On Eve’s temptation, see D27:22-4 [Ariomanitas].  Though this tells us nothing about how divine 
command relates to any objective reality of good and evil – e.g., does it create it or describe it? 
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As a consequence of Adam and Eve’s sin, humans becomes mortal: “Through 
the sin of the first-formed, the death belonging to sin fell on, great and incurable.”
632
  
It also becomes more inclined to sin, relative to its original created state.  Slavery to 
the devil is also slavery to sin.  So, once he has repented, the penitent thief has 
“escaped tyrannical hostility.”
633
  As observed in chapter 3, Eustathius regards 
human souls as “polluted.”, and thinks of this trait as at least partly inherited.  He 
seems to regard this as an inherited trait, because he connects it to the fact that all 





Eustathius tends to regard the devil as the root cause of human degeneration.  
The devil is “the sower of death in the human race.”
635
  It becomes clear from the 
immediate context that Eustathius does not mean to suggest that human sin had no 
part in creating the current human situation, but he does also hold the devil 
responsible for human sin.  He may have in mind a division of responsibility between 
humankind and the devil, but this is never explicitly stated.  Eustathius thinks that 
human sin first happened when Eve and Adam ate the fruit from the tree of 
knowledge in the Garden of Eden, and that the devil tempted Eve.  The devil 
“masked as the serpent slinked up to Eve, in order that, shooting the poisonous words 
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 D22:9-10 [Ariomanitas]. 
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 D27:64-65 [Ariomanitas]. 
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 D50:23-24 [Ariomanitas].  It is possible that the reference to bodily intercourse also points to a 
connection between sin and sex, but this is highly speculative and, even if this is so, this connection is 
suggested nowhere else, despite considerable discussion of sin, which cautions us against seeing it as 
an important aspect of Eustathius’ anthropology.  
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from above, he might offer manifest proofs to many people.”
636
  The devil’s sin, 
then, was prior to human sin, and prompted human sin.
637
  Although it is through 
human sin that humanity became corruptible and mortal, the devil is blamed for “the 




Eustathius’ account of the origins of human sin belongs to a school of thought 
that was ascending, but not axiomatic, in the early fourth century.  Specifically, it in 
some ways echoes Origen’s account of “the fall” which was taken up, in different 
ways, by Methodius and Athanasius, among others.  For Eustathius, as for Origen, 
Methodius and Athanasius, Lucifer sins and falls and, partly prompted by him, 
humanity sins and therefore lapses into moral and ontological degeneracy, becoming 
corruptible.  However, there are certain important respects in which Eustathius’ 
account diverges significantly from Origen’s.  He shares some key departures from 
Origen with Athanasius and Methodius.  Pointedly, for Eustathius, Methodius and 
Athanasius, human souls are not pre-existent, so it is Adam and Eve, specifically, 
who sinned in the first instance, and passed their degeneration on to their ancestors.  
In this, they all reject a particularly controversial aspect of Origen’s concept of the 
fall.  However, Eustathius may be further from Origen than Athanasius or Methodius 
in an important respect: he does not seem to have the sense of a fall of human beings 
from paradise, comparable to Lucifer’s fall from heaven and corresponding to 
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 D27:31-34 [Ariomanitas]. 
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 On the devil’s sin, see note 630 above. 
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 Eustathius refers to the devil tempting Eve.  The sin ‘of the first-formed’ is presumably Adam’s 
sin, because Eustathius refers to Adam as ‘the first-formed’ in exegeting Genesis 2.7.  See chapter 2. 
The relative importance and relative blame that Eustathius attributes to each of them apparently 
varies, though it is hard to tell because of the fragmentary nature of the sources.  Where he draws a 
close parallel, it is Adam who is the inverse parallel of Christ. 
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Origen’s ‘fall of souls.’  For Origen, the fall is an historical event that took place 
between different spheres of creation with distinctive metaphysical limits and 
possibilities; it is a fall from one sphere to another.
639
  Neither Athanasius nor 
Methodius entertain the possibility of such a fall as an historical reality, but the 
metaphysical element of Origen’s idea is nonetheless important in their use of it; they 
both use the analogy of a fall between different metaphysical spheres to describe 
human degeneration, retaining the term ‘fall’ as a metaphor.
640
  Because Eustathius’ 
corpus is so fragmented, it is unclear whether he did hold this idea or not.   
 
As I argued in chapter 3, Eustathius, in contrast to Origen, believes that the 
primeval paradise was on earth.  However, because Origen’s profound legacy was 
often shorn of the most extremely Platonist (and, as some have argued, not clearly 
Origenist) metaphysical structures, we should not take this as evidence of the total 
absence of Origen’s influence.  Nonetheless, in the absence of either a clear idea that 
humankind’s degeneration involved a geo-metaphysical fall or evident use of the 
term ‘fall’ as a metaphor in this context, I shall avoid using the term ‘fall’ to describe 
Eustathius’ understanding of the degeneration of human ontology and circumstance.  
I opt instead for the term ‘lapse’.  When I remark upon the wider patristic context of 
Eustathius’ theology of the lapse, this often does refer to authors in whom the term 
‘fall’ would be more obviously appropriate. 
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 For Origen on the fall of souls, c.f. De Princ. (CPG, 1482), 2.8.3. 
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 For Methodius, c.f. his Convivium (CPG, 1810), 10.3 on humankind’s fall.  For Athanasius, c.f. his 
C. Ar. (CPG, 2093), III,.10 on Lucifer’s fall and his C.G. (CPG, 2090), 3-4 on the fall of humankind. 
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Humankind as culprit and as victim: a note on the conceptual 
framework 
I observe that throughout Eustathius’ writings, he depicts humankind 
variously as the victim and as the guilty party in the meta-narrative of human history.  
This observation is complicated by the difficulty of establishing Eustathius’ precise 
understanding of sin. 
 
In particular, it is difficult to establish the role of knowledge in sin, and the 
related relationship between ability to do otherwise, responsibility, and sin.    The 
next chapter seeks to establish Eustathius’ concept of human free will, as far the 
sources will permit.  For now, I make a few observations about this topic as it relates 
to the reconstruction of Eustathius’ soteriology. 
 
In this chapter, I identify the importance of the concept of slavery to the devil 
in Eustathius’ soteriology, and juxtapose it with the concept of human guilt.  This 
might suggest that slavery provides an alternative to guilt as an explanation for the 
human condition; given that Christ saves partly by “bringing light to the human race” 
it might suggest that humans are not guilty because the devil’s bondage keeps them 
in ignorance.
641
  This must be greatly qualified; the fact that these concepts sit so 
readily side by side in Eustathius’ writings would, if anything, suggest rather the 
opposite (though both victim and culprit anthropological motifs are employed in a 
wide-range of patristic soteriology, by writers with hugely diverse views on the 
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 D21:18 [Ariomanitas]. See ‘God’s image reveals God’ section, chapter 4. 
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relationship between sin and knowledge).  However, Eustathius has a picture of a 
human being thrashing helplessly in the devil’s clutches which does more than 
simply evoke a sense of the person’s helplessness.  It points the finger, away from 
the person, towards the person’s captor and therefore also connotes the person’s 
innocence, at least in relative terms.  This connotation is importantly and 
substantially qualified by Eustathius’ undeniable belief that the lapsarian condition is 
a sinful condition, but it nonetheless requires to be hailed as a competing strand in 
Eustathius’ anthropological tapestry. 
 
Essential transformation 
The previous chapter examined Eustathius’ concept of progression from 
ψυχικός to πνευματικός.  As noted, this narrative tends to focus on the difference 
between pre-lapsarian humanity and eschatological humanity; it need not be 
inconsistent with the lapse of humankind (and, in asserting that ψυχικός people have 
now sinned, Eustathius hints at a connection between a deficiency in the original 
condition and the sin that caused a departure from it), but does not lend itself to 
centralising this lapse within a narrative of human history.
642
  Eustathius’ soteriology 
also offers a picture of transformation from the effects of sin, and this is tied in with 






The devil defeated 
Eustathius frequently describes salvation in terms of the defeat of the devil, 
and describes the lapsarian condition, correspondingly, as bondage to him.  This 
narrative focuses on human circumstance.  Although it is profoundly connected to 
Eustathius’ narrative of essential transformation, it has a different starting point, and 
a different emphasis. 
 
Eustathius’ soteriology is intensely political in the sense that it concerns itself 
with the machinations of power and their relationship to the circumstances in which 
they operate.  “From the New Testament through to the Cappadocians, the Christian 
felt himself to be involved in the warfare between God and the devil, good and evil, 
light and darkness, life and death, righteousness and sin.”
643
  Eustathius is no 
exception.  He believes that God and the devil are at war: “it is… [the devil’s] 
custom to join battle with God.”
644
  Perhaps the most dominant of all his 
soteriological motifs is that humankind is saved because Christ has defeated the devil 
and has therefore saved humankind from bondage to him.  Humankind was created 
free, but became enslaved to the devil.  Through Christ, humankind becomes free 
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 See chapter 4, especially the discussion on the sinfulness of the ψυχικός state. 
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 Frances Young, The use of sacrificial ideas in Greek Christian writers (Cambridge, MA., The 
Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979), p.142. 
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 Engastrimytho, 10.14.  Here, as in many other instances, Eustathius sees this as asymmetric 
warfare.  This is one of many tensions in Eustathius’s soteriology, and I explore it below. 
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In this narrative, the devil has power over humankind.  For example, 
Eustathius refers to “the serpent’s tyrannical rule.”
646
  In succumbing to the devil’s 
temptation, humankind came under his power and remains in thrall to him until 
Christ defeats him.  Eustathius nonetheless typically depicts the devil as always 
under God’s power, and sometimes suggests that the devil’s power over humankind 
is legitimate.  
 
Eustathius’ discourse on the devil focuses on the nature of the devil’s power, 
and its relationship to other forms of power.  This discourse is complicated, and can 
sometimes appear to be incoherent.  It becomes illuminated, however, when placed 
within the wider context of early Christian political theology, and its ambivalence 
about the legitimacy and justice of any power other than God’s.  Eustathius drew on 
the models of power available to him, and therefore on models of power as he had 
experienced and observed them. 
 
Discourse on earthly power is entwined with discourse on the power of 
supernatural forces in both Christian and pagan Greco-Roman culture.
647
  In patristic 
discourse, sometimes, this came in the form of a connection between imperial power 
                                                                                                                                          
645
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and the devil; imperial power may set the stage for the devil, for example.
648
  
Conversely, Christology is also connected to ideas about the emperor, though almost 
always in a context where the analogy between Christ and emperor is supposed to be 
imprecise.
649
  Eustathius’ discourse on power echoes a wider patristic ambivalence 
about power and authority in the current world order, and such ambivalence makes a 
lot of sense for Eustathius in the immediate aftermath of Nicaea.  He apparently does 
not draw an explicit parallel between imperial authority and the devil (as some 
patristic authors do) but his conceptual resources for articulating power are shaped 
by his perception of power in the late Roman Empire. 
 
Patristic attitudes to earthly authority, and imperial authority in particular, are 
highly complex and hotly contested.  An identifiable trend in early Christian 
literature pits the church against the empire, and sees imperial authority as essentially 
negative.
650
  Some scholars have seen it as declining early, and have emphasised its 
own self-qualifying tendencies.
651
  It is widely acknowledged that an anti-imperial 
political theology persisted longer and with more force, in the West than in the East 
                                                 
648
 C.f. Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, introduction to Irenaeus, From Irenaeus 
to Grotius: A sourcebook in Christian Political Thought (William B Eerdmans, Cambridge, 1999), 
pp.15-16. 
649
 So, for example, Athanasius, arguing that the image of God, Christ, can also be God, writes that 
“[the emperor’s] image might indeed say ‘I and the emperor are one.  I am in the emperor, and the 
emperor is in me.’ ” C.Ar. (CPG, 2093), III, 5. See Field’s discussion of “The Christology of 
emperorship” in his Liberty, pp.220-28. 
650
 C.f. Allen Brent, The Imperial Cult and the development of church order: concepts and images of 
authority in Paganism and early Christianity before the age of Cyprian (Boston, Brill, 1999).  Brent 
argues that the Christian community self-consciously defined itself in opposition to imperial authority. 
651
 C.f. Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine political philosophy: origins and background, vol. 2, 
(Washington, Dumbarton Oaks Centre for Byzantine Studies, trustees for Harvard University, 1966). 
Dvornik considers Origen’s political theology a key turning point in a move towards a more 
accommodating attitude to the Roman state, p.604 
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(though this deserves to be qualified, as I discuss in chapter 7).
652
  It is almost otiose 
to add that there are many, and complex ways, of being ‘opposed’ to imperial 
authority, and this itself has been the subject of much discussion.  
 
Scholarship has often tended to ask whether and how far various strands of 
patristic thought were positive or negative about the empire.  This is, in my opinion, 
a meaningful question to ask, and can be useful, depending upon its context.  
However, the categories implied by it must be treated flexibly.  Even the most 
positive descriptions of earthly authority tend to imply that “earthly royalty was but 
the reflection of the supreme royalty of Jesus.”
653
  Among the most negative we are 
likely to find a qualifying sense that earthly rulers are under divine sovereignty and 
are therefore ordained by God.  This tends to correspond with a sense that, for all 
their faults, the world would be worse without their rulership.  Irenaeus is so often 
rightly noted for following in the anti-imperial tradition of revelation.
654
  
Nonetheless, he can also write that, 
  
Earthly rule…has been appointed by God for the benefit of the 
nations – and not by the devil, who is never at rest at all, and does 
not love to see even the gentiles conducting themselves in a quiet 
way.  This is so that under fear of it, people might not eat each 
other up like fish, but, by the establishment of laws, they might 
hold down the great wickedness of the gentiles.  And in this way, 




                                                 
652
 C.f. Ibid., p.606 and Field, Liberty, p.22. 
653
 Dvornik, Byzantine political philosophy vol., 2, p.600. Dvornik argues that this royalty motif was 
derived from Hellenism. 
654
 On which see note on O’Donovan’s and Lockwood O’Donovan’s analysis of Irenaeus, below. 
655
 Irenaeus, A.H., (CPG, 1306) 5.24.2. 
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Here, earthly authority is a consequence of human sin, but its institution is an act of 
divine mercy, helping to rein in the consequences of sin.  Tertullian, similarly, argues 
that, through the power of juridical violence, God restrains pagan savagery.
656
  
However, though earthly power is legitimate in this schema, there are often 
conditions placed on its legitimacy.  In the same passage, Irenaeus says that earthly 
authority should be respected where it is doing what is right: a person’s requirement 
to submit to authority is contingent upon its morality, but it is not quite clear that the 
authority’s legitimacy is the same thing, or is contingent in the same way. 
  
In the 320s, the relationship between the church and the state was extremely 
uncertain.  Most of the facts shaping the picture are familiar enough, but deserve to 
be sketched here so as to contextualise Eustathius’ political discourse.  Following the 
legalisation of Christianity in the final quarter of the third century, the opening 
decades of the fourth century saw peculiarly bad persecution of the church, 
particularly in the east, under Galerius, Maximinus and Diocletian.
657
  The ever-
shifting relations between church and empire had undergone especially large 
fluctuations within living memory, and a number of the leaders of the church of the 
320s had personally suffered violence, to varying degrees, at the hands of the 
imperial governance.  This shaped collective Christian self-definition, as is 
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 C.f. Tertullian, De anima (CPL, 2), 56.8. 
657
 Timothy Barnes and David Potter both argue, persuasively, that Christianity was legalised by the 
emperor Gallienus in 260. C.f. Barnes Early Christian Hagiography and Roman History (Tübingen, 
Mohr Siebeck, 2010), p.97 and Potter, The Roman Empire at Bay AD 180-395 (London and New 
York, 2004), pp.85-172, 217-262.  See Stephen Mitchell A History of the Later Roman Empire, A.D. 




repeatedly evidenced in the discourse of the Constantinian Church.
658
  The 
‘Constantinian Revolution’ then offered the church much.  However, it was soon to 




As argued in chapter 1, Eustathius was disappointed by the compromise that 
Constantine’s intervention had produced at Nicaea.  He must have remained 
conscious that this scenario was not the violence that he had witnessed, and perhaps 
experienced, under Constantine’s rival emperors some thirteen years previously, but 
it was not unambiguously positive, and the previous experience of persecution, 
though rendering Constantine’s behaviour relatively favourable, was also likely to 
render the church suspicious of the empire.  Whatever he was feeling before Nicaea, 
its course clearly led Eustathius to reject the glowing picture of imperial support for 
the church that would be painted by Eusebius in his Life of Constantine.  Eustathius 
does not connect imperial power with the devil’s power, and it is unlikely that he 
intended an extended and explicit analogy between the two, but the ambivalence that 
he felt about imperial power provides conceptual resources for his discourse on the 
devil’s power. 
 
                                                 
658
 For example, as part of his anti-‘Arian’ polemic, Athanasius calls Asterius “the sacrificer”, a 
derisive, and probably humiliating, reference to the fact that Asterius sacrificed to during persecution. 
De Decretis (CPG, 2120), 8.  H.A. Drake details the political fluctuations and complexities of the 
Constantinian Church in his Constantine and the Bishops: the politics of intolerance (London, John 
Hopkins University Press, 2000).   
659
 Rowan Williams correspondingly argues the ‘Constantinian revolution’ appeared to offer 




Eustathius often depicts the devil’s power as illegitimate.  Specifically, he 
implies that it was acquired by illegitimate means.  The devil is an “arch-
plunderer.”
660
  He has somehow taken power away from God, or Christ.
661
  The title 
“arch-plunderer” is used within a description of Christ saving humankind from the 
devil.  The most natural interpretation of this phrase is that the devil has plundered 





Eustathius firmly believed that Christ would reign, eschatologically, as king: 
“[Christ] the human being justly takes up supervening glories, having also been 
furnished with power, duly receiving the highest place and the throne of the 
kingdom.”
663
  This completes Eustathius’ political-soteriological narrative.  The 
devil, “the tyrant” will be replaced by Christ as ruler: according to Eustathius, the 
devil’s crown is removed and given to Christ.
664
  The anthropological implications of 
Eustathius’ eschatology are examined in detail in chapter 7.  Here, I want only to 
observe how his eschatology fits into his wider soteriological narrative.  Ultimately, 
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 D28:61 [Ariomanitas]. 
661
 The relationship between God’s power and Christ’s power in Eustathius’ thought is discussed in 
chapter 7. 
662
 As this descriptor is in the epitome of Ariomanitas, we cannot be sure that the wording is 
Eustathius’ own.  However, the theme of the illegitimacy of the devil’s power is so frequent 
throughout the text that we can trust the wider sense of this word. 
663
 D100:5-6 [Arianos]. 
664
 D32:74-81.  Eustathius offers Ezekiel 21:25-27 in evidence: “thus says the lord: ‘remove the mitre 
and take off its crown.  It will not be the same.  You have brought low the high thing having brought 
high the low thing.  I will designate it a wrong thing, until the one who owns it comes, and I shall give 
it to him.’ ” 
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one set of circumstances – bondage to the devil, is exchanged for another – Christ’s 
kingdom.
665
  Both are expressed in political terms. 
 
Eustathius repeatedly presents the devil’s relationship to humanity as a 
perversion of Christ’s relationship to humanity.  This is particularly emphatic in his 
interpretation of Psalm 73 in which he contrasts the life-giving qualities of Christ’s 
body with the poisoning qualities of the devil’s body.  (With reference to Christ’s 
body, he evidently has the Eucharist in mind): 
 
if Christ, having hung on the cross, gives to us the exact 
representation of his body so that, once we have partaken of the 
sacred food, we may inherit incorruptible life, it follows that 
conversely, when the many-shaped serpent dies, he furnishes food 




An inverse parallel between Christ and the devil is treated as axiomatic in this 
passage.  The devil’s ultimate pathos is juxtaposed simultaneously with Christ’s 
pathos on the cross and with Christ’s military victory, which is, achieved largely by 
the cross.  Eustathius has a strong sense that the current, perverse scenario will 
ultimately be inverted and that, when it is, the devil (and his followers) will be 
punished.  In placing a description of Christ on the cross beside a description of his 
violent victory of over the devil, Eustathius embraces in a paradox common in 
patristic theology. 
                                                 
665
 This has significant implications for Eustathius’ view of human freedom, which I discuss below. 
666
 D32:28-34 [Ariomanitas].  I discuss this passage with reference to its implications for Eustathius’ 




God the Son the saves the human race by becoming human and defeating the 
devil as a human being: “the Child of God…determined to punish the devil, the 
sower of death, through the same human race.  He bore the whole human being, in 
order that… because he had conquered the evil one in this way, he might hold sway 
in incorruptible life.”
667
  This entire passage is ostensibly an exegesis of Romans 
5.15, which Eustathius quotes in full: “For if we many have died by the transgression 
of one human being, how much more the grace, and the gift in the grace of Jesus 
Christ abounds in the many.”
668
  Christ defeats the devil by being sinless, and 
therefore negating the effect that the devil had in causing Adam to sin.  Eustathius 
takes a passage that might more readily be taken to blame Adam for the lapse, but 
reads into it more Adam’s victimhood than Adam’s guilt. 
 
Eustathius also sometimes depicts Christ as defeating the devil through a 
series of discrete events.  For example, Christ tussles with the devil when he is 
tempted in the wilderness.
669
  Christ’s descent to Hades is a central event.  
Sometimes, it is depicted an important part of this series of events, commensurable to 
Christ’s temptation in the wilderness.  At other times, it is depicted as the moment at 
which Christ defeats both death and the devil.
670
  Eustathius focuses on it a good deal 
in both Engastrimytho and Ariomanitas and, in both works, vests it with particular 
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 D22:10-15 [Ariomanitas]. 
668
 Quoted at D22:6-9. Eustathius’ quotation diverges from the Pauline text in its most common form, 
which reads: οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπἑθανον – “the many have died…”  Eustathius writes that οἱ πολλοὶ 
ἀπεθάνομεν – “we many have died…” 
669
 C.f. Engastrimytho, 10.14. 
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soteriological significance.  These two ideas meet in the idea that Christ must be 




Descending to Hades via his soul, Christ unlocks the gates of Hades, and 
leads humanity to paradise.
672
  According to both Engastrimytho and Ariomanitas, 
the souls of the dead are all in Hades prior to Christ’s descent there; between his 
death and resurrection, Christ goes to Hades and leads the souls imprisoned there to 
somewhere better.  In Engastrimytho, Eustathius writes that “Christ…set up his 
victory trophy against the enemy, dragged off the captives as his plunder and went up 
bodily on high into [the] heavens.”
673
  In Ariomanitas, Christ similarly “leads the 
captives captive” from Hades (after Ephesians 4.8, and Psalm 67).
674
  As he leads 




The souls in Hades are, correspondingly, often described as prisoners.  In 
these cases, it is clear that Eustathius is thinking of human souls in Hades as the 
devil’s prisoners – among several descriptors denoting captivity is the term 
αἰχμάλωτον, ‘prisoner of war.’
676
  Christ’s descent to Hades was important to 
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 Defeat of death, the devil and evil are conceptually connected and imperfectly distinguished in 
Eustathius’ writing. 
671
 As noted in the previous chapter. 
672
 C.f. Engastrimytho, 17.9.  He is, simultaneously, already in paradise with the penitent thief. 
673
 Engastrimytho, 20.5. 
674
 D28:8 [Ariomanitas]. 
675
 D22:19-20 [Ariomanitas]. 
676
 D28:6.  In this case, it is actually the people who are the prisoners, Christ taking the paradise “the 
souls of the prisoners of war” (emphasis mine). 
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patristic soteriology and Eustathius’ account is in many ways typical.
677
  Christ 
descends to Hades between his death and resurrection.  Christ accomplishes two 
highly interrelated things in Hades: he vanquishes the devil, and he frees the souls 
trapped in Hades.
678
  An equation between lapsarian human circumstance and 
enslavement to the devil is necessary to this picture. 
 
Christ’s ability to free the souls from the devil’s captivity derives in some 
sense from a ransom he offers in his death.  Hence, Eustathius claims that “[Christ’s] 
soul ransomed souls of the same kind.”
679
  I examine Eustathius’ conception of 
Christ’s death as a sacrifice in more detail later in the chapter.  It is important for the 
immediate question that Christ’s death is integral to freeing humankind from 
bondage to the devil.  Eustathius gives almost equal soteriological value to Christ’s 
entrance into paradise, which he sees as simultaneous with his entrance into 
Hades.
680
  When he describes the destruction of lapsarian circumstance, he also 
offers an alternative.  The effect of this is to underline the contrast between lapsarian 
circumstances and the circumstances of those rescued from it. 
                                                 
677
 C.f. Irenaeus, A.H. (CPG, 1306), 4.27.2; Origen, Homilia in Leviticum (CPG, 1416), 9.5.  Remi 
Gounelle gives a detailed account of the development of this idea in his La descente du Christ aux 
enfers: institutionnalisation d’une croyance (Institut d’études Augustiniennes, Paris, 2000).  Hilarion 
Alfeyev provides a useful shorter survey in his, Christ the conqueror of hell (New York, St Vladimir’s 
theological press, 2009), pp.43-101. Both argue that, by the fourth century, a fleshed-out concept of 
Christ’s descent to Hades had been developed as an important part of soteriology.  Variation in 
Eustathius’ account tends to fall within the normative range of patristic views, and where his account 
is distinctive, this reflects a distinctive aspect of his wider theology.  For example, Eustathius believes 
that Christ’s human soul descended to Hades, and regards this as soteriologically necessary, while 
Athanasius gives this place to the Logos, reflecting the Christological difference between the two.  
C.f. Athanasius’ Letter to Epictetus (CPG, 2095), 5-6. 
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 We might be tempted to suppose that these two things are identical.  However, this assumes that 
Eustathius uses these events as metaphors for Christ’s victory, while he understands them as 
historical.  In this case, the defeat of the devil and the freedom of his prisoners’ may be closely 
connected, but they are not the same thing. 
679




In centralising the devil’s role in the human predicament, Eustathius depicts 
humankind primarily as a victim, rather than a culprit. Consider, for example, his 
description of the souls in Hades as “prisoners of war.”  The picture Eustathius paints 
here is that those in Hades fought the devil and lost, and now their commander has 
come to rescue them. 
 
Eustathius sometimes views the devil’s power over humanity as legitimate.  
This is most evident where he couches it in legalistic terms in which it is the proper 
consequence of human sin.   Eustathius claims that humanity was “sold to the penalty 
of the curse.”
681
  Similarly, Christ “acquits the souls’ penalties.”
682
  The precise 
concept behind this phrase is difficult to determine, partly because it is unclear 
whether and how far it points to a worked out theological idea or a devotional mode 
of referring to the situation from which Christ rescues humanity.  At any rate, the 
reference to a penalty suggests that humanity finds itself in slavery as a proper 
consequence of its actions.  Eustathius’ reference to Christ as a “ransom from evil” 
fits well with the prisoner of war motif but also places humanity’s relationship to the 
devil in a legalistic framework.  I expand on this theme when discussing Eustathius’ 
ideas about Christ’s death.  It is primarily this legalistic concept that underlies 
Eustathius’ occasional suggestion that humanity is rightly held captive.  
Significantly, it combines an emphasis on the devil’s role in the lapsarian order with 
a sense that humanity is responsible for its lapsarian reality.  There is an inverse 
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 C.f. Engastrimytho, 18.1. 
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correlation between the extent of the devil’s power and its legitimacy; where the 
devil is weak and basically subject to God, he can only have acquired dominion over 
humankind by right. 
 
In Eustathius, legalistic interpretations of humanity’s enslavement sometimes 
suggest a dualistic approach to cosmic power and at other times, are partly attempts 
to insist that everything – including the devil – is subject to God.  Correspondingly, 
sometimes, humans look more like prisoners of God than prisoners of the devil.  
Eustathius connects Christ’s death with forgiveness of sins (among other things).
683
  
Freedom often seems to be a consequence of forgiveness, and occasionally, more 
specifically, seems to be freedom from punishment.  This is not as dominant in 
Eustathius’ thought as the motif of freedom from the devil, but it qualifies and 
complicates the latter, more dominant, idea. 
 
Eustathius believes that the devil was already under God’s power in some 
sense prior to Christ’s descent to Hades, which reveals an ambiguity about the 
devil’s role in the lapsarian order.  This seems to lend itself in many ways to the 
legalistic strand of thought in Eustathius and, more particularly, to the idea that 
humanity is a prisoner of God and is free from the devil when forgiven its sins.  
However, this is not exactly the case: Eustathius’ belief that the devil was subject to 
God shares with some of his legalistic ideas a concern for God’s sovereignty.  
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 D70:19 [Proverbs 8:22]. 
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 D28:29-30 [Ariomanitas]. 
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 I discuss this in detail later in the chapter. 
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Eustathius believes that the devil was imprisoned by God in Hades when he fell, but 




Eustathius interprets Isaiah 14:9-15 as indicating that the devil is imprisoned 
in Hades by God.  Pointedly, when the devil arrives in Hades, various human kings 
who are already imprisoned there mock him for his dramatic demise.  The relevant 
biblical passage, which Eustathius quotes in full, is as follows:  
 
Hades beneath is provoked, because it met with you.  All those 
who have been great rulers of the earth have risen up together 
against you, those that have raised up all the kings of nations from 
their thrones.  All will answer and say to you ‘you have also been 
taken, just as we have.  And you are numbered among us.  Your 
glory and your great rejoicing have come down into Hades.  They 
shall spread corruption over you, and the worm shall be your 
covering.  How has Lucifer, who rose in the morning, fallen from 
heaven? He that sent [orders] to all the nations is crushed into the 
earth.  But you said in your heart ‘I will go up into heaven, I will 
set my throne above heaven’s stars.  I will go up above the clouds.  
I will be like the most high.’  But now you will go down into 
Hades, and into the foundations of the earth.
685
    
 
Eustathius also discusses the devil’s fall in Engastrimytho, using the same text from 
Isaiah, but beginning the quotation rather later, so that the problematic description of 
the imprisoned kings is not included.  In both works, the devil’s sin was his attempt 
to be equal to God: as quoted above, the devil had said “I will be like the most high.”  
This coheres with his sense that the devil’s power over the current world order is a 
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 The battle with the devil is also, in an important sense, ongoing.  This is highly significant to this 
thesis, but not to this immediate argument, so it will be dealt with later. 
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 Interspersed through D29:2-16 [Ariomanitas]. 
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perversion of Christ’s, or God’s.  In Engastrimytho, the devil’s punishment seems 
still to be pending, as he insists that it is, after all, in Ariomanitas, despite the fact 





Eustathius takes up an established tradition, stemming from Origen, in 
interpreting Isaiah 14 as referring to the devil’s fall.
687
  In doing so, he enters into a 
discourse that is rich with suggestion and he employs this suggestiveness in 
reflecting on the devil’s place in the meta-narrative of history.  He notes Isaiah 14 as 
qualifying the picture of the devil as ruler of the lapsarian world order: “on one hand, 
the prophets all speak in agreement in saying where, having been condemned, the 
devil spends his time.  On the other, they sometimes declare the punishments set 
before him, as if they are describing future events.”
688
  He does not think that the 
Isaiah passage relays what happened to the devil in a straightforward sense, but he 




This identification and resolution of apparent inconsistencies in the biblical 
text is a common exegetical method for Eustathius.
690
  For example, we have already 
come across his discussion of the disparate accounts of the thieves crucified next to 
Christ in Luke, relative to Mark and Matthew, and this will be discussed further 




 On Origen’s use of this passage, see his De Princ. (CPG, 1482), 1.5.4-5.  For a similar 







below.  Similarly, in discussing the number of heavens, Eustathius observes that 
“both Moses and all the divine writings say that heavens are both multiple and 
singular” – and then argues that this points to a distinction between “the highest 
heaven” and the heavens in general.
691
  This passage has a remarkably similar tone to 
those other two instances: Eustathius not only acknowledges the apparent 
inconsistency, but goes into considerable detail about it.  Eustathius’ exegesis here 
follows a roughly similar line, so it seems likely that he developed the significance of 
his distinction further.  At any rate, he argues that the various ways of describing the 
devil’s situation point to a distinction between his initial imprisonment and his 
eventual punishment.  
 
There is a certain tension between God’s ever-actualised will and God’s 
eschatologically actualised will in this distinction.  The application of this passage to 
the devil’s fall threatens to problematise Eustathius’ picture of the devil as “the 
sower of death in the human race” because it suggests that human mortality and 
human sin predated the devil’s fall.   
 
We cannot dissociate the claim that the devil is imprisoned in Hades from the 
claim that Christ defeated the devil and, in doing so, freed humanity: Eustathius 
describes the devil’s imprisonment in Hades in order to maintain that Christ did, in 
fact, descend to Hades to free the souls that were there.  Specifically, in his 
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 This is based on a form of exegesis common in patristic texts.  C.f. Young, Biblical exegesis, 
pp.186-213 and my discussion on Eustathian exegesis in chapter 1. 
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 D36. See D40 for Eustathius’ eventual synthesis. 
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discussion of Hades in Ariomanitas, he is trying to establish that Hades is a specific 
place, to which one might descend and cannot be identified simply with the grave.  
This is important to counter the suggestion that it was simply Christ’s body, rather 
than his soul, that descended to Hades.
692
  His analysis of quotations about the devil 
and Hades begins after he has described Christ’s descent to Hades, with the 
challenge: “if someone feigns ignorance, let him examine closely the voices of the 
sacred writings.”
693
  The fact that, prior to Christ’s advent, humanity was in bondage 
to the devil is the starting point for this argument: Christ freed human souls, 
Eustathius claims.  He then describes Christ’s victory in Hades and only then goes on 
to describe how the devil came to be in Hades.  He is trying to establish that the devil 
must have been in Hades because wherever the devil was, that is where his captive 
human souls were.  He wishes to maintain his picture of Christ’s battle with the 
devil, not undermine it. 
 
Nonetheless, Eustathius is uncomfortable with some of the implications of 
Christ’s battle with the devil, and consciously holds it up as a paradox.  This is part 
of a wider self-qualifying tendency in Eustathius’ discourse on the devil’s power: at 
times, he sees it as legitimate – but it cannot be entirely so, because it is immoral.  At 
others, he sees it as illegitimate – but, again, he finds this picture problematic 
because the rightful wielder of the power currently held by the devil is God, and it 
ought to be impossible to wrest power from God.  This is the result of an attempt to 
understand how the devil is in power now, but everything is subject to God.  The 







devil’s dominion is not absolute.  It is also not simply an inversion of Christ’s 
eschatological rule, but rather, a perversion.  Christ rules in power and glory.  The 
devil, tragically, has power, but he wields it from a humiliated position.  The devil 
himself has also fallen.  His fallen state is a warped state.  There is a dialectic 
running through Eustathius’ soteriology between the devil’s power and his pathos.  
In the devil’s pathos, another picture of his relation to humankind emerges.  In this 
picture, the devil is not the root cause of human sin.  The devil’s legal right to 
humanity may suggest that God is somehow constrained, but at least it does not 
suggest that he lost to the devil. 
 
We can infer his theological priorities from the various accounts that he holds 
to be a valuable part of his elusive, wider narrative.  There is a tension, in Eustathius’ 
thought, between human responsibility and human victimhood.  Where humankind is 
a victim, it is a victim of the devil.  The question of the devil’s responsibility for 
human sin is related, though not identical, to the question of the devil’s power; he 
appears much more responsible where he is more powerful; some ideas in early 
Christian soteriology see humankind as a culprit, while others see humankind as a 
victim, and these ideas are typically intertwined.
694
  Eustathius’ soteriology reflects 






Conflict with the devil and the current world order 
As a corollary of his cosmic power, the devil currently influences individual 
human beings directly.  Eustathius’ synthesis of the evangelists’ divergent accounts 
of the thieves crucified next to Christ provides a good example.
695
  The penitent 
thief, Eustathius argues, initially also blasphemed Christ because he was possessed 
by the devil.  It is this earlier blasphemy that Matthew and Mark record.
696
  The 
devil’s pervasive influence over human life and experience is fundamental to 
Eustathius’ soteriology. 
 
In describing conflict with the devil, Eustathius paints a picture of a battle 
won by Christ, yet still fought by each Christian, and finally ended when Christ 
becomes king.  For example, he claims that Christ destroyed the devil when he went 
to Hades, but also that, because of this “the devilish troupe gets its head broken 
daily.”
697
 This is part of a wider tension in Eustathius’ soteriology about when 
salvation is achieved.  So, whilst Christ binds the devil when he descends to Hades, 
Christian martyrs nonetheless fight the devil.  Eustathius thus has a profound sense 
of an ongoing struggle with the devil taking place now, yet connected both to the 
coming of Christ and Christ’s eschatological reign. 
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 C.f. Athanasius, De Inc. (CPG, 2091), 6.6. where Athanasius juxtaposes human carelessness and 
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697
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Correspondingly, the battle with the devil is, in some sense, ongoing, and it is 
a battle in which Christians fight.  The struggle between the (soon to be) penitent 
thief and the devil is part of an ongoing war between ἄνθρωπος and the devil, 
stretching both backwards and forwards across human history.  Eustathius therefore 
contextualises the thief’s experience by referring first to Paul’s advice about 
distinguishing between true and false spirits, and then to Eve’s temptation.
698
  This 
war is played out partly in martyrdom.  Eustathius places Christ’s death at the centre 
of a cosmic conflict reaching backwards and forwards across history.  The deaths of 
martyrs and prophets are a pale reflection of Christ’s death.
699
  The relevant passage 
is from a fragment in the epitome of Ariomanitas: 
 
Many righteous men have been killed, and many prophets have 
been murdered, and many martyrs have been tortured during 
interrogation.  They have been burnt through with sharp strokes, 
just like the bodily strength of the old chief priest Eleazar, at the 
victory feast of the seven brothers and their mother, not one of 
whom fell from the brotherly virtue.  But who beheld any of these 
incredible narratives with wonder?  For when who had died, did 
such great winds disrupt the entire earth, so that, being shaken root 
and branch, it moved out of the inmost parts, and the light of day 
changed into night as the sun failed? When who has died does the 




The connection between Christ and the martyrs initially seems weak, since 
Eustathius is contrasting them.  This might indeed have been the case if this passage 
primarily addressed martyrdom.  However, placed within its own context, it shows 
that Eustathius associates martyrdom with Christ’s death.  This passage is part of a 
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 Christ’s death is discussed in more detail below. 
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refutation of the idea that someone else was crucified in place of Christ.  No one 
else’s sacrificial death has had the effect that Christ’s had, Eustathius argues. What 
was so special about this other person, crucified in place of Christ, that it has these 
unique consequences?
701
  Martyrdom is almost incidental to his argument and it is 
for that reason that the reference suggests a connection between Christ’s death and 
martyrdom.  In claiming that Christ’s death was unique, Eustathius compares it with 
deaths of the same kind.  Eustathius has a very real sense of a battle with the devil, 
spanning all of human history, and played out in the blood and dirt of the arena. 
 
Eustathius’ picture of martyrdom and confession in some ways suggests a 
negative attitude to the current world order, though he never uses it explicitly to 
contrast either the church and the empire, or the church and the world.
702
  Here, 
Eustathius’ concept of the devil’s power is connected to the earthly power (though 
not necessarily to Constantine’s power).  His ambivalence about the power of the 
devil reflects a wider ambivalence about the current world order.  This can elucidate 
the way that his ideas about the devil’s power echo much patristic discourse on 
imperial power, such as we have seen in Irenaeus and Tertuallian.  I have argued that 
he uses this model of power because it is the one most readily available to him and 
not because he wishes to connect the devil with the emperor.  However, it does not 
follow that he sees the devil and the emperor as operating in entirely separate 
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 For a ‘church versus empire’ understanding of martyrdom in patristic thought, c.f. Paul Middleton, 
Radical Martyrdom and cosmic conflict in early Christianity (London, T and T Clark, 2006).   For a 
‘church versus world’ understanding, c.f. David Lopez Separatist Christianity: Spirit and Matter in 
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dimensions.  His sense of our enslaved circumstance is connected to his observation 
of the world around him, and a sense of its contribution to human slavery, and this 
brings human power structures into the question of the devil’s power.  
 
Christ’s death 
For Eustathius, Christ’s death is very important soteriologically.  
Unremarkably, it is a sacrifice that deals with sin.  Eustathius talks about this 
sacrifice in various ways, some of which are mutually exclusive.  Christ’s sacrifice 
breaks the bonds of the devil, forged by sin; it purifies humankind, and it procures 
forgiveness from God for humankind.  Like many Greek patristic writers, Eustathius 
approaches the problem of human sin from many angles, and Christ’s sacrifice deals 
with them all.  However, there is little evidence of a mechanical synthesis of these 
strands within his extant writings, and it is likely that he never elaborated one. 
 
It will be helpful to define clearly the terms I am using to describe and 
contextualise Eustathius’ various ways of talking about Christ’s death, and they draw 
on a complex and diverse discourse on Christ’s sacrificial death in patristic 
literature.
703
  Many of the terms that I use have overlapping semantic ranges of 
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meaning.  Here, ‘propitiation’ refers to appeasement, or regaining of favour, and the 
prevention of punishment.   In this case, a sacrifice of propitiation addresses the 
adverse effects of human sin on the relationship between God and the sinner. 
‘Purification’ refers to a removal of sin.  Whilst a sacrifice of propitiation is applied 
to the effects of the sin, a sacrifice of purification is applied to the sin itself.  
Sacrifices of propitiation and purification are sometimes offered by the guilty party, 
and sometimes on behalf of the guilty party by someone else.  ‘Ransom’ refers to a 
price paid to a captor for the release of captives.  These definitions are intended to 
clarify my descriptions of Eustathius’ theology and are not a set of a prioris with 





Eustathius’ discussion of Christ’s death is found almost entirely in the 
epitome of Ariomanitas where the extant text contains the words λύσιν and λύτρον 
denoting ransom or recompense and ἀμοιβὴ, which can also refer to 
transformation.
705
  I have resisted the temptation to read detailed signification into 
the sometimes complex and specific meanings of these terms because, in this case, 
we have very little reason to regard the terminology itself as Eustathian; these terms 
                                                                                                                                          
1999), 47-70.  He identifies three variants of ransom soteriology: 1) “the metaphor of ransom” in 
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power, and humanity is forfeit.  3) “Overcoming death” in which Christ is offered to death rather than 
the devil.  Death cannot hold him, and, in spitting him back up, releases the rest of humankind as well. 
Teselle attributes a further variant to Athanasius, in which humanity is held by death because of God’s 
dictate that whoever sinned would die. God must then undo his dictate, and thus offer to death. 
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 The definitions I have formulated are partly indebted to Young, Sacrificial ideas, pp.161-217. 
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 These are all connected with Christ’s death within a segment of writing in Ariomanitas [D27:89-
95]. In Engatrimytho, we read that Christ ἀναλυτροῦται the souls in Hades [18.2]. 
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also, and primarily, are used more or less synonymously to refer to the function of 
Christ’s death in relation to human sin.  Ransom is generally the primary sense, but 
purification and propitiation can also be implied.  It therefore seems to me that an 
epitomiser is likely to have used these terms interchangeably.  Because of the 
subtlety and ambiguity of the differences between them, even if the epitomiser 
intended to vest them with different meanings, we have no basis for supposing that 
these would reflect any differentiation Eustathius himself had made.  My analysis 
shall therefore focus on the relationship between agents and events in the extant text, 
as this probably does, broadly, reflect Eustathius’ original writing. 
 
The significance of Eustathius’ treatment of Christ’s death for his 
anthropology is manifold.  Firstly, because Christ’s death is a sacrifice that deals 
with sin, his treatment of it reveals a strong sense of this sin and, specifically, a sense 
that human sin is the predicament from which humankind is rescued.  The difficulty 
of reconstructing the mechanisms of this sacrifice in any detail leaves it less clear 
exactly how human sin manifests itself, but Eustathius’ writing is rich with 
suggestions.  Secondly, for Eustathius, Christ’s suffering and death is the suffering 
and death of the archetypal human being.  It therefore has profound implications for 




Eustathius connects Christ’s death strongly with sin.
706
  This understanding 
has various strands which overlap, but nonetheless require separate identification. 
Firstly, Christ’s death is an expiating sacrifice that purifies and heals sinners; 
secondly, it is a ransom; thirdly, it is a propitiating sacrifice, bringing about 
forgiveness.  Eustathius refers to these ideas together and seems to regard them as 
different aspects of the same thing.  However, the precise mechanism of this 
sacrifice, and the way in which ransom, forgiveness and purification are connected, 
is complex.  Sometimes Christ’s blood is a ransom to the devil, sometimes it is a 
sacrifice of purification.  Occasionally, it is a sacrifice of propitiation.  The radical 
difference between these ideas has been noted and variously explained before.  A 
few points are particularly pertinent to my investigation: a sacrifice of propitiation 
changes the person’s status before God whilst a ransom to the devil changes his or 
her circumstances.  A sacrifice of purification changes a person’s existential 
condition. 
 
The propitiating model adds something to Eustathius’ soteriology that 
otherwise scarcely features.  Not only is humanity to blame for its situation, but it is 
the status afforded by this blame that is the problem. The purifying and ransom 
models meet within the concept that the devil’s dominion warps human nature, and 
that therefore its destruction brings healing. 
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A particular passage in the epitome of Ariomanitas contains all these ideas, 
and gives a good sense of their interrelation in Eustathius’ thought.  In this passage, 
Eustathius rhetorically addresses the penitent thief: 
 
And if, when you arrived at the vineyard late, the fruit of your 
lips, though the very last, supplied a ransom [λύσιν] from evil for 
you, by declaring a confession loved by God, the recompense 
[ἀμοιβὴ] of Christ’s words became an eternal healing for you.  
And forgiveness, as if from a vessel for holy water, gushes out 
like a spring from the God-bearing body and purifies you.  And 
the precious blood that has been cleansingly secreted from the tree 
of life marks you with a seal.  And perhaps also the pouring out of 
the blood which had hastened from the dead limbs became a vital 
ransom [λύτρον] for you.  For when you confessed Christ king, 
you carried before you the streams of blood falling in drops 




This passage suggests that Christ’s blood is a ransom from evil, has purifying results, 
and propitiates God.  Whatever Christ’s blood is doing, the thief’s repentance and 
Christ’s consequent decision to save him are necessary to its efficacy.  Hence, 
Christ’s blood “became a vital ransom” for the thief, but it is the thief’s own penitent 
words that provided a “ransom…from evil.” The thief is purified, partly by Christ’s 
blood, but partly by Christ’s words.  Forgiveness gushes from Christ’s body and 
purifies him.  Eustathius scarcely distinguishes between them; in the text we have at 
least, they are presented as complementary aspects of the same thing.  The sense that 
these ideas are closely connected probably partly derives from the fact that we have a 
condensed version of the text.  Nonetheless, it is plausible that these ideas did sit 
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together in Eustathius’ original writing, especially as the lack of detailed mechanical 




Eustathius frequently describes Christ’s death as purifying.  In the quoted 
passage, this is associated particularly with Christ’s blood.  The western-sounding 
emphasis on Christ’s blood as purifying recurs in Ariomanitas, again specifically 
with a περιραντηρίων– “a vessel for sprinkling holy water.”
709
  In this association of 
Christ’s death with ritual worship, it is evident that Christ’s death has liturgical 
connotations for Eustathius.  His discourse on Christ’s death has a stronger 
devotional element than much of his soteriology.  So, in one discussion, he refers 
both to “the pure washing” and “Christ having been hung on the cross [who] gives to 
us the exact representation of his body”, clearly thinking of the Eucharist.
710
  
Repeatedly, Eustathius suggests that Christ’s death objectively changes the essential 
state of the one to whom it is applied.  There is a strong sense that Christ’s death is a 
purifying sacrifice. 
 
Where the thief is forgiven, a sacrifice of propitiation to God is implied.  In 
the above quoted passage, propitiation has evidently occurred in that the relationship 
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between God and the thief is changed; the thief’s confession procures forgiveness for 
him from Christ.  In the first instance, this is in the form of Christ’s reply, but it is 
immediately connected back to Christ’s blood, which suggests that the forgiveness is 
a direct consequence of Christ’s sacrifice, rather than a consequence of an essential 
or circumstantial change achieved by the sacrifice. 
 
The efficacy of Christ’s blood evidently involves a transaction of some sort 
with God.  Correspondingly, the thief’s change of status is key to the allusion to the 
vineyard, which is central to the entire passage.  Eustathius here connects the ransom 
of Christ’s blood to a payment which is made or otherwise on the basis of God’s 
decision, rather than on the basis of the recipient’s actions or circumstances.  
Admittedly, it is in a sense a payment for the person’s actions; the labourer had to 
appear in the vineyard in the same way that the thief had to repent.  Repentance, 
apparently, is necessary to the ransom, as to the forgiveness and purification.  
Salvation is not purely an act of God upon humanity or even of Christ, the human 
being, upon another human being.
711
  However, repentance is necessary because it 
alters one’s status in God’s eyes.  Repentance also has a causal effect upon one’s 
circumstance or essential state, in that it causes God to forgive, to offer a ransom, 
and to purify, but this causal effect is indirect.  The primary effect is to change God’s 
attitude to the thief.
712
  
                                                                                                                                          
on the faithful, as well as its negative effects on the serpent.  See discussion on “Eschatological 
judgement” in chapter 7. 
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 I discuss human agency and divine agency in salvation in chapter 6. 
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 It is unclear whether this response to Christ’s sacrifice is voluntary on God’s part, or whether he is 




   
The concept of propitiation jars with Eustathius’ recurring references to 
Christ as a “ransom.”  We may be tempted to conclude that Eustathius holds 
something akin to Aulén’s “Classic theory of Atonement”: Christ’s death is both a 
ransom to the devil and a propitiating sacrifice to God.
713
  However, the concept of 
propitiation does not address what Eustathius generally considers the lapsarian 
condition to involve.  God’s wrath does not feature prominently in any strand of 
Eustathius’ soteriology.  Even where he refers to the temptation of Eve, this is in the 
context of humanity’s struggle with the devil, rather than human guilt.
714
  Humanity 
is guilty, and must be forgiven, but it is the fact of their sinfulness per se, and not of 
their guilt before God, that Eustathius sees as the root cause of the problem.  
Eustathius uses both a ransom and a propitiation model to explain Christ’s sacrifice, 
but the pairing of the two in reference to Christ’s death is not reflected in other areas 
of his soteriology. 
 
Eustathius’ references to forgiveness are perhaps driven by devotional 
tradition more than they are by theological systematisation.  Nonetheless, we should 
not assume that Eustathius jettisoned the theological reflection at this point.  
Forgiveness does, apparently, cause purification: “the recompense of Christ’s words” 
– Christ’s forgiving words – “became a healing…”  Similarly, forgiveness is said to 
purify the thief.  Mechanistically, forgiveness is a result of Christ’s sacrifice, but it is 
part of a causal chain within which its purpose is to transform its recipient.  This 
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coheres to some extent with Eustathius’ idea that a person is transformed by the 
Spirit, in that a disjunction between the person and God would prevent this 
transformation.  Eustathius’ references to forgiveness best cohere with his wider 
soteriology if they are considered as pointing a subsidiary aspect of the problem of 
sin, and not as denoting a doctrine of propitiation per se. 
 
The idea of Christ’s sacrifice as a ransom to the devil most coheres with 
Eustathius’ political narrative of soteriology because it explains how Christ’s death 
freed humankind from bondage to the devil.   
 
Eustathius has some sense that Christ’s blood buys humankind from the 
devil.  As noted, he refers to the souls in Hades as “prisoners of war.”  In light of 
this, his ransom metaphor looks like an allusion to buying back captured warriors.  
However, as also noted, Eustathius makes several references to legal transaction that 
suggest that humanity’s captivity is just: he refers to the “those sold to the penalty of 
the curse” and “the souls’ penalties.”
715
  In either case, the mechanism of Christ’s 
sacrifice is the same, in that it pays the devil for humankind.  In either case, also, the 
devil is guilty, as it is by succumbing to his temptation that humanity surrendered 
itself to the devil.  The difference between these two understandings of ransom is 
therefore ultimately one of human moral responsibility. 
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In going through death, Christ defeats death.  In dying, Christ partakes of and 
thereby renews an aspect of human experience; he must come through death in order 
to overcome it.  In this regard, he is changing the essential state of the human race.  
Lapsarian humanity is mortal, and he renders it immortal.  Christ’s death transforms 
human nature here, in a rather different way to that implied in the sacrifice of 
purification.  The problem it is solving is not so much sin as mortality.  
Correspondingly, Eustathius, drawing on Paul, claims that Christ is the “first-fruits of 
the resurrection of the dead.”
716
  It is necessarily Christ’s humanity that fulfils this 
role.  This is evident from Eustathius’ analysis of Christ leading the penitent thief to 
paradise.  Here, as noted, he argues that Christ must have had a soul to lead the thief 
to paradise.  His argument for Christ’s human soul in this instance is different from 
usual.  Most typically, Eustathius argues that, if Christ does not have a human soul, 
God Incarnate must be the agent of a given action.  He then portrays this as variously 
absurd, impossible or soteriologically redundant.  In this instance, however, the 
alternative agent is the penitent thief. 
 
Eustathius applies the term “first fruits of the resurrection of the dead” to 
Christ’s ascent to paradise.  He then argues that, if Christ’s soul did not go to 
paradise, it was not Christ, but the penitent thief, who was “the first fruits of the 
resurrection.”  The presence of Christ’s divinity on the journey to paradise is 
irrelevant with reference to this quote because it is axiomatic to Eustathius that these 
verses apply to a human being.  Christ’s death is therefore a lynch pin in his narrative 
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of Christ reliving and therefore renewing human experience.  His death therefore has 
value in that it is part of his taking on humanity.   
 
In dying, Christ recapitulates an aspect of human experience.  This is 
efficacious for salvation because, unlike Adam, Christ is not held by death.
717
  It is in 
this vein of thought that Christ’s soul is a “ransom” for the other souls.  It is 
significant that it is specifically Christ’s soul here that is a ransom for the other souls 
because it indicates a clear parallel between Christ’s experience and normative 
human experience.  This is connected to the fact that it is specifically his soul that 
has entered Hades, the place of the dead.  Christ’s soul enters the place of the dead, 
as a ransom, but it does not remain there.  Instead, it storms the gates.  Christ, here, is 
a ransom that cannot be held.  It is unclear whether it is death or the devil that has 
wrongly taken Christ, and must therefore surrender humankind.  Death and the 
devil’s bondage are closely connected for Eustathius, so Christ defeats both 




We can elucidate how these different ideas of ransom are connected by 
returning to Eustathius’ expansive comments on Romans 5:15:  The devil tempted 
Eve to sin.  Adam and Eve sinned and, consequently, became mortal.  Death is 
therefore part of the way in which the devil has dominion over ἄνθρωπος.  There is a 
sense that it is by overcoming death that Christ defeats the devil, which parallels the 
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idea that he overcame the devil by obedience, in place of Adam’s sin.  Christ defeats 
the devil by negating the effects of his dominion. 
 
This understanding of the destruction of sin does not cohere mechanically 
with the conception of Christ’s death as an expiating sacrifice: where Christ’s blood 
is said to purify the sinner, purification is an immediate consequence whereas it is an 
indirect consequence if it comes about by defeat of the devil.  A propitiating sacrifice 
to God is still more irreconcilable.  However, in the connection between the devil, 
human sin and death, there is a clear sense of the emotive connection between the 




Eustathius also writes about the suffering of martyrs and other persecuted 
Christians, which he relates to Christ’s suffering.
719
  Drawing on these discourses, 
this section will consider how Eustathius regards suffering, with particular reference 
to its place in the lapse.  In Eustathius’ thought, suffering is an intrinsic part of 
lapsarian nature whereas there is a sense in which sin remains contingent.  However, 
suffering also has positive aspects that sin lacks.  Whilst it is an aspect of lapsarian 
nature, and therefore intrinsically negative, it is often also a trial or contest for which 
one will be eschatologically rewarded.  Eustathius sometimes suggests, more 
specifically, that it also provides a chance for improvement.  Suffering therefore has 
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a teleological role similar to that of temptation.  Hence, the endurance of suffering is 
equivalent to the negation of sin. 
 
Christ’s humanity, like the rest of humanity, is weak and susceptible to 
suffering.  This is a primary reason for Eustathius’ clear articulation of Christ’s full 
humanity: something in Christ must have suffered, and this can’t have been God.   In 
respect to suffering, then, Christ is unremarkable.  Suffering is a mark of humanness 
in the lapsarian world order.  By contrast, Christ is morally perfect.  Whilst suffering 
and sin are both aspects of the lapsarian condition, they relate to the fact of this 
condition differently.  This difference manifests itself in a saviour who is weak, and 
suffers, but does not sin.  It also corresponds to Eustathius’ wider concept of 
humankind.  Although, humankind apparently retains some ability to make moral 
choices, it has lost the strength and incorruptibility that it had before the lapse, and 
will have yet more with the resurrection.  Suffering is therefore part of the human 
condition.  It is contingent upon the lapse, but is out with human control, whereas sin 




There is little indication that Eustathius consciously connects this now-
limited human freedom with Christ’s moral perfection.  However, it is noteworthy 
that his sense that humanity retains some freedom, and that its lack of freedom 
resides primarily in weakness, gives coherence to his understanding of Christ’s full 
humanity. 
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Eustathius does, however, have ample room for temptation in his thought.  
Susceptibility to sin is an intrinsic part of lapsarian nature.  The fundamental 
difference between suffering and sin is therefore that one is subjected to suffering, 
but one practices sin.  It is for this reason that suffering is unique to the lapsarian 
condition. 
 
Although it is an aspect of lapsarian nature, suffering is not unambiguously 
negative in Eustathius’ thought.  Firstly, it can act as an aid to moral improvement.  
Secondly, mental anguish is most often depicted as an appropriate response to 
lapsarian reality, and to one’s experiences within it. 
 
Eustathius sometimes depicts suffering, particularly suffering in martyrdom, 
as a trial: “For the judge would not have displayed the victory wreaths, unless rough 
struggles were present.”
721
 Specifically, here, suffering is an organised trial, a 
wrestling match, of which God is the judge.  In this respect, Eustathius draws on a 
very common theme in Greco-Roman thought, which had readily been adopted by 
Christianity.  For example, he echoes the suggestion, found in both Irenaeus and 
Origen that the world is “a gymnasium” designed by God for human improvement.
722
  
He may also be drawing on ideas in medical practice, in which painful procedures 
were thought, ultimately, to cure.  This take on suffering does not necessarily imply 
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that suffering is a good or a neutral thing per se, and this does not seem to be 
Eustathius’ conception of it.  Martyrdom is discussed in the same passage with 
reference to overthrow of the devil; the martyrs are warriors, as is Christ, and they 
follow Christ in his fight against the devil.  In one sense, the current situation is seen 
in terms of the power of the devil – suffering sits in the same ambiguous regard to 
God’s will as the rest of human and cosmic lapsarian nature.  As the rest of this 
lapsarian nature, suffering is, in itself, intrinsically bad. 
 
Eustathius’ descriptions of suffering should be read in light of the fact that he 
lived through and may also have suffered in the persecution of the early 300s.
723
  
Sentiments that might strike a modern reader as trite platitudes on suffering are in 




Eustathius’ ideas on the ‘right way’ to react to suffering vary.  Describing the 
suffering of the penitent thief on the cross, he does not say that it is a good thing, but 
that the thief’s pain is outweighed by his joy: “He is unmindful of death and wounds 
and suffering” because “he has escaped tyrannical hostility.”
725
  Eustathius’ 
description of suffering in these terms may, justifiably, dismay both those who 
regard Christianity’s frequent focus on suffering as masochistic, and those who urge 
a focus on the uniquely liberating capacity of a suffering God.
726
  However, this is 
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 This does not, of course, answer the question of whether they are helpful ways of understanding 
these experiences.  Eustathius’ detailed references to medicine might suggest that he also has in mind 
painful medical procedures designed to cure. 
725
 D27:51-52 and D27:64-65 respectively. Emphasis mine. 
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 E.g. Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (London, SCM, 1974). 
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not a glorification of suffering.  Rather, the intrinsic evil of the suffering is implied in 
the juxtaposition with a greater good.   
 
This description of the penitent thief as “unmindful of death and wounds and 
suffering” in some ways depicts him as attaining moral virtue in Stoic terms.  For 
example, it echoes Stoicising tendencies in Origen’s treatment of Christ’s death, 
which we came across in chapter 3.
727
  So, the thief does suffer, but he does not feel 
grief about this, because he has a correct understanding of reality.  The kind of grief 
that the thief avoids is exactly the kind of grief from which Origen wishes to protect 
Christ.  As I argued in chapter 3, this is in sharp contrast to Eustathius’ picture of 
Christ, in which Eustathius is at pains to stress the reality of Christ’s grief.  
Eustathius’ dominant picture of grief is as a natural part of human experience, a 
proper response to a distressing situation.  The comparison is, however, imperfect; 
the thief is happy because his situation has been materially improved – Christ’s has 
been materially worsened.  Furthermore, the thief merely seems to think that his 
sufferings are outweighed by his blessings, not that they are not the worthy object of 
lament per se.   Eustathius does echo Stoic ethics here, but there are divergences 
from Stoicism, even in this case, which cohere with his more frequent idea that 
mental anguish is appropriate in the lapsarian order. 
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In Eustathius’ analysis of Christ’s grief, we see another sense in which 
suffering can be good – suffering is an appropriate reaction to evil, and to pain.  The 
tragedy of the lapsed order is not best dealt with by disengagement. 
 
Eustathius regards susceptibility to suffering as an unavoidable aspect of the 
lapsarian condition, apiece with mortality.  However, within this understanding, he 
suggests that suffering is often a test and an aid to moral improvement and he thus 
paints a picture of God working within the parameters of the lapsarian order to bring 
about his purpose.  In one sense, this gives the current life a great deal of importance.  
However, it does threaten to exchange intrinsic value for teleological value.  
Although he does sometimes draw on Stoic ethical theory to suggest that one ought 
to be as unaffected by suffering as possible, he more often sees mental suffering as 
the appropriate response to adversity.  This shares with his anthropological ontology 
an unwillingness to abstract his understanding of human beings from their current 
context; we must engage with our experiences in this life, not seek to ignore them. 
 
Human suffering and divine impassibility 
In Eustathius’ anti-Arian writings, “the human being of Christ” suffers in 
sharp contradistinction to the Word.  This idea is woven into the fabric of Eustathius’ 
attack on logos-sarx Christology.
728
  It forms part of the ontological gulf between 
humanity and God.  The paucity of evidence renders it impossible to reach a firm 
conclusion as to whether Eustathius had always held so strongly to divine 
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impassibility.  This section argues that what evidence there is suggests that he did 
not. 
 
It is tempting to assume that divine impassibility is a non-negotiable principle 
(perhaps one among many) from which other aspects of Eustathius’ later Christology 
developed.
729
  A close examination of the way in which Eustathius’ thought 
developed casts doubt on this assumption.  He earlier did believe that God suffered in 
the crucifixion, vindicating the more nuanced picture of patristic attitudes to divine 




By the 320s, Eustathius has a picture to which four convictions are mutually 
determining.  1) God is one. 2) The Word, who became incarnate in Christ, is God. 
3) God is impassible. 4) Christ suffers.  The second of these propositions was the 
point of dispute in the early part of the ‘Arian’ controversy.  These are all clearly and 
repeatedly articulated in Eustathius’ anti-subordinationist works and there is no 
reason to doubt his genuineness in asserting them.
731
  Nonetheless, in order to 
understand the emphases in his theological structure, it is necessary to deduce how 
far and in what ways each of these concerns was prior to the particular theological 
challenge that gave rise to this later theological structure. 
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 Following a widespread interpretation of the ‘Arian’ controversy.  “The Arian controversy did not 
involve any clash of opinions as to the divine nature, insofar as both sides affirmed it to be free from 
all change and passion.” Mozley, The impassibility of God (Cambridge, CUP, 1926), p.74. 
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 Gravilyuk, Suffering.  In Tota ecclesia, Eustathius claims that God the Word was “nailed to a cross 




In his anti-subordinationist tracts, Eustathius is writing (as he sees it) in 
defence of Christ’s divinity (and, correspondingly, God’s unity).  Further, an 
examination of Eustathius’ earlier works suggests that his conception of the Godhead 
was always highly unified.  This is evident in precisely the unified Christology he 
later jettisoned: in Engastrimytho, Eustathius often refers to Christ as ‘God’, 
whereas, with a less unified conception of the Godhead, he might have referred to 




Christ’s suffering is not mentioned as frequently in the (much sparser) pre-
controversy sources as in the anti-subordinationist works, but the fragmentary nature 
of the sources means that this doesn’t tell us much about its importance to Eustathius 
in his earlier life.  Where Christ’s death is mentioned in early works, it carries an 
entirely unremarkable, emotive tone which is also found in his later works.  
Significantly, however, in an early work, Eustathius suggests that the Word of God 
undergoes suffering: he is “killed” so he presumably dies.
733
  It is this that later 
changes. 
 
It is difficult to determine how Eustathius’ early sense that the Word suffered 
during the incarnation related to his evident conviction that the soul suffers in itself 
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 Grillmeier, whilst clearly delineating between Eustathius’ earlier and later Christology, downplays 
Eustathius’s later proto-Nestorianism on the basis that it is an anti-subordinationist tactic.  See his 
Christ in the Christian Tradition, pp.243-9, and my discussion in the introduction. 
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 C.f. Engastrimytho 10.16. 
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and, therefore, that whatever acted qua soul in Christ would have to likewise suffer in 
itself.  This rather suggests that a concept of the Word as passible in itself underlies 
his Christology in Oratio coram tota ecclesia which would, indeed, be surprising.  
Perhaps, Eustathius had picked up a devotional mode of referring to the suffering of 
Christ, such as that found in the Homilies on the Psalms and used it unthinkingly 
until the ‘Arian’ controversy forced him to become reflective on the subject.
734
  
However, a more plausible explanation may be found in the Origenist, mediatory 
role of Christ’s soul.  Perhaps the Word suffered, in this earlier theology, not through 
the body, but through the soul? This would be another example of his taking an 
important Origenist concept and placing it in a divergent framework, where its 
consequences are strikingly different. 
 
Christ as typical and archetypal ἄνθρωπος 
A concept of Christ as typical and archetypal ἄνθρωπος pervades Eustathius’ 
otherwise diverse soteriology, and it is related to a connection between Adam and 
Christ.  I have already demonstrated that Eustathius makes this connection in 
reference to God’s image.  I have also noted Eustathius’ extremely strong emphasis 
on Christ’s full humanity.  This section seeks to demonstrate that the concept of 
Christ as the perfect human being is inextricable from a concept of Christ as a typical 
human being, and offers a synthesis of Eustathius’ soteriological ideas. 
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Because this section addresses a synthesising paradigm in Eustathius’ 
soteriology, it necessarily revisits ground that has been covered already.  It would be 
superfluous to cover it again in equal detail, so this section takes the form of a brief 
survey, highlighting the many ways in which the theme of Christ’s humanity is 
fundamental to Eustathius’ soteriology. 
  
Eustathius writes of Christ as ὁλόκληρον ἄνθρωπον – perfect, or complete, 
human being.
735
  The idea of Christ as typical and archetypal ἄνθρωπος is necessary 
both to the Eustathius’ conception of the transformation of human nature and to his 
conception of Christ defeating the devil.  As argued in chapter 4, Christ is perfect 
humanity in that he is what we will all become.  Eschatologically, people are 
conformed to Christ.  He is, as in Irenaeus, more Adam than Adam.  He presumably 
only completed the process of perfecting Adam once he had risen, as 1 Corinthians 




It is fundamental to Eustathius’ ‘political’ narrative that Christ vanquishes 
humanity’s ancient foe.  This concept forms part of a much richer tapestry in which 
humankind, its experiences and potential, are summed up and fulfilled in Christ.  I 
have argued that Christ achieves victory in each realm, Hades and paradise through 
the soul, and achieves victory over death through his body, which dies.  Here, I 
expand on the implications of this a little; salvation must extend to every sphere in 
which humans operate.  Christ must go through all of Adam’s experiences and ‘redo’ 
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Adam in each place.  The implication is that the effects of the lapse extend to every 
sphere of human existence.   
 
Christ must go through death because he must go through the things which he 
is trying to negate; ergo he must “partake of the grave.”
737
  However, he must also 
overthrow it.  Everything that went wrong in Adam goes right in Christ.  He lives as 
a human being but does not sin; he dies but is resurrected; he fights the devil, but 
wins whilst Adam and Eve lost.  His perfection is a manifestation and proof of his 
success.  However, it is also presumably the cause of his success, as it renders his 
sacrifice efficacious.  This is evident from Eustathius’ decision to quote Romans 
5.15, and the juxtaposition of sin and obedience therein.  In each instance, Christ’s 
actions are an inverse parallel of Adam’s actions.  In order for them to be efficacious, 
the circumstances in which they occur must be the same, authentically human 
circumstances. 
 
Christ must also have the same, authentically human condition: it is only by 
entering into the lapsarian condition that he may negate it.  Correspondingly, before 
dying, Christ suffered from the effects of the lapse in his essential state;
738
 Christ is 
mortal.  Eustathius quotes Romans 5.15 because he believes that the substantive 
point of distinction is that where Adam, and all the rest of humankind, transgressed, 
Christ was obedient.  Through refusing to replicate the sin that saw humankind sold 
                                                                                                                                          
736
 See discussion on existential soteriology above, and D44. 
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to the devil, Christ freed humankind from the devil.  This is a key point at which 
Eustathius ‘political’ and ‘essential’ narratives intersect: sin has an ongoing causal 
effect on human circumstance, rendering humankind perpetually captive to the devil. 
 
By being archetypal humanity Christ recapitulates human experience.  This 
concept is fundamental across Eustathius’ soteriology.  In defeating the devil, he 
wins a rematch of the fight that Adam and Eve lost.  Where the first human being 
failed, Christ succeeds.  Christ must be fully human in order to represent the human 
race in this rematch.  This contributes to Eustathius’ insistence on the fullness of 
Christ’s humanity.
739
  In being what we will all become, Christ is the first fruits of 
the New Creation.  As such, he leads the way to the places to which the rest of the 
human race will follow him – out of Hades, where human souls are prisoners of the 
devil, into paradise.  It is similarly because he is a perfect human being that his 
ransom to the devil, or to death, is efficacious.  Correspondingly he was “a ransom 
for the souls of the same kind (τὰς ὁμογενεῖς…ψυχάς).”
740
  It is because he is human 
that death takes him with the human souls of the dead, but because he is obedient that 
it cannot hold him, and he ascends to paradise and rises from the dead, fulfilling 
human potential.  Obedience, as we have seen, is a stage in the process of becoming 
πνευματικός, and Christ’s obedience is directly contrasted with Adam’s 
transgression.  Christ is without sin, but he must go through human life and death as 
a mortal and corruptible human being in order to destroy the death and corruption 
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 Friedrich Zoepfl and Sara Parvis have correspondingly both argued for the soteriological 
importance of Christ’s humanity for Eustathius.  Cf. Zoepfl “Die trinitarischen und christologischen 
Anschuuangen”, p. 201; Parvis, Marcellus, p.59. 
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that the devil has sown.  Christ re-forms every aspect of human experience and 
emerges as the first πνευματικός human being.  In doing so, he creates a path in 
which we, like the penitent thief, can follow. 
 
In Eustathius’ conception of the lapse, there is a strong sense of an original 
humanity, and its original encounter with the devil, that must be reworked.  Eve 
sometimes appears to be a more natural focal point for the original that must be 
reworked than Adam.  Eustathius’ references to the lapse are scattered across his 
writings and there is no extant discussion devoted to it.  Eustathius’ concept of Christ 
as ‘new ἄνθρωπος’ is heavily indebted to Paul and, where it is most explicit, it is 
expressed in direct quotation of Paul, so it is Adam with whom Christ is directly 
paralleled.  However, Eustathius refers to the devil as the “sower of evil in the human 
race” but singles out Eve, rather than Adam, as the one in whom this evil was sown:  
 
[I]f, because they are set alight by the spirit of the devil, the false 
prophets, speaking evil, charge Christ with evil, clearly the blood-
thirsty one roused the murderous thief at that time, just as the one 
masked as the serpent slinked up to Eve, in order that, shooting 




In order to appreciate the significance of this passage for Eustathius’ understanding 
of Eve, it is necessary to appreciate that he presents the devil’s temptation of Eve as 
the archetype of the devil’s current relationship to humanity.  Eustathius is focusing 
on a specific case of the devil tempting an individual – the (soon to be) penitent thief.  
He wants to explain how the thief came from blaspheming Christ to repentance, and 
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he invokes the direct interference of the devil.  This is not a remarkable thing, 
Eustathius feels.  Rather, this is how the devil has operated since he first ‘shot 
poisonous words’ at Eve, and thereby ‘sowed death in the human race.’
742
  Eve is not 
a vehicle for the sin of Adam, nor is her sin ancillary; she is compared to the penitent 
thief being tormented by the devil as he hangs on the cross, and is therefore the first 
participant in ἄνθρωπος’ long struggle against the devil.   
 
Both where he singles out Adam and where he singles out Eve, Eustathius’ 
narrative is shaped by the biblical texts with which he is working.  It is Adam whom 
Eustathius describes as the exact inverse of Christ, transgressing where Christ was 
obedient, ψυχικός where Christ was πνευματικός, because he is quoting Romans.  
Similarly, his choice of Eve as the archetypal failed warrior against the devil is 
presumably partly determined by the fact that she is the one directly in contact with 
the devil in Genesis 3.  There is insufficient evidence to ascertain exactly how Adam 
and Eve relate to each other in the context of archetypal human sin.   
 
Eustathius’ use of Eve as the archetype that Christ must fulfil suggests that 
his conception of the human condition is not exclusively androcentric.  This is part of 
a wider tendency to focus on Christ’s connection to the whole of humanity over his 
connection to either Adam or Eve.  When describing Christ’s full humanity, 
Eustathius almost always uses the term ἄνθρωπος.  This is, in itself, completely 
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of the devil above. 
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unremarkable and does not appear to tell us very much about either Eustathius’ 
attitude to the role of either gender or, specifically, Adam in Christ’s full humanity.  
It is, nonetheless, significant that this seems to be as an alternative to reference to 
Adam more than it is a part of it: except when he is quoting Paul, Eustathius does not 
refer to Adam, specifically, to describe Christ’s full humanity.  Eustathius does 
understand the lapse as an historical event, and the way in which Christ fulfils human 
potential by negating the lapse strongly echoes an Irenaean tradition that focused on 
Christ as New Adam.  However, Eustathius seems to emphasise Christ’s common 
humanity above his relationship to the historical person of Adam and the historical 




Eustathius believes that Christ’s fulfilment of human potential is completed 
in the eschaton, when he reigns eternally.  When Christ receives authority, it is 
“restored” (reponenda sunt) to him.
744
  By receiving it, he regains an attribute of 
Adam (and Eve?).  There is a corresponding emphasis on Christ’s full humanity: it is 
emphatically “the human being of Christ” who reigns. 
 
Eustathius’ various soteriological ideas meet in the concept of Christ being 
typically human, but doing it right, and therefore both restoring and fulfilling 
                                                 
743
 Eustathius does, unremarkably, describe Christ’s humanity with specifically masculine adjectives 
(with which we must, admittedly, be careful because they are in the Ariomanitas epitome). The Son 
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with other human frames, not above normal in measure, not wanting in width, not leading in number 
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humanity.  He goes through human life in the lapsarian world order, but does not 
succumb to sin, and therefore negates the effects of the lapse. 
 
Conclusion 
Eustathius’ soteriology focuses simultaneously on human plight and human 
sin, both of which have both circumstantial and ontological dimensions.  Humanity is 
both enslaved to the devil, and warped by sin.  Eustathius’ picture of the devil’s 
power is shaped by his view of power in the Roman Empire, and he occasionally 
points to scenarios in which the two kinds of power are connected.  This does not 
suggest a deliberate connection between the devil and any particular earthly 
institution, but it does suggest a sense that the mechanisms and problems 
encountered in our current life contribute to constraining and enslaving us. 
 
In achieving salvation, human beings are both freed from slavery to the devil 
and essentially transformed.  This transformation both renders them immortal, and 
removes the predisposition to sin that is inherited from Adam and Eve. 
 
Eustathius vests a great deal of soteriological significance in Christ’s death.  
In part, it is necessary to his defeat of the devil, both as a ransom and as an act of 
cosmic war.  In part, it is a sacrifice that cleanses us from sin.  Eustathius uses a host 




The idea of Christ as the archetype for human perfection runs through 
Eustathius’ soteriology.  Christ is what we will all become.  This, in turn, underlines 










































Chapter 6: Human Free will 
This chapter examines Eustathius’ view of human free will.
745
  It argues that 
Eustathius thinks of moral freedom – ἐλευθερία – as the ability to determine the right 
course of action and that he also has a concept of the power self-direction - τὸ 
αὐτεξοὑσιον.  These two concepts are connected insofar as action that is performed 
ἐλευθέρωϛ is also performed αὐτεξοὑσίως – self-direction is a prerequisite for 
freedom.
746
  Adam and Eve originally possessed τὸ αὐτεξοὑσιον and a large measure 
of ἐλευθερία, though not as much as humankind will possess eschatologically.  





Because ἐλευθερία was not entirely lost with the lapse, lapsarian humanity’s 
τὸ αὐτεξοὑσιον entails liberty of indifference.  Lapsarian people can attain some 
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 There is a considerable body of literature discussing the concepts of freedom and the will in ancient 
thought.  This literature is complicated, and partly driven, by disagreements about what is meant by 
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in Philo, Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis, 114.  C.f. Parvis, Paul and Minns, Denis, Justin, philosopher and 
martyr, Apologies (Oxford, OUP, 2009), p.241 n.6. 
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 It is noteworthy that, in some patristic discouse, ἐλευθερία and τὸ αὐτεξοὑσιον are related 
concepts – Justin can refer to ἐλεύθερος προαίρεσις as something like a liberty of indifference, 
echoing his use of τὸ αὐτεξοὑσιον as in, Dialogus cum Tryphone (CPG, 1076), 88.5, where he claims 
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we are able to elect to do good or evil. Origen, Fragmenta in evagelium Joannis (CPG, 1453), 43.7, 
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seems to mean lack of constraint, though the fact that the choice is unconstrained does not mean that 
the person is. Eustathius never uses the adjective ἐλεύθερος in a description of the liberty of 
indifference in the extant text. 
314 
 
measure of ἐλευθερία through the right exercise of this liberty.  Importantly, liberty 
of indifference could not exist if ἐλευθερία – true liberty – were entirely lost, because 
there would not be morally various options.  Being partially in bondage, as humanity 
is, means that self-direction operates as a liberty of indifference.  The liberty of 
indifference is therefore true liberty in a state of becoming.  Ability to make the right 
decsion in lapsarian people is very limited unless they are strengthened by the Spirit; 
the Spirit enables one to progress towards true liberty. However, the lapsarian person 
is sufficiently ἐλευθέροϛ to decide to accept the Spirit’s help.  Eschatologically, 
humanity will achieve total ἐλευθερία. 
 
Eustathian terminology 
There is little evidence that Eustathius showed much concern for technical 
philosophical discourse surrounding freedom and will.  This chapter shall therefore 
focus primarily on his construction of particular human experiences, as they relate to 
freedom, or its lack, in reference to decision making.  However, it will be helpful to 
establish what terminology relating to freedom, voluntary action and decision 
making, are evidenced in Eustathius, in order to establish what concepts might 
underlie his construction of particular human experiences. 
Voluntary action, self-direction and freedom 
According to Eustathius, Adam possessed moral agency prior to the lapse: 
upon receiving a soul, Adam διοικεῖ - roughly, he manages or is in control.  It is 
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 Eustathius sometimes describes the devil’s bondage as if it acts on the person as an external 
constraint, which gives the impression that the human power of self-direction was also impaired with 
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unclear whether Eustathius wishes to convey here specifically moral control, which 
the word sometimes denotes.  If so, this is generally over another subject, rather than 
oneself.
748
  At any rate he evidently does mean to attribute decision-making power to 
Adam. The connotations of control that the word διοικεῖ carries suggest that this is 
not a constrained power of decision-making, but is self-directed.  This idea seems to 
correspond to what is described in other Greek patristic authors as τὸ αὐτεξοὑσιον;
749
 
although we have no clear evidence of Eustathius using this term, the fragmented 
nature of the corpus renders this inconclusive and we may infer that his reference to 
διοικεῖ involves this very common concept.   
 
Eustathius also uses the related ἑκουσίως.  So, in Ariomanitas, he writes 
accusing the pro-Arians of suggesting that Christ did not “give up his own body 
ἑκουσίως.
750
  In a Latin fragment from Arianos, he writes that the human being of 
Christ “censuit sponte to sustain the passion of death” and it seems likely that 
ἑκουσίως underlies sponte.
751
  Similarly, he writes that the devil “shunned light” 
ἑκουσίως.
752
  He refers to action under compulsion by saying that Paul was forced to 
write about being taken into heaven ἄκοντά.
753
  In these instances, ἑκουσίως is 
presumably meant in the common sense of ‘purposefully and without external 
compulsion’.  It is unclear exactly how this relates to the self-direction that 
Eustathius attributes to Adam.  As the instances of ἑκουσίως appear in the epitome, it 
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could be that Eustathius’ term was αὐτεξοὑσίως, so I shall not endeavour to 
distinguish between the two, though we must be aware that Eustathius might have 
made some kind of distinction.
754
  The instances referring to disembodied souls, 
post-mortem, and the prelapsarian will of the devil could not in themselves tell us 
whether and how far Eustathius regards human decisions on earth in the current 
world order to be made ἑκουσίως.  However, the claim that Paul acted ἀκόντως 
implies the possibility of acting ἑκουσίως.  When I refer to ‘opting’ here, I mean to 




According, Christ brings people ἐλευθερία:  
…the loosening locks having been suddenly prised up, the 
gates being broken asunder, and by a royal gift [lacuna] 
contributing the release, and reaping the freedom [ἐλευθερία] 
by an amnesty, all the body guards of the arch-plunderer 




It is evident that Adam and Eve also possessed at least some measure of ἐλευθερία, 
because people have ἐλευθερία specifically when the locks of Hades are broken; they 
lacked ἐλευθερία because they were in bondage to the devil.   
 
Decision-making and motivation 
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In Ariomanitas, Eustathius writes of the Son “having determined [βουληθείς] 
to punish the devil…” and then goes on to describe him taking up a human being in 
order to do so.
757
  There is a sense of both deliberation and decision to act (though 




Eustathius refers to προαίρεσις in Engastrimytho.  Origen argues that, 
although Christ’s soul was in Hades, it was not like the other human souls, because it 
was above with respect to προαίρεσις.  Eustathius responds that everyone, even the 
devil, is above with respect to προαίρεσις.  He has read (or pretended to read) Origen 
as saying that Christ’s soul was different from the other souls in Hades because 
Christ didn’t want to be there.  His response is that everyone wants to be 
elsewhere.
759
  Eustathius clearly understands προαίρεσις to entail a preference, but 
does not give us much of an idea as to whether he regards this preference as free.
760
  
It should be noted that it is not clear that this is Eustathius’ only sense of προαίρεσις 
                                                                                                                                          
opting for one over another.  In the absence of any verb for “choice” in Eustathius’ writings, I avoid 




 D22:12 [Ariomanitas]. 
758
 Interestingly, Eustathius’ use of βούλησις in relation to ἐπιθυμία seems to echo Aristotle in the 
sense that βούλησις seems to connote rational decision-making, whereas ἐπιθυμία connotes appetitive 
impulses to action.  C.f. John Cooper, “Some remarks on Aristotle’s Moral Psychology”, 237-50, 
Cooper, Essays on ancient moral psychology and ethical theory (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1999), p.241. 
759
  Engastrimytho, 17.4-7.  Eustathius and Origen both understand the word προαίρεσις to denote an 
internal disposition. (Whether rational or appetitive, and whether the distinction would be meaningful 
in this case, is unclear).  That is, one’s having a προαίρεσις to do a certain thing does not entail doing 
it.This is a distinction which Michael Frede credits Epictetus with being the first to make, or, at any 
rate, articulate clearly in Free will, pp.66-88.  Origen at least seems to use προαίρεσις in the sense of 
desire as opposed to “deliberate intention”. Albrecht Dihle claims that, in Cicero’s Latin, voluntas 
sometimes denotes “desire or spontaneous wish”, as well as acting as an equivalent for the Greek 
προαίρεσις and βούλησις, which denote deliberate intention.  See his The theory of the will in 
classical antiquity (Berkley, University of California Press, 1982), p.134. 
760
 Origen might be supposed to disagree with him here.  However, Origen’s difference with 
Eustathius is likely to be rooted in Origen’s soteriology: one’s distance from God is determined by 
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– he is here responding to Origen’s claim about Christ, uniquely, being above with 
respect to προαίρεσις and his usage is determined by Origen’s. 
 
Eustathius also writes of ἐπιθυμία and ὄρεξις in relation to bodily appetites – 
hunger, thirst, and tiredness.
761
  The text does not reveal to us how such appetites 
relate to, or can be equated with, either προαίρεσις (in the sense of preference, the 
only sense in which it is attested), or βούλησις – a decision involving rational 
determination – or both.  Eustathius’ view of the soul, and his view of passions in 
relation to it, both suggest that passions are not necessarily an alternative to reason as 
a motivating factor: firstly, the soul is a monistic entity.  Secondly, emotions such as 
grief are appropriate and even required responses in certain situations.  This suggests 
that ἐπιθυμία and ὄρεξις, which Eustathius connects to πάθος are involved in 
βούλησις.  
  
The individual in Eustathius’ theology 
The most extended instance within which Eustathius describes the act of 
opting for one course of action over another by lapsarian humanity is that of the 
penitent thief.  The penitent thief is juxtaposed with the other thief crucified next to 
Christ.  This is discussed in more detail below.  Suffice here to note that Eustathius 
has a picture of the thief’s individuality when he describes him coming to 
repentance: “one of the criminals had been locked in a struggle…”
762
  Eustathius’ 
                                                                                                                                          
one’s desire, or lack thereof, for God, so the souls in Hades really did prefer to be there.  It does not 
follow, however, that he thought their preference was freely arrived at. 
761
 D17:21 and D17:19 respectively [Ariomanitas].  See the discussion on the passions in chapter 3. 
762
 D27:46-47 [Ariomanitas]. 
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idea of action that is αὐτεξούσιος/ἑκούσιος seems to be focused on the individual.  
(That is, unremarkably, it seems to be the self that is directed through αὐτεξούσιος 
action).  However, Eustathius also often writes of human nature and history as if the 
human race were a single actor within history.  This section examines the 
relationship between individual and corporate personhood in Eustathius’ 
anthropology in order to elucidate his concept of τὸ αὐτεξοὑσιον.  
 
Some aspects of Eustathius’ theology are underpinned by a corporate 
anthropology – that is, a concept of humanity as a collective body, lapsed and 
restored as one, whilst others are underpinned by an individualistic anthropology – 
that is, a concept of individual human beings in whom the lapse is played out, being 
transformed. 
 
These two ways of conceiving of human beings are highly related in 
Eustathius’ thought.  For example, in Eustathius’ soteriology, it is sometimes implied 
that the individual partakes in a change that happens to the whole human race; it is 
then perfectly coherent to talk both of the human race being transformed and of a 
particular individual being transformed.  Nonetheless, it is difficult completely to 




                                                 
763
 I should note that Eustathius does not explicitly discuss the relationship between the individual and 
the human race.  Here, more than elsewhere, I am considering the assumptions underlying his ideas, 
rather than reconstructing his arguments. 
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A corporate anthropology underlies most of Eustathius’ soteriology in some 
sense, in that it is necessary to the concept of Christ as a “Last Adam”, or the 
perfected human being.  However, there is considerable variety in Eustathius’ 
articulation of Christ qua human telos, and a corresponding variety in the degree and 
manner in which it suggests a corporate anthropology: sometimes, Christ is, or 
undergoes, an essential change required for salvation, and, in doing so, effects this 
change in humanity.  Here, there is a close ontological identity between him and the 
rest of humanity.  Wherever an essential change in Christ effects or equates to an 
essential change in the human race, there is an assumption that the human race is one 
thing on an essential level, with a single essential identity. 
 
Eustathius’ idea that Christ defeats the devil, and so frees humankind, also 
requires a basically corporate anthropology, but in a looser sense. The picture of 
Christ winning a rematch with the devil is fundamental to this narrative.  As noted, 
Eustathius thinks that it must be a human being, and not God, who defeats the devil.  
The identity between Christ’s humanity and everyone else’s is required for this to be 
meaningful.  However, here, Christ need only be able to act on behalf of humanity; 
the office of victor is, as it were, delegated to a particular member of the human race.  
One human being must be able to represent another human being, or the whole race.  
This requires a close identity between all human beings.  However, it requires it in 
the sense that it requires that the wider forces involved – God and the devil – 
recognise an affinity, and that circumstance is changed on the basis of this 
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recognition.  It does not require that a change in the essential state of one human 
being automatically causes a change in the essential state of humankind.
764
   
 
Where Eustathius writes about essential transformation through Christ, he 
suggests that Christ has enabled humanity to transform, not that he has transformed 
humanity; the concept that salvation is complete in the person of Christ is side-lined 
in favour of the concept that Christ has provided the archetype according to which all 
will be moulded.  Thus, Eustathius’ dominant conception of the interconnection 
between people is corporate in a loose sense. 
 
Where Christ fulfils human potential, the fact that others have yet to fulfil it is 
important to his understanding.  Consider Eustathius’ use of Paul’s notion that Christ 
is the ‘first fruits’ of the New Creation and ‘first born from the dead.’  In this 
understanding, Christ has temporal precedence over other human beings in achieving 
human telos and this temporal precedence allows everyone who partakes in the 
process of achieving this telos to retain his or her individuality to some extent.  It 
allows that the process of salvation is not yet complete in each individual, and ties 
the salvation of each individual to the following in the footsteps of Christ.
765
  Christ’s 
attainment of human telos causes human salvation, but it is not equivalent to human 
salvation. 
                                                 
764
 The fact that, for Eustathius, a human being must be the one to alter human circumstances 
demonstrates how deeply intertwined his political narrative of salvation is with his narrative of 
essential transformation. 
765
 This is in itself inconclusive regarding the questions of universal or particular salvation and of 




There is a tension between the individual and the corporate identity of human 
beings in Eustathius’ understanding of how Christ and Adam relate to the rest of 
humanity.  As we have seen, he quotes Romans 5.15: “For if we many have died by 
the transgression of one human being, how much more the grace, and the gift in the 
grace of Jesus Christ abounds in the many.”
766
  Eustathius’ divergent reading – “we 
many have died” – carries a sense of personal inclusion in the human corpus that has 
died and thus emphasises the collectivity of the passage.  Both in Paul’s thought and 
Eustathius’ reading of Paul, there is an assumption that the fate of all human beings 
is connected.  However, this verse also self-consciously juxtaposes the one with the 
whole of which it is a part.
767
  To say that all lapse or are redeemed through the sin or 
obedience of one implies the individual impetus of the one who sins or is obedient as 
much as it implies everyone else’s connection to that one. 
 
Eustathius’ descriptions of a person struggling with the devil assume a much 
more individualistic anthropology.  In these instances, he tends to imply that the root 
cause of the individual’s lapsarian state can, and must, be addressed within the 
individual.  In the more corporate understanding, the universal lapsarian state has its 
root in something that happened to the first human being.  Individual sin, suffering 
and death are simply manifestations of this.  An individual’s lapsarian state may, of 
course, still be caused by a primeval event that triggered the lapsarian state of each 
                                                 
766
 D22:6-9 [Ariomanitas]. 
767
 Sang-Won Son, commenting on the passage in Paul, correspondingly notes the use of eis and of the 
definite article, in contrast to the Adam-Christ parallel in 1 Corinthians 15 in his Corporate elements 
in Pauline anthropology (Editrice Pontifico Istituto Biblico, Rome, 2001), p.51. 
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subsequent human, and, in Eustathius, this is very clearly the case.  However, where 
lapsed state is countered person by person, individual sin is a consequence rather 
than simply a manifestation of this primeval tragedy.  The lapsarian state of each 
individual is a discrete phenomenon. 
 
We have here two ways of thinking about ἄνθρωπος; one focuses on a 
person, the other on humankind, but they are closely connected.  In Eustathius, as in 
most ancient writers, the most clearly articulated soteriological narratives assume a 
broadly corporate anthropology.  A more individualistic narrative comes into play in 
trying to explain how the fact of corporate salvation – that is, the salvation of 
humankind per se – is experienced by an individual. 
 
Both corporate and individualist anthropologies must be employed to make 
sense of Eustathius’ soteriological nexus.  He juxtaposes ideas that assume a strong 
corporate identity with those that assume a clearly individualist identity.  The 
apparent starkness of this contrast derives partly from the fact that Eustathius does 
not try to articulate the role of collectivity in anthropology, systematically or 
otherwise, but it probably points to an interrelation of corporate and individual 







Moral agency and the lapse 
Throughout Eustathius’ soteriology, there is ambivalence about the 
relationship between sin and the lapsarian state.  This ambivalence results from 
competing, and, to some extent opposed, theological axioms.   
 
Eustathius’ view of human moral agency is shaped around a collection of 
ideas about the lapse common in early Christianity.  I have already touched upon 
them in the previous chapter.  Eustathius believes that humankind has lapsed.  He 
believes, unremarkably, not only that lapsarian humanity is sinful but also that the 
lapsarian condition is partly defined by this sinfulness.  However, he also believes 
that the lapse was sin – the first sin; therefore, the greater propensity to sin that 
results from the lapse was caused by sin itself.  The dilemma is common enough: the 
idea that humanity lapsed through sin implies that the original human condition also 
involved susceptibility to sin.  Similarly, where the devil is seen as the chief culprit, 
the fact that humanity succumbed to his temptation suggests that it was already under 
his power.  Paradoxically, sinful nature is a consequence, as well as a cause, of the 
lapse and the devil’s power over humankind is, likewise, a cause, as well as a 
consequence, of the lapse. 
 
It is clear that the lapsarian state is peculiarly sinful in Eustathius’ thought.  
The way in which sinfulness is a distinctive part of the lapsarian state nonetheless 
raises some questions.  This is evident in his distinction between ψυχικός and 
πνευματικός.  Eustathius clearly regards sinlessness as a characteristic of the 
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πνευματικός state.  A sinful person becomes sinless and, in so doing, undergoes an 
essential change.  In a broad sense, Eustathius connects sinfulness with the lapse.  
However, it is difficult to see how the pre-lapsarian propensity to sin could have been 
qualitatively different from the lapsarian propensity to sin.  Sinfulness was 
apparently prior to mortality.  If the lapse was a sin, pre-lapsarian humanity was 
evidently capable of and susceptible to sin.  This is reflected in the fact that 
Eustathius uses the term ψυχικός to refer to the original condition, but also associates 
it with having sinned.
768
  It is heavily implied that humanity will ultimately lose 
either the ability, or any desire, to sin: “no one at all sins anymore” – but this must be 
part of its progression beyond the created state.  Eustathius never adequately defines 
the sinful state.  This is partly due to a wish to maintain a sense of human moral 
agency.  The effect, anyway, is to suggest that there is no a priori reason why 
lapsarian humanity should be more prone to sin than pre-lapsarian humanity. 
 
Eustathius closely connects salvation with ἐλευθερία, and the implication is 
that we are not, now, fully ἐλεύθερος.  As observed in the previous chapter, it is 
unclear how far lack of freedom entails lack of culpability, but there is some 
connection.  The various motifs of Eustathius’ soteriology, as noted in the previous 
two chapters, can help us to establish how lapsarian humanity is not free.  Firstly, 
Eustathius’ sense that the revelation of God in Christ is itself salvific implies that 
freedom is limited or obscured partly by ignorance. 
 
                                                 
768
 D47:5-9 [Ariomanitas]: “Paul wrote that a ‘soul-like’ body was sown, which has performed 
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Secondly, when Eustathius refers to bondage to the devil, he means it 
literally, if not only literally.  The devil is acting upon the person, and causing him or 
her to sin. 
 
Eustathius believes that the devil acts upon the person to tempt him or her to 
sin and also that the Spirit acts upon the person to make him or her πνευματικός, and, 
consequently, to stop him or her from sinning.  These two scenarios can look a lot 
like mirror images of each other.  If this were strictly the case, we would have a 
picture of two external forces vying to remake the human person according to their 
respective desires.  Eustathius does indeed suggest a parallel between the work of the 
devil and the work of the Spirit on the person.  This is illustrated by his contrast 
between the penitent thief and the (continuously) blasphemous thief, in which he 
juxtaposes the Spirit’s influence with the devil’s influence: “each utters words 
through each spirit and, whilst one was aroused from the divine breath, the other was 
aroused out of the influx of devilish works…”
769
  A little later in the same fragment, 
Eustathius employs the same Spirit-devil contrast again, describing the thief’s 
struggle with the devil prior to repentance, and how the Spirit enabled the thief to 
triumph in this struggle. 
 
However, a person torn between two competing forces is not quite 
Eustathius’ idea.  Eustathius generally implies that the Spirit is more intimately 
                                                                                                                                          
manifold sins through the soul, but he says that this body is raised spiritual, since he [God] changes 
the bodies of all those having been raised.” 
769
 D27:14-17 [Ariomanitas]. 
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involved with the person on whom it acts than the devil is; this is reflected in a 
contrast between Eustathius’ manner of describing the devil’s relationship to the 
person and his manner of describing the Spirit’s relationship to the person.  For 
example, he refers to “fellowship of the divine Spirit”  [τοῦ θείου 
πνεύματος...κοινωνίας]
770
, but writes that the devil “slinked up to Eve” and “shot 
poisonous arrows from above,”
771
 depicting the devil as an external assailant.  This 
corresponds closely to Eustathius’ claim that the devil was the “sower of death in the 
human race.”
772
  The devil’s effect on the human constitution is grave, but indirect. 
 
This comparison between the Spirit and the devil in Eustathius’ thought 
elucidates the relationship between salvation as transformed circumstance and 
salvation as transformed essential state.  Eustathius’ picture of the person torn 
between the Spirit and the devil is a key intersection between them: as the person 
struggles against the devil, the Spirit aids the person and effects essential 
transformation.  In this way, Eustathius’ picture of the person being essentially 
transformed is part of his picture of the person at war with the devil, and ultimately 
freed from the devil.  Furthermore, the imperfect inverse parallelism between the 
Spirit and the devil more specifically echoes Eustathius’ sense that the devil’s status 
in the current world order is a perversion of Christ’s.  The devil, and his war with 
Christ and humankind, is needed to explain the sinfulness that is so necessary to the 
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 D47:2-3 [Ariomanitas]. 
771
 D27:32, D27:34 respectively [Ariomanitas].  The devil is in the character of the serpent in this 
passage, so Eustathius’ idea may be that he is speaking “from above” [ἐκ τῶν ὑψηλοτάτων] in the 
sense of ‘not (yet) crawling on the ground.’ The phrase could, admittedly, also be translated “from 
pride” though, in deploying the image of the serpent as the devil, Eustathius would still be presenting 
the devil as external to those he is tempting. 
772
 D22:11-12 [Ariomanitas].  Emphasis mine.  See also the discussion in chapter 5. 
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narrative of essential transformation.  Nonetheless, when Eustathius focuses on the 
transformation of the person, his emphasis shifts away from the nature of events and 
situations and becomes more inward-looking. 
 
The issues arising in Eustathius’ treatment of human freedom are common 
enough: Adam and Eve lapsed whilst they were free (ἐλεύθερος).  Human sin keeps 
humankind in bondage.  The overriding sense, however, is that humanity does not 
want to remain in bondage prior to Christ’s advent – humankind was in bondage to 
devil, and so was helpless to change its situation.  It required a saviour to set it free.  
Lapsarian humankind is constrained.  The logic of this is that the lapsarian essential 
state carries a particular propensity to sin, and we have already observed this idea in 
Eustathius.  This propensity is part of our bondage.  Eustathius’ conception of human 
moral freedom must be understood in light of both his political soteriology and his 
soteriology of essential transformation.  The lapse entails our bondage to the devil 
and we are morally weakened by the lapse.
773
  We are less free because of the lapse. 
 
Consider Eustathius’ sense of the role of the Spirit in soteriology in this light.  
His sense that we are weakened by the lapse coheres with the way in which Christ 
overcomes lapsarian nature.  Christ is perfect because he is “strengthened” by the 
Spirit.   We need to take the claim that the Spirit strengthens seriously because the 
implication is not so much that union with the Spirit removed temptation from Christ 
                                                 
773
 It is worth noting the resemblance with original sin, though use of the term would be anachronistic, 
particularly in implying more theological reflection behind the concept than is evidenced in 
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– why would he require strength if that were the case? – but that it gave him the 
ability to withstand it.  This, in turn, finds a parallel in Eustathius’ picture of the 
penitent thief, empowered to win his struggle with the devil by the Spirit’s 
intervention.  God’s Spirit strengthens us, as it strengthens Jesus, in order to help us 
be moral. 
 
Eustathius has a strong sense of God’s gift when he writes of the Spirit 
strengthening the thief: “munificent Jesus…when he saw that one of the criminals 
had been locked in a struggle with the traps of the evil one, took for himself 
[ἐξαιρεῖται] the fearless soul from among those bearing the traps of death.”
774
  
Subsequently, Jesus bestows the Spirit upon the thief, and the thief wins in his 
struggle against the devil.  This passage is significant to Eustathius’ view of human 
moral freedom in several ways: the thief, before he has repented, is struggling 
against the devil, rather than working on the devil’s behalf.  However, he is 
incapable of doing good without the Spirit.  There is clearly a sense of Christ’s 
decision to help the thief here – he “took [the thief] for himself” – and a strong 
emphasis on Christ’s mercy.
775
  This suggests that he has lost the ability to do the 
                                                                                                                                          
Eustathius.  For a discussion of the development of the concept, c.f. Henri Rondet, Original Sin: the 
patristic and theological background trans. Finegan, Cajetan (Shannon, Ecclesia Press, 1972). 
774
 D27:45-49 [Ariomanitas]. 
775
 The phrase “munificent Jesus” has a strong devotional tone, more especially because Eustathius 
only refers to Christ as “Jesus” thirteen times in his extant writings and seven of these instances are 
direct biblical quotes.  (He also refers once to “Jesus Christ”, [D92a:4, D92b:1] quoting 2 Timothy 
2.8).  This instance occurs within the epitome, but the unusualness of it in this case suggests that it is 
Eustathius’ wording; whatever the relationship of the epitome to the original text, it is clear that this is 
not the epitomator’s usual mode of presenting the text. 
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The implication is that humanity lost Adam’s capacity to act rightly at the 
lapse.  Nonetheless, Eustathius does not regard the thief as altogether devoid of this 
power prior to the intervention of Christ and the Spirit.  Firstly, we must be cautious 
in extrapolating from Eustathius’ depiction of the thief’s experience to his 
understanding of lapsarian human experience per se.  On one hand, as already noted, 
the reference to Eve’s encounter with the devil deliberately ties the thief’s experience 
into a wider pattern of human experience.  However, the fact that Jesus saw “that one 
of the criminals had been locked in a struggle…” points to the specificity of this 
thief’s experience; the other thief, evidently, is blaspheming Christ without 
struggling with the devil.  There are, admittedly, reasons to suspect that this 
differentiation should not be taken too seriously for the purposes of determining 
Eustathius’ view of human moral agency: Eustathius is trying to demonstrate that it 
is possible for both thieves to have blasphemed on the cross and for one of them to 
have repented.  He is constrained by the fact that, in Luke’s gospel, one thief did not 
repent.  It is also possible that the phrases “one of the criminals”, which emphasises 
this differentiation, may be a gloss added by the epitomiser.  However, we should not 
overplay these problems.  In the first instance, Eustathius’ theology is shaped by his 
reading of the Gospel passages as much as it shapes them. 
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 This seems to echo Romans 7.19:  “I do not the good I want to do, but the evil that I do not want is 
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In any event, he depicts an individual who is struggling against the devil; the 
devil does not hold this individual totally in bondage.  The ambiguity arises in regard 
to whether the experience of struggling against the devil is the universal human 
experience, or merely a very common one.  Most of what else we know of 
Eustathius’ theology suggests the latter: for example, when he describes people who 
were fed the devil’s “poisonous body”, these are people who are, by their own 
volition, in cahoots with the devil.  One enslaved by the devil still retains enough 
ἐλευθερία that he or she may opt to fight him, and some do not. 
 
Eustathius elsewhere shows a more mundane sense of the pressures under 
which moral decision-making are placed in the lapsarian world order.  For example, 
in describing Joseph’s treatment by his brothers, Eustathius excuses Reuben and 
Judah saying that “they were holding against savage men” as Simeon and Levi had 
already committed a massacre.
777
  This suggests that Eustathius’ sense of a tension 
between human guilt and human victimhood reflects his wider worldview. 
 
Eustathius’ idea of moral decision-making is, specifically, of a decision to be 
made between the devil and the Spirit.  Eustathius sees an inverse parallel between 
the Spirit’s relationship to the person and the devil’s relationship to the person.  It is 
this that is reflected in his view of moral choice.  This is why Eustathius is able to 
                                                                                                                                          
what I do.” 
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 D121a, quote D121a:2 [In Joseph].  According to Genesis 37: 21-28, most of Joseph’s brothers 
wanted to kill him.  Reuben suggested putting him in a well instead, intending to rescue him later, and 
Judah suggested selling him into slavery rather than killing him.  The latter took place.  Eustathius 
interprets Judah’s suggestion as an attempt to save Joseph’s life. 
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believe simultaneously in the crippling nature of human circumstance and the reality 
of various moral possibilities for the lapsarian person: doing the right thing involves 
deciding to be helped by God. 
 
Correspondingly, an individual must repent in order to receive the effects of 
Christ’s sacrifice.  The Spirit is needed to reach full repentance, but the process of 
turning away from evil can be started without the Spirit’s intervention.  This is 
evident in Eustathius’ discourse on the penitent thief.
778
  The thief himself plays a 
role in procuring his own forgiveness, healing purification and ransom.  He is only 
once actually stated to procure his own salvation, “the fruit of your lips, though the 
very last, supplied a ransom from evil for you”
779
  He procures this only after Christ, 
with the Spirit, has intervened to save him; Christ’s intervention is Eustathius’ 
explanation for how it is that the thief went from blaspheming to confessing Christ.  
However, Christ intervenes for the thief because the thief was struggling against the 
devil: “seeing that one of the criminals had been locked in a struggle with the traps of 
the evil one, [Jesus] took for himself the fearless soul.”
780
  Eustathius’ attempt to 
reconcile Luke’s account of the penitent thief with Matthew and Mark’s account of 
two blaspheming thieves requires us to read this as describing a struggle against the 
devil, and a struggle which is not (necessarily) a perpetual feature of the lapsarian 
state; both thieves were originally blaspheming, so the struggle cannot simply refer 
                                                 
778
 See discussion in the section on “Christ’s death as sacrifice” in chapter 5. 
779
 D27:89.  In the epitome, the author is ‘addressing’ the thief and so uses the second person singular.  
For example, he exhorts him “O youth with an accursed soul.” D27:87 [Ariomanitas].  
780
 D27:46-8 [Ariomanitas]. 
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to the bondage to the devil in which we all find ourselves.
781
  This thief, in particular, 
struggled, and he is described as “fearless” for doing so, suggesting some moral 
content to his actions.  The thief’s attempt to resist the devil preceded the 
intervention of Christ and the Spirit.  Eustathius, further, apparently conceives of the 
thief’s subsequent repentance, aided by Christ, as a victory within the struggle 
between good and evil, God and the devil.  Repentance is therefore necessary for 
salvation, but it is placed within the context of factors outside of the penitent’s 
control. 
 
A lapsed person has some ἐλευθερία prior to the Spirit’s help, because he or 
she can decide to struggle with the devil or decide not to.  He or she has is able to 
direct him or herself towards ἐλευθερία.  Eustathius depicts a person being presented 
with the option either to follow the devil or not, or to follow the Spirit or not, rather 
than being presented with both simultaneously.  The case of the penitent thief, who 
decided to struggle against the devil, illustrates the first instance.  The second 
instance is illustrated by Eustathius’ understanding of people Paul defines as 
variously πνευματικός or ψυχικός:  
The apostle tends to call human beings ‘soul-like’ inasmuch as, 
when they sin through the soul, the fellowship of the divine Spirit 
is turned away, and spiritual inasmuch as, through divinely 





So, a person needs the Spirit to resist the devil, but must first decide to resist the 
devil. The implication is that there are two distinct moments of deliberation involved 
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when someone under the devil’s power makes the right decision: the first, against the 
devil, and the second in favour of the Spirit.  In temporally differentiating these two 
decisions, Eustathius wants to avoid the suggestion that the person is simply torn 
between the devil and the Spirit, able only to submit to one or the other.  The moral 
struggle cannot be adequately described in terms of rival tempters.  Also, some of the 
native moral agency which God originally bestowed on Adam remains in the 
lapsarian person. 
 
Eustathius’ depiction of martyrdom evokes a strong sense of the individual’s 
substantial and genuine moral agency.  This refers to a context where the Spirit is 
already at work, so is not strictly comparable to the conversion of the penitent thief, 
but has the same sense that the Spirit enables and enhances the person’s agency.  In 
particular, Eustathius frequently uses metaphors involving athletic games to describe 
martyrdom and persecution.  In these metaphors, “the prizes for the best athletes lie 
displayed.”
783
  In placing the martyr’s eschatological glory in the context of reward, 
Eustathius implies that the martyr, rather than God, is responsible for his or her own 
victory.   
 
Immediately following this he refers to the time when “each rightly 
contending is honoured.”
784
    This idea is particularly striking in a context that 
emphasises reward for action because it appears to recognise a degree of victory, or 
at least of credit, in the struggle.  This can elucidate the somewhat ambiguous 
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elements of the moral status of the thief’s struggle with the devil prior to Christ’s 
intervention.  It suggests that Eustathius did indeed mean to contrast the soon-to-be 
penitent thief with the other thief on the basis that the former had chosen to struggle 
with the devil.
785
  This finds a parallel in his picture of souls in Hades, longing for 
better things, but unable to break the locks of Hades, as Christ will.  Among other 
things, Eustathius feels that humanity must do what it can to be moral, but that what 
it can do without God is very limited. 
 
The extent to which a person is free to choose salvation and morality in 
Eustathius’ thought depends partly on the context in which he is considering the 
question.  His otherwise disparate soteriological narratives hold in common the 
implication that human action supported by God is fundamental to the individual 
person’s salvation.  However, the relative importance of God’s action and the 
person’s response, respectively, in helping the person varies.  In relation to the 
transforming action of the Spirit, human co-operation appears to be primarily assent 
to the Spirit.  Where Eustathius depicts a person locked in combat with the devil, 
humanity appears to have a more active and more strenuous role in its own 
perfection.  This is largely because the entire process is conceived of in more 
strenuous terms.  However, this difference also reflects the disparate nature of the 
human predicament within each narrative; where the primary problem is something 
internal to the person, the person must submit to improvement and therefore to the 
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Spirit; the person must fight him or herself, so his or her efforts are directed inward 
and resemble passivity. 
 
There is a tension in the different degrees to which a person contributes to 
freedom from the devil and purification from sin respectively.  Where the primary 
problem is the devil, an external enemy, the person’s efforts against this problem are 
externally focused and therefore more obviously strenuous, though ineffectual 
without divine help.  Where the problem is the person himself, he receives salvation, 
but where the person is a captive, he plays a part in freeing himself.  This partly 
reflects a dialectic between dependence on God and human agency.  It also suggests 
a connection between sin and weakness, in that a sinner cannot free himself or 
herself, but requires rescue. 
 
Eustathius’ negotiation of the minefield of moral freedom presented by 
questions of the lapse plays out partly in his ambiguous approach to the devil.  To 
say that humanity lapsed through sin necessarily implies that humanity was 
susceptible to sin prior to the lapse.  The difference between susceptibility to sin 
before and after the lapse is therefore, presumably, merely quantitative, but this does 
not satisfy Eustathius’ notion of the gap between human actuality and humanity in its 
original created state, which is great indeed. 
 
He apparently did not resolve this problem.  He sees human nature as having 
degenerated from an earlier state.  In light of this, the devil is necessary to explain 
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how lapsarian humanity is different from original humanity whilst insisting that 
humankind remains morally responsible; it is not so much human nature that 
changed with the lapse, but the devil’s power over humanity.  However, emphasising 
the devil’s role simultaneously reduces the level of human moral responsibility in 
general.  The tensions in Eustathius’ soteriology partly reflect an attempt to hold 
together various aspects of freedom and self-direction, and their degeneration. 
 
The necessary implication of Eustathius’ picture of the lapse is that humanity 
has always been in principle susceptible to sin, and to the devil’s machinations.  
Succumbing to these, after all, is how Eve and Adam lapsed.  The driving force of 
Eustathius’ thought on human morality is that susceptibility to sin and ability to resist 
it have both always been part of the human condition.  Humankind becomes more 
susceptible to sin after lapsing primarily because its circumstances are changed; in 
opting to partake of sin, Adam and Eve came under the devil’s power.  Eustathius 
nonetheless suggests that a greater tendency to sin was embedded in humanity at the 
lapse: it is when the penitent thief repents that he is free from the devil’s tyranny.
786
  
This corresponds closely to the idea that moral “pollution” is inherited from ones 
parents.  Our inherited moral pollution is part and parcel of our bondage to the devil, 
part and parcel of our lack of freedom. 
 
I have argued that, according to Eustathius, eschatological humanity becomes 
sinless.  Evidently, this is part of a progression from a ψυχικός state to πνευματικός 
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state, and not a restoration to an original state.  Given the Spirit’s morally fortifying 
role, it is likely that this susceptibility to sin is what ψυχικός Adam and Eve 
possessed, even before the lapse, that πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος, conformed to Christ, 
does not. 
 
Sin relates differently to the lapsarian condition than mortality or weakness 
because it requires our active participation in the lapsarian condition.  This perhaps 
explains why forgiveness and purification are so central to Eustathius’ narration of 
Christ’s sacrifice, despite jarring with his wider soteriology; sin comes directly from 
the person, and it is the person who must undergo alteration to address it.  The notion 
of forgiveness is also, very simply, connected to the notion of guilt.  The sinner is 
guilty, and requires forgiveness.  Eustathius does suggest that we are morally 
strengthened by the Spirit and morally weakened by the lapse.  However, throughout 
this change, he seeks to maintain the reality of moral choice. 
 
Christ’s humanity as saviour: God’s role in human freedom 
Eustathius’ insistence that Christ’s humanity is saviour initially suggests a 
high level of human agency; ἄνθρωπος extracts itself from its own dire predicament.  
However, Eustathius’ understanding of how it is that Christ’s humanity is able to be 
a saviour to the human race is shaped partly by a belief that lapsarian humanity is 
unable to save itself: that is why God had to assume a human being.  By uniting with 
ἄνθρωπος, God renders human willpower what it should be, and thereby enables 
ἄνθρωπος to save itself.  The same picture is evident in his descriptions of 
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individuals struggling against the devil, or being essentially transformed: the Spirit 
strengthens the person, and in doing so enables him or her to make the right decision 
and therefore to defeat the devil and move towards a πνευματικός state. 
 
Eustathius’ conception of humanity’s role in Christ’s salvific actions, 
predictably, developed as his Christology became more divisive.  In comparative 
terms, humanity becomes a greater agent of its own salvation as Eustathius’ 
delineation between the actions of Christ’s humanity and Christ’s divinity becomes 
greater, because, where he distinguishes between the Word and “the human being of 
Christ” as agents, Eustathius overwhelmingly thinks that the human being is the 
saviour.  However, this dynamic is complicated by a persistent belief that Christ’s 
humanity can only perform salvific actions because it is helped by the in-dwelling 
Word. 
 
The contrast between Eustathius’ view of Christ’s humanity in his early 
works and his anti-subordinationist works is pointed.  In Engastrimytho Eustathius 
sometimes describes Christ’s actions as God’s actions.  For example, with reference 
to Christ’s temptation in the wilderness, Eustathius asserts that “the Lord silenced the 
avenging spirit by patient endurance, for it is proper to God to bear everything with 
forbearance.”
787
  In Ariomanitas and Arianos, Christ’s actions are human actions.  
Christ’s humanity was nonetheless already important in Eustathius’ earlier thought.  
Very significantly, Christ’s human soul is the principal agent of the journey to Hades 
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and paradise, “strengthened by the divine Spirit” as it is in his anti-subordinationist 
works.
788
  In his earlier writings, God and humanity effect human salvation together.  
In his later writings, it is barely an exaggeration to say that Christ’s humanity 
performs every salvific act.  God strengthens and is united to the human Jesus, but 
the human being is the agent of any given action, as Eustathius’ soteriology requires. 
Salvation is a human act enabled by God.  Any given salvific act cannot occur 
without God, but it is not efficacious unless ἄνθρωπος is its agent.  Eustathius’ later 
soteriology therefore has a high view of intrinsic human potential, but this potential 




Eustathius sometimes describes God’s union with Christ’s humanity as if it 
made the human Jesus a kind of superman.  The most striking instance is the 
omnipresence of Christ’s human soul; Christ’s soul was not only in Hades and 
paradise simultaneously while his body was dead, but also was in heaven with the 
Spirit/Word while his body was on earth.  Evidently, it was simultaneously vivifying 
his living, walking, talking, body.
790
  He bases his argument on John 3.13: “No one 
has ever ascended to heaven, except the one who come from heaven, the son of 
ἄνθρωπος, who is in heaven.”
791
  He wants to get at the fact that it is an ἄνθρωπος 
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who came from heaven, and so must have gone there before.
792
  He emphasises the 
humanity of Christ’s soul in talking about its extraordinary omnipresence.  At the 
same time, he emphasises the superiority of Christ’s humanity.  Christ can be in 
Hades and paradise at the same time “by the excellence of [his] soul.”
793
   
 
The unique strength and power of the human being of Christ works within 
Eustathius’ soteriology because Christ opens up paths in which others can follow: he 
has stormed the gates of Hades, and unlocked paradise, so no one else needs to be 
able to do these things.  However, this power and glory is repeatedly declared to be 
reliant on the help of the Word who is united with the human being. 
 
The Word’s strengthening of Jesus partly points forward to eschatological 
humanity, as observed in chapter 4.  This affirms the salvific agency of Christ’s 
humanity in one sense: it is a perfect, and perfectly free, human being that saves the 
rest of the human race.  However, the extent to which Christ’s humanity has no more 
divine help than the rest of humanity is also the extent to which humanity 
intrinsically needs God’s help. 
 
It is perfectly possible that Eustathius believed that all human souls would 
eventually achieve omnipresence, as Christ’s soul did.  As I observed in chapter 4, 
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Eustathius sees an imperfect comparison between the way in which the Spirit is 
united with Christ and the way in which the Spirit is united with πνευματικός 
Christians.  This would cohere with the idea that Christ was the “first fruits of the 
resurrection from the dead.”  In either case, it is clear that perfect humanity requires 
God’s help.   
 
As observed in chapter 4, Eustathius’ view of the union between the person 
and the Spirit has a sense that God continues to bolster the person continually.  
Eustathius’ soteriology generally has a strong sense of God’s gracious gift, and 
humanity’s need for it, alongside his conception of humankind as at considerable 
distance from God.  So, the whole chain of soteriological events, in which the 
humanity is to act, starts with God’s choice to save humanity.  Significantly, 
Eustathius spells this out at the same time as emphasising Christ’s humanity; it is not 
an alternative thesis.  Hence his reading of Romans focuses on the Son’s decision to 
become incarnate: 
 
‘For if we many have died by the transgression of one human being, 
how much more the grace, and the gift in the grace of Jesus Christ 
abounds in the many.’
794
  Therefore assuredly, in the transgression 
of the first-formed, the death belonging to sin fell on, great and 
incurable.  But the child of God…determined to punish the devil, 
the sower of death through the same human race, bore the whole 
human being, in order that…he might hold sway in incorruptible 
life.
795
   
 
The Child of God decided to train a prize fighter. 
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Freedom and Perfection 
Both the political narrative and the narrative of essential transformation 
within Eustathius’ soteriology suggest, to some degree, the ultimate negation of 
moral deliberation between various choices: in the essential narrative, the person 
conforms to the Spirit whilst in the political narrative the person becomes subject to 
Christ.  Eschatologically, the person always makes the right decision.  This section 
argues that this is bound up in a view of freedom that equated it with the ability to, 
decide and act rightly which was normative in philosophical as well as theological 
discourse in antiquity.
796
  Relatedly, the attainment of this eschatological freedom 
does not involve the loss of self-direction. 
 
After being resurrected from the dead “no one sins at all anymore.”
797
  
Eschatologically, the ambiguity about the unique sinfulness of lapsarian nature and 
the original propensity to sin is resolved: eschatological humanity has no propensity 
to sin.  Here it is unclear whether humanity eternally retains the capacity to sin.  
Salvation is salvation from a lapsarian, sinful nature, so a vision of salvation is a 
vision of sinlessness.  It is difficult to see how humanity retains moral choice in this 
situation. 
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Similarly, Eustathius seems to believe that humans will be subject in the 
eschaton.  Ultimately, Christ qua human receives authority over the cosmos.  Christ 
then becomes ruler, replacing the devil.  Eustathius regards Christ’s authority as an 
important aspect of his kingship.  “The human being of Christ” receives “a sceptre of 
eternal authority (imperii).”
798
  In one sense, bondage to the devil is replaced by 
bondage to Christ.  However, the prevailing motif within Eustathius’ political 
soteriological narrative is not so much submission to Christ as liberation from the 
devil.  Insofar as Eustathius is concerned with wrong government, he is concerned 
with it because it means that human beings are not free.  The devil, sin and death, as 
variously interrelated, enslave ἄνθρωπος and it is in submission to Christ that 
ἄνθρωπος is free of this enslavement.  Eustathius explicitly connects Christ’s defeat 
of the devil with humankind’s universal submission to Christ (we have come across 
part of this passage already): 
 
Then, the loosening locks having been suddenly prised up, the 
gates being broken asunder, and by a royal gift [lacuna] 
contributing the release, and reaping the freedom by an amnesty, 
all the body guards of the arch-plunderer melted and fell down 
before him, not being able to withstand the strength of the 
kingdom, as Paul indicates, ‘every knee will bow to Christ, not 
only in heaven and on earth, but also under the earth.’
799
   
 
Eustathius’ connection between the lapsarian state and enslavement is typical in 
patristic thought.
800
  As we have seen, he also makes an equally unremarkable 
connection between the lapsarian condition and moral imperfection.  There is, in 
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Eustathius’ thought, a profound connection between moral perfection and freedom.  
This is evident in his tendency to depict struggle with the devil as moral struggle; 
when the battle is won, and the person is free from the devil, the person is moral.  
This comes across clearly in Eustathius’ picture of the penitent thief struggling on the 
cross, and in his conception (indebted to Paul) that Adam became enslaved through 
disobedience.  
 
The link that Eustathius makes between freedom and moral perfection 
reflects a very common way of understanding freedom in ancient thought: broadly, 
freedom is freedom to make the right decision.  For example, this idea is 
fundamental to the Stoic conception of free will.
801
  A similar concept is also found 
in Aristotle, in that the virtuous person will always make the right decision.
802
  This 
idea assumes, broadly speaking, that, when faced with multiple courses of action, 
there is a right course of action; it further interprets lack of freedom as inability to 
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The liberty of indifference is necessary for the attainment of this ultimate 
freedom in some patristic discourse.  So, in Irenaeus, humankind needed to start out 
with the liberty of indifference in order to reach the freedom of perfection 
eschatologically.  Unless humanity had started out with the liberty of indifference, 
the freedom of perfection would not be genuine.
804
  Eustathius may share aspects of 
this idea, which would fit well with his similarly developmental soteriology.  
Importantly, in the lapsarian order, the liberty of indifference is always freedom in a 
state of becoming, because the devil would limit our options just as much as they 
appear to be limited eschatologically.  The ability always to decide rightly occurs 
when this becoming is complete. 
 
On one level, the political narrative seems to be coming from a rather 
different place because the person’s will appears to be an irrelevance.  Of course one 
will be allowed to do good during Christ’s reign, but it does not follow that one will 
decide, ἑκουσίως, to do it.  Where slavery is slavery of the person’s own desires, 
preferences or intuitions, being allowed to do the right thing is being allowed to 
decide to do it.  The sense that, given this internal permission, the person will decide 
rightly depends on a conception of eschatological ἄνθρωπος as morally good; it 
makes morality a character attribute, so that ability to make the wrong decision is not 
a prerequisite for self-direction.  By contrast, Christ’s kingship creates a space, free 
from the devil’s tyranny in which we can exercise our total freedom.  In a society 
where government could be highly volatile, good government seems like a blessing 
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indeed, and a freeing blessing, but, in this context, it is freedom from, whereas the 
freedom granted by the perfection of our wills is freedom to. 
 
Eustathius’ discourse on Christ’s eschatological rule also contains a more 
radical suggestion.  When Christ receives authority from God, it is “restored” 
(reponenda sunt), implying that ἄνθρωπος possessed such authority prior to the 
lapse.
805
  In referring to God’s giving of Christ’s authority as a “restoration”, 
Eustathius sees it as part of Christ’s fulfilment of human potential.  This coheres with 
the list of attributes that Adam is said to have received when God breathes Adam’s 
soul into his body: “he walks and breathes, he governs, he reasons, he acts, he has 
control.”
806
  This is presumably a reference to Adam and Eve’s lordship over 
creation: “[God said] ‘Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the sky and over 
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Eustathius particularly emphasises the idea that Christ, the human being, 
receives authority.  His argument here probably contains a similar soteriological 
thread to that so often found in Ariomanitas:
808
 “the human being of Christ” must be 
the one who receives the kingdom, because otherwise authority is not restored to 
ἄνθρωπος.  Eustathius gives a less hierarchical picture of the eschatological society 
by connecting Christ’s authority with Adam and Eve’s authority.  It suggests that 
authority is restored to all human beings.  Further, the authority that God gives to 
Adam and Eve in Eden is not authority over other human beings, but over creation.  
In this picture, human beings are eschatologically subject to no one, because God has 
delegated power to them.  In submitting to Christ, we share in his authority.
809
  
Strength is made perfect in weakness. 
 
Conclusion 
Eustathius believes that human beings were created with the capacity to 
deliberate between different moral positions.  They are morally crippled, though not 
utterly incapacitated, by the lapse: they retain some ability to decide rightly, but this 
is largely an ability to try to be moral, rather than to succeed fully.  The Spirit makes 
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one likely to succeed.  Ultimately, perfect human beings will possess the capacity, 
absolutely, to determine the right moral decision. 
 
There are two mutually qualifying concepts of moral freedom in this picture.  
Firstly, the crippling nature of lapsarian circumstance and its effects on the person’s 
essential state are slavery.  They are the reason that the person is not free.  Total 
moral freedom is the freedom to make the right decision.  This is not simply not an 
alternative to self-direction for Eustathius because he believes that people are 
intrinsically good and that human sinfulness is contingent on the lapse.  Therefore, 
people are simply being themselves when they make the right decision.  Secondly, 
lapsed people have some liberty of indifference.  They can opt rightly or wrongly.  
This is necessarily related to the freedom of perfection – you must possess a partial 
ability to decide rightly in order to have morally various options.   
 
The liberty of indifference itself often appears weak in lapsarian people 
within Eustathius’ writings, corresponding to his strong sense of the bondage into 
which we have lapsed.  The penitent thief is able to direct himself towards good, but 
only, just.  It is unlikely that Eustathius would claim that his action was, 
correspondingly, less ἑκούσιος/ αὐτεξούσιος as a result; rather, self-direction does 
not necessarily result in the liberty of indifference.  The liberty of indifference 
existed more robustly in Adam and Eve, corresponding to their greater degree of 
ἐλευθερία.  Total, eschatological ἐλευθερία, however, will involve perfection, with 
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the result that self-direction will not entail the liberty of indifference, much as it 
would not if one were totally lacking in ἐλευθερία. 
 
How exactly Adam and Eve became enslaved is ambiguous, but it certainly 
involved a moral decision on their part, among other things.  Similarly, the 
relationship between the moral slavery of lapsarian humanity and the moral 
imperfection involved in Adam and Eve’s ψυχικός condition is ambiguous and 
problematic.  There are various possible syntheses, but as the fragmented sources do 















Chapter 7: Anthropology in Eustathius’ eschatology 
Eschatology is important to anthropology in the same way as soteriology, 
because it is typically the fulfilment of soteriology.  It offers a vision of how human 
beings are supposed to be, and the world in which they are supposed to live.  It acts 
as a yard-stick against which to measure all other human action, experience, and 
ontology, both before and after the lapse. 
 
Its implications are therefore also intensely political because part of what it is 
measuring is human government.  However, a range of eschatological motifs 
common in patristic thought can be, and were, deployed to reflect on political reality 
in the current order in diverse ways. 
 
As chapter 5 argued, Eustathius participated in a political discourse that drew 
analogies between God’s power, human power and the devil’s power, and was 
ambivalent partly because the implications of such analogies are highly ambiguous 
and multivalent.  It is often very difficult to establish, in both biblical and patristic 
texts, how close is the analogy between Christ’s or God’s power and human power, 
and what the implications of this closeness are.  To define the ways in which 
eschatology reflects upon current political structures, we must ask how 
commensurable the eschatological order is to the current order.
810
  Chiliasm, the 
belief in Christ’s thousand year reign on earth, provides the most common and 
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straightforward example of a vision of a commensurable eschatological society, but 
this commensurability, as we shall see, can be maintained whilst elements of the 
chiliastic narrative are jettisoned. 
 
The commensurability of the eschatological order with this one enables 
eschatological society to act as a model for present society, even if it is 
acknowledged that lapsarian society will always fall short of this model.  It is 
possible to look to a commensurable eschatological order, and see there what society 
should be like.  The commensurability of the eschatological order gives us a 
framework for determining what kind of analogy a given author sees between 
particular aspects of the eschatological order and the current order, but it does not 
actually tell us the answer; commensurability between the eschaton and the current 
order tends to sharpen the comparison between them, but this comparison can still be 
deployed variously.  The anticipation of a reign of Christ on earth was often intended 
as a challenge to imperial power.
811




Christian communities in the pre-Christian Roman Empire tended to see 
chiliasm – the anticipation of a reign of Christ on earth – as making a challenging 
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eschatological authority – in his “History and Politics in the Book of Revelation”, pp.25-30. 
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political statement to imperial power.  This was clearly a use for which Irenaeus 
deployed the Book of Revelation, for example.
813
  Attempts to renegotiate the 
relationship between earthly and divine power in chiliasm are themselves 
recognitions that it is problematic.  Chiliasm must, like non-chiliast eschatologies, 
imply the contingency and transience of earthly rule, and the closeness of the 
comparison in chiliasm often has the effect of driving this implication home 
especially sharply.  It also offers a critique, and a suggestion, another way of being 
on earth.  Eschatological claims were ambiguous, but they were not neutral.  
Chiliasm, by suggesting the commensurability between the eschatological and 
current world orders, is particularly challenging to the society in which it arises. 
 
This chapter expands upon the observations about the resurrection of the 
body in chapter 3 and those about Christ’s eschatological kingdom in chapters 5 and 
6 to argue that Eustathius’ eschatology emphasises commensurability with the 
current world order, both in human ontology – the resurrection body is the same in 
substance to, and very like, the current one – and, to an uncertain degree, in human 
society – Christ will reign in a society comparable to the one in which Eustathius 
lived.  He engages with chiliastic ideas, but constructs them in respects that seem to 
soften their sometimes forceful political implications.  His ideas about eschatological 
authority, however, suggest that he does intend his discourse about Christ’s kingship 
to place a question mark over the nature of Constantine’s authority. 
                                                                                                                                          
of events leading to Christ’s reign.  For example, the emperor is often seen as holding the anti-Christ’s 
reign in check. 
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Another important aspect of Christian eschatology is judgement before God, 
which is closely connected to the question of who achieves salvation (though the 
connection is often far from straightforward).  This chapter argues that Eustathius 
believes that some people will be eternally punished, but that his description of the 
eschatological fulfilment of God’s ends fails to reconcile this with his soteriology. 
 
Christ’s eschatological kingdom 
As demonstrated in chapter 5, Eustathius very clearly believes in an 
eschatological reign of Christ.  However, if he ever wrote a detailed and explicit 
description of Christ’s kingdom, it does not survive.  We should not conclude that 
Eustathius was uninterested in the nature of Christ’s kingdom.  It is fairly evident 
that the eschatological reality concerned Eustathius in its own right. 
 
The fragments of Arianos focus a good deal on Christ’s eschatological 
kingship. However, they give virtually no description of his kingdom.  This is to be 
expected, in light of the process by which these fragments were selected.  
Theodoret’s selections are short, and his agenda does not recommend him to include 
any extended discussion of Christ’s reign.
814
  He is interested in Eustathius’ divisive 
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Christology, which arises in the context of Eustathius’ claim that “the human being 




The context of Eustathius’ original argument is germane to the eschatological 
significance of these passages.  Some light may be shed on this by considering how 
his argument in the extant portion of Arianos requires this context to work.  
Theodoret very probably has caught the pivotal point of Eustathius’ argument about 
Christ’s kingship, since it is precisely the contrast between human Christ and divine 
Word, or Spirit, which serves Eustathius’ anti-Arian argument. 
 
In Arianos, Eustathius’ argument is specifically exegetical: he is involved in a 
discussion about biblical passages that suggest (or, at any rate, were read to suggest) 
that Christ will receive authority, glory and honour from the Father, or from God.  
He is arguing that they do not mean that the Son receives authority from the Father.  
Arius’ letter to Alexander offers a good example of the claims Eustathius refutes: the 
Father “gave [the Son] the inheritance of everything” and “gave subsistence to his 
glories.”
816





Clearly, Eustathius believes that Christ’s kingdom will be corporeal. This is 
evident from his insistence on the resurrection of the body, and the strongly 
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physically focused anthropology underpinning it.  Everyone will be resurrected, and 
the resurrection body is decidedly corporeal.  The world in which resurrected human 
beings are to live must, therefore, also be corporeal.  This conclusion is reinforced by 
the emphatic claim that “the human being of Christ” will be ruler over this kingdom: 
Eustathius does not regard a soul without a body as a person, and uses the title “the 
human being of Christ” to designate Christ’s full humanity within precisely this 
framework.  It is especially unlikely that Eustathius would be inconsistent on this 
point, since his insistence upon the embodied nature of the human person occurs very 
often in the context of eschatological judgement.  Furthermore, Eustathius actually 
refers to Christ’s body in the context of Christ’s kingship: “the human being, 
gracefully having been made a temple of justice from limbs and dwelling with the 
most sacred Word, has inherited by excellence the everlasting throne.”
818
  Eustathius 
maintains his vivid picture of resurrected physicality in his depiction of the glorified 
Christ.  The king is physical, and so must the kingdom be. 
 
It is less clear whether Eustathius’ eschatological kingdom is, like Irenaeus’ 
eschatological kingdom, “a social and political reality, not just a physical one.”
819
  
On one hand, most of the time that Eustathius talks about eschatological reality, he 
emphasises its commensurability with current reality, which might lead us to the 
tentative conclusion that he believed that the eschatological kingdom would be 
“social and political.”  He also approvingly quotes a handful of biblical passages 
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which suggest he conceived of it as other-worldly but, on examination, they do not 
appear to represent a central aspect of his eschatology.  He quotes Paul’s claims that 
Christ’s throne is “prepared…in heaven” and similarly that “we are citizens of 
heaven.”
820
   
 
The contexts in which Eustathius implies a heavenly kingdom suggest that 
this implication was not very important to him, and perhaps not even intentional.  In 
both cases, he is quoting scripture, and the ‘heavenly’ nature of eschatological life is 
not the reason that he offers the quotation.  In both cases, the passage in question 
actually argues for the commensurability between eschatological reality and current 
reality.   
 
In reference to Christ’s kingdom, Eustathius is simply giving an example of a 
phrase that should be applied to “the human being of Christ” rather than to the Word.  
His quotation does not tell us much about his concept of the eschatological kingdom.  
When he refers to our heavenly “citizenship”, Eustathius is quoting Philippians 3.20, 
and is interested in a later part of the quote, for its relevance to the congruence 
between Christ’s resurrection and our own.  Here is the fragment in which the quote 
is contained: 
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That the body has the same form as the human body, he teaches us 
more clearly, writing to the Philippians: ‘We are citizens’ he 
[Paul] says, ‘of heaven, out of which we received a saviour, the 
lord Jesus Christ, who will change our body of lowliness to 
become conformed to the body of his glory.’  And if, changing the 
lowly body of human beings, he conforms it to his own body, the 
slander of the enemies is revealed…to be obsolete.
821
   
 
Eustathius is trying to prove that “the body has the same form as the human body.”
822
 
‘The body’ could here be referring either to Christ’s body, or to the resurrected 
bodies of other human beings.  This passage makes most sense if we take it that the 
body referred to here is Christ’s.  This fragment then fits well with the other 
fragments from Proverbs 8:22, forming part of the argument found in D68, in which 
Eustathius specifies that we are conformed to “the human express image having been 
made bodily by the Spirit, bearing the same number of members as all the rest, and 
clad in similar form to each” rather than to “the bodiless spirit of wisdom.”
823
  The 
emphasis on Christ’s physicality in D69 contributes to the impression that these 
fragments are drawn from one piece of argumentation about our bodies being 
conformed to Christ’s.  It is evident that Eustathius refers to Christ’s resurrected 
body for several reasons: firstly, this fits into the wider pattern of his soteriology as 
outlined in chapters 4 and 5: Christ fulfils Adam and does so, partly, by going 
through death to defeat death.  Adam is fulfilled only after Christ has defeated 
death.
824
  Secondly, the description of Christ’s body as ‘glorious’ makes most sense 
if Eustathius (and Paul) has the resurrected body in mind.  The passage, then, is 
about the commensurability between Christ’s resurrection body and ours.  
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 D68:11-15 [Proverbs 8:22]. 
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Eustathius’ reference to the Christian’s heavenly citizenship is actually part of an 
argument that we become conformed to the human being, Christ, rather than to God 
the Son.  The connection between Christ’s resurrection body and our resurrection 
bodies is central to this argument.  Admittedly, Eustathius does not explicitly state, in 
this passage, that resurrection bodies are commensurable to current bodies.  
However, the frequent Eustathian distinction between corporeal humanity and 
incorporeal God is emphasised in the face of a reference to ‘heavenly citizenship.’  
This implies that the same ontological categories, with the same experiential 
implications, continue into eschatological existence. 
 
Eustathius’ exegesis of Philippians 3.20 coheres with his sense of a wider link 
between ‘citizenship’ of the ultimate reality and the resurrection body.  Elsewhere he 
refers to “divinely inspired citizenship” as part of a defence of bodily resurrection.  
This is in a passage we have already come across in examining Eustathius’ 
understanding of the resurrection, but here it is significant enough to merit quoting in 
full: 
 
The apostle tends to call human beings ‘soul-like’ inasmuch as 
when they sin through the soul, the communions of the divine 
Spirit are turned away, and spiritual inasmuch as, through divinely 
inspired citizenship, they partake in the Holy Spirit, accepting its 
plenty.  Because of this, he wrote that a ‘soul-like’ body was 
sown, which has performed manifold sins through the soul, but he 
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As was demonstrated in chapter 3, the wider context of this argument is Eustathius’ 
insistence on the identity of the resurrection body with the current body.  Eustathius 
connects “divinely-inspired citizenship” to the πνευματικόν state in the more specific 
context of the πνευματικόν body.  He also associates the πνευματικόν state with 
congruence between the person’s actions and the Spirit in this life.  Both in his 
analysis of the resurrection body, and his willingness to see the term πνευματικός as 
applying, albeit in a presumably qualified form, to current human behaviour, 
Eustathius insists that resurrected humanity is commensurable to current humanity.  
It is only in the context of human telos that he refers to a heavenly, ultimate reality 
and he consistently emphasises the commensurability of perfected humanity with 
current humanity.  Eustathius’ reference to heavenly citizenship, suggests, if 
anything, that he regarded ultimate reality as commensurable to current reality.  
 
The fact that the collection of biblical quotations referring to heaven all 
emphasise commensurability suggest that they do not form part of an alternative 
eschatological vision.  We may simply conclude Eustathius does not, after all, locate 
the kingdom in heaven, given that heaven is never the point of the quotation.  They 
may, however, anticipate heaven come down to earth, as in the final chapter of 
Revelation.
826
  Evidently, if Eustathius does believe that Christ will reign in heaven-
on-earth, he emphatically does not mean to imply that heaven-on-earth will be 
unrecognisable as the earth on which we are living.  Christ reigns qua human being; 
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as in his ontology, so in his analysis of human society – what we are now is to be 
fulfilled, not superseded. 
 
For Eustathius, Christ’s eschatological kingdom is eternal: “the human being 
…has inherited by excellence the everlasting throne.”
827
  Similarly, in Proverbs 8:22 
he refers to the apostles as “preachers of the everlasting kingdom.”
828
  He therefore 
evidently rejects the classically chiliastic idea that Christ’s earthly reign will be 
followed by the reign of God the Father.
829
  In this respect, Eustathius is evidently 
further from classic chiliast eschatology than Marcellus of Ancyra, who not only 
espoused the classic chiliast position that Christ’s earthly reign would be finite but 
also suggested that, upon the end of Christ’s reign, the Word would return to the 
Father and the incarnation would end.
830
  By contrast, Eustathius regards Christ’s 
kingship as dependent on the incarnation: “he will rule all creation alike by means of 




Chiliast eschatology and its politically confrontational implications have 
often been thought to have been alien to fourth-century, Greek-speaking 
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 However, there are clear indications that chiliasm was not an out-
dated concept in the fourth-century Greek-speaking church.  We have seen that 
Marcellus clearly believed that there would be an earthly reign of Christ.  Athanasius 
adopts a chiliastic eschatology in Historia Arianorum, in which he wishes to attack 
the pro-Arian emperor Constantius.
833
  Chiliasm is clearly an eschatological nexus 
readily available to him.  Eustathius echoes this eschatology in insisting on the reign 
of the human Christ over a corporeal, human kingdom, but diverges from it in 
claiming that this reign is eternal. 
 
There are many possible reasons for Eustathius’ position on the eternity of 
Christ’s reign.  The contrast with Marcellus is suggestive of a Christological/ 
soteriological motivation.  In avoiding the idea of an end to Christ’s reign, Eustathius 
also avoids the most problematic element of Marcellus’ theology: that the incarnation 
would end.  As I have argued elsewhere, Marcellus and Eustathius share a sense that 
Christ reigns qua human being, and this has the effect of emphasising human 
autonomy over intimacy with God – humanity has its own kind of value, distinct 
from the divine.
834
  In Eustathius, we have seen, the human Christ’s authority and 
power is dependent on his union with the Word.  A new kind of humanity is 
established with the incarnation.  In Eustathius’ view, it is not an Athanasian, 
divinised, human being who rules eternally, but it is a human being strengthened and 
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bolstered by the Word.  Human beings need God’s grace, though not God’s 
substance, to be fully human, and this grace continues eternally. 
 
Asserting the eternity of Christ’s reign must have some bearing on how far 
this reign is commensurable to the present reigns of kings and emperors.  In both the 
Book of Revelation and Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses, the earthly reign of Christ is, 
in a very significant sense, part of human history, prior to the final end that will be 
brought about with the “new heaven and the new earth.”
835
  This seems to me to 
contribute substantially to the way that Christ’s reign reflects negatively on particular 
manifestations of human power, in both texts.  Rather a lot may rest on how 
Eustathius stands in relation to this framework.  If he shares its sense of a final end of 
history, this has the effect of removing Christ’s reign from history, which makes it 
less commensurable with the emperor’s reign.  If, conversely, he shares the sense 
that Christ’s reign is historical, he has extended this historical reign forever, 
magnifying its importance.  The eternity of Christ’s reign stands as a sharp reminder 
of the transience and fragility of the emperor’s rule, and a reminder that would be all 
the more felt in a time when imperial power changed hands so quickly, and violently. 
 
God’s authority, Christ’s authority, and human authority  
The commensurability of eschatological vision with the current order vests 
this vision with particular resources to comment upon earthly power and authority 
whether or not the authority involved in the vision is part of what is commensurable.  
364 
 
The idea that life is to be entirely different in the eschaton either reflects entirely 
negatively on the present – the eschaton does represent objective perfection, but the 
present offers no opportunity to strive towards the perfection we see in the eschaton -  
or suggests that the eschaton does not provide an archetype for human society at all – 
if life is so different now, we may expect that human interaction, including structures 
of power and authority, will also be different, and the sharp contrast between the 
eschaton and the present does not reflect on either.  
 
This section argues that Eustathius views Christ’s eschatological authority as 
deriving legitimacy from its relationship to God’s authority, and that this is a 
relationship which other human authority cannot share.  Christ’s incommensurable 
authority is, however, placed in a political framework that is in other respects 
comparable.  The validity of comparison is necessary to the contrast. 
 
Writing to Alexander, Eustathius describes Melchisedek as a type of Christ 
specifically with regards to his “royalty.”
836
  Significantly, Eustathius connects 
Melchisedek’s status as a “type” of Christ with Christ/ the Word being the archetype 
of the image, and so places it in a soteriological context.  This suggests an analogy 
between Melchisedek’s royalty and Christ’s, though we don’t know how close this 
analogy is supposed to be.  Arianos, however, gives a rather different picture. 
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In Arianos, Eustathius implies that the way in which Christ’s reign receives 
legitimacy finds no equivalent in the lapsarian world order.  Christ receives his 
authority from God.  This is, in itself, entirely unremarkable but it forms an 
interesting parallel to the common idea that worldly rulers receive their authority 
from God.
837
  Eustathius frequently contrasts the authority of “the human being of 
Christ”, which is acquired, with the authority of God, both Father and Word, which 
is intrinsic and eternal: 
 
And these were neither going to be restored to the Omnipotent, to 
the one who has his own sceptre, nor to the Word who has the 
royal power itself, which the Father also has, but this will be said 
to Christ: “The Lord prepared his throne in heaven.”  For he will 




   
Eustathius believes that a human king will rule over the eschatological kingdom, 
receiving his authority from God.  Eustathius’ view of humanity’s eschatological 
authority finds a parallel in his anthropological conception of God’s image: human 
destiny is properly separate from God.  However, because Christ’s authority is 
received from God, it is not independent of God. 
 
The concept that Christ receives authority from God points to the underlying 
idea that human authority is derived from God.  However, as argued in the previous 
chapter, Eustathius connects Christ’s authority with the authority given to Adam and 
Eve by God, and lost, presumably in the lapse.  The idea that authority lost at the 
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lapse is restored to humankind when it is bestowed on Christ implies that no 
commensurable authority has existed within the lapsarian world order. 
 
We need not conclude that Eustathius completely rejected the legitimacy of 
all authority in the current world order, but he certainly seems to reject any 
identification between such authority and Christ’s authority.  It is this divinely 
derived human authority that has been absent since the lapse.  Eustathius’ 
Christology is important here, because his emphasis on the authority of the human 
being invites a comparison with the authority of other human beings more than a 
similar emphasis on divine authority would. 
 
Christ receives authority “by means of the mixing with the divine Word” – 
that is, because of the incarnation.  This does threaten to undermine Eustathius’ 
insistence that Christ reigns qua human being and touches, once again, upon a fault-
line within his conception of Christ as the archetypal human being.
839
  It also 
emphasises the uniqueness of Christ’s derived authority.  It is difficult to see how 
earthly authority within the lapsarian order could stand other than in negative 
contrast to Christ’s authority.
840
  Eustathius is not here attacking the emperor; he 
does seem to be rejecting a description of human authority favourable to Constantine. 
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The concept that authority will be restored to humankind in Christ has other 
implications for the nature of authority, already touched on in chapter 6.
841
  It 
suggests that we will all receive this authority, as we will all be raised πνευματικός.  
Our eschatological authority, then, relates to our current authority as our πνευματικός 
nature relates to our current nature: it is in a state of becoming, which must wait until 
the eschaton for fulfilment.  Let us consider the idea that Christ acts as a delegate for 
humanity.  Could an earthly ruler wield delegated authority connected to Christ’s via 
this state of becoming? I suspect not, because such an analogy would rely on a 
misinterpretation of the tension between Christ as unique and Christ as typically 
human.  In the tension between the bestowal of authority on Christ and the bestowal 
of authority on all humanity, the former more hierarchical, suggestion derives from a 
desire to see Christ reign, the latter from a desire to see all of humanity restored and 
promoted.  The rule of another individual human being (though it may aid them) 
fulfils neither of these. 
 
We saw in chapter 5 that Eustathius draws an inverse parallel between 
Christ’s power and the devil’s power.  Although his images of demonic power, and 
its ambiguous legitimacy, draw on structures of imperial power, he doesn’t want to 
ally the devil’s power with the emperor’s power, unlike the author of Revelation.  
Christ overthrows and binds the devil.  He supersedes the emperor.  Eustathius’ ideas 
about Christ’s kingship are suggestive of a sense that the authority of the empire is 
wanting.  It is part of what is held back by the lapse, not part of what is, even now, 
reaching forward to Christ’s kingdom.  These ideas do not, however, suggest an 
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attack on imperial power, so much as a refusal to give it a prime place in the 
narrative of salvation, worked out in history. 
 
Correspondingly, Eustathius’ use of the Pauline motif of ‘heavenly 
citizenship [πολίτευμα]’ suggests that Christians owe their political allegiance to God 
rather than earthly rulers.  It should be acknowledged that πολίτευμα might not refer 
to citizenship; it often refers simply to ‘way of life’.
842
  Although to claim that ‘our 
way of life is in heaven’ would still have implications for the way of life on earth, it 
would not invoke the political dimension of this life as the idea of citizenship does.  
However, it seems to me that ‘citizenship’ is, indeed, the best translation here 
because the other instance in which Eustathius uses biblical ‘heaven’ imagery is 
unashamedly political; it refers to Christ’s throne.  It is a reasonable supposition that 
Eustathius conceived of citizens of heaven to correspond to the king in heaven, who 





Eustathius’ eschatology shares with most Christian eschatology a dialectic 
between salvation and judgement.  This is because two rather different motifs, both 
of which are common in patristic thought, govern his soteriology.  One is Christ’s 
eschatological, total victory.  The other is the eschatological judgement of each 
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person before God.  We have already seen a great deal of this first motif.  To 
understand how this motif problematises that of divine judgement, we must 
remember that, within it, Christ rescues people from the devil.  Several important and 
overlapping questions arise from this dialectic, and these are the subject of this 
section: 1) what is the relationship between punishment, reward and salvation? 2) 
what is the purpose of eschatological punishment? 3) does punishment last forever? 
4) who achieves or receives salvation? 
 
The fragmented Eustathian sources leave a dappled picture in response to 
these questions.  In particular, Eustathius clearly has a picture of eternal punishment, 
but his soteriology overwhelmingly suggests that everyone will be rescued from 
captivity to the devil and achieve human τέλος.  Eustathius’ soteriology is largely 
separate from, and inconsistent with, his conception of eschatological punishment 
and reward; his punishment-reward schema for the most part relates neither to the 
transformation of human circumstance that is involved in freedom from the devil nor, 
more remarkably, to the transformation of the human person.  The two schemas 
sometimes overlap in the instance of reward because Eustathius couches it in terms 
of reward for success in battle and therefore connects it to humankind’s fight against 
the devil.
844
  Nonetheless, the salvation of God’s creation, including humanity, and 
eschatological judgement before God or Christ, are two irreducible axioms that sit 
side by side in his theology. 
                                                 
844
 Clement of Alexandria refers to “the punishment of eternal fire” (Liber Quis dives salvetur CPG, 
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Eustathius clearly believes that everyone will be resurrected: this is most 
pointedly evident in his argument for the resurrection of the body, discussed in 
chapter two.  Eustathius argues that justice demands that the whole person face the 
consequences of his or her actions.  As he is refuting the idea that a different body, or 
only a soul, is eschatologically judged, the whole person element of this belief is 
undeniably Eustathius’ focus.  Nonetheless, the idea that each person must face the 
consequences of their actions is a heavily implied corollary of Eustathius’ argument.  
The idea that people face the consequences of their actions is not a concession he 
makes to his opponents, but an axiom he shares with them.  A belief in the 
eschatological judgement of each person before God is important to the picture on 
which Eustathius bases his argument.  Eustathius makes an argument about the 
necessity of resurrection to the moral coherence of judgement.  This argument 
would, admittedly, retain structural coherence if he believed that only some people 
were raised and referred throughout his argument only to the eschatological 
judgement of those people.  However, such a basis would jar with the emotive thrust 
of his argument.  We can assume, then, that everyone is raised, and that 
eschatological events are events that happen to the reunited body and soul. 
 
Eustathius’ wider soteriological system, as outlined above, broadly lends 
itself to universal salvation in several ways.  Most fundamentally, its assumption that 
Christ represents the human race, and reforms not just himself, but ἄνθρωπος in 
general, strongly suggests that every individual ultimately achieves human telos.  
This is true of much Greek patristic soteriology.  It is pointedly true of the 
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soteriological understanding of the Christ-Adam relationship which Eustathius shares 
with Irenaeus: not only the salvific efficacy, but also the very meaningfulness of 
Christ recapitulating Adam is based on the idea that the salvation of one person 
means the salvation of all because humanity is, in the most significant sense, a unit.  I 
have already observed several caveats in the corporate anthropological assumptions 
underlying Eustathius’ soteriology.  These are also caveats to his implied 
universalism.  Christ has temporal precedence over others in achieving salvation, and 
others must follow him in order to be saved; the possibility of not following is 
implied. 
 
Eustathius’ depiction of Christ as a victorious warrior, again, lends itself to 
the idea that everybody is saved: Christ’s victory is total, and the freedom of those 
captive to the devil is central to Eustathius’ articulation of it.  Christ is victorious in 
freeing humankind from bondage to the devil.  Within this schema, in order to be 
totally victorious, he must free all of humankind.  Eustathius’ understanding of 
Christ’s descent to Hades certainly suggests that all the souls imprisoned there at that 
time are freed.  Samuel, and the just in general, are in Hades before Christ’s descent.  
Nonetheless, Eustathius does connect Christ’s descent to Hades with freedom from 
sins, and the redemptive power of Christ’s death.  It is, for example, when Christ 
went to Hades that he “ransomed” human souls.
845
  It may be justifiably objected that 
Eustathius, presumably, regarded even the just as needing forgiveness.  Nonetheless, 
in light of Eustathius’ strong connection between the devil’s dominion and human 
sin, Christ’s victory only really makes sense if it has an effect for the profoundly 
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guilty.  It is implausible that, when he writes of Christ leading the human race to 
paradise, Eustathius conceives of Christ leading only the just out of Hades, to 
paradise, and leaving others behind. 
 
Eustathius’ soteriological nexus, then, consistently and strongly suggests 
universal salvation.  Nonetheless, Eustathius evidently did not believe in universal 
salvation.  He often declares that some people will be eternally punished. 
 
Eustathius frequently writes of eschatological reward and punishment in quite 
straightforward terms.  Martyrs will receive “the wages of their pain” and the sinner, 
conversely, will be sent to “αἰωνίοις punishments.”
846
  The most obvious implication 
is that salvation and damnation are two possible options for the afterlife, and both 
result from human choice. Salvation does not apply to everybody because not 
everybody chooses that which results in salvation. 
 
Eustathius does not detail reasons for eschatological punishment.
847
  He 
typically seems to regard it as retributive and sometimes describes it as “eternal” – 
αἰώνιος.  There is, admittedly, some ambiguity about whether the term αἰώνιος 
denotes eternity, rather than simply a very long time.
848
  However, in the epitome of 
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 In contrast to Origen, who explicitly states that punishment is remedial.  See his De Princ. (CPG, 
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Lassiat, Promotion de l’homme en Jésus Christ d’après Irénée de Lyon (Tours, Mame, 1974), pp.409-
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Ariomanitas, αἰώνιος is complemented by a reference to “unquenchable fire”, which 
removes this ambiguity: 
 
someone is given over to eternal punishments, and is sent out into 
the unquenchable source of fire through which things he is said to 




Here, retribution for sin is the aim of punishment, and this punishment never ends.  It 
is difficult to see what purpose eternal punishment might possibly have other than 
retribution.  It is tempting, in light of this passage, simply to equate reward with 
salvation and punishment with its lack. This stands in sharp contrast to the sense that 
Christ destroys the devil’s dominion and thereby saves humankind. 
  
We might wish to seek a partial resolution in ideas common in the idea that 
people who live after the historical Christ event may fare worse than people living 
before it, common in Latin theology.  In this understanding, Christ did lead all the 
human souls from Hades to paradise, but those who die after this event will not 
necessarily go to paradise.  For example, Arnobius, in his Adversus nationes, writes 
that all those who died prior to Christ’s advent were freed by Christ but that, 
subsequently, only Christians receive this freedom.
850
   
 
A desire to see sinners punished makes a lot of sense coming from someone 
who had witnessed, and possibly experienced, persecution under Diocletian and his 
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successors, because it provides a mechanism by which the persecuted saints are 
avenged.  The fact that Eustathius refers to punishment and reward primarily in the 
context of martyrdom strongly suggests that he has, indeed, linked eschatological 
punishment with persecution of the church. 
 
A view of eschatological judgement as retributive for persecution does not 
require Arnobius’ belief that, of those living after Christ, only Christians will be 
saved.  It in some ways threatens to undermine it, in fact, because, if one is not a 
Christian, whether or not one has persecuted the church is an irrelevance as far as 
God’s judgement is concerned.  The parable of the Sheep and the Goats (Matt. 
25:31-46) is an important text in these discussions, partly because of its very strong 
emphasis on divisive judgement.  In Irenaeus, one of the many ideas we find is that 
the nations are to be judged on the basis of their treatment of Christians.  So, he 
refers first to Christians regularly being dependent on pagans for their basic needs, 




This view of eschatological judgement avoids the highly problematic idea 
that Christ came to damn, rather than to save.  Christ does not open the gates of 
paradise only to slam them shut again; it is a structure that can better bear the 
soteriological weight that Eustathius places on Christ’s descent to Hades and ascent 
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to paradise.  However, even in this light, Eustathius’ descriptions of eternal 
punishment significantly undermine his depiction of Christ’s victory and humanity’s 
place within it.  For example, Eustathius’ description of Christ opening the gates of 
paradise has a deliberately definitive feel: “for he…reclaimed (the) fiery sword and 
pacified the fear of the cherubim, but he removed the stubborn locks also, having 
opened the unopenable gates...”
852
  The bars to entering paradise were the locks on 
the gates of Hades, keeping souls in, and on paradise, keeping souls out.  They have 
both been removed.  Furthermore, Christ is said to have led “the human race” to 
paradise, not a large number of individuals, or particular collective.  Eustathius’ 
picture of Christ as a victorious warrior only really makes sense if everyone is 
rescued. 
 
Before the description of “αἰωνίοις punishments” in Ariomanitas, Eustathius 
suggests that rejection of salvation results in continued, even increased, enslavement 
to the devil.  He refers to Christ “crushing the heads” of the dragon, equating it with 
Christ’s triumph over the devil in Hades.
853
  Then he continues: 
 
[I]f Christ, who has been hung on the cross, gives to us the exact 
representation of his body so that, once we have partaken of the 
sacred food, we might inherit incorruptible life, it follows that also 
the many-shaped serpent, in dying, conversely, furnishes food 
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 This reference to a many-headed dragon echoes Rev. 12.2. 
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 D32:28-34 [Ariomanitas]. 
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In this picture, the destruction of the devil is actually a means by which people reap 
the results of rejecting “eternal light.”  The emphasis here is not on punishment per 
se.  God, or Christ (unusually for Ariomanitas, the distinction is a little ambiguous) 
“gives” the devil “as food” to those who have rejected Christ’s body.  He is here, as 
in the other picture, an active and willing agent, perhaps the primary active and 
willing agent, in the destruction of those who do not receive salvation.  Nonetheless, 
the causal link between a person’s choice and his or her ultimate destiny is more 
direct in this picture.  This corresponds to a tension in Eustathius’ political 
soteriology because it is linked to a sense that humanity is, at least potentially, a 
culprit as well as a victim in the drama of salvation.  Eustathius’ concept of starkly 
contrasting possible destinies is connected to a high view of human free will. 
 
This description of people masochistically gorging on the devil’s corpse 
echoes another Irenaean view of damnation, in which, similarly, people shun the 
light for themselves.  So, he claims that people receive punishment, in the form of 
separation from God, as a natural (we might suspect, strictly necessary) consequence 
of turning from God:  
 
on everyone who departs from God from their own resolve, [God] 
inflicts the separation from him that they have elected of their own 
accord…but God does not take the initiative in punishing them, 
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As punishment is separation from God, and the people receiving it have already 
separated themselves from God to some extent, there is a strong sense that people 
have not only opted for actions that deserve this punishment, but have actually opted 
for the punishment; that is, they have opted not just for their actions, but the 
consequences of their actions. Eustathius may be drawing on Irenaeus directly here, 
especially as the reference to the many-headed dragon sounds a lot like Revelation, 
which is a foundational text for book 5 of Adversus Haereses. 
 
Here, the idea is that people opt to align themselves with the devil’s defeat.  
We should take this idea seriously in Eustathius, because it goes some way to 
offering a solution to the tension between humankind as victim and humankind as 
culprit, as it is formulated in his thought.  There is a corresponding sense in which it 
also resolves the initial tension between limited salvation and the saviour’s total 
victory; Christ did defeat the devil who sowed death in the human race, and freed the 
entire human race; unfortunately, some of us have switched sides in the process.  In 
another sense, the problem remains: Christ has still descended to Hades in order to 
free the devil’s captives and ended up partaking in the ultimate destruction of some 
of the said captives.  He hasn’t altogether solved the problem he set out to solve 
being defeated, in the end, by Stockholm Syndrome. 
 
Eustathius once suggests that human beings are punished for their sins after 
they have been made perfect.  This is connected to an understanding of the 
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resurrection, in that everyone who is resurrected is πνευματικός.  We have already 
come across the first portion of the relevant fragment:  
The apostle tends to call human beings ‘soul-like’ inasmuch as 
when they sin through the soul, the communions of the divine 
Spirit are turned away, and spiritual inasmuch as, through divinely 
inspired citizenship, they partake in the Holy Spirit, accepting its 
plenty.
856
  Because of this, he wrote that a soul-like body was 
sown, which has performed manifold sins through the soul, but he 
said that this [body] is raised spiritual, since he changes the bodies 
of all those having been raised.  The bodies change their ways, no 
one at all sins anymore, having stood before the divine tribune 
striking the breast, and, repenting of those things through which 




Admittedly, this fragment is very likely to elide two passages from different portions 
of a wider discussion about resurrection, because it is implausible that Eustathius 
intends to claim that those who have received the Holy Spirit are punished for it.  
However, it is impossible to explain the impression that sinless human beings are 
punished as a false impression given by the conflation of two separate passages. 
  
The first sentence is an explanation of Paul’s use of the adjectives ψυχικός and 
πνευματικός and is most likely to have in mind people living before the eschaton, 
apiece with, if not part of, the discussion that we have evidence of in D44.  There, 
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Eustathius analyses Paul’s use of the term πνευματικός in application to the saints on 
earth in order to elucidate 1 Corinthians 15:44: “he was sown a soul-like body, raised 
a spiritual body.”
858
  The passage in question here continues in the same vein – by 
claiming that 1 Corinthians 15:44 is about eschatological moral transformation.  The 
phrase Διὰ τοῦτο σπείρεσθαι μὲν σῶμα ψυχικὸν ἔγραφε τὸ διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς 
παντοδαπὰς ἐργασάμενον ἁμαρτίας, ἐγείρεσθαι δ’αὐτο πνευματικὸν ἔλεγεν ἐπειδὴ 
πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀνισταμένων σώματα μετασχηματίζει then, probably did originally 
follow the first sentence in the fragment, as it does here (though the epitomiser may 
have changed the sentence structure).  This still seems to involve a claim that 
everyone is raised πνευματικός, but the force of claiming that πνευματικός people are 
punished is lost.  Πάντα may well be a gloss by the epitomiser, intended to link this 
passage to the next one.  Eustathius may not have intended to address the question of 
punishment here at all.  Though there is a certain universalist logic – he seems to 
think everyone is resurrected, and here, he says that resurrection involves becoming 
πνευματικός – it is no stronger than in, for example, his claims that Christ saves the 
human race. 
 
If we take it that we have two amalgamated passages, it seems likely that the 
phrase μὲν τούς τρόπους, οὐκετι δ’οὐδεὶς οὐδ’ὅλως ἁμαρτάνει πρὸ τοῦ θείου 
βήματος ἑστὼς τύπτων τὸ στῆθος καὶ μετανοῶν ἐφ’οἷς ἐσφάλη, δι’ὧν καὶ ἄγεται 
δίκας ὑφέξων belongs to the second passage.  We must assume that μετασχηματίζω 
(or a synonym) is still the verb corresponding to τούς τρόπους here, so this phrase 
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could be translated as “he changes his ways (or, everyone changes their ways?), no 
one at all sins anymore, and, repenting of those things through which he slipped, he 
is led to punishment.”  The changing of ways fits well with the picture of repentance, 
and therefore does seem to belong to this passage, rather than the one about being 
raised πνευματικός.  Eustathius may not wish to apply the verb πνευματικός to those 
being led to punishment.  However, we still have the idea that, eschatologically, 
everyone attains moral perfection and that some people are punished.  It is clear that 
Eustathius claimed both that everyone is resurrected and transformed, and that some 
are subsequently punished. 
 
So, everyone is eschatologically transformed, to a significant degree, and at 
least some of these transformed people are subsequently punished.  In the epitome, 
these passages come only shortly after the reference to “unquenchable fire.”  It is, of 
course, difficult to ascertain how close together the two descriptions of punishment 
were in Eustathius’ original text.  However, it is very likely that they were at least 
part of the same discourse which covers bodily resurrection and the nature of 
resurrected ἄνθρωπος. 
 
This passage stands in sharp contrast to the one depicting the devil’s body as 
a perversion of the Eucharist.  Here, people stand, perfected, before God’s judgement 
seat and receive punishment and, at the time of receiving punishment, they regret 
their previous misdeeds.  Those who receive the poisonous anti-Eucharist still desire 
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it.  They do not exactly desire a punishment, because they do not see it as such, and 
this is not, anyway, exactly what is given to them.
859
  There are two substantially 
different pictures here.  In one, unrepentant sinners are masochistic, and God 
ultimately gives them what they mistakenly want.
860
  In the other, there is no such 
thing as an ultimately unrepentant sinner.  People are punished, after the problem of 
their sin has been solved, and they see it for what it is.  This latter picture is more 
typical of Eustathius.  Let us return to his response Origen’s claim that Christ, when 
in Hades, was above “with respect to προαίρεσις.”
861
  Everyone, Eustathius retorts 
“even those who have made no effort to lead a righteous life” were above “with 




As demonstrated earlier, in Engastrimytho, Hades is always somewhat 
negative but is a place of punishment specifically for sinners.  This is significant 
now, because it means that Eustathius is saying, among other things, that obviously, 
no one actually wants punishment whilst they are undergoing it.  This jars with his 
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picture of the people receiving the devil’s body in place of Christ’s.  It is, however, 
unclear whether the souls in Hades have repented of the sins for which they are being 
punished, as those beating their breasts before the divine judgement seat have. 
Eustathius here uses προαίρεσις to mean “preference”, and the context of his 
argument – of course no one prefers to be in Hades – does not require its connotation 
of a preferred course in matters of ethics.  However, the terms in which Eustathius 
writes of people wanting to be delivered from Hades, whilst ambiguous, suggest an 
ethical slant.  Eustathius writes that people desire “τῶν ἄνω φορῶν.”  Greer and 
Mitchell, despite translating Eustathius’ προαίρεσις as “ethical purpose”, supply 
τόπων from the previous sentence and correspondingly translate the phrase “the 
fruitful lands above.”
863
  This could imply simply that no one wants to be in Hades 
because it is not a nice place to be.  No repentance is required. 
 
Declerck, conversely, evidently thinks that the passage refers to a kind of 
inner yearning for better things, because he suggests a parallel with Plato’s 
discussion of the ascent of musical motions.
864
  This reading of the text corresponds 
well to the picture of people beating their breasts before being led to punishment, 
though it reads rather a lot into what seems to be quite a straight-forward argument 
on Eustathius’ part.   
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At any rate, in his argument against Origen’s reading, Eustathius insists that a 
preference not to be in Hades is universal and unambiguous. The difference between 
Eustathius and Origen is readily explained by a difference in their soteriology: 
Origen believes that people continue in moral struggle after death, as this is part of 
their gradual, fluctuating progress towards perfection.  Whilst we cannot preclude a 
concept of post-mortem ethical struggle in Eustathius, it does not seem to be in his 
thoughts here, within an anyway tangled picture of Hades.  At this point, even those 
who have not sought to live a good life wish they had, Eustathius seems to be 
arguing.  This also coheres with his picture of people in Hades as prisoners of the 
devil: now they see the devil’s tyranny for what it is, and long to escape it.
865
  In this 
passage, Eustathius may not envision penitent souls, but he does at least have  a very 
strong sense that people have a clearer perspective on this life once it is over, if only 
because this is forced upon them by its consequences.  
 
In Ariomanitas however, Eustathius goes further than this and suggests that 
people are punished when truly repentant and also transformed, even if not in the 
sense of being πνευματικός.  This problematic passage must be considered in light of 
what else we know about Eustathius’ understanding of the resurrection and the 
πνευματικός state.  Drawing on chapter two, we can summarise as follows: 1) 
Salvation consists in essential transformation.  This is, more specifically, conformity 
to Christ, that is, becoming πνευματικός and is closely connected with the final 
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resurrection. 2) Everyone will be resurrected.  3) Following resurrection, some 
people will be rewarded for their earthly lives, others will be punished. 
 
How does this picture fit with Eustathius’ suggestion that everyone will be 
transformed?  It is one natural conclusion of the belief that everyone will be 
resurrected.  However, here he suggests that everyone will be transformed and that 
some will be rewarded, others punished.  It seems, firstly, that everyone is not 
transformed to the same degree; though he does think that those punished are sinless 
and penitent, he does not, apparently, use the term πνευματικός in reference to them. 
This would not remove the problem presented by the association between 
resurrection and the πνευματικός state, but it would suggest that it belonged to a 
different discourse.  It is also possible that the punishment described in this passage 
is retributive but not eternal.  In this case, the accomplishment of perfection would 
not be squandered in eternal fire.  Alternatively, he has, in this passage, synthesised 
the wider, universalist sense of his soteriology with his belief in eternal punishment.  
Everyone is saved from bondage to the devil, and is transformed into the ultimate 
human state, but they nonetheless get, as it were, what they deserve on the basis of 
their life in a lapsarian world.  This rather chilling synthesis is, however, implausible 
because salvation is no longer a cause for rejoicing per se.  It also ignores the very 
significant aspect of Eustathius’ soteriology which focuses on the forgiveness of sins. 
It is more likely that the people led to punishment here will eventually be released 
from it, and that this is either a qualification of Eustathius’ claims about αἰῶνος 





The dialectic between universal and particular salvation in Eustathius 
partially corresponds to his dialectic between lapsarian humanity as victim and 
lapsarian humanity as culprit.  Where humanity is depicted as imprisoned, it is freed.  
Where it is depicted as guilty, individual members achieve salvation on the basis of 
reformation.  This correspondence is imperfect because the distinction between 
human sin and human captivity is often blurred, and Christ’s redemptive sacrifice 
often appears to be universally applied.  Thus Eustathius writes that “If, through one 
human being, salvation began for all human beings, clearly, [his] soul ransomed 
souls of the same kind.”
866
  Nonetheless, where salvation and its lack are seen in 
terms of morality and immorality respectively, the possibility of damnation maintains 
the variety of moral possibilities.  Eustathius’ picture of the redemption of the 
penitent thief is a good example of this: the penitent thief is deeply sinful, but in 
struggling with the devil and, through Christ’s help, repenting, opts for salvation and 
wins a battle with the devil.  Eustathius’ soteriology is inconsistent, once again, 
because he is grappling with how human free will plays out in human destiny. 
 
Eustathius’ writings contain irreconcilable ideas about whether salvation 
applies to every member of the human race.  His soteriology overwhelmingly 
suggests that it does, but he also very clearly articulates a belief that some people 
will be eternally punished, others rewarded.  It is very likely that Eustathius did 
believe that some people would be eternally punished, in spite of his soteriological 
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system.  However, we cannot altogether exclude the possibility that the ambiguities 
raised by much of his soteriology point to an alternative understanding. 
 
The common tension between universal salvation and divisive judgement is a 
tension, in part, between two ways in which eschatological events render history 
intelligible:
867
 God’s providential ordering of history and God’s judgement for the 
sinfulness of history.  There are two different ways in which God must redeem the 
tragedies presented by history: he must rescue what he has created, but he must also 
render human action in history meaningful, via judgement. 
 
Conclusion 
Eustathius believes that there will be a corporeal, and in some sense earthly, 
kingdom of Christ.  Unfortunately, the details of this kingdom are unclear, but he 
does have a clear sense of commensurability between the current world and the 
eschatological world.  This reinforces many other aspects of his theology and, 
notably, his insistence on the identity between the resurrection body and the current 
one.  He does not want to conceive of ultimate human identity as removed from the 
world in which we currently live, having a strong sense that what we are is what we 
are now.  Consistently, therefore, he avoids conceiving of eschatological 
transformation as a transformation of our nature. 
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In patristic thought (though not exclusively there), history makes sense in 
light of eschatological events.  Eschatology reflects on history.  The manner, as well 
as the content, of its reflection on history was diverse across patristic texts.  Because 
eschatology is an end, in which telos is achieved, history has teleological value.  This 
is clear in both Irenaeus and Origen.  However, Irenaeus also holds eschatological 
reality as commensurable to current reality, and in doing so vests history with 
intrinsic value, in addition to teleological value.  In this respect, Eustathius is much 
closer to Irenaeus, and the apocalyptic tradition on which he is drawing, than to 
Origen. 
 
Eustathius does, however, conceive of eschatological transformation; the 
world will be commensurable to what it is now, but it will be very different.  This 
reflects negatively on the current world order (and, arguably, more negatively than 
an ethereal eschatology might tend to).  This comes out most clearly in his discourse 
on Christ’s authority; because it is, emphatically, human authority, it is implicitly 
placed in contra-distinction to other human authority.  Christ’s authority is authority 
restored to him on behalf of humanity, having been lost in Adam and Eve.  This has 
two effects: firstly, it relativises the sense, noted in the previous chapter, of 
eschatological subjection to Christ.  Secondly, it problematises any comparison with 




A number of themes in Eustathius’ discourse on power, whether directly or 
otherwise, are indebted to Revelation: the inverse parallelism between the devil’s 
power and Christ’s; the description of the devil as a many-headed serpent; the 
commensurability between current reality and eschatological reality.  It is uncertain 
whether Eustathius regards Revelation as canonical, but he does seem to be drawing 
on a tradition in which it was an important imaginative resource. 
 
Eustathius’ view of eschatological judgement contains a tension: he explicitly 
and clearly believes that some people will be eternally punished, but the dominant 
motifs of his soteriology all point towards universal salvation.  This is a common 
dynamic in patristic soteriology.  It is further complicated by disparate ideas about 
the experience of eternal punishment: sometimes, people are punished for sins of 
which they have repented, sometimes, they revel in their punishment.  Eustathius’ 
view of eschatological judgement here reflects a host of competing axioms. 
 
Eustathius’ eschatology, insofar as the sources permit judgement, bears some 
marks of a chiliasm which was declining during his lifetime.  His use of it reflects 
both a commitment to embodied existence and an ambivalence about the current 
world order, which made him feel that it could not be this creation’s final 
manifestation.  However, he has combined it with other ideas, and drawn on chiliasm 







Theological anthropology was profoundly important to the thought of 
Eustathius of Antioch.  Eustathius’ approach to anthropology was inevitably shaped 
by his context – both the intellectual milieu of fourth-century Christianity, and his 
experience within and observation of the church and the Roman Empire in the 
tumultuous decades of Constantine’s reign. 
 
Eustathius devotes a great deal of attention to anthropological ontology, 
within which he wishes to articulate human experience both in terms of embodied 
souls and ensouled bodies.  He conceives of the relationship between the human 
body and soul in terms of a hylomorphic dualism.  Within this framework, there is a 
sense in which the body’s potential is fulfilled by the soul, and a sense in which the 
human person’s potential is fulfilled by the union of body and soul.   
 
Pointedly, body and soul can exist apart from each other.  This allows 
Eustathius’ picture of the soul between death and resurrection to cohere with his 
wider anthropological ontology in a strictly structural sense.  Nonetheless, 
Eustathius’ discourse on the soul between bodily death and resurrection does have a 
significantly different emphasis.  This is because he vests a great deal of importance 
in the activity of the disembodied soul and does occasionally equate the disembodied 
soul with the person, despite his protestations to the contrary.  Here he is drawing on 
a very common patristic collection of narratives about souls in Hades and paradise 
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respectively and this leads him to a different place than his more explicitly 
philosophical reflections on the person in the present life. 
 
Aristotelian influences are found across much of Eustathius’ anthropological 
ontology: his view of soul-body relations, his physiology, and his attack on 
transmigration.  There is little evidence that Eustathius self-defined as a follower of 
Aristotle, but the influence on him of the Aristotelian tradition was very significant.  
This was, however, an Aristotelianism profoundly marked by Platonism.  Eustathius 
is sincere in touting his dislike for Plato, but he cannot avoid Plato’s pervasive 
intellectual legacy.  This is reflected in the fact that he adopts the broadly Platonic 
metaphysical categories, perceptible and intelligible and (perhaps accurately), 
interprets Aristotelian hylomorphism as cohesive with these categories. 
 
Perhaps the most striking element of Eustathius’ anthropology is that he 
simultaneously insists that the soul undergoes passions and maintains a monistic 
conception of the soul.  The experience of passions is not only inevitable for the soul, 
it is natural and desirable.  This particularly comes across in his discussion of 
Christ’s grief on the cross: Christ’s soul should be grieving.  This shows a profound 
concern for human emotional experience.  It is not clear how this relates to rational 
thought, particularly in Eustathius’ concept of will, but it is evident that the rational 
faculty and the faculty of emotions such as sorrow are contained within the same 
entity, if they are not indeed one and the same thing.  Eustathius also connects this 
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back to the body – the soul most often requires the body to undergo passion, just as 
the body requires the soul. 
 
Eustathius’ theology of the image of God reinforces his sense of the body’s 
importance by locating the image partly, if not mainly, in the body.  It is significant, 
however, that when he describes the body without the soul qua image, he still 
conveys a sense of its incompletion. 
 
A parallelism between Adam and Christ is evident in Eustathius’ image 
theology, and this comes out in a persistent emphasis on Christ’s full and perfect, 
humanity across his soteriology.  A key element in this soteriology looks to progress 
from beyond the original condition, and echoes a basically optimistic attitude to the 
world as it is, found prominently in the thought of Irenaeus.  This is, however, held 
together with a strong sense of the lapse, and its catastrophic consequences.  
Humanity is degenerate and enslaved.  The extant sources give rather more time to 
this aspect of Eustathius’ soteriology, but we cannot tell which, if either, of these 
ideas was more important to Eustathius.  He himself, at any rate, places them within 
a single overarching narrative, as our salvation from slavery and degeneration 
culminates in our progression to the πνευματικός state.  This he has in common with 
much patristic theology, but the clear echo of a more specific tradition, most often 
associated with Irenaeus, is still notable.  Older German scholarship is to some 




A sense of disjunction between humankind and God recurs in many areas of 
his theology: his highly divisive Christology, and related sense that the Spirit 
strengthens, rather than imbues, the person; his claim that humanity is not “true” 
image of the Son, as the Son is of the Father; his belief that it is the human being of 
Christ who will reign eschatologically, placing eschatological society at a distance 
from God.  This disjunction does strongly reflect a normative contemporary 
engagement with Platonism, which places God, definitively, on one side of a 
temporal-eternal divide, and everything else on the other.  However, even a cursory 
glance at the theology of Athanasius should remind us that a radically, and necessary, 
disjunction between God and humankind is not an inevitable consequence of this 
metaphysics. 
 
Eustathius’ theology can give a sense of isolation from God, although it must 
be allowed that this is only relative to other patristic interpretations of the God-
human relationship, and is not absolute.  All of the ideas suggesting that humanity is 
isolated from God also carry a sense of the person’s intrinsic autonomy.  Eustathius 
(completely unremarkably) conceives of eschatological freedom in terms of the 
freedom to do the right thing, and this might seem to undermine, or at least, qualify, 
his emphasis on autonomy.  However, to draw this conclusion is to misunderstand 
both the nature of Eustathian autonomy, and freedom to do the right thing.  His 
concept of eschatological freedom is fundamentally optimistic about human nature.  
If human beings are acting wrongly, it is because they are constrained, in some sense, 
to do so.  In locating the eschatological absence of sin in human nature he makes it a 
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fundamentally human endeavour, which has less to do with obedience than it does to 
do with a proper understanding of the situation, and an ability to act accordingly. 
 
Eustathius displays a clear antipathy to many anthropological principles he 
associates with Origen, and here he draws on Methodius’ critique of him.  However, 
his critique of Origen is, like Methodius’ own, complex.  It is also independent.  He 
not only rejects anthropological ideas that Methodius shared with Origen – such as 
the location of God’s image in the soul, rather than the body – but follows Origen in 
ways that Methodius does not – in the doctrine of Christ’s human soul, and the soul’s 
corresponding mediating role.  
 
Throughout Eustathius’ theology, there is a desire to ground the fulfilment of 
human potential in observable reality.  In his anthropological ontology, what the 
person was created to be must be commensurable with what the person is now.  His 
eschatology is consistent with this: he has a concrete vision of a perfect society 
commensurable to the current one.  This enables his eschatology to reflect a sense of 
discomfiture with the current world order and, more concretely, his dislike of the 






































Translations of Greek and Latin fragments cited 
 
These are translations of Declerck’s text, except where otherwise stated. 
Note: I have not included fragments referred to only in introducing a writing, or only 
as part of a comment on word frequency.  Occasionally, I have offered only the 
relevant sections of longer fragments.  With regards to the epitome of Ariomanitas 
and the Latin fragments, I have generally attempted no retroversion to the original 
text (even where I have suggested a retroversion in the body of the thesis), but have 





[Questions of those stirring up war around Arius]: ‘After Christ had come to visit 
among human beings, like according to body, did he not also bear a human soul?’ 
Then they bring on “what then? It is absurd to think that the Lord bore the form of a 
human soul, since he appears after he has been united with the Holy Spirit.  For the 
bodies of other human beings have been formed being unmoving in themselves.  
Therefore, the body needed the power of moving.  On which account the souls have 
come to be, in order that, having been left behind in the bodies, they might breathe 
life-giving power into them, so that through these things the unmoving dwellings are 
led and moved to partake also of mind and thought and reason.  Furthermore, once 
the unfeeling body of the first-formed was moulded, it received movement from the 
rational soul that had been moulded by the divine inflation.
868
  And as the body of 
Christ was holy through the Spirit, and lived together with it from beginning to end 
in this way, what did it need the soul for, when the “divine Spirit of wisdom”
869
 was 
dwelling in it and moving the instrument, and laying down will and mind and good 
sense as a foundation, teaching knowledge of the best and the most excellent things 
and offering the voice and written word?” 
 
2 
‘Two unlike natures do not dwell around the one nature of the body, as they are 
different from each other in nature.  Nor is it right’ they say ‘that where the Holy 
Spirit was dwelling, the form of the soul had been mixed and was partaking in the 
reforming acts being done through him, as if the Spirit were not sufficient in 
abundant worthiness to be in place of the soul.’  And God himself is advanced, being 
made out as a witness, sometimes through the prophet Isaiah calling on the lawless 
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 Exodus 31.3, 35.1. 
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Jews: “My soul hated your fasts and leisure and holy days”, sometimes through 
Jeremiah, calling prophetically upon Jerusalem: “be chastened, Jerusalem, lest my 
soul turns from you.”
870
 ‘And so here,’ they say ‘God says he has a soul.  Not, of 
course, that he possesses a human soul; rather, he means the divine Spirit, which is 
invisible, limitless and incomprehensible.  Thus it is necessary to think also about 
Christ.  And Moses says in Leviticus “I will stand my covenant among you and my 
soul will not abhor you.” ’
871
 They are turned around in their own problems.  For if, 
on the one hand, God and the Father took up human nature, as did his most divine 
Son, they would throw forward these sayings properly.  But if, on the other hand, the 
incorporeal Father never yet for himself embraced a perceptible body, but his Child 
was made human, having cast around a way of life in human beings, what sort of 
coherence do these premises have? 
 
3 
Because whenever the all-ruling God talks as if he has a soul, as he is a divine Spirit 
and stands very far from a body, it is clear that he is not talking about a human soul 
but about an intelligible thing and some divine breath.  And when his true Son cast 
over himself a bodily organ in the form of a man and contracted himself in 
proportion with other human frames, not above normal in measure, not wanting in 
width, not leading in number or multitude of limbs, it is a agreed upon everywhere at 
once that he has a soul with a body. 
 
4 
Since God declared in many places of scripture that a heart together with the soul 
existed with him, it is necessary to confess that it is a kind of intelligible heart – for 
the bodiless is not able to have a bodily part.  Going along these lines, he will not 
need to say that Christ took up and bore a heartless body, will he? For if he did not 
need a soul, as those opposing say, neither did he need a heart, nor any of the internal 
organs, since each of these provisions has been created for the sake of the 
stewardship of eating, in order that the body should ripen and feed and send the 
materials being brought in in the right direction.  Then, these things being issued 
forth into humours and bile, some things being sifted beside everything, are delivered 
to the bulks of the body, whilst others are turned into blood.  Flowingly, it withdraws 
into the blood vessels; others change into bile and phlegm; the roughness and 
excrement is passed in clots through the thicker of the intestines and into the 
outermost places and it is secreted through these.  And if the entrails and throat and 
belly and the other holders of these things are prepared for the sake of food, and 
through these, for living – for this is germane to the question – then neither for these, 
did he need a soul that could move and revolve the bodily instrument, as I already 
said according to the true word.  For in this case he entirely bore imperishable life 
itself, and he by no means needed the ripe things being delivered from the earth, 
because he was nourished from heaven and so lacked nothing.  So therefore, 
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according to these men, if indeed Christ, received the soulless bulk of a body, it was 
free from natural desire, without bowls, heartless and liverless,
872
 and, the overall, a 
statue and not a human being, the shape having been cast on from the beginning, and 
the innermost stamp having fled. 
 
D6 
Let the opposition say, since the very Word of God is also God, whether he is 
impassible, or whether he is held fast inside by passions and change?  For if, he is 
susceptible to passions, they anathematise themselves, because they have denied his 
immutability in writing, in public and also in private, after having agreed to it in the 
assembly.  And if, on the other hand, he is unmoved - as he is - when he reaches the 
right time for bodily death, what was pained? Who is it who said “My soul is greatly 
pained until death”?
873
  But pain and tears and laughter and sleep and hunger and 
thirst and desire and longing and anger and wrath and things such as these, which are 
established to be passions, bring to light the mutability spoken of.  If therefore, the 
divine Word is immutable, what is the thing that changes and that was subjected to 
sufferings of great pain? Isn’t it a soul? 
 
D7 
He did not say “my body is in greatest pain” in order that someone who had received 
this from above should not think that, while the Spirit itself was remaining for the 
soul, the very the temple of the body suffered according to itself, but he said “my 
soul is in greatest pain.”
874
  For the suffering principally falls upon the soul and has 
dealings with it.  Therefore, the soul does not gush forth tears apart from a body, and 
nor will a body cry joylessly asunder from a soul, but the thing having a 
proportionate mixture from both does these things.  Because the soul clings to it, 
digesting entirely pain and joy at once; applying fire, it heats the water, and when 
this is burning, it comes up through the eyes.  Partly the liquid is turned into vapour, 
partly it is secreted through the larger well springs.  That these are passions of soul 
and body, no one may deny.  Indeed one must not apply these things to the divine 
Spirit, since the divine is far from all that lowers its condition. 
 
D8 
It is clear when he is sleeping visibly upon the ship that he is no less than the same 
image of union, leading humanity into perfection out of both parts.  For, clearly, he 
would not have needed sleep, having been changed, if he had not indeed taken to 
himself the soul and the body.  Therefore, whenever the body, being led around, 
would grow sufficiently weary, on one had the soul, taking heed of its own tent, 
shares in suffering with it, this change establishing the limit of the capacities.  On 
one hand, both [soul and body] together desire to keep still, and they give up the 
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labours at an interval, in order that the powers might recuperate again, receiving 
relaxation between the strength of the tendons.  On the other, resuming, they reignite 
the straining of bodily strength.  And if at one time it is pained by greater toil, or by 
the sharp invasions of fever that comes afterwards, or by a broken off piece in the 
deepest wounds, or having the colic and a spinning in the head mangling the inner 
parts, even by the pains themselves the soul is compelled to pay attention, in no way 
being able to be still.  When sleeplessness lodges with the body, the soul supplies 
lack of strength.  And, sleep failing, after bodily death attacks suddenly, the union of 
the two breaks off.  Therefore, suffering is shared between body and soul.  In the 
same way as it is the business of other human beings to sleep by being surrounded by 
rest through both soul and body, thus it is the business of the one who has been 
joined together [with the Word].  Someone acting the fool may not say persuasively 
that this relates to the perceptible body alone, bringing forward soulless bodies.  For 
this is from a much inopportune mythology.  Consequently, this passion was of a 
human being who had a soul, and not the divine which is far from every passion. 
 
D9 
And in these things, “having toiled on the journey”, and, resting himself “on the 
fount”
875
, it hints at the context of these actions.  For if the immutable Word is also 
God, what is the thing that has been surrounded from below in weariness and 
passions? “The body,” someone might perhaps respond.  Testing this, someone 
might say “what then, o best of men, is a better explanation?  To say that the body 
suffers apart from the soul, whilst it is not able to obtain for itself, according to itself, 
one sensible perception? Or that a mutable thing and the divine Spirit are constrained 
to be in harmony? Or that a soul is joined together with the body? Or he suffered in 
seeming and not in truth all the things at to the time of suffering, and before the cross 
the Lord did not receive the passions that are natural and unexceptionable?” For also, 
“eating and drinking”
876
 the things offered not unreasonably, he had been equipped 
with limbs, things able to receive food. 
 
D10 
Since these people purport to agree with what has been written, if the unchanging 
Spirit dwelling in Christ was present from beginning to end, given that he turned the 
mind to love of food, he was clearly hungry, and never yet without the soul did the 
body, according to itself, grasp at food.  For, after the perceptible tabernacle of the 
psychic
877
 movements had been shared, he gave up neither food nor drink, since the 
Lord defined food as the soul’s business.  He says, “Do not worry your souls about 
what you eat or what you drink,”
878
 as if the matter of food primarily concerns the 
soul.  And the Lord used to eat openly in diverse distant feasts, sometimes sitting at 
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table among the disciples, sometimes eating together with the tax collectors, and, for 
the sake of the salvation of everyone, he did not decline to drink with the sinful, 
making them righteous.  Hence, once the devil saw that he underwent desire, tempted 
him lavishly, as he lies in wait shamelessly for the souls of human beings.  So he 
took up a soul, as he took a body, having put on the perfect human being. 
 
D11 
The Lord did not take up half of a perfect human being, having mutilated the better 
part.  Although the divine writings, throughout which he acts like someone with a 
soul, might not actually say that he has taken up the organ of the soul, it is necessary 
to believe sincerely that he prepared a perfect temple for himself.  For, since, where 
it is written that the first-formed human was created, this is not laid out according to 
nature and manner either, he will need to say that the first human being was a 
practice, without feet, without hands, without a stomach; but just as we believe from 
speaking and hearing and working and walking around, that all human beings 
proportionately have the appropriate constitution of limbs, thus also through the 
marks of Christ’s human passions and all his earthly movements, clearly one must 
hold that he was not soulless, nor was he formed as of statue of the best kind. 
 
D12 
Being thrown by argumentative words, and having been forced into a corner, they are 
compelled, not unreasonably, to allegorise the famine, the tears, the pain, the sleep 
and the toils.  Therefore, if [lacuna] they handle these things allegorically, they will 
need to allegorise the whole bodily birth and be prepared to think of the way of death 
differently, and to interpret figuratively the information about the resurrection, and 
still indeed the cross and the beatings and the wounds of the spitting and all the 
sufferings that occurred at that time.  But if they deem none of those worthy to be 
changed in some sense, but deem it worthy to receive as it is laid down, in order that 
they may not say that everything happened in seeming, but not truly, it is necessary 
to guard, unshaken, natural desire and the rest of the passions, as many as concern 
the body and the soul, which are siblings in these things. 
 
D13 
Proclaiming the words to be a metaphor, they change the acts.  Desiring to allegorise, 
they speak in accord with Marcion’s followers, taking away everything around 
Christ’s business so that all things were done in seeming and by a charade.  And they 
adduce as a witness the story of what happened to Abraham.
879
  For, they say, at this 
time three men were seen, from among whom one was proclaimed to be judge and 
lord – this was Christ, but the others were clearly shown to be angels.  Though these 
[visitors] were bodiless, they were indeed seen to have human shapes, and the 
patriarch prostrated before them and entered into his tent, after they had washed their 
feet with water and partaken of the suckling calf and the things that had been cooked 
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and placed before them.  Thus, they say that this was also how, having visited in the 
last times, Christ seemed indeed to eat or drink or do all things as if he had a body, 
but in fact he was bodiless and needed none of these things.  But that each of these 
people is raging and acting crazily, no one is likely to dispute.  For what admits a 
comparison of these things with those?  For in the case of Abraham and Lot and all 
of the others, these events passed over all in a brief moment, just as some righteous 
men receive, in a manner, a share of a vision; some divine glory was also visiting 
constantly, prefiguring the bodily presence of Christ.  Therefore, the human form is 
also imaged, partly through the judge of everything, partly through the angelic 
spirits.  And when the events were completed, in one case, not one outward 
appearance was left, in the other, by clearer pursuits, God, having come through a 
human being, was shown openly. 
 
D15a 
And saying that, they ascribe to him a great weakness, since he did not give up his 
own body willingly into slaughter for the sake of the salvation of human beings – 
how absurd – as he could not stop the attack of the enemies, and he betrayed the 
blameless substitute to the blood-guilty men.  The first thing is absurd; as to the 
second, in addition to these other objections: who was this, who was crucified at this 
time, and what kind of man was he and how old was he?  For many righteous men 
have been killed, and many prophets have been murdered, and many martyrs have 
been tortured during interrogation.  They have been burnt through with sharp strokes, 
just like the bodily strength of the old chief priest Eleazar, at the victory feast of the 
seven brothers and their mother, not one of whom fell from the brotherly virtue.  But 
who beheld any of these incredible narratives with wonder?  For when who had died, 
did such great winds disrupt the entire earth, that, being shaken root and branch, it 
moved out of the inmost parts, and the light of day changed into night as “the sun 
failed?”
880
 When who has died does the steward see that the rocks are broken? But in 
order that I should not spend the time describing each according to its form and 
nature, let’s just ask who, after he has died, raised the dead? For, he raised “many 
bodies of the saints who had been asleep.”
881
  And if the one who was crucified did 
this, clearly he was not a person who this happened to by chance, but he was our 




Through very little it is possible to refute their ungodly slander.  For, at best, unless 
he willingly gave up his body into the slaughter of death for the sake of the salvation 
of human beings, firstly they ascribe great weakness to him, suggesting that he could 
not stop the attack of the enemies. 
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If before the passion he used to predict his bodily death, every time saying that he 
would be handed over to those around the chief priests, and after the passion, having 
risen from the dead on the third day, while the disciples were doubting, he appeared, 
confessing that he had “flesh with bones”
882
, submitting the wounded side to their 
eyes, showing the “places of the nails”
883
, he taught them that it was necessary that, 
after Christ had suffered, he was raised on the third day from the depths – and God 
would not lie, speaking in bodily form through his own temple – and it is not 
possible that death happened without a soul or the thing that suffered everything, 
then Christ did not take up a body alone, but also a soul. 
 
D16b 
Indeed before the passion he used to predict his bodily death, each time saying he 
would be handed over to those around the chief priests, announcing the trophy of the 
cross.  And after the passion, having risen from the dead on the third day, while the 
disciples were doubting that he was raised, after he had been shown to them in an 
actual body, he both confesses that he has entirely “flesh with bones”, and he submits 
to their gaze the wounded sides, showing them the places of the nails. 
 
D17 
If, also, the scriptures say mysteriously that God was made angry, inscribing anger 
and some other passions,
884
 because what is righteous avenges unrighteousness, he 
nonetheless never alters in proper virtue.  And with this, it will not be necessary, 
using the same line of argument as the model, to take away the pain which has 
befallen the human being of Christ.  For one mind is appointed to the divine Spirit, as 
it is said, whilst another is appointed to the humanity.  Indeed, the pain falls upon the 
human being of Christ in addition to all the other harmless passions which occur 
throughout life.  The pain is for the sake of the divine economy.  For truly the 
passion falls on the deepest parts of the soul unseen, and, being hidden on one hand 
by the invisible nature of the unknown things, on the other, it is apparent to the 
many, being imperceptibly turned to good in the secret destiny.  And he has clear 
tests of the wellsprings of tears and the downcast appearance.  But to allegorise the 
tears is to deny the cross and the death.  And if these things really happened, then 
neither is it fitting to speaking figuratively about the food or the drink nor to 
allegorise the hunger or thirst.  And if he is said to be hungry and thirsty, a yearning 
for food and drink is put in the soul by the body, [lacuna] supplying the desire.  Thus 
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Whenever we should hear of someone announcing, like the Marcionites, that Christ 
is seen in a shape here upon the earth, having been shown forth in seeming, a man-
shaped statue of God, we shudder, we are smitten in soul, we turn to flight, we dart 
away from the heralds, we fortify the ears, we bridle the mouths, we force back the 
tongues, we gag the lips, we put to silence the organs of speech with every power, 
lest some who have heard should be defiled by the ungodly words.  And whenever 
the ‘stirrers up of war around Arius’ introduce many new, hollow loves of popularity, 
we in no part agree to pass over the apostasy.  For these very men say that the Son of 
God became a child of the all-powerful God in seeming, both having been created 
out of not being and not begotten from him.  And they say that the Father is father in 
seeming, if indeed he did not beget naturally, and is not a father of a true child.  And 
he took up the human being in seeming, and not a human being, but some other 
likeness that was fashioned as a parody of this.  A human being is, properly, one 
from soul and body, not one who has been limb- formed, with only a soulless body.  
So, then he was not responsible for the salvation of the soul.  And how did he speak 
when refuting the Jews: “why do you seek me to kill a person who has told you the 
truth”?
885
  But if he did not take up a soul, how is he a human being? Consequently, 
thinking superstitiously like the Greeks, they not only declare that the Child of God 
was half god, but also that he was half human.  And they do this in order that, having 
attached the alterations involved in passions to the divine Spirit, they might seduce 
the simpler people recklessly, as the mutable is not begotten from the nature of the 
immutable.  For if someone should grant to them that Christ did not take up a soul, 
they reply: ‘What then is the thing dwelling inside the tabernacle that is passionately 
grieved?
886
 Isn’t it the very “Sprit of wisdom”?
887
 And if it is grieved and cries and 
becomes tired, it is capable of passions.  And if it undergoes passion and changes, 




Why do they consider it so important to show that Christ took up a soulless body, 
forming old wives deceptions? In order that, if they may be able to gradually corrupt 
some people, decreeing that these things are so, in this case having attached the 
alterations involved in passions to the divine Spirit, they might easily persuade them, 
as the mutable is not begotten from the nature of the immutable. 
 
D20 
From the same words of the saviour, it is possible to show the opponents babbling.  
For these words say “no one has ever gone to heaven except the one who came from 
heaven, the son of humanity, who is in heaven.”
888
  Consequently, not only did the 
unattainable Word of God “fasten himself to heaven, and was upon earth” but also 
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acting as God  himself, he allotted such great increase of authority to the human 
being who had contained him that, through the soul he at once both traverses the 
entire earth and dwells in the heavenly bodies.  For we say that the son of humanity, 
rather than the Son of God, has passed into heaven, and came from heaven itself, and 
being in heaven again, continues unshakably.  He led the ascending occupations of 
the soul.  Or let the pretenders say that Christ took up a soulless body.  When he was 
on the earth opposite Nicodemus,
889
 addressing him, he expressly confesses that the 
son of humanity was going about and dwelling in heaven.  Which of the human parts 
was able to do these things, except the form of the soul, which was led by spiritual 
impulses?  But dwelling together with the divine Word, he held for himself such a 
great freedom that he entered heaven itself.  Consequently, human nature being 
divided into two parts, the perceptible and the intelligible, it is necessary for us to 
think truly that, as Christ walked about here on earth in body, in soul he walked in 
the high heavens, and touched the foundations of the earth, and touches lightly upon 
the innermost depths, being treated far better than the angelic spirits, as he had been 
united with the divine Word.  This is also shown from the words “And what if you 
should see the son of humanity going up where he was before.  It is the Spirit that is 
life-giving, the flesh profits nothing.  The words that I have spoken to you are Spirit 
and life.”
890
  He was by no means saying by this that his own flesh which he 
displayed was useless, but he taught clearly, that the life-giving thing is, in the first 
instance, the divine “Spirit of wisdom.”
891
  And if someone, looking at the bodily 
organ, does not know the holy movements of the Spirit and names them to be human 
and not God, he stumbles in judgement, and is able to be profited nothing from 
looking according to the power of sight. 
 
D21 
As Christ said to the thief, “today you will be with me in paradise”
892
, unless he had 
a soul that was able to do these things, the opponents must say one of these two 
things: either he lies to the thief, and has not fulfilled his promise, or he was not shut 
up in the grave for three days.  But if both of these unshaken things are deemed 
worthy to remain, by what method do they handle the narrative? “So behold,” they 
say “that the dead body was lying in the tomb, but the Word, having received the 
thief, led him into the pasture of paradise.”  So the thief entered paradise before 
Christ, and he himself became the “first fruits” of the resurrection of the dead.
893
  
Christ no longer unlocks the gates of paradise having been strengthened by the power 
of the Spirit.  But, on the contrary, the Word himself fulfilled this on his own.  So, 
therefore, he bore a human being and made him a shrine superfluously.  No longer 
are all the causes of rejoicing in the public places through him.  Furthermore, why do 
the divine writings prophesy that the human being of Christ is a saviour, a ransom, a 
guide, a doer of good, a king, a judge, a physician, a bringer of light to the human 
race? In order that we should behold the Word and God through him, through the 
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Word we should behold the universally sovereign authority, on the one hand through 
the one image looking at the dyad of Father and Son, on the other in the dyad 
knowing the one godhead. [Lacuna] As Paul says “for if we many have died by the 
transgression of one human being, how much more the grace and the gift in the grace 
of one human being Jesus Christ abounds in the many.”
894
  Consequently, the soul of 
Christ dwells together properly with the Word and God, with the one who 
encompasses alike the whole creation of everything that has come to exist, cheerfully 
acting as a guide, led the soul from the same human race into paradise, inasmuch as 
he is also holding greater authority. 
 
D22 
Therefore, if the Word bore the human being of Christ, having been mixed by the 
harmony of the Spirit, in order that through the same race he might save the kindred 
souls together with the bodies from unrighteous destruction, then the human being 
himself is the cause of the salvation to the other human beings who believe, as Paul 
says in the letter to the Romans:  “For if we many have died by the transgression of 
one human being, how much more the grace, and the gift in the grace of Jesus Christ 
abounds in the many.”
895
  Therefore assuredly, in the transgression of the first-
formed, the death belonging to sin fell on, great and incurable.  But the child of God, 
having looked ahead, determined to punish the devil, the sower of death through the 
same human race, and bore the whole human being, in order that, after having 
attached it by the divine harmonies, after he had conquered the evil one in some such 
way through this, he might hold sway in incorruptible life.  For he himself reclaimed 
the “fiery sword”
896
 and pacified the fear of the cherubim, but he removed the 
stubborn locks also after he had opened the unopenable gates and the one bearing 
God entered into paradise with unconquerable authority.  And if through the divine 
manifestation of Christ he leads the human race into paradise, then assuredly, on the 
very day that he was crucified, he foretold that he would lead the thief there, while 
his body was still encompassed by the tomb, then it is clear that Christ’s soul, 
dwelling together as Lord with the Word and God, the one who encompasses alike 
every creature who has come to exist, led the soul from the same human race into 
paradise.  For it is not thus written that before the resurrection of the holy body, the 
thief’s body, having received the promise, was raised first.  It is not thus written, 
because it did not happen.  For if it had happened, it would have been written.  But if 
someone is disposed to argue against the odds on this point, he must say how and 
where he solves the inclusion of everything that we are trying to include, in order 
that, establishing each boundary, he might accept that Christ’s body was lying dead 
in the grave and that, three days before his resurrection, the thief had entered 
paradise with Christ. 
 So, it follows, it is rational to reply that the soul, cheerfully acting as a guide 
to the kindred soul, as it indeed had greater authority, that very day both fulfilled the 
promise and entered into the assigned inheritance, opening paradise. 
                                                 
894
 Romans 5.15. 
895
 Romans 5:15. 
896






Therefore, at length the sinful Marcionites, when determining that Christ came 
without a body, first throw down this sign.  For thus they say: ‘He bore the body in 
seeming, walking around here.  Indeed, he said expressly to the thief who confessed 
him “today you will be with me in paradise.”
897
  But the body,’ they say ‘was itself 
lying dead and unbreathing in the tomb.  And, according to this, he was not able to 
do these things at the same time, unless, indeed, it happened that the body of another 
was lying in the grave but he, treading air, was uttering prophecies.”  But that these 
things are indeed irrational was shown before.  But when they are asked for the 
solution, and concrete realities do not allow them to allegorise the purposes that have 
been fulfilled by a deed, they utterly destroy the economy. 
 
D26 
How might someone say that Christ did not speak truly, if, on one hand, the body 
rose at the proper time and, one the other, the God-bearing soul, having gone before 
it, took away for himself the soul that witnessed to the truth, restoring it into the 
place of the just?  For I, for my part, would not say that the malefactor broke out with 
the cry of the best confession without the aid of God, as nor was the other without 
the enemy spirit resonating in him.  And it is fitting to focus on each of their 
narratives, since there are greatly different senses concerning them in the holy 
evangelists’ accounts.  So, John said absolutely nothing about these things, except 
that two others were crucified with Christ, having left the narration about them to the 
others.  And Matthew and Mark say that indeed the passers-by, like the chief priests 
and scribes, were blaspheming the Lord.  And they said both thieves proclaimed the 
same things as the impious people.  But Luke on the contrary says that whilst one 
speaks evil of Jesus, the other first rebukes the raving thief and after this says 
“remember me Lord, whenever you come into your kingdom.”
898
  Consequently, 
some people think that there is a great contradiction here.  Those giving the account 
appear to differ a lot, since they say on the one hand that this thief’s character utters 
blasphemy, but then on the contrary that he utters pious words pleasing to God.  Only 
it is not right to think that the evangelists struggle against each other, holding 
contrary opinions to each other, but now it is necessary to heed the more mysterious 
reference shrewdly, when there is no other resolution.  Everything that is 
demonstrated from the body of the text, one must take as a concrete reality.  
However, whatever things receive referents to a more mysterious design, to these 
rightly allot their own manner. 
 
D27 
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Both Matthew and Mark, having determined that both thieves blaspheme, hint at an 
expressive meaning, wishing to make plain to those able to understand with more 
subtlety, that not only was the man shooting off profane words like arrows from on 
high, but that the devil, having crept in, spoke with evil from within, arousing the 
man at the same time, since he exhibited the deeds of the enemy the more.  They 
spoke nothing concerning the other, having given way to the narration about him in 
Luke, and the narrative of visible things.  And Luke, having taken up the web of 
reflection, shows one thief to have blasphemed shamelessly, having told us to think 
this also about the one with him, by deliberate omission of him.  After this, he tells 
us the story of the other thief, who is stirred up with love of God, and imparts and 
confesses the power of the kingdom of Christ.  So, each utters words through each 
spirit and, whilst one was aroused from the divine breath, the other was aroused out 
of the influx of devilish works, as Paul says writing to Corinthians: “Therefore, I 
make known to you that no one speaking in God’s Spirit calls Jesus accursed, and no 
one is able to call Jesus Lord except in the Holy Spirit.”
899
  And the theologian 
characterises them like this in the first of the letters, saying “Beloved, do not believe 
every spirit, but test if the spirits are from God, since many false prophets have gone 
out into the world.  In this know the spirits of God.  Every spirit confessing that Jesus 
came in the flesh is from God, and every spirit that does not agree that Jesus came in 
the flesh is not from God.  And this is one from the antichrist, whom you have heard 
is coming and is now in the world.”
900
  Therefore, if, because they are set alight by 
the spirit of the devil the false prophets, speaking evil, charge Christ with evil, 
clearly the blood-thirsty one roused the murderous thief at that time, just as the one 
masked as the serpent slinked up to Eve, in order that, shooting the poisonous words 
from above, he might offer manifest proofs to many people.  And just as, wearing a 
tragic costume on the outside, the mask having been placed around the feigned 
character, he is likely to conceal himself from sight wholly within.  And the one 
feigning the character of the thief replied tragically, crying out in a loud call “If you 
are the Christ, save yourself and us.”
901
  So, you confess, o head defiled with blood, 
having cried out a frank question, that twice you peep out from the innermost parts.  
And indeed you are vexed and in uproar, looking at the completion of your 
destruction from below, seeing the victory trophy being established firmly against 
you.  After that, from where did the thief try to vomit forth such cries, pretending to 
have forgotten the present pains?  But munificent Jesus himself, displaying the marks 
of the heroic feat, seeing that one of the criminals had been locked in a struggle with 
the traps of the evil one, chose for himself the fearless soul from among those 
bearing the traps of death.  Indeed then the young man, having been set alight by the 
divine Spirit and flourished sufficiently in virtue, both casts forth the body and 
forgets the present misfortune.  He is unmindful of death and wounds and suffering.  
For if one calculates so as to find the truth, resolving the way in which he had been 
stretched from four points on the tree, the feet and the hands being nailed in this way, 
raised up and stretched out from the ends, and the limbs and tendons and bones 
having been bored through and pierced by the strokes of the nails, one must either 
heed the strength of the breaths or be ignorant in this and of who he was, or be 
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unwilling to hear the things that are said, as those in great pain are wont to suffer, 
being held in blindness and great darkness.  For they are fainthearted like this and 
give up in the face of the punishments, rather than receiving some pain from the 
things to be done to them, suffering pain in many ways.  But none of this dulls the 
soul of the one who has escaped tyrannical hostility, but he both keenly hears 
everything that is said, and also rejoins shrewdly and replies accordingly, and 
consequently silences the mouth defiled by blood through the blessing.  Having been 
fixed on the tree as on the platform in a tribunal, shutting in the reckless tongue with 
unloosable muzzles, he makes a public speech within the hearing of everyone, 
rebuking him fiercely, having cried out. “Do you not fear God, you that are in the 
same condemnation? And we indeed rightly, for we receive what is worthy of what 
we did.  But this man has done nothing wrong.”
902
  And after he has turned to the 
Lord, he proclaims “remember me, Lord, when you come into your kingdom.”
903
  
And tell me o fiercest of men: Who told you that this man, who has been crucified 
upon the tree is Lord and where did this person hear it? For you were not educated in 
divine law, and nor have you listened to prophetic words.  You were not trained with 
knowledge about the gospel.  You have not received a proof of the apostolic 
doctrines.  For before this time, when you had fallen into the chasms of apostasy, you 
went astray, roaming, stealing, selling freemen into slavery, burgling, cutting purses.  
If, without teaching, you knew Christ’s kingdom, then the Begetter himself, having 
filled you with the Spirit, taught you these things, as the saviour himself says: “No 
one is able to come to me, unless the Father who sent me draws him.  And I will raise 
him up on the last day.”
904
  Therefore, have confidence, o youth with an accursed 
soul.  And if, when you arrived at the vineyard late, the fruit of your lips, though the 
very last, supplied a ransom from evil for you, by declaring a confession loved by 
God, the recompense of Christ’s words became an eternal healing for you.  And 
forgiveness, as if from a vessel for holy water, gushes out like a spring from the God-
bearing body and purifies you.  And the precious blood that has been cleansingly 
secreted from the tree of life marks you with a seal.  And perhaps also the pouring 
out of the blood which had hastened from the dead limbs became a vital ransom for 
you.  For when you confessed Christ king, you carried before you the streams of 
blood falling in drops through all the holes.   
Making this clear beforehand, the prophet Habakkuk cried out in the Spirit: “the 
stone will cry out from the wall of a house, and the beetle will answer from the 
timber.”
905
  For not unreasonably one might find it fitting to represent idolatry with a 
wall since, after a fortress had been built with hostility by human beings, it caused a 
separation from the divine love.
906
  The Child of God carried off as a prize the whole 
human being whom he bore for love of humankind, and, having held sway by a royal 
proclamation in good order, he prophesies peace.  And it seems that the one cheering 
from the places of the deceit of idols is like a stone.  For I myself could call these 
stones, as all the soulless stone statues of gods sink like blind people.  But, no less 
than turning around their words and deeds, they change their character, being called 
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by God.  Furthermore, contrary to expectation, ensouled voices are said to be brought 
forward from the unfeeling walls, as having been fastened formerly, unmoving and 
powerless, they change to fruitfulness by God’s will.  And I say that the thief is 
compared with the beetle, responding piously from the wood contrary to expectation.  
And why is this surprising, when the prophetic style compares the Lord to a worm 
because of the parable of the kernel?
907
  For the beetle of the parable seems to be 
worthless and insignificant and dark and murky.    And, in short, being on the ground 
it flutters around and sits on materials that smell bad and, making the dung into balls, 
it brings in the bad smelling things from the earth.  And, having entered into a torpid 
den and lain down there, it eats the trophies it has gathered for itself.  Therefore, all 
who have lived like brigands are worthless or insignificant with respect to virtue, and 
are dark and gloomy with respect to souls.  Inconsiderately escaping the day’s tasks, 
they desire to walk on air whilst sitting down, walking on walls, climbing ropes, 
running about on the roofs of houses.  Then, appointing the spoils for themselves, 
they plunder in every way.  And they don’t draw the line at grave robbing, tearing off 
the remains and unfolding ill-smelling cloths, tracking down the heirlooms.  Then, 
having gathered together and put on many garments, and taken much gold and a 
multitude of coins as plunder, having made rounded bundles for themselves, they 
store it up in many secret places in the earth.  Then, slipping home unnoticed, they 
feed upon the slimy trophy.  The prophetic meaning seeing clearly into the life of 
thieves, seemed indeed to liken the criminal with a beetle.  The thief who was fixed 
to the tree made it plain divinely.  He changes the nature of his voice, no longer 
sending forth an inarticulate, deep hollow sound in consternation, but throwing 
forward the words of piety. He became the dishonour of Christ’s enemies, and, 
having stopped the devil’s mouth, he defeated him. 
 
D28 
Not only is it shown from irrefutable evidence that the Lord went into paradise 
through his soul on the same day as the death of his body, but also that he had 
authority to set foot in the heavens and to go down into the lowest parts of the earth, 
both bringing about a releasing freedom for those shut up there, and with a single 
blow, sending up the souls of the prisoners of war, according to the wise Paul.  For 
writing about the prophetic text word for word, he says “Therefore he says ‘After 
having ascended into the heights, he led captivity captive and gave gifts to the human 
beings.”
908
  And then, distinguishing the meaning of the line, he brings forth, “And 
what is this ascension unless he also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? 
The one who descended is also the one who ascended far above the heavens.”
909
  For 
if the body was lying in the grave, one must seek after who it was who went down 
into the deepest parts of the earth.  For taking up a notion, one would not say that the 
grave was part of the infernal parts.  And if some think this is the hollow in the 
lowest parts of the earth, they must say in which and what kind of part the souls are 
shut up.  For until the resurrection its own place has been assigned to each, and I 
think that no one doubts that the place under the earth is different from the tombs. 
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 But if someone feigns ignorance, let him examine closely the voices of the 
sacred writings.  So, God, proclaiming to Job, says this: “And did you go to the 
source of the sea, having walked in the tracks of the deep? And do the gates of death 
open for you in fear, and the locked gates of Hades cower in fear when they have 
seen you?”
910
 So these are the “deepest parts of the earth” in which the souls are 
obliged to render punishment.  Consequently, it follows that, whilst the body was 
lying in the grave, according to the divine words, through the soul, Christ, running 
through the deep and forbidden places, goes also to the repositories of souls and 
acquits the souls’ penalties, now visiting kindred, now removing the fetters of 
punishment.  For, by having partaken in the grave through the body, he unexpectedly 
gives life to the remains shut up in the tombs, thus through the soul, having mixed 
with the earth’s groans, he sets free the souls from the prison not made of iron, 
bringing about freeing release.  And besides, the Word according to nature arranges 
that, on one hand, the visible parts, the bodies, are attended through the visible body, 
whilst on the other the hand, the invisible soul that has visited among the invisible 
souls herds them together.  And the thing that Jacob said by way of preface is 
witness: “and you will bring my old age down into Hades.”
911
  And in Numbers, 
concerning the people in the Core, divinely inspired Moses speaks: “And, the earth 
having opened greedily, it swallowed into itself the disobedient and their houses.  
And they themselves and everything that they had went down alive into Hades.”
912
  
And David: “In Hades, who will give you thanks?”
913
 And elsewhere “the dead will 
not praise you, nor all going down into Hades.”
914
 And “their bones were scattered 
abroad beside Hades.”
915
 So indeed, prophesying to Job, God made the power of the 
name and the place clear.  For first he laid side by side “the sources of the sea”, then 
“the tracks of the deep” and after this, “the gates of death” and last, “the gates of 
Hades.”
916
  So, these are the deepest parts of the earth.  And through these Christ 
plainly reached.  And in that place, having taken the enemy by siege, he bore off 
spoils.  To this one “the gates of death were opened in fear”
917
 and very fast, and the 
gates of Hades fell, seeing that the human soul bearing God had ordered with 
authority, as he was living together with the divine Spirit.  Then, the loosening locks 
having been suddenly prised up, the gates being broken asunder, and by a royal gift 
[lacuna] contributing the release, and reaping the freedom by an amnesty, all the 
body guards of the arch-plunderer melted and fell down before him, not being able to 
withstand the strength of the kingdom, as Paul indicates, “every knee will bow to 
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The devil, after he had fallen from his own virtue, was sentenced to live in Hades, as 
Isaiah says: “Hades from beneath was made angry when it met with you.  All the 
great ones who have ruled over the earth have been raised up together against you.  
All will answer, and say to you ‘You have been taken just as we have, and were 
numbered among us.  Your great glory has come down into Hades, and your great 
joy.  They spread corruption under you, and the worm is your covering.’ ”
919
   Then, 
wondering from what and into what he has suddenly fallen, he brings on: “How did 
he fall from heaven, as the morning star rising early, and how was the one sending 
orders to all the nations crushed into the earth?”
920
  Then, shaming him again, he 
calls out: “For you said in your mind, ‘I will go up into heaven, I will set my throne 
above heaven’s stars.  And I will sit on a lofty mountain, on the lofty mountains 
towards the north.  I will go up above the clouds.  I will be like the most high.’  And 
now you will go down into Hades, and to the earth’s foundations.”
921
 And then 
Isaiah, having substituted the character of the Assyrian king, shows in a riddle that 
the devil, having freely shunned light, most certainly dwells in Hades once he has 
fallen.  And the prophet Amos said that God menacingly proclaimed about the 
ungodly sinners: “And if they should go down from my eyes into the depths of the 
sea, there I will command the dragon, and he will bite them”, defining the abysses of 
the sea to be his dwelling.
922
  And thus, with one opinion the prophets say where, 
having been condemned, the devil spends his time.  However, sometimes, when 
talking about the punishments set before him, they speak as if defining future deeds.  
And Ezekiel, because he wished to show the suffering of his sudden turn to be 
incurable, said that “the deep mourned” for him, (and the things that follow that).
923
  
And moreover, God, proclaiming to Job, says on one hand that the deceiver dwells in 
the abysses, on the other that he has riches lying at the bottom of the sea.  And 
Tartaros himself has been taken in the manner of a prisoner of war, having been laid 
under sharp skewers.  For it says “the lair is made of sharp points, and the sea’s gold 
under him is as a multitude of clay.  He makes the deep boil like a cauldron.  He has 
dominion over the sea as over an unguent box and over Tartaros of the deep as a 
prisoner of war.”
924
  Therefore, if he really boils the deep like a cauldron, gushing 
forth, driving over the many-edged waves, he arranged that the chaos dwell under the 
earth, he mines the streams, it says, from beneath.  And this deepest thing has been 
named ‘under the earth of Hades’ and ‘Tartoros.’ 
 
D30925 
The children of the Greeks, undertaking either poetry or philosophy, name “one of 
the chasms in the earth”, surpassing the others in size, “Tartaros.”  And into this 
chasm the rivers come together at one time and flow out of it again, for liquid matter 
and the bottom are not separated by the foundation.  From there they say that the 
                                                 
919
 Isaiah 14.9-11. 
920
 Isaiah 14.12. 
921
 Isaiah 14.13-15. 
922
 Amos 9:3 
923
 Ezekiel, 31:15 
924
 Job 41:22-24. 
925
 This fragment draws heavily on Phaedo, 111e6-114c2. 
411 
 
rivers are divided into four superior from others, and they are called Oceanus, and 
Acheron, and Pyriphlegethon and Cucuton, and from these comes the Styx lake.  
And they say that these flow out of the Tartaros and rolling around every hollow of 
the earth in a circle, they come again into the Tartaros. Therefore, the souls are sent 
into the river Archeron, attaching themselves to certain vessels and then from there 
they stop in the lake Acherousia and speaking before the judge in that place, some 
souls are cleansed again, others, being cast out again, are borne into the Tartaros, 
whilst those that are unrighteous, being turned back again, linger much in the chasm 
and are never yet raised from there.  These, being divided into two, are cast out once 
again into the rivers by the waves, and the murders fall out into the Cucuton, and the 
father-murderers withdraw to the Pyriphlegethon, then from there they are mixed 
into the lake Archerousia.  Those asking to receive an end to the pain or, being bent 
back again under the flood, are thrown back, presumably into the Tartoros itself.  
And they suffer these things continually, not coming to an end until they prevail on 
those whom they have wronged.  And whichever ones are deemed to have carried 
life through to perfection are freed from these rivers, indeed being released just as 
from prisons, they mount upward into the pure dwelling at the top of the earth.  But 
indeed those who do not piously perceive the strength of the divine nevertheless 
concede to the imminent judgement.  And they introduce the greatest myth, that 
some souls transmigrate.  For who, among human beings knows that he became a 
horse or a cow, or an ape, or a hunting dog, or some other such thing, in order that, 




But since they know plainly that they are caught in that place, changing their 
purpose, they fabricate the water of forgetting of which, they say, everyone who 
drinks forgets the begetting of life’s images.  But that these myths are very far from 
philosophy,
926
 no one in their right mind ought to be ignorant.  For what do we say, o 
Pythagorases and Platos? Did you yourselves receive and drink the water that makes 
one forget, or did you escape this and flee? Therefore, if on the one hand you 
escaped the river of wandering in such a way, clearly many others did too. But if, 
having been dragged away in the common mist, you greedily drank the water of 
forgetting, how do you know that the souls of human beings change suddenly into 
asses and wolves and all kinds of living forms?
927
 And from what source did you 
know absolutely everything about the origins of those rivers? For either you did not 
make trial of the need for them, and you are ignorant of the bursting forth of these 
waters.  Or, if you did come to be inside their designs; by forgetfulness, you 
obscured the memory of the means by which this happened, having spit out the 
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knowledge.  But leading into these things with barbaric
928
 superstition, they stumble.  
Because they made use of Egyptian myths, they are brought down. 
 
D32 
On one hand, Christ was with the divine Spirit everywhere, on the other hand the 
Word and God made the younger and foreign ways up and down his own through the 
human soul, fighting the waters and the disturbing depths.  “The waters saw you, 
God, and were afraid, the depths were disturbed.”
929
  And next, through the whole 
verse, Christ’s descent into Hades through his soul can clearly be picked out.  For the 
high “clouds” let loose “voices”, applauding the most beautiful successes of the 
victory.  And more quickly, Christ’s divine powers flew out of the sacred darts, 
sharply wounding the army of the blood-guilty one.  For indeed in the whole world, 
just as in a “whirlwind”, the holy sound, through which he forged salvation, let loose 
[lacuna].
930
  And the deeds of his justice shone forth, flashing forth as if on fire and 
bringing light to the whole creation.  And the earth was shaken at that time. 
 And this is also shown in the words, “You crushed the heads of the dragons 
upon the water.  You smashed the dragon’s head.  You gave him as food to the 
people in Ethiopia.”
931
  For Christ, having arrived at the innermost parts of the deep 
by Spirit and soul, subdued the wild beasts.  And, through this same image, yet also 
now the many-headed serpent is destroyed in the waters of rebirth,
932
 and, in short, 
the devilish troupe gets its head broken daily by the pure lather.  Therefore, he 
prophesied that the heads of the very other dragons were crushed, and of the many-
faced beast himself, he spoke out plainly that the heads from many origins were 
crushed together.
933
  For on one hand, as the inedible bodies were crushed whole 
entirely, so, on the other, the one bearing the edible body will be given out as meat to 
the peoples of Ethiopia.  For if Christ, having been hung on the cross, gives to us the 
exact representation of his body so that, having partaken of the sacred food, we 
might inherit incorruptible life, it follows that also the many-shaped serpent, dying, 
conversely, furnishes food from his body to the ones having fled eternal light, as God 
himself foretells to Job the destruction of the serpent, telling him, “the gentile race of 
the Phoenicians divided him up among themselves and fed on him”
934
, clearly in this 
not meaning Phoenicians and Ethiopians, but those displaying pagan superstitions in 
the darkness of error, not inappropriately calling them Ethiopians.  For he did not say 
that those having been allotted the land of Ethiopia alone profit from the serpent-like 
food, but all those gloomy in sin, to whom also, through the prophet’s mouth he 
proclaims “be washed, become clean” (and the things that follow that).
935
  For on one 
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had, concerning the sins of the ones who are fattened over the altars, they inspire the 
stains having become blood-red on the souls.  On the other, the murderers and 
adulterers image the deeper places of sin as a berry from a kermes oak.
936
  These 
types the “washing of regeneration”
937
 undertakes to cleanse.  For those springing 
from Phoenicia, for the most part, rage with unbridled mad passion.  And everyone 
who receives his counsels fulfil his operations, those becoming full of his blood-
defiled limbs swell up for the worse, being destroyed by the noxious poison.  But on 
one hand, one must give to these ones, and to all who wish to fight against God, the 
snake-like food to be to be customarily feasted upon.  On the other, that not even the 
Ethiopians were uninitiated of the divine calling, and nor are the Egyptians far from 
the leadership of divine voices, the prophet himself witnesses: “Leaders will come 
from Egypt, Ethiopia will offer her hands to the Lord” (and what follows that).
938
  It 
is appropriate, the serpent’s tyrannical rule having been destroyed, that the leaders 
fall before the king of the heavens himself, about to offer the victorious first-fruits of 
the wreath rightly.  And Isaiah sings, saying “the Lord will bring the holy and great 
and strong sword upon the dragon, the unjust serpent, and will destroy the dragon on 
that day.”
939
  And if the sword is holy, being able to slaughter the invisible spirit of 
evil, undeniably he did not make it as out of idle and unmoving material.  On the 
contrary, the most divine Word of God himself, according to the apostolic writing, 
strikes “sharper than any double-edged sword.”
940
  And he resembles the sword, 
because of the perceptible sheath of the human body.  And Ezekiel, speaking as to 
the blood-guilty dragon, the leader of the Israelites’ apostasy, says, “And you, 
profane and wicked prince of Israel, whose day has come at the right time, an end 
unrighteousness, thus says the Lord: ‘remove the mitre and take off its crown.  It will 
not be the same.  You have brought low the high thing having brought high the low 
thing.  I will designate it a wrong thing, until the one who owns it comes, and I shall 
give it to him.’ ”
941
 
 So indeed, Christ, to whom the feat’s successes belong, was bodily at home 
in that place, and, having made the devil a prisoner of war, he took his mitre and 
crown of arrogance, and after he had made a path to the life of paradise for human 
beings, and destroyed the multitude of savage pleasures, he tamed the fiery heats of 
the passions having cut out each sin according to its form, through which things “he 
crushed together the dragons’ heads.”
942
  And practicing some unceasing drunken 
violence, some people still desired to be filled with the animal carcass bodies.  For 
they do not know to tame the passions of the fierce demons or the defiled passions of 
desire.  And it is necessary in the pit that the prizes for the best athlete lie displayed 
[lacuna], each rightly contending is honoured.  For the judge would not have 
displayed the victory wreaths, unless rough struggles were present, so that when all 
the contestants who have obtained the victory-bearing prizes should bind fast their 
brows with garlands, at this time all the limbs of the dragon’s body will be crushed.  
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[lacuna] the Lord, having come from heaven a second time, will slay the remnants of 
the tyranny lying opposite, then the prophesy will be fulfilled.  “Where death, is your 
sting, where Hades, your victory?”
943
  The great apostle Paul furnished the speech, 
naming the devil Hades and death.  Still plainly, the songwriter murmuring from 
Christ’s persona, says in the twenty-ninth psalm “I exalt you Lord, since you have 
raised me up.”
944
 And following, “Lord, you let my soul out of Hades.”
945
  And 
again: “but God will free my soul from the hands of Hades.”
946
  And again: “I will 
proclaim that your mercy is great upon me, and that you have raised up my soul from 
the depths of Hades.”
947
 And that “you will not leave my soul behind in Hades.”
948
  
And that these words belong to Christ, no one may dispute.  In this all the prophets 
speak in unison, being moved by the divine Spirit. 
 
D34 
Some say there are many heavens, some say there is one.  One group, beginning 
from Moses having said “in the beginning, God made the heaven and the earth”
949
 
and, having plucked for themselves many opinions from the writings of the prophets 
and evangelists which establish the singular number, they try to establish what is 
proper.  And another group, again, from the same writings, think to establish the 
multitude of heavens.  In no way will we say that the scriptures declare things 
opposite.  And some say there are two, the one that was created in the beginning, and 
the later “firmament” that was formed, as is true.
950
  For God deemed it right to cut 
the boundless mass of liquid in two parts, so that, on one hand, the firmament which 
is above, hung up in mid-air in the manner of a roof, might moisten the dry land 
when it falls in drops, and, on the other the lower liquid, coming to an end in hollows 
and chasms, after it had flowed together, might make the seas and lakes and rivers so 
that the earth, having been adorned, should become nourishing and fruitful. 
 And if a season demands partly a cultivating of plants to be watered, partly 
for the unrighteous to be water-boarded, on one hand, keeping them in suspense, he 
summons the streams running along the surface from the sea, hanging them in mid-
air and, on the other hand, he opens the shutters of heaven, as the most righteous 
God, judging, utterly destroyed the most beast-like giants.  At this particular time, it 
says “all the springs were broken up and the shutters of heaven were opened, and a 
heavy rain came upon the earth for forty days and forty nights.”
951
  And it says this 
too: “the abyss calls upon the abyss to aid it.”
952
  For indeed, the abyss, ascending 
upwards, calls the deep to its aid, longing to benefit from the fellowship of its 
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kindred.  And moreover, the one tending downwards, sending the moistures up 
through the winds and calling on the water-bearing clouds, calls its sister to its aid. 
 The deep was formed together with the waters because it does not say 
specifically the day on which it occurred.  For just as when a tree bearing fruit had 
risen up from the earth, he did not want this to be defenceless or unstable, but much-
cloven roots had been prepared on its behalf so that it would be firmly fastened to the 
ground and it was also inexpressibly held to the fruitful buds and it had been fastened 
to shaded branches and things able to sprout fruitful fruit - and if whilst nothing 
whatever is written of these things, we are weighed down to think of all the fruits and 
the whole covering together around the trunks - thus so it is fitting to think that God, 
the best of artificers, furnishing the flat bit of the earth, formed together in it the 
greatest capacities.  He stretched up the mountains and ridges and stretched down the 
depths and chasms in the deep so that the earth, being cultivated through everything, 
might rear the sowings of the seeds.  But he also prepared the sandy materials to fit 
well in order that, the wetness being allowed to flow down into many streams and the 
sand having been fortified as a circle, though the fierce waves might beat hard, the 
working sand should not allow the watery parts to overflow their bounds.  And he 
moulded the very sources of the streams, producing and forming rivers. 
 
D36 
Excellently, both Moses and all the divine writings say that heavens are both 




[Lacuna] and the great Paul himself says that he was seized into a third heaven.
953
  
And Moses says “heavens rejoice with them.”
954
  For he rejoices with heaven’s corps 
for the sake of the salvation of human beings. 
 
D39:1-14 
And Paul, being forced because of the false brothers to narrate, with reference to type 
and nature, the labours of the contest, brings this in his writing: “But I will go on to 
visions and revelations of the Lord.  I know a person in Christ who more than 
fourteen years ago, was seized up into the third heaven, whether in body or outside of 
the body I do not know, God knows.”
955
  Being modest, he controls the tale with an 
obscure utterance.  Having attached the noble vision to what seems to be another 
man, he means to refer to himself.  But he is caught out by shrewd minds, the words 
being coupled in the writing.  For narrating the afflictions of his own trials, he brings 
upon: “I will go on to visions and revelations” as he interprets the things he has seen.  
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But, having feared lest the charge of arrogance should be brought in reply to this, he 
lies hidden cleverly, giving a twist to the tale. 
 
D40 
When Paul says “into a third heaven”
956
, he reveals that there is also another one.  
For he says this not with an article, but without an article.  But the Lord, proclaiming 
it with the addition of the article says: “no one has ascended into ‘the’ heaven.”
957
  
The heaven that is higher than all, which is attached to the greater glory, into which 
the divine nature, shining forth most, is seen more distinctly by those who have been 
deemed worthy to proceed there.  So, then ‘no one has ascended’ into this heaven, in 
which the Child himself will sit with the Father.  So therefore, the Lord also says: 
“no one has ascended into heaven, except the one who came down from heaven”
958
, 
[lacuna] no one has ever arrived at this farthest point, except only God’s Child, who 
traverses everything at once by a soul and a Spirit.  Furthermore, conversing with 
Nicodemus
959
, he said that the son of humanity was in heaven.  Through the things 
he said, he made it plainly evident that on one hand, up until this time, living here he 
went to and fro with the visible limbs, whilst on the other, with the human soul he 
laid claim to the greatest of the heavens, soaring on high.  For the soul was traversing 
with the divine Spirit, it was able to outstrip all the bodies, and consequently it is 
shown through these things also that Christ bore a soul.  For on one hand whenever 
he talks about the soul’s ascending occupations, he pronounces that it did these 
things in its own right.  Saying, “no one has ascended into heaven, except the one 
who came from heaven, the son of humanity, who is in heaven.”  On the other, when 
he declares the migration of the body suspended in mid-air, having said it, he brings 
on directly, “And just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, in this way it is 
necessary for the son of humanity to be lifted up, in order that everyone who believes 
in him may not die, but have eternal life.”
960
  And if in some respect, at that time, it 
said that the son of humanity was in heaven, and he will be lifted up again at the 
same time as he is a guest in the hollows of the earth, it is evident that the virtues of 




But the apostle, he says, directed the Corinthians, writing “the first Adam became a 
living soul, the last Adam a life-giving spirit.  But the first was not spiritual but 
‘soul-like’, the latter spiritual” (and the things that follow).
961
  And if these things 
hold thus, evidently, he who has been united with the Holy Spirit is spiritual, whilst 
he who has been proportionately mixed with a soul and body is ‘soul-like.’   
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Consequently, through these things, they say, it is clear from the words that Christ 
was walking around hither apart from a soul. 
 Now we say one hand that the one who is ‘soul-like’ is from body and soul, 
whilst the one who is spiritual has been brought together from divine Spirit.  For if he 
had not had a soul, neither would he have borne the limbs of the body, since, best 
naming him ‘spiritual’, [Paul] would have made mention of neither soul nor body.  
For if he was spiritual himself, according to himself, it is clear that he was also 
bodiless.  For it did not say that he was both spiritual and had a body.  And if he is a 
human being, it is clear that he became a human being after being united with a soul 
and body, and more than that, out of all, only one perfect human was produced, and 
accordingly, necessarily has all the virtues.  If, therefore, out of the signification of 
these words, they present Christ as soulless, they present many of the chosen men as 
soulless.  To begin with, writing to the same Corinthians, Paul said, “But the ‘soul-
like’ human being does not receive the things of the Spirit of God.  For they are 
foolishness to him, and he cannot understand them since they are spiritually 
discerned.  And the spiritual human being discerns all things, and is himself 
discerned by no one.”
962
  And also “The first human being was from earth, earthly.  
The second was from heaven, spiritual.”
963
  And then, writing to the Galatians, he 
said “Brothers, if a person should be overtaken in some fault, you, the spiritual ones, 
restore such a one, in a spirit of humility.”
964
  Such a one is also the body “sown a 
‘soul-like’ body, raised a spiritual body.”
965
  For doubtless it is not soulless.  For he 
does not show one human being raised up in place of another, as if, as Valentinus 
and his associates say, a different, intelligible thing is raised, apart from this 
perceptible thing.  For how are those repeating these things not filled with frenzy, 
attaching unjust judgements to God?  For then, if some people become evil, others 
rise up and will be judged in place of them.  One of the most unjust things about this 
is that those who have done the worst decline correction, whilst others, in place of 
them, pay the penalty in full.  For it is necessary on one hand for the murderers to be 
punished, on the other for the blasphemous tongues themselves to be flogged, and the 
bodies of the unchastened to be set on fire, since neither does it make sense that some 
pluck recompenses in place of others or are punished.  For if the bodies of the 
martyrs were confined in fetters and in prisons, the ribs were scraped, they were 
tortured in every way, they were cut limb from limb, they were surrendered into the 
gluttony of fire, and with all the flesh and similarly all the bones they have been set 
on fire, is it not by far the most just that the same bodies will be raised again, which 
went within the things of pain and affliction, about to receive the wages of the pains? 
 
D45 
Faith that the same bodies, not different ones, are to be raised is from the body of the 
Lord, in which the hands preserve the wounds of the nails, and the ribs preserve the 
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And this is believed from other images.  For it is not one who contends a complete 
contest with much labour in victory and another, having come from the sides and not 
within the pit, who receives the victory wreath.  And it is not one contending in an 
equestrian, or the so-called heavily armoured event, and another, rushing passed, 
who is honoured. 
 
D47 
The apostle tends to call human beings ‘soul-like’ inasmuch as when they sin 
through the soul, the communions of the divine Spirit are turned away, and spiritual 
inasmuch as, through divinely inspired citizenship, they partake in the Holy Spirit, 
accepting its plenty.
968
  Because of this, he wrote that a ‘soul-like’ body was sown,
969
 
which has performed manifold sins through the soul, but he says that this body is 
raised spiritual, since he changes the bodies of all those having been raised.  The 
bodies change their ways, no one at all sins anymore, having stood before the divine 
tribune striking the breast, and, repenting of those things through which he slipped, 
he is led to punishment.  
 
D50 
Those stirring up war around Arius, in a difficulty of comprehension, say that the 
movements of two spirits are unable to dwell around the body’s one nature.  From 
deeds and words themselves it is shown that Christ had a soul which was subject to 
human changes, and he bore a divine Spirit which was altogether unchanging.  
Indeed the Spirit also dwells there in those other humans that are made temples, just 
as it says that Stephen was “full of the Holy Spirit”
970
 as was Barnabas.
971
  But the 
Lord also said “the one who loves me will keep my word and my Father and I will 
come to him, and will make a mansion in him.”
972
  And if indeed the Spirit does not 
shun the opportunity to dwell with the soul, and nor does the weaker go aside to 
make room for the better, but, much more, this weaker one is made young again, 
being nourished towards virtue by the divine concourse, and the Father thus lives 
there willingly with the child, then clearly a form of a soul, is able to contain the 
divine Spirit in it, dwelling there together.  And if he promises to dwell in other 
human beings, being satisfied to dwell with the living souls, although they are not at 
all unpolluted – for the mind would be a partaker of all the filth by a short mingling – 
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but indeed Christ’s soul is undefiled, pure and unpolluted, having absolutely no trace 
of sin, would it not much rather have dwelt with the divine Spirit, because of the 
superiority of purity and righteousness?  For indeed the other holy men, who have 
been brought forth from bodily intercourse, and are shabby temples that have been 
shown forth, reaped the sweet smell of the Spirit by participation.  And Christ is the 
only one who became embodied by the Holy Spirit, he did not produce the better 
nature from participation but “in him the fullness of the Godhead”
973
 settled utterly, 
as the apostle says.  And if the Son of God is “fullness of the Godhead”, then he is 
perfect.  And if he is perfect, clearly, he has been begotten from the Father’s 
perfection.  The one who had been perfected to the highest virtue of divinity would 
not have prepared an imperfect temple, having been mutilated in the best part, but in 
himself he submitted the whole, healthy human race.  He did not partially remedy but 
leave behind the more valued part unhealed, but, stewarding the whole, nurturing, 
took up our nature entirely. 
 
D51 
It is fitting to cover in a few words what in the world the soul is.  On one hand, that it 
is invisible spirit is evident to everyone.  On the other, the motion makes an image of 
itself from the organs of perception and, moulding the activities, it furnishes 
everything with visible marks.   
 In Leviticus Moses expressly writes that God declared: “[any] person among 
the sons of Israel or the proselytes who would eat blood, I will stand my covenant 
upon that soul and expel it from the people.”
974
  Thus it is gently suggested that the 
soul is blood.
975
  For scripture forbids blood as nourishment.  Because of this, when 
the blood flows forth, the body stands soulless and unmoving.  And the soul is not 
simply blood, but the soul flies in the blood itself.  Because of this, on one hand as 
many of the limbs as are ensouled, when they suffer under a wound, the blood is 
secreted, flowing like a spring, and it bears the sharp perception to the one being 
smitten.  And as far as it has survived death, no blood flows if the body is pierced, 
and nor does the blood furnish perception to the senses.  From whenever it is parted 
from the soul, it is fixed, whilst before it was active because of the soul’s ‘enfiring’ 
nature.  Consequently scripture, by a hyperbole of language, calls the blood a soul, 
showing it to be perishable, meaning the human being.  “And whoever smites a soul 
of a human being, let him die.”
976
  And it says, “and if a person should be clean, and 
not far on a journey, and fails to keep the Passover”, what sort of punishment does he 
submit to? “That soul shall be cut off from its people.”
977
  So there are indeed many 
other things concerning the destruction of the soul in the books of the law, but let it 
be satisfied with these things, that the lawgiver names the cattle a soul, saying, “and 
whoever shall strike a beast and it dies, let that person render a soul for a soul.”
978
  
Therefore, by a misuse of language, the lawgiver calls both the blood and the beast a 
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soul, because of the association of each, and, consequently, death is twice spoken of 
in the same language, on one hand by the separation of body and soul, on the other 
coming from sin, according to the prophetic saying “the soul that sins will itself 
die.”
979
  And the Lord in the gospels says, “stop fearing things that kill the body, but 
that are not able to kill the soul.  But rather fear the one who is able to throw both 
body and soul into Gehenna.”
980
  And, what is more related to doctrine in these 
things, Christ, coming near to the very causes of chastening, names them destruction.  
For through these someone is given over to eternal punishments, and is sent out into 
the unquenchable source of fire through which things he is said to be utterly 
destroyed, paying the penalties in an endless cycle. 
 
D52 
In the Phaedo, Plato says that Socrates said “Every soul is unbegotten.  For what is 
unbegotten is also immortal.”
981
  This is the foolish doctrine of the Greeks. 
 
D53 
There are different and manifold kinds of souls, just as of bodies. Because of this, 




Those stirring up war around Arius, in the seasons of fruit and plants and many 
varieties of garden herbs, taking upon themselves to be sick with the fever of Greek 
superstition, consider that the souls board ships and, once upon these, say, as in old 
wives tales, “I do not cut the cabbage, lest it hold inside the soul of my grandmother 





Furthermore, the body of the first-formed which had been adorned, was sleeping, 
dead, unbreathing, unmoved, having been brought utterly into harmony according to 
outward appearance, and having been conspicuously adorned with beauty and a 
form, having been fashioned from him, prototypical statue of God, and having been 
modelled a most perfect copy of the most divine image,
982
 but imperceptible, 
voiceless, unbreathing.  And when God breathed into his face creatively, straight 
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away, he received movement.
983
  And from that time he walks and breathes, he 






So, if the Word received a beginning of his generation, when, at the time after he had 
passed through his mother’s womb, he bore a bodily frame, it stands that he was 
“born of woman.”
984
  But if we say that the Word and God was beside the Father 
from the beginning, and we say that “everything came to be through him”
985
, then the 
one who is, and is the cause of all things that are made was not “born of woman.”  
But he is by nature God, self-sufficient, limitless, incomprehensible.  But the human 
being, who had been implanted in the virgin mother’s womb by the Holy Spirit, was 
born of a woman. 
 
D67 
Therefore, the Word made a temple, then bore a human being.  Visiting among 
human beings in a body, he both demonstrated all kinds of miracles out of sight and 
sent the apostles, preachers of the everlasting kingdom. 
 
D68 
For Paul did not say, “like in form to the son of God” but “like in form to the image 
of his Son”
986
, showing that the Son is one thing and his image another.  For, indeed, 
the son, bearing the divine marks of the paternal excellence, is the image of the father 
since, because like is begotten from like, the ones begotten appear as true images of 
the ones who begot them.  But the human being whom he bore is the image of the 
son, as images are made from dissimilar colours by being painted on wax, some 
being wrought by hand deliberately and others coming to be in nature and likeness.  
Moreover the very law of truth announces this.  For the bodiless “Spirit of 
wisdom”
987
 is not conformed to corporeal people, but the human express image 
having been made bodily by the Spirit, bearing the same number of members as all 
the rest, and clad in similar form to each. 
 
D69 
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That the body has the same form as the human body, he teaches us more clearly, 
writing to the Philippians: “we are citizens” he says, “of heaven, out of which we 
received a saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who will change our body of lowliness to 
become conformed to the body of his glory.”
988
  And if, changing the lowly body of 
human beings, he conforms it to his own body, the slander of the enemies is revealed 




But as the human being who is born of the virgin is said to have been “born of a 
woman”, thus it is also written that he was “born under the law”
989
 by which it means 
that he sometimes walked by the law’s instructions.  Most clearly, when he was an 
eight day old infant, his parents eagerly hurried to circumcise him, just as the 
evangelist Luke relates: fulfilling the purifying offerings, “They brought him into the 
temple to present him to the Lord and to give a sacrifice according to what is said in 
the law of the Lord, a pair of turtle doves and two young pigeons.”
990
  If, therefore, 
the purifying gifts were offered on his behalf according to the law, and he bore 
circumcision on the eighth day, because of this Paul writes, not unreasonably, that he 
was born under the law.  But the Word was not under the law, as the slanderers flout 
it, being the law himself.  And God does not need purifying sacrifices, as he purifies 
and sanctifies everything with a sudden blow.  But although, having received the 
human instrument from the virgin, he bore it and became under the law, having been 
purified according to the status of the firstborn, he did not himself need these means.  
He maintains the mode of worship but only so that those who had been sold to the 





For, the human being who died rose on the third day, and when Mary was eager to 
touch the holy limbs, objecting, he proclaims “Stop touching me, for I have not yet 
ascended to my Father.  But go to my brothers and tell them ‘I go up to my Father 
and your Father, to my God and your God.”  But the Word and God did not say “I 
have not yet ascended to my Father.”
992
  He comes from heaven and dwells in the 
Father’s bosom.  Nor did the wisdom who surrounds everything that exists.  Rather, 
the very human being said this.  The one who had been made out of all kinds of 
limbs, and who has been raised from the dead and, whilst he had not yet gone up to 
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“No one takes my soul from me.   I have authority to put my soul down, and I have 
authority to take it up again.”
994
  And if he had authority for both these things as 
God, then he yielded to those who thoughtlessly attacked the temple and, when he 
rose, he restored it more gloriously.  By irrefutable evidence, it is proved that he 
restored and raised up his own dwelling place himself.  And one must refer the great 
works of the Son also to the divine Father.  For the Son emphatically does not 
perform works without the Father, according to the irrefutable words of holy 
scripture.  For this reason, sometimes the all-divine Begetter is written to have raised 
Christ from the dead by grace and sometimes the Son promises to resurrect his own 
temple.  If, therefore, it is shown from previous examinations that Christ’s divine 
Spirit is impassible, the polluted ones attack the apostolic decrees falsely.  For if Paul 
said “the Lord of glory was crucified”
995
, clearly looking at the human being, one 
must not, because of this, attribute passion to the divine.  Why, then, do they weave 





So, I will now proceed to the things that happened. What then? When, because of 
these things, a great council was summoned at Nicaea, two hundred and perhaps 
seventy, having been gathered together there – because of the multitude of men I am 
not able to write the exact number, nor have I tracked this information as far as 
possible with due care.  As the manner of the faith was sought, the writing, a 
manifest proof of Eusebius’ blasphemy, was brought forward.  And, when it had 
been read aloud to everyone, immediately it gave ever-growing grief to those who 
had heard it because of its heresy, and it inflicted irredeemable shame on the writer. 
After the gang of those around Eusebius was clearly convicted, the heretical writing 
having been torn asunder before everyone’s eyes, some men from the plot, putting 
forward the name of peace, silenced those who used to speak best.  But those stirring 
up war around Arius, feared lest they should be banished, given that so great a 
council has come together.  On one hand, they rush forward to anathematise the 
condemned doctrine, subscribing with their own hands to a common written 
statement.  On the other, once they had held onto their seats through the greatest 
possible deviousness, when they should have fallen, sometimes covertly and 
sometimes openly, they are ambassadors for the rejected opinions, plotting against 
diverse refutations.  And, being determined to establish the tares they have planted, 
they fear the learned, pervert the authorities and in this way attack the preachers of 
godliness.  But even so, we do not believe that godless people can ever take the 
leading position over the divine.  For “though they might grow again, they will again 
be defeated”, according to the venerable word of Isaiah the prophet. 
 
In Psalm 92 
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He it is who, after violation was made formless and unsightly, then again was 
changed, having been “clothed with honour.”
997
  For God dwelling in him, whose 







And when Jesus is said for the second time to “know that the Father had given 
everything to his hands”
999
, even thus he introduces the power of a human being and 
he declares how, taking up a sceptre of eternal authority, he had all authority, which 
had been entrusted. 
 
93a 
But the God-bearing human being, who decided voluntarily to sustain the passion of 
death himself because of its usefulness to human beings, received the prize of the 
contest, in order that, so to speak, he might gain honour and power and, where it is 
received, glory, which he had by no means held at first. 
 
D95 
God the Word bears the same image as the Begetter, being an image of the divine 
substance.
1000
  Indeed a human being, being his true temple, is not the same as the 
builder of the temple, having sprung from a different race. 
 
D100 
“Until the son of humanity sits on his throne of glory”
1001
: one character is seen to 
speak, but manifestly he speaks about another.  Therefore, the divine Spirit is clearly 
speaking about the human being: “Until the Son of humanity will sit in his throne of 
glory”, undeniably foretelling that the human being justly takes up supervening 
glories, also having been furnished with power, duly receiving the highest place and 
the throne of the kingdom. 
 
D101 
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“Everything has been given to me by the Father.”
1002
  Manifestly, he is found to 
prophesy from the character of the human being, just as we demonstrated before.  
Such indeed anticipates the acquired powers, advancing towards better things with 
reference to dignity. 
 
D102 
It is to be considered how, speaking in this way by God and saying “you destroy 
cities”
1003
, he then introduces another Lord, advancing “And the Lord continues into 
eternity.  He prepared his throne in judgement.”
1004
  Most plainly, he is speaking to 
one concerning another.  It signifies that there is a judge who prepared a throne for 
him.  He seemed to speak about the one who did not have this honour at first; he was, 
as it were, revealing through prophetic figures, the human being who has gracefully 
been made a temple of justice from limbs and, dwelt with the most sacred Word, and 
has inherited by excellence the everlasting throne. 
 
D103 
For one who has the throne of the kingdom, does not prepare another fate for 
himself, but for one who does not yet have the power of the throne.  Therefore, this 
clearly concerns the human being of Christ.  And these were neither going to be 
restored to the Omnipotent, to the one who has his own sceptre, nor to the Word who 
has the royal power itself, which the Father also has, but this will be said to Christ: 
“The Lord prepared his throne in heaven.”
1005
  For he will rule all creation alike by 
means of the mixing with the divine Word. 
 
D107 
Because, if he is a creature, then he is not begotten.  And if he is begotten, then he is 
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“What then?” someone might say.  “For Melchisedek is described to us as 
motherless.  And yet indeed if he resembles the Son of God and, to say everything, is 
like him, the one bearing his image and carrying his type is neither motherless nor 
fatherless.
1006
  For Mary is a mother to Christ, and he rises up from the royal line of 
David and the “rod of Jesse”
1007
, the bud of the sweet-smelling barely corn, for us, 
and he is genealogised from Jesse’s line according to the flesh.  But Melchisedek is 
seen to be “of unrecorded descent.”
1008
  Therefore one might say that Melchisedek 
was of unrecorded descent in this sense, in that he was not from the seed of 
Abraham, nor is he of Moses’ line, but he is of the Canaanite race, and begins from 
this accursed seed.  But a righteous person being revealed according to himself, and 
not being anchored in the righteous people born before, nor from someone’s 
righteous seed, it was not fair to trace his descent to the line of Canaan, as he nears 
the peak of righteousness.  For it was most unsuitable to force together the man who 
had achieved the peak of righteousness for himself with the race who had achieved 
the peak of unrighteousness.  Therefore, it says that he is “fatherless and motherless”, 
not considering the ancestors worthy of the virtue of a righteous and wise man. 
 
D116a 
Therefore, plainly, if Melchisedek resembled the Son of God, he will be neither 
fatherless, nor motherless, nor of unrecorded descent,
1009
 but on one hand he will be 
geneologised concerning the things of the flesh according to the nature of the flesh, 
whilst on the other hand, in another way, he will be seen to be of unrecorded descent, 
just like Christ.  For Christ also, on one hand, is genealogised according to the body, 






Reuben and Judah took the best counsel together, if it comes to that.  For they were 
holding against savage men.
1010
  For Simeon and Levi had tasted murder 
immoderately.  They had already become accustomed to it at the time of the deed, 
and they longed to creep skilfully around such a scent of victims. Thus they were 






                                                 
1006
 C.f. Hebrews 7.3. 
1007
 Isaiah 11.1. 
1008
 Hebrews 7.3. 
1009
 Hebrews 7.3. 
1010
 Genesis 37.21-28. 
1011
 Genesis 34.25-29. 
427 
 
Indeed therefore, Reuben and Judah together took the best counsel, if it comes to 
that.
1012
  For they were holding against savage men.  For Simeon and Levi, having 
tasted murder immoderately, hastened to the same deliberate purpose out of habit.  







Therefore, we see as in a mirror,
1014
 with unveiled face, the Lord’s all holy flesh, 
through the shape in an image.  So, holding the untroubled eye of the soul to the 
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